What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Arguments against moral objectivism

6 Theistic moral objectivism

The following is a valid generalised argument for moral objectivity.

P1 If agent A says X is morally right/wrong, then (it’s a fact that) X is morally right/wrong.
P2 Agent A says X is morally right/wrong.
C Therefore, (it’s a fact that) X is morally right/wrong.

But this argument is unsound, for any agent A. So to claim it is sound if agent A is a god is to commit a special-pleading fallacy. (Adding the premise What agent A says is true does nothing to rescue the argument.)

And anyway, pending good evidence for the existence of any god, an argument for theistic moral objectivism does not even make it to the starting post.

PS I've been posting this sequence of connected arguments in response to the charge that I have no rational defence for my rejection of moral objectivity. And here's a conclusion about why the delusion that morality is objective is so prevalent.

Reasons for moral objectivism - amended

I suggest that moral objectivism – belief that there are moral facts – has three main sources, as follows.

First, many or most of us care - even deeply - about our moral values, judgements and opinions. They form an important part of our lives and attitudes towards how we and others behave. So we tend to think of them as more than matters of opinion. And we find the idea that there are no moral facts offensive.

Second, we tend to apply our moral values universally – across time and space. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, then we tend to think it always was and will be morally wrong, anywhere in the world. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

And third, the supposed choice between moral objectivity and moral relativism, nihilism or anarchy assumes the existence of moral facts in the first place, which begs the question. But if we think that’s the choice – if we accept the false or at least undemonstrated dichotomy – then we’ll tend to prefer moral objectivity, as the moral choice.

For these reasons, it is natural to think that there are moral facts. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

[FlashDangerpants]

Reasons for moral objectivism

I suggest that moral objectivism – belief that there are moral facts – has two main sources, as follows.

Many or most of us care - even deeply - about our moral values, judgements and opinions. They form an important part of our lives and attitudes towards how we and others behave. So we tend to think of them as more than matters of opinion. And we find the idea that there are no moral facts offensive.

Also, we tend to apply our moral values universally – across time and space. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, then we tend to think it always was and will be morally wrong, anywhere in the world. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

For these reasons, it is natural to think that there are moral facts. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

An additional common denominator visible among those realists who write here* (I can't think of any real philosophers to tarnish with this accusation) seems to be that they feel moral objectivity is required or else that movie The Purge will become a documentary, or some other horrible chaos must ensue.

It's not quite clear how they would form an argument for this as none of them is very capable in that regard, but seemingly one must at least believe in moral objectivity in order to hold any beliefs about moral content

• See IC here.. " Those are moral concepts, and you've insisted they're all merely subjective. If some others, or some swing voters, experience him as of sterling character and impeccable judgment, a Subjectivist has nothing more legitimately to say. There is no objective basis for a critique, then."

• phyllo here... "That would make subjective morality pretty well useless."

• And VA wherever you like for examples of this line of thinking.

The follow up line of reasoning varies, but they need to get from this supposed requirement to believe that there is moral fact to a justification that there is moral fact. Phyllo and VA appear to just assume that the requirement to believe in moral fact justifies elevating whatever is their version of the "best" (or the "-proper") moral thinking into the vacant position of "objective morality". This heist is made possible in one case bu apparently just holding that "objective" is a context dependent term that just means "bestest". The other one just gets indignant when challenged and demands that somebody show him a better option, so it seems that they are thinking along similar lines to each other.

IC does it differently because he's a divine command sort of a guy so he can stop at just claiming to have shown that moral antirealism somehow fails on its own terms (the terms he sets for it are of course those of moreal objectivism in that it must establish some universal moral truth or else he claims it has failed... but that's an intelligence test he will never pass so it's kind of moot really).




* This offer excludes CIN, but he doesn't really write very much.

[Peter Holmes]

Reasons for moral objectivism

I suggest that moral objectivism – belief that there are moral facts – has two main sources, as follows.

Many or most of us care - even deeply - about our moral values, judgements and opinions. They form an important part of our lives and attitudes towards how we and others behave. So we tend to think of them as more than matters of opinion. And we find the idea that there are no moral facts offensive.

Also, we tend to apply our moral values universally – across time and space. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, then we tend to think it always was and will be morally wrong, anywhere in the world. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

For these reasons, it is natural to think that there are moral facts. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

An additional common denominator visible among those realists who write here* (I can't think of any real philosophers to tarnish with this accusation) seems to be that they feel moral objectivity is required or else that movie The Purge will become a documentary, or some other horrible chaos must ensue.

That's a good point. If you don't mind, I'll nick it and amend this section.

It's not quite clear how they would form an argument for this as none of them is very capable in that regard, but seemingly one must at least believe in moral objectivity in order to hold any beliefs about moral content

• See IC here.. " Those are moral concepts, and you've insisted they're all merely subjective. If some others, or some swing voters, experience him as of sterling character and impeccable judgment, a Subjectivist has nothing more legitimately to say. There is no objective basis for a critique, then."

• phyllo here... "That would make subjective morality pretty well useless."

• And VA wherever you like for examples of this line of thinking.

The follow up line of reasoning varies, but they need to get from this supposed requirement to believe that there is moral fact to a justification that there is moral fact. Phyllo and VA appear to just assume that the requirement to believe in moral fact justifies elevating whatever is their version of the "best" (or the "-proper") moral thinking into the vacant position of "objective morality". This heist is made possible in one case bu apparently just holding that "objective" is a context dependent term that just means "bestest". The other one just gets indignant when challenged and demands that somebody show him a better option, so it seems that they are thinking along similar lines to each other.

IC does it differently because he's a divine command sort of a guy so he can stop at just claiming to have shown that moral antirealism somehow fails on its own terms (the terms he sets for it are of course those of moreal objectivism in that it must establish some universal moral truth or else he claims it has failed... but that's an intelligence test he will never pass so it's kind of moot really).

This analysis makes a lot of sense. Thanks.

PS I've amended the 'Reasons for moral objectivism' above to incorporate your point - though I know you developed it differently.

[Skepdick]

It is an understandable misunderstanding.

The intellectual dishonesty by Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes continues...

What's a "mis" understanding without the a priori moral presupposition of of right vs wrong understanding?

There's just the subjectivists' understanding.
There's the objectivists' understanding.

If either of those understandings is a "misunderstanding" then morality is objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Arguments against moral objectivism

5 Anti-realist arguments for moral objectivity

Anti-realist arguments sometimes have the following form.

We humans necessarily perceive, know and describe reality in human ways. Therefore, either we can never know what reality really is, or there is no such thing as reality-as-it-really-is. (See Kant’s invocation and denial of the existence of noumena: things-in-themselves.)

So we have to construct a model of reality based on the ways it appears to us. (See Kant’s phenomena: appearances.) And recently this view has been called model-dependent realism or constructivism.

It follows that, since we have to construct or create what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity – we can construct what we can call moral facts – so that morality is or can be objective.

And, in line with the philosophical ‘turn to language’, this argument can take a linguistic form, as follows.

Agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. So if we say x is morally right or wrong, then it’s a fact that x is morally right or wrong. This could be called the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity.

Some counters to anti-realist moral objectivism are as follows.

To construct a model of reality is not to construct reality. If it were, then of what is the model a model? So we do not construct so-called moral facts, any more than we construct facts of any kind.

If there are no noumena (things-in-themselves), then there are also no phenomena (appearances). Of what are phenomena phenomena?

We can describe things in countless different ways. But a description is not the described. The described does not depend on the description. And we cannot describe things and their properties into or out of existence.

Pending evidence for the existence of abstract or non-physical things, the word existence means physical existence. So if there are moral facts, then they are physical things or properties – the burden of proof for the existence of which is with moral objectivists and realists, and unmet, so far, to my knowledge.

Though it is necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs in descriptions does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. For example, we may agree on the use of words in the factual assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon'.

Therefore, the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity is invalid, as it would be for any other kind of objectivity.

With reference to my arguments, your above is a strawman ad nauseum.
'We' have pointed your fallacies many times.

The speculated assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon' is an empirical possibility within the science-biology FSERC because all the variables therein are empirical-based.
It is just a matter of bringing the possible empirical evidence to be confirmed by science-biology.
Because there is no consensus agreement to the above speculation within a FSERC [a criterial for objectivity] there is no consideration of objectivity for this statement.

If a speculation is raised, i.e. there are square-circles in Mars, this is outright nonsensical because there is no empirical possibility to such a contradiction.
Even if there is a group of millions insisting on such a claim, there is no question of any possibility of objectivity [zero] to it.

There are two senses of 'what is fact'.
Your sense of 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion.
So it is a non-starter to prove to you 'objective moral facts' exist since you are relying on an illusory 'what is fact'.

No, your sense of 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion.

You say a fact is not a thing that exists, or has occurred, or is true. Instead, you say a fact is a thing that exists only within a human 'framework and system of knowledge' - so that facts - and therefore reality/the universe - depend on humans. And that's both false, and anyway irrationally anthropocentric.

Let's stop saying these things to each other. I'm sure you're as bored as I am, and everyone else is.

Strawman again.

Rigor wise, I have never asserted
"therefore reality/the universe - depend on humans."

My stance is I opposed the p-realists' dogmatic stance that there are absolutely mind(human) independent things existing as real out there.
So basically I am ANTI-philosophical_Realism.

My view is, reality is somehow related and cannot exist without reference to the human conditions.
Humans are intricately part and parcel of Reality [all there is] as it is; there is no way, any human[s] can extricate itself from reality which they are intricately part and parcel of, to arrive at an absolutely mind(human) independent realization and cognition of reality.

I believe in a relative [not absolute] mind-independent reality [as empirical realist] but that is merely a subset and is subsumed ultimately within the ANTI-realist view.

I am not bored at all, but rather hope you do not stop making your realist-claim and remain so.
It is because your dogmatic stance provide the leverage and motivation for me to expand my knowledge base. So, thanks for that.
Look, I am now researching into serious depths re the origin and history of 'what is fact' to counter your beliefs [shallow] re 'what is fact'.
My Morality & Ethics [non Kantian] Folder is now '1857 files in 121 folders' [some repetitions] mainly because of you [my countering your views].

[Veritas Aequitas]

Arguments against moral objectivism

6 Theistic moral objectivism

The following is a valid generalised argument for moral objectivity.

P1 If agent A says X is morally right/wrong, then (it’s a fact that) X is morally right/wrong.
P2 Agent A says X is morally right/wrong.
C Therefore, (it’s a fact that) X is morally right/wrong.

But this argument is unsound, for any agent A. So to claim it is sound if agent A is a god is to commit a special-pleading fallacy. (Adding the premise What agent A says is true does nothing to rescue the argument.)

And anyway, pending good evidence for the existence of any god, an argument for theistic moral objectivism does not even make it to the starting post.

PS I've been posting this sequence of connected arguments in response to the charge that I have no rational defence for my rejection of moral objectivity. And here's a conclusion about why the delusion that morality is objective is so prevalent.

Reasons for moral objectivism - amended

I suggest that moral objectivism – belief that there are moral facts – has three main sources, as follows.

First, many or most of us care - even deeply - about our moral values, judgements and opinions. They form an important part of our lives and attitudes towards how we and others behave. So we tend to think of them as more than matters of opinion. And we find the idea that there are no moral facts offensive.

Second, we tend to apply our moral values universally – across time and space. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, then we tend to think it always was and will be morally wrong, anywhere in the world. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

And third, the supposed choice between moral objectivity and moral relativism, nihilism or anarchy assumes the existence of moral facts in the first place, which begs the question. But if we think that’s the choice – if we accept the false or at least undemonstrated dichotomy – then we’ll tend to prefer moral objectivity, as the moral choice.

For these reasons, it is natural to think that there are moral facts. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

You got is wrong because you are morally bankrupt without a moral compass.

Reasons for moral objectivism

Those who aligned with moral objectivity or objective moral reality are driven by the following mission and vision for humanity, either explicit [planning with reasoning] or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously [intuitively];

• 1. What can we know - epistemology, science, objective knowledge etc.
  2. What can we do [morally and whatever positive]
  3. What can we hope for - perpetual peace

The above is inherent in all humans with varying degrees of activeness and strength; all humans are progressing towards the above objective relative in their own pace. Some act the opposite [deficit in moral cognition] because their inherent system for such is damaged or very weak.

The most effective way to strive 3 [perpetual peace] is to rely on objective knowledge and objective moral principles and standard as a guide with a moral Framework and System [FS].
Within the moral FS there is the installing fixed goal posts or lighthouses to guide moral progress via potential pitfalls.

Therefore moral objectivity is inherent critical for moral progress within humanity.

If one failed to plan [with objectivity] one is planning to fail, i.e. planning for moral progress in this case.

Moral Relativists - to each their own and moral skeptics do not rely on any fixed standards to guide moral progress. They do not have a moral compass at all to guide them towards moral progress.
Moral relativists [by default] will have to tolerate 'the torture and killing of babies' genocides, all sort of evil, where certain cultures and groups claim such acts are moral.
Moral Skeptics [with moral deficit] do not have any say at all on moral issues and progress.

Note what is going at present with the protest in support of Hamas even Hamas had committed one of the most atrocious evil, genocide, mass rapes, all sort of evil acts.
This is moral relativism as work, i.e. without a moral compass at all.
It is true the IDF committed evil acts which are "acceptable" [unfortunately] within a justified act of war; point is all wars [even justified and legal] must be prevented in the future.

The fact is the IDF is committing a lesser evil to get rid of the potential mother-of-al- evil by Hamas motivated by the "religion of peace".
Hamas and its allies has been raining missiles into Israel, i.e. their intention is to kill all Jews as commanded by their religion, and everyone in Israel.
If not for the Iron Dome, this terrible evil of millions-killed would be a reality, in contrast to the 'in-000s' killed by the IDF due to Hamas [immorally] using civilians as human shield.

Being a moral relativist or moral skeptic is being evil, i.e. being indifferent and complicit to evil and evil acts committed by evil agents.

[Peter Holmes]

VA's latest sparkly thing: the deflationary theory of truth and, therefore, facts.

'• Imagine a statement like "The cat is on the mat."
o Deflationary Facts: This view says there's no separate "fact" that makes this statement true. The statement itself, accurately reflecting the cat's position, is sufficient.
o Deflationary Truthmaking: This focuses on the connection between the statement and the world. It might explain that the statement is true because the world actually has a cat on a mat, without needing a separate "fact" to mediate that connection.

Key Points:
• Both deflationary facts and deflationary truthmaking aim to simplify how we understand truth.
• Deflationary facts focus on the proposition itself, while deflationary truthmaking focuses on the relationship between language and the world.'

So, there are no separate facts that make a statement true. But there are features of reality, or states-of-affairs, in reality, that make statements about them true.

And this passes for serious philosophy.

All that glisters is not gold.

[Peter Holmes]

A thought about facts.

We may not know that a feature of reality (a fact) is or was the case. So we may use ways to calculate the probability that it is or was the case. But that doesn't mean that its being the case is probabilistic. It either is or isn't, or was or wasn't the case, whatever we say about it.

And - to head this off at the pass - this also applies to quantum mechanics. Quantum indeterminacy is or isn't the case. And it seems to be the case.

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA's latest sparkly thing: the deflationary theory of truth and, therefore, facts.

'• Imagine a statement like "The cat is on the mat."
o Deflationary Facts: This view says there's no separate "fact" that makes this statement true. The statement itself, accurately reflecting the cat's position, is sufficient.
o Deflationary Truthmaking: This focuses on the connection between the statement and the world. It might explain that the statement is true because the world actually has a cat on a mat, without needing a separate "fact" to mediate that connection.

Key Points:
• Both deflationary facts and deflationary truthmaking aim to simplify how we understand truth.
• Deflationary facts focus on the proposition itself, while deflationary truthmaking focuses on the relationship between language and the world.'

So, there are no separate facts that make a statement true. But there are features of reality, or states-of-affairs, in reality, that make statements about them true.

And this passes for serious philosophy.

All that glisters is not gold.

There are no absolutely human [mind] independent features of reality or states of affair that exists as real. As such, any statements about them has nothing to do with true, so they are meaningless.

A statement like 'water is H20' cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds] but is always contingent upon the science-chemistry Framework and System [FSERC].
So it is a conditional science-chemistry fact.

That 'Earth is a planet' cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds] but is always contingent upon the science-astrological Framework and System [FSERC].

That 'Biden is the 46th President of the USA' cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds] but is always contingent upon the US-Political Framework and System [FSERC].

There cannot be a standalone fact of your type, i.e. a features of reality or states of affair that exists as real and is absolutely human [mind] independent.
Your traditional view of what is fact is outdated and illusory.

[Veritas Aequitas]

A thought about facts.

We may not know that a feature of reality (a fact) is or was the case. So we may use ways to calculate the probability that it is or was the case. But that doesn't mean that its being the case is probabilistic. It either is or isn't, or was or wasn't the case, whatever we say about it.

And - to head this off at the pass - this also applies to quantum mechanics. Quantum indeterminacy is or isn't the case. And it seems to be the case.

Your 'what is fact' i.e. a feature of reality, that is the case, state of affair, just-is-so that exists absolutely independent of humans [minds] is illusory. There is no such facts.

What are facts that exist as real are those that emerged and is realized within a human-based framework and system of emergence and realization that is subsequently cognized, perceive, known and described.

[Peter Holmes]

VA's latest sparkly thing: the deflationary theory of truth and, therefore, facts.

'• Imagine a statement like "The cat is on the mat."
o Deflationary Facts: This view says there's no separate "fact" that makes this statement true. The statement itself, accurately reflecting the cat's position, is sufficient.
o Deflationary Truthmaking: This focuses on the connection between the statement and the world. It might explain that the statement is true because the world actually has a cat on a mat, without needing a separate "fact" to mediate that connection.

Key Points:
• Both deflationary facts and deflationary truthmaking aim to simplify how we understand truth.
• Deflationary facts focus on the proposition itself, while deflationary truthmaking focuses on the relationship between language and the world.'

So, there are no separate facts that make a statement true. But there are features of reality, or states-of-affairs, in reality, that make statements about them true.

And this passes for serious philosophy.

All that glisters is not gold.

There are no absolutely human [mind] independent features of reality or states of affair that exists as real. As such, any statements about them has nothing to do with true, so they are meaningless.

A statement like 'water is H20' cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds] but is always contingent upon the science-chemistry Framework and System [FSERC].
So it is a conditional science-chemistry fact.

That 'Earth is a planet' cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds] but is always contingent upon the science-astrological Framework and System [FSERC].

That 'Biden is the 46th President of the USA' cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds] but is always contingent upon the US-Political Framework and System [FSERC].

There cannot be a standalone fact of your type, i.e. a features of reality or states of affair that exists as real and is absolutely human [mind] independent.
Your traditional view of what is fact is outdated and illusory.

False.

[Peter Holmes]

A thought about facts.

We may not know that a feature of reality (a fact) is or was the case. So we may use ways to calculate the probability that it is or was the case. But that doesn't mean that its being the case is probabilistic. It either is or isn't, or was or wasn't the case, whatever we say about it.

And - to head this off at the pass - this also applies to quantum mechanics. Quantum indeterminacy is or isn't the case. And it seems to be the case.

Your 'what is fact' i.e. a feature of reality, that is the case, state of affair, just-is-so that exists absolutely independent of humans [minds] is illusory. There is no such facts.

What are facts that exist as real are those that emerged and is realized within a human-based framework and system of emergence and realization that is subsequently cognized, perceive, known and described.

False.

[FlashDangerpants]

That's a good point. If you don't mind, I'll nick it and amend this section.

That permission is always granted. Note also the bit where he wrote "Therefore moral objectivity is inherent critical for moral progress within humanity", demonstrating the logically invalid ought-to-is direction of portions of his work. IF we are to have true moral progress (as defined by some weird metric) THEN at all then morality must be objective ... THEREFORE it must be so.

[Peter Holmes]

That's a good point. If you don't mind, I'll nick it and amend this section.

That permission is always granted. Note also the bit where he wrote "Therefore moral objectivity is inherent critical for moral progress within humanity", demonstrating the logically invalid ought-to-is direction of portions of his work. IF we are to have true moral progress (as defined by some weird metric) THEN at all then morality must be objective ... THEREFORE it must be so.

Thanks. And agreed.

P1 If there are no moral facts, then we can have no lighthouse by which to steer.
P2 We ought to have a lighthouse by which to steer.
C Therefore, there are moral facts.

Maybe moral objectivists can't acknowledge a moral premise, such as P2. Paradoxically, they have to blank it out, because it's an embarrassment.

[Skepdick]

That permission is always granted. Note also the bit where he wrote "Therefore moral objectivity is inherent critical for moral progress within humanity", demonstrating the logically invalid ought-to-is direction of portions of his work. IF we are to have true moral progress (as defined by some weird metric) THEN at all then morality must be objective ... THEREFORE it must be so.

You just keep scoring irony-points.

Taking logic as a given/normative is a pretty weird gambit while also claiming to reject objective morals.

It must be so wonderful having your cake and eating it too.