Is morality objective or subjective?

[Will Bouwman]

How do we know, given Subjectivism, whose feelings are right?

How do you know how you currently interpret your Bible is right?

I'm not sure how that question relates to Subjective Morality. Maybe you'll explain.

Well, if as you claim morality is objective because your god says so, how do you know your feelings about what he says are objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

False. The claim 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It has no moral entailment whatsoever - as neither would it's negation: 'all humans torture and kill babies for pleasure'.

As ever, your insertion of a moral entailment is question-begging - you just assume it, with flummery about 'the moral fsk' - or whatever you call it now. And you just don't understand the mistake. Probably never will.

Again, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
You have been running away and not countering my argument.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

I have stated your 'what is fact' is outdated, here is the generally accepted meaning of what is a fact.

What is a Fact? ref: WIKI
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

I say that what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. And I say that's why we value facts and objectivity.

You say that such facts are illusions, because humans 'construct' reality - the facts of reality. To put it simply: what we call a fact is a human construct.

But now, go very slowly here. If a fact is a human construct, then the fact that a fact is a human construct is also a human construct.

I agree up to this point.
It based on Kant's Copernican Revolution, the association with the human conditions is inevitable.
Note we have gone through this before.

To put it another way. If humans construct reality, then there can be no perspective or vantage point from which to observe that humans construct reality.

Yes, there is no independent vantage point to observe that human construct reality, i.e. a human is not God and cannot have an absolutely independent perspective.

The vantage point of view is a shared-platform intersubjectively on the basis of a Framework and System of Emergence, Realization of Reality and Cognition.

But wait. Anti-realism is the claim that it's a 'fact' that humans construct reality - that it's a feature of reality that just is the case, regardless of opinion.

When anti-realism depends on the collective share-consensus of a group of humans within a Framework and System, it is independent and regardless of the opinion of any individuals or a loose group of individuals.

For example, objective scientific facts [anti-realism] are independent and regardless of the opinions and belief of any individual scientists but it is not absolutely independent of the organized collective of subjects or human scientists.

But - such a thing - such a fact - is supposed to be an illusion.

It is only an illusion when realists claimed that facts are absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Antirealists claim objective facts are independent of a subject or group of loose subjects and not absolutely independent of the human conditions because supposedly 'independent' objective facts in one perspective are not ultimately independent of the collective of subjects.
Thus in this case, objectivity is intersubjectivity.
Whatever is objective reality, there is no escape from the elements of the subjects, i.e. the collective-of-subjects.

Conclusion? Anti-realism rests on flatly contradictory premises. And that's a fact.

It appear to be contradictory, but antirealism's is relative independence while that of the realist is based on absolute independence which is not tenable.

Now, instead of mindlessly repeating that my 'what is fact' is an illusion - and instead of mindlessly giving a link to your silly argument - have a long, slow think about what I've said. Please.

PS To put it another way. If reality is a human construct, then humans are also a human construct. And the human construction of reality is also a human construct. So there is no bottom or stopping point. If my 'what is fact' is an illusion, then all is illusion.

Now, instead of mindlessly repeating that my 'what is fact' is contradictory - and instead of mindlessly giving shallow argument - have a long, slow think about what I've said. Please.

There is no issue of a bottomless pit for me.
What I start with is based on empirical observations of what is spontaneously experienced and the cognition and knowing of it is based on the collective-shared knowledge.
Thus what-is-knowledge is based on as far as the evidence can support reinforced with critical thinking and wisdom.
I don't need to speculate and assume there is something illusory beyond the empirical to be discovered.

Btw, at present I am reading the book 'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti who argued your concept of what is fact is a sham.

[quote
'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti.
]https://www.amazon.com/Against-Facts-Pr ... 0262029219
An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world.

In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenableneither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form the fact that such and such. There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts.

Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in the fact that statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.[/quote]

[phyllo]

Can you give us an example of an objectivist's reasoning regarding the wrongness of stealing?

I already gave an example ... if stealing is accepted as moral, then people would have to waste time, effort and money on securing their property.

If nobody minded spending time, effort and money on securing their property, and they didn't mind having their possessions stolen, then what reason would they have for thinking stealing was wrong?

Sure, if nobody valued their stuff then they wouldn't care about losing it and stealing wouldn't be a moral issue. Millions of behaviors are in the "we don't care" category.

But people do value their property.

And why do we not want people to steal from our property? I would say the reason is subjective; it's because we don't like it.

Anything can be reduced to "I like" and "I don't like" if reasoning is abandoned.

It doesn't explain anything.

It certainly doesn't explain why somebody shouldn't do what they like doing. Which is a fundamental question in ethics and morality.

The fact that you don't like what they are doing doesn't seem to be an adequate response. So what if you don't like it?

For example, why shouldn't a pedophile have sex with kids? It's what he likes doing.

[Harbal]

I already gave an example ... if stealing is accepted as moral, then people would have to waste time, effort and money on securing their property.

If nobody minded spending time, effort and money on securing their property, and they didn't mind having their possessions stolen, then what reason would they have for thinking stealing was wrong?

Sure, if nobody valued their stuff then they wouldn't care about losing it and stealing wouldn't be a moral issue. Millions of behaviors are in the "we don't care" category.

But people do value their property.

Exactly. Morality is relative to what people value. If my only concern is my own property, then I will probably only see theft as a moral issue when it happens to me, but if I value an environment where no one has to suffer the theft of their property, I will see theft in general as a moral issue.

And why do we not want people to steal from our property? I would say the reason is subjective; it's because we don't like it.

Anything can be reduced to "I like" and "I don't like" if reasoning is abandoned.

It doesn't explain anything.

Not liking something seems a perfectly good explanation for condemning it to me.

It certainly doesn't explain why somebody shouldn't do what they like doing. Which is a fundamental question in ethics and morality.

How would you explain to a thief why he shouldn't steal if he doesn't see anything wrong with it?

The fact that you don't like what they are doing doesn't seem to be an adequate response. So what if you don't like it?

What would be an adequate response?

For example, why shouldn't a pedophile have sex with kids? It's what he likes doing.

I don't suppose there is a reason why he shouldn't do it in his own mind. But so what, what does that show us?

[phyllo]

Not liking something seems a perfectly good explanation for condemning it to me.

I don't lots of things. It doesn't mean that I condemn them and prevent other people from doing them or 'enjoying' them

I would have to have reasons beyond like and dislike to prevent people from doing things.

How would you explain to a thief why he shouldn't steal if he doesn't see anything wrong with it?

By pointing out the negative aspects of stealing.

What would be an adequate response?

One with reasons for doing something or not doing doing something.

I don't suppose there is a reason why he shouldn't do it in his own mind. But so what, what does that show us?

It shows the poverty of subjective morality?

[phyllo]

Then this part...


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_ ... eft!%22%20

That's moral relativism.

Not if your own One True Path to Enlightenment revolves around dialectical materialism. And the thing about "political economy" is that Marx and Engels insisted that their own historical assessment was...scientific?

They went all the way back to nomadic, slash and burn, hunter and gatherer, agricultural, feudal and mercantile communities and, in examining the means of production, drew their own conclusions regarding how the superstructure [social, political and economic institutions] functioned to sustain the interest of those in power.

This approach as opposed to, say, "metaethical" philosophers like Ayn Rand. For Rand, private property -- capitalism -- reflected the very epitome of human morality. Why? Because, they insisted, it reflects the very epitome of rational thinking. She actually believed that the only reason much earlier political economies did not embrace "market capitalism" is because those like her and John Galt weren't around then to bring it all about.

The irony here being that there are any number of Christians who will argue that Jesus Christ himself was pretty much a socialist.

Then those like IC who insist that, on the contrary, only their own assessment of Jesus reflects True Christianity.

And he'll argue further there is scientific and historical proof of this. Those YouTube videos. Only he can't/won't address my own interest in why he doesn't come back to them himself, if he is truly interested in saving souls rather than keeping it all up in the spiritual clouds here.

Sure, but that's separate from the central issue here ... subjective morality.

[Peter Holmes]

Again, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
You have been running away and not countering my argument.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

I have stated your 'what is fact' is outdated, here is the generally accepted meaning of what is a fact.

What is a Fact? ref: WIKI
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

I say that what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. And I say that's why we value facts and objectivity.

You say that such facts are illusions, because humans 'construct' reality - the facts of reality. To put it simply: what we call a fact is a human construct.

But now, go very slowly here. If a fact is a human construct, then the fact that a fact is a human construct is also a human construct.

I agree up to this point.
It based on Kant's Copernican Revolution, the association with the human conditions is inevitable.
Note we have gone through this before.

To put it another way. If humans construct reality, then there can be no perspective or vantage point from which to observe that humans construct reality.

Yes, there is no independent vantage point to observe that human construct reality, i.e. a human is not God and cannot have an absolutely independent perspective.

The vantage point of view is a shared-platform intersubjectively on the basis of a Framework and System of Emergence, Realization of Reality and Cognition.

Look again at your contradiction here.

1 There is no perspective or vantage point from which to observe that humans construct reality.
2 There is a perspective or vantage point from which to observe that humans construct reality: the human intersubjectively shared platform, etc.

Intersubjectivity is subjectivity. So your appeal to intersubjectivity doesn't work. In other words, the claim 'humans intersubjectively construct reality' just adds a redundancy to the claim 'humans construct reality'.

And anyway, this remains a realist claim - a claim about the way things are. So your 'intersubjective' anti-realism remains fundamentally contradictory: 'it's a fact that humans intersubjectively construct reality'.

But wait. Anti-realism is the claim that it's a 'fact' that humans construct reality - that it's a feature of reality that just is the case, regardless of opinion.

When anti-realism depends on the collective share-consensus of a group of humans within a Framework and System, it is independent and regardless of the opinion of any individuals or a loose group of individuals.

As above, this distinction between individual and collective opinion is ineffectual.

For example, objective scientific facts [anti-realism] are independent and regardless of the opinions and belief of any individual scientists but it is not absolutely independent of the organized collective of subjects or human scientists.

But - such a thing - such a fact - is supposed to be an illusion.

It is only an illusion when realists claimed that facts are absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Antirealists claim objective facts are independent of a subject or group of loose subjects and not absolutely independent of the human conditions because supposedly 'independent' objective facts in one perspective are not ultimately independent of the collective of subjects.
Thus in this case, objectivity is intersubjectivity.
Whatever is objective reality, there is no escape from the elements of the subjects, i.e. the collective-of-subjects.

Conclusion? Anti-realism rests on flatly contradictory premises. And that's a fact.

It appear to be contradictory, but antirealism's is relative independence while that of the realist is based on absolute independence which is not tenable.

Dependence on intersubjective opinion is not relative independence from opinion. How can it be? And you're back to the part of the story that is independent - reality itself.

Now, instead of mindlessly repeating that my 'what is fact' is an illusion - and instead of mindlessly giving a link to your silly argument - have a long, slow think about what I've said. Please.

PS To put it another way. If reality is a human construct, then humans are also a human construct. And the human construction of reality is also a human construct. So there is no bottom or stopping point. If my 'what is fact' is an illusion, then all is illusion.

Now, instead of mindlessly repeating that my 'what is fact' is contradictory - and instead of mindlessly giving shallow argument - have a long, slow think about what I've said. Please.

There is no issue of a bottomless pit for me.

And that's precisely because you don't recognise that your argument spirals down into the pit.

What I start with is based on empirical observations of what is spontaneously experienced and the cognition and knowing of it is based on the collective-shared knowledge.
Thus what-is-knowledge is based on as far as the evidence can support reinforced with critical thinking and wisdom.
I don't need to speculate and assume there is something illusory beyond the empirical to be discovered.

As ever, your appeal to empiricism demolishes your anti-realism. Knowledge comes from experience of reality - not experience of an intersubjective human construct.

Btw, at present I am reading the book 'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti who argued your concept of what is fact is a sham.

[quote
'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti.
]https://www.amazon.com/Against-Facts-Pr ... 0262029219
An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world.

In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenableneither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form the fact that such and such. There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts.

Nuff said. Deep incomprehension. Of what do reality and its 'entities' (revealing obfuscation) consist?

Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in the fact that statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.

Mistaking what we say for the way things are. But, of course, 'There is reality and there are entities in reality'. Realism by definition.

[Harbal]

Not liking something seems a perfectly good explanation for condemning it to me.

I don't lots of things. It doesn't mean that I condemn them and prevent other people from doing them or 'enjoying' them

You miss my point, which is that we don't tend to condemn things we do like.

I would have to have reasons beyond like and dislike to prevent people from doing things.

So would I, so I don't see how you could disapprove of my subjective morality on that score.

How would you explain to a thief why he shouldn't steal if he doesn't see anything wrong with it?

By pointing out the negative aspects of stealing.

I would do the same, but why should he take more notice of you than of me? I would tell him that his actions are hurting other people, but if he didn't see that as a bad thing, it isn't going to have much impression on him. What negative aspects would you point out to him that would be more likely to succeed in changing his behaviour?

What would be an adequate response?

One with reasons for doing something or not doing doing something.

What reasons can you, as an "objectivist", give him that I can't?

I don't suppose there is a reason why he shouldn't do it in his own mind. But so what, what does that show us?

It shows the poverty of subjective morality?

Why do you think your "objective" morality would be any more effective? If he doesn't agree with, or accept, what you say to him, that would surely make your "objective" morality just as impoverished, wouldn't it?

[phyllo]

You miss my point, which is that we don't tend to condemn things we do like.

Sure we do.

I want to get stuff for nothing. Stealing is great for that.

So would I, so I don't see how you could disapprove of my subjective morality on that score.

Then you don't use subjective morality.

I would do the same, but why should he take more notice of you than of me? I would tell him that his actions are hurting other people, but if he didn't see that as a bad thing, it isn't going to have much impression on him. What negative aspects would you point out to him that would be more likely to succeed in changing his behaviour?

Then you're not using subjective morality because you're giving reasons which transcend your personal likes and dislikes.

"Hurting people" is an objective fact.

And if your morality is based on that fact, then you're in the objective morality area.

What reasons can you, as an "objectivist", give him that I can't?

The only reason that a subjectivist has is "I don't like it".
If you're saying something else then it's not subjective. Anything without "I" in it, is not subjective.

Why do you think your "objective" morality would be any more effective? If he doesn't agree with, or accept, what you say to him, that would surely make your "objective" morality just as impoverished, wouldn't it?

A pedophile may not accept it.

But an objective morality is more than personal likes and dislikes. There is a benefit to others coming from moral behavior. In this case, the kids who are not abused benefit. Which is the reason why one would establish that moral rule. It's there is a benefit, therefore we have rule P. Not ... I don't like it, therefore rule P.

[Immanuel Can]

How do you know how you currently interpret your Bible is right?

I'm not sure how that question relates to Subjective Morality. Maybe you'll explain.

Well, if as you claim morality is objective because your god says so, how do you know your feelings about what he says are objective?

"Feelings?" Anybody who trust his/her feelings is bound to go off course. In regards to the Bible, it's better to do proper textual analysis and exegesis, not rely on feelings. There isn't even any promise in the Bible that "feelings" will prove reliable; in fact, the Scriptures say, "The heart of man is deceitful and desperately wicked; who can know it?" (Jer. 17:9)

[Immanuel Can]

...you are completely unable to show how objective morality exists, or even how it could possibly exist. There is no such thing as objective moral truth.

What we're doing, at the moment is allowing for the sake of argument that what you say is true. So objective morality is out of the conversation: we'll assume there's no such thing.

But how does that help Subjectivism? It turns out that it doesn't. Even if we believe there's no objective morality, that won't enable subjective morality to exist -- all it will make rational is the belief that NO morality exists.

And there's the interesting dilemma. The Subjectivist doesn't want to admit that NO morality exists. He doesn't want to end up in Nihlism, even thought that's the end his own Subjectivism points him to. So he tries to stop short of that, and say, "If I discount objective morality, then I can believe in subjective morality instead." He's like one of those cartoon characters that jumps off a cliff, and then madly spins his legs, hovering in the air...just before he falls. He wants to stop half way down.

But he can't. The elimination of objective morality doesn't save Subjectivism.

[Harbal]

You miss my point, which is that we don't tend to condemn things we do like.

Sure we do.

I want to get stuff for nothing. Stealing is great for that.

So what are you condemning that you like?

So would I, so I don't see how you could disapprove of my subjective morality on that score.

Then you don't use subjective morality.

But my reasons would just be a matter of my subjective opinion, so how is that objective?

I would do the same, but why should he take more notice of you than of me? I would tell him that his actions are hurting other people, but if he didn't see that as a bad thing, it isn't going to have much impression on him. What negative aspects would you point out to him that would be more likely to succeed in changing his behaviour?

Then you're not using subjective morality because you're giving reasons which transcend your personal likes and dislikes.

"Hurting people" is an objective fact.

But it isn't an objective fact that hurting people is wrong; that is just a subjective human opinion. If you disagree, tell me where such a fact is to be found.

And if your morality is based on that fact, then you're in the objective morality area.

My morality is based on my personal opinion that hurting people is wrong, and my personal opinion is subjective.

What reasons can you, as an "objectivist", give him that I can't?

The only reason that a subjectivist has is "I don't like it".
If you're saying something else then it's not subjective. Anything without "I" in it, is not subjective.

How can missing out "I" turn a subjective opinion into an objective fact?

Why do you think your "objective" morality would be any more effective? If he doesn't agree with, or accept, what you say to him, that would surely make your "objective" morality just as impoverished, wouldn't it?

A pedophile may not accept it.

But an objective morality is more than personal likes and dislikes. There is a benefit to others coming from moral behavior. In this case, the kids who are not abused benefit. Which is the reason why one would establish that moral rule. It's there is a benefit, therefore we have rule P. Not ... I don't like it, therefore rule P.

If it shows the poverty of subjective morality when my moral opinion fails to dissuade someone from paedophilia, then it must show the poverty of "objective" morality when that also fails.

[Harbal]

...you are completely unable to show how objective morality exists, or even how it could possibly exist. There is no such thing as objective moral truth.

What we're doing, at the moment is allowing for the sake of argument that what you say is true. So objective morality is out of the conversation: we'll assume there's no such thing.

My only purpose here is to argue that there are no such things as objective moral truths; hence objective morality is an impossibility. So if objective morality is out of the conversation, I have no reason to take part in the conversation. As far as I'm concerned, you persistence in avoiding the moral objectivity argument demonstrates that you haven't really got one.

[Immanuel Can]

...you are completely unable to show how objective morality exists, or even how it could possibly exist. There is no such thing as objective moral truth.

What we're doing, at the moment is allowing for the sake of argument that what you say is true. So objective morality is out of the conversation: we'll assume there's no such thing.

My only purpose here is to argue that there are no such things as objective moral truths; hence objective morality is an impossibility. So if objective morality is out of the conversation, I have no reason to take part in the conversation. As far as I'm concerned, you persistence in avoiding the moral objectivity argument demonstrates that you haven't really got one.

I'm not avoiding. I know perfectly well, and have always said, that a person who disbelieves in God has no hope of establishing reasons to believe in objective morality. And since you reject God, that's you...and I'm honouring your supposition and treating it as serious.

But the resulting impossibility of your being convinced of objective moral values is not a failure of God to exist, or of objective morality to be real. It's a natural consequence your own assumption. You've already ruled out the only condition under which objective morality can exist. I agree with that: that's what you've done. So I'm not surprised that you conclude objective morality cannot exist.

I'm accepting your assumption, and showing you where that actually leaves you -- not with a different "morality," but with absolutely no basis for any morality at all. And fear is driving you away from the inescapable conclusion: you don't want to be a Nihilist, so you pull back to an unwarranted confidence in fake, purely subjective "moralizing," instead of going into that pit.

I get it. It's what every Subjectivist does.

[Gary Childress]

What we're doing, at the moment is allowing for the sake of argument that what you say is true. So objective morality is out of the conversation: we'll assume there's no such thing.

My only purpose here is to argue that there are no such things as objective moral truths; hence objective morality is an impossibility. So if objective morality is out of the conversation, I have no reason to take part in the conversation. As far as I'm concerned, you persistence in avoiding the moral objectivity argument demonstrates that you haven't really got one.

I'm not avoiding. I know perfectly well, and have always said, that a person who disbelieves in God has no hope of establishing reasons to believe in objective morality. And since you reject God, that's you...and I'm honouring your supposition and treating it as serious.

But the resulting impossibility of your being convinced of objective moral values is not a failure of God to exist, or of objective morality to be real. It's a natural consequence your own assumption. You've already ruled out the only condition under which objective morality can exist. I agree with that: that's what you've done. So I'm not surprised that you conclude objective morality cannot exist.

I'm accepting your assumption, and showing you where that actually leaves you -- not with a different "morality," but with absolutely no basis for any morality at all. And fear is driving you away from the inescapable conclusion: you don't want to be a Nihilist, so you pull back to an unwarranted confidence in fake, purely subjective "moralizing," instead of going into that pit.

I get it. It's what every Subjectivist does.

I'd love to believe that if humans are kind to each other and solve problems through cooperation instead of warfare, that would be reward enough for engaging in kindness and cooperation. I take it you don't believe that is so?