story of Rorty and knowledge.... we hope....

[Peter Kropotkin]

After some stops along the way, I am, finally, getting around to
reading ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature''
my version, is a 2009 reprint with an introduction and another
Rorty essay... "The Philosopher as Expert"

Even the Introduction brought about some ideas for me......
The heart of philosophy since Descartes has been Epistemology....
the question of knowledge... and the introduction acknowledges that
modern day philosophy, since oh, 1900, has been the replacement
of epistemology with language theories as the basis of
philosophical endeavor.... Wittgenstein for example, is taken
as the prince of language theories...

(but Wittgenstein himself says he was an ethics/morality seeker,
not a language game theorist, that he was trying to use language
as a means of getting an ethical theory, and this was quite common in
the Vienna he grew up in.... another language theorist who was actual
engaged in ethics was the writer Karl Kraus... it was in the air in Vienna
in the early 20th century)

but the question is still out there... what should/is the base or
the bottom floor of philosophy? is it epistemology as it was for centuries
from Descartes to Kant.. or is the modern theory of language since Wittgenstein,
or should the base camp of philosophy be something else?

Nietzsche held that philosophy base camp, was or should be, values...
what values should we be holding and why those values and not other
values? One of the primary values of Liberals is justice... and justice
is the act of equality.... they are one and the same.... to be just, is
to be equal.....equally politically, socially, economically, legally,
and of course, philosophically.....
the question for a Liberal is not, how do we achieve wealth,
no, the question is, how do we distribute the wealth, equally?

and all this is predicated on an idea of what it means to be human...
is being human about the search for knowledge, in part yes, in part, no....
So, Descartes was partially right, but partially wrong...
the epistemological search for knowledge can get us to some
understanding of what it means to be human, but it hasn't really
done that yet.... and the Language game theorist, try to discover
what it means to be human through the language we use....

so far, that attempt has been a failure....so, for the last say,
400 years of philosophy, since Descartes, has been, not to be
too harsh, but it has been a failure....
it has led us nowhere....

It has been said, that Rorty was a skeptic about epistemology...
and he should be.... there is much to be skeptical about
epistemology.... to the point where we have to be skeptical
about the very value and worth of our epistemological search.....
for the very question of epistemology is that we can't be sure
of ANY knowledge that we get due to the weakness and failures
of our senses.....

(the Gettier problem seems to address this question..
I am deaf, and thus any, anything that addresses my hearing,
it is reasonable to question it... I must question any information
or knowledge gained from my sense of hearing... I must automatically
doubt any information gained from my hearing... that is the deaf problem...
or the senses problem we have.... there is reason to doubt any information
gained from our senses... which leaves us where, exactly?)

so, let us remove our senses as a mean of gaining information...
so, how do we for example, work out that democracy is the best
theory we have for a political system? Why do we choose democracy
over other political systems if we doubt, and we must doubt
our senses, that a democracy is the best political theory around?

On what basis should we choose a democracy over a dictatorship?
if we remove our senses as a ground for any determination of
the best political system for human beings?

how are we to determine the truth or falseness of any question, if
we removed the senses from any understanding of that question?

Kant went with the idea of ''a priori'' as one possible answer...
before the evidence.... before we try to understand it through
the senses..... the problems with this Kantian notion are so well known,
that I shouldn't have to engaged with the question of ''A priori''...  
for example, what is the mechanism for gaining ''a priori'' knowledge?
How does that happen?

as far as I can tell, that, for whatever reason, philosophy itself,
isn't practicing philosophical technique on philosophy itself....
we should be just as engaging in practicing doubt on philosophy
itself, just as we practice doubt on any concept or belief that we have.....

would philosophy even survive a full on philosophical method/technique
on itself? I'm not very sure about that.... but for philosophy to have some
value, it must practice philosophical methods/techniques on itself....

and how would that work? is that an epistemological question,
a language problem, a sensory problem?

and to some extent, this is what Rorty does, work on philosophy
with the tools of philosophy...

Kropotkin

[Veritas Aequitas]

I raised this thread on the same book by Rorty
Rorty - No Mind-Independent Reality
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32188

What I am interested with Rorty is his condemnation of the very proud, arrogant but ignorant, Analytic Philosophers [PH, FDP, etc.] who insist upon and are dogmatic with a mind-independent external world.

[Skepdick]

I raised this thread on the same book by Rorty
Rorty - No Mind-Independent Reality
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32188

What I am interested with Rorty is his condemnation of the very proud, arrogant but ignorant, Analytic Philosophers [PH, FDP, etc.] who insist upon and are dogmatic with a mind-independent external world.

The first chapter of the book is literally called "The invention of the mind".

And you continue to speak about mind-dependence and mind-independence.
You continue to speak of the internal/external world distinction using different words but exactly the same conception.

Tell me you didn't understand the book without telling me...

[Veritas Aequitas]

I raised this thread on the same book by Rorty
Rorty - No Mind-Independent Reality
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32188

What I am interested with Rorty is his condemnation of the very proud, arrogant but ignorant, Analytic Philosophers [PH, FDP, etc.] who insist upon and are dogmatic with a mind-independent external world.

The first chapter of the book is literally called "The invention of the mind".

And you continue to speak about mind-dependence and mind-independence.
You continue to speak of the internal/external world distinction using different words but exactly the same conception.

Tell me you didn't understand the book without telling me...

Not sure of your point.

In chapter one I try to show that the so­-called intuitions which lie behind Cartesian dualism are ones which have a historical origin. Rorty

As stated above, my interest in that book is Rorty's exposure that to cling onto the concept of an mind-independent external world is unrealistic.

I have extended the above argument to an evolutionary default and that philosophical realism is illusory.

Btw, I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' since it is very misleading.

[Skepdick]

I raised this thread on the same book by Rorty
Rorty - No Mind-Independent Reality
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32188

What I am interested with Rorty is his condemnation of the very proud, arrogant but ignorant, Analytic Philosophers [PH, FDP, etc.] who insist upon and are dogmatic with a mind-independent external world.

The first chapter of the book is literally called "The invention of the mind".

And you continue to speak about mind-dependence and mind-independence.
You continue to speak of the internal/external world distinction using different words but exactly the same conception.

Tell me you didn't understand the book without telling me...

Not sure of your point.

In chapter one I try to show that the so­-called intuitions which lie behind Cartesian dualism are ones which have a historical origin. Rorty

As stated above, my interest in that book is Rorty's exposure that to cling onto the concept of an mind-independent external world is unrealistic.

I have extended the above argument to an evolutionary default and that philosophical realism is illusory.

Btw, I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' since it is very misleading.

My point is that you haven't actually read chapter 1.

He doesn't merely attack mind-independence. He attacks the either-or mindset too. He attacks the problem; as well as the solution to the problem; and even the approach to preventing the problem which causes its own set of problems.

Rorty is an anti-representationalist. And your entire pursuit of constructing a framework .... that's a representationalist approach.

In the introduction he writes that he offers no solutions. He is simply states that his work is an art of meditation - coming to terms with the unsurmountable problem.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The first chapter of the book is literally called "The invention of the mind".

And you continue to speak about mind-dependence and mind-independence.
You continue to speak of the internal/external world distinction using different words but exactly the same conception.

Tell me you didn't understand the book without telling me...

Not sure of your point.

In chapter one I try to show that the so­-called intuitions which lie behind Cartesian dualism are ones which have a historical origin. Rorty

As stated above, my interest in that book is Rorty's exposure that to cling onto the concept of an mind-independent external world is unrealistic.

I have extended the above argument to an evolutionary default and that philosophical realism is illusory.

Btw, I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' since it is very misleading.

My point is that you haven't actually read chapter 1.

He doesn't merely attack mind-independence. He attacks the either-or mindset too. He attacks the problem; as well as the solution to the problem; and even the approach to preventing the problem which causes its own set of problems.

Rorty is an anti-representationalist. And your entire pursuit of constructing a framework .... that's a representationalist approach.

In the introduction he writes that he offers no solutions. He is simply states that his work is an art of meditation - coming to terms with the unsurmountable problem.

I don't claim to be an expert on Rorty's book.
The point is I have read the book but with a specific emphasis, i.e. Rorty's attack on 'Analytic Philosophy' and its Linguistic Philosophy.

Here is a summary I did on the 'Introduction'.

• Evolution of the Philosophical Urge re Foundation of Knowledge to the anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian revolution
  Aim of this Book to UNDERMINE Confidence of .. mind, knowledge, philosophy [Kantian]
  Analytic Philosophy Need Changes to Improve
  The Independent Framework of Analytic Philosophy
  Foundation of Knowledge due to a priori Elements
  Philosophy Escaped from History
  Summary for Part and Chapters
  Picture – Mind as a Mirror
  Historical Phenomenon of Mirror-imagery Missing
  Dewey’s aesthetic enhancement and Hope

Rorty did critique Kantian Philosophy but I am not interested in that because it is shallow. Kantian may have elements of representation but it is not the analytic kind, i.e. not absolutely mind-independent representations.
As such I would need to have a counter-critique of 'Rorty's Critique of Kant'. I am not interested in that at present.

What I am more interested in Rorty's critique and condemnation of Analytic Philosophy and its concept of mind-independence and representation via language.

Here is reference the analytic turn to 'language', i.e. Ordinary Language Philosophy.

But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental­ physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains.
This intuition seems to them enough to establish an unbridgeable gap.
But such neo-dualist philosophers are embarrassed by their own conclusions, since although their metaphysical intuitions seem to be Cartesian, they are not clear whether they are entitled to have such things as "metaphysical intuitions."
They tend to be unhappy with the notion of a method of knowing about the world prior to and untouchable by empirical science.

In this situation, it is tempting for the dualist to go linguistic and begin talking about "different vocabularies" or "alternative descriptions."

[Skepdick]

Not sure of your point.



As stated above, my interest in that book is Rorty's exposure that to cling onto the concept of an mind-independent external world is unrealistic.

I have extended the above argument to an evolutionary default and that philosophical realism is illusory.

Btw, I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' since it is very misleading.

My point is that you haven't actually read chapter 1.

He doesn't merely attack mind-independence. He attacks the either-or mindset too. He attacks the problem; as well as the solution to the problem; and even the approach to preventing the problem which causes its own set of problems.

Rorty is an anti-representationalist. And your entire pursuit of constructing a framework .... that's a representationalist approach.

In the introduction he writes that he offers no solutions. He is simply states that his work is an art of meditation - coming to terms with the unsurmountable problem.

I don't claim to be an expert on Rorty's book.
The point is I have read the book but with a specific emphasis, i.e. Rorty's attack on 'Analytic Philosophy' and its Linguistic Philosophy.

Here is a summary I did on the 'Introduction'.

• Evolution of the Philosophical Urge re Foundation of Knowledge to the anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian revolution
  Aim of this Book to UNDERMINE Confidence of .. mind, knowledge, philosophy [Kantian]
  Analytic Philosophy Need Changes to Improve
  The Independent Framework of Analytic Philosophy
  Foundation of Knowledge due to a priori Elements
  Philosophy Escaped from History
  Summary for Part and Chapters
  Picture – Mind as a Mirror
  Historical Phenomenon of Mirror-imagery Missing
  Dewey’s aesthetic enhancement and Hope

Rorty did critique Kantian Philosophy but I am not interested in that because it is shallow. Kantian may have elements of representation but it is not the analytic kind, i.e. not absolutely mind-independent representations.
As such I would need to have a counter-critique of 'Rorty's Critique of Kant'. I am not interested in that at present.

What I am more interested in Rorty's critique and condemnation of Analytic Philosophy and its concept of mind-independence and representation via language.

Here is reference the analytic turn to 'language', i.e. Ordinary Language Philosophy.

But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental­ physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains.
This intuition seems to them enough to establish an unbridgeable gap.
But such neo-dualist philosophers are embarrassed by their own conclusions, since although their metaphysical intuitions seem to be Cartesian, they are not clear whether they are entitled to have such things as "metaphysical intuitions."
They tend to be unhappy with the notion of a method of knowing about the world prior to and untouchable by empirical science.

In this situation, it is tempting for the dualist to go linguistic and begin talking about "different vocabularies" or "alternative descriptions."

You continue to miss the point.

Yes, Rorty attacks your enemies - he dismantles their positions and burns them to the ground. He burns down the entire house that is philosophy.
But he is doing you no favours when he does so. Because you are in the very house he's burning down.

The enemy of your enemy is not your friend!

[Veritas Aequitas]

My point is that you haven't actually read chapter 1.

He doesn't merely attack mind-independence. He attacks the either-or mindset too. He attacks the problem; as well as the solution to the problem; and even the approach to preventing the problem which causes its own set of problems.

Rorty is an anti-representationalist. And your entire pursuit of constructing a framework .... that's a representationalist approach.

In the introduction he writes that he offers no solutions. He is simply states that his work is an art of meditation - coming to terms with the unsurmountable problem.

I don't claim to be an expert on Rorty's book.
The point is I have read the book but with a specific emphasis, i.e. Rorty's attack on 'Analytic Philosophy' and its Linguistic Philosophy.

Here is a summary I did on the 'Introduction'.

• Evolution of the Philosophical Urge re Foundation of Knowledge to the anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian revolution
  Aim of this Book to UNDERMINE Confidence of .. mind, knowledge, philosophy [Kantian]
  Analytic Philosophy Need Changes to Improve
  The Independent Framework of Analytic Philosophy
  Foundation of Knowledge due to a priori Elements
  Philosophy Escaped from History
  Summary for Part and Chapters
  Picture – Mind as a Mirror
  Historical Phenomenon of Mirror-imagery Missing
  Dewey’s aesthetic enhancement and Hope

Rorty did critique Kantian Philosophy but I am not interested in that because it is shallow. Kantian may have elements of representation but it is not the analytic kind, i.e. not absolutely mind-independent representations.
As such I would need to have a counter-critique of 'Rorty's Critique of Kant'. I am not interested in that at present.

What I am more interested in Rorty's critique and condemnation of Analytic Philosophy and its concept of mind-independence and representation via language.

Here is reference the analytic turn to 'language', i.e. Ordinary Language Philosophy.

But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental­ physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains.
This intuition seems to them enough to establish an unbridgeable gap.
But such neo-dualist philosophers are embarrassed by their own conclusions, since although their metaphysical intuitions seem to be Cartesian, they are not clear whether they are entitled to have such things as "metaphysical intuitions."
They tend to be unhappy with the notion of a method of knowing about the world prior to and untouchable by empirical science.

In this situation, it is tempting for the dualist to go linguistic and begin talking about "different vocabularies" or "alternative descriptions."

You continue to miss the point.

Yes, Rorty attacks your enemies - he dismantles their positions and burns them to the ground. He burns down the entire house that is philosophy.
But he is doing you no favours when he does so. Because you are in the very house he's burning down.

The enemy of your enemy is not your friend!

Rorty may claimed to be burning all sorts of philosophical houses.

He is doing me a favor in his burning down of Analytical Philosophy and its linguistic turn, however I reject his claim that he had burned my [& the Kantian] philosophical stance.
My rejection will have be supported by argument but I am not doing it here.
Rorty is just good source for me to counter the philosophical realists but there are tons of alternative counters I can rely on to squash the p-realists as illusory.

Whatever is of Rorty in his 'Mirror of Nature,' it has no significant counter to Kantian-philosophy-proper.

[Skepdick]

He is doing me a favor in his burning down of Analytical Philosophy and its linguistic turn, however I reject his claim that he had burned my [& the Kantian] philosophical stance.
Whatever is of Rorty in his 'Mirror of Nature,' it has no significant counter to Kantian-philosophy-proper.

Eeeeeh, he burns Kant's house down too... Your attempt to hide behind your executioner is futile.

I am not going to bother to find the pages/paragraphs for you now, here's you AI-fueled answer.

The AI is hallucinating some stuff, but the gist of what matters remains in tact.

In his influential work "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature," Richard Rorty offers a critique of Kant's philosophical project and its legacy. Here are some of the main points Rorty makes regarding Kant:

The Kantian project of grounding knowledge on transcendental arguments is misguided, according to Rorty. He argues that Kant's attempt to find ahistorical, permanent conditions for knowledge is itself an example of the kind of metaphysical thinking that Kant sought to undermine.
Rorty takes issue with Kant's distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, arguing that this duality sets up an unworkable split between how things appear to us and some inaccessible "thing-in-itself."
He criticizes Kant's idea of a permanent, ahistorical faculty of reason or mind that grounds knowledge. Rorty sees this as a remnant of Descartes' search for an Archimedean point of certainty.
Rorty argues that Kant's transcendental arguments rely on circular reasoning, presupposing the very concepts and mental faculties they are attempting to ground.
More broadly, Rorty rejects Kant's ambition to provide a philosophical "mirror of nature" - a theory that perfectly maps the intrinsic structures of the mind onto the intrinsic structures of reality.

In essence, Rorty sees Kant's transcendental idealism as a continuation of the representationalist epistemology that Kant criticized - the idea that we can find a single, privileged representation that perfectly captures reality. For Rorty, Kant is still trapped within the metaphysical tradition he aimed to overcome.

[Veritas Aequitas]

He is doing me a favor in his burning down of Analytical Philosophy and its linguistic turn, however I reject his claim that he had burned my [& the Kantian] philosophical stance.
Whatever is of Rorty in his 'Mirror of Nature,' it has no significant counter to Kantian-philosophy-proper.

Eeeeeh, he burns Kant's house down too... Your attempt to hide behind your executioner is futile.

I am not going to bother to find the pages/paragraphs for you now, here's you AI-fueled answer.

The AI is hallucinating some stuff, but the gist of what matters remains in tact.

In his influential work "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature," Richard Rorty offers a critique of Kant's philosophical project and its legacy. Here are some of the main points Rorty makes regarding Kant:

The Kantian project of grounding knowledge on transcendental arguments is misguided, according to Rorty. He argues that Kant's attempt to find ahistorical, permanent conditions for knowledge is itself an example of the kind of metaphysical thinking that Kant sought to undermine.
Rorty takes issue with Kant's distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, arguing that this duality sets up an unworkable split between how things appear to us and some inaccessible "thing-in-itself."
He criticizes Kant's idea of a permanent, ahistorical faculty of reason or mind that grounds knowledge. Rorty sees this as a remnant of Descartes' search for an Archimedean point of certainty.
Rorty argues that Kant's transcendental arguments rely on circular reasoning, presupposing the very concepts and mental faculties they are attempting to ground.
More broadly, Rorty rejects Kant's ambition to provide a philosophical "mirror of nature" - a theory that perfectly maps the intrinsic structures of the mind onto the intrinsic structures of reality.

In essence, Rorty sees Kant's transcendental idealism as a continuation of the representationalist epistemology that Kant criticized - the idea that we can find a single, privileged representation that perfectly captures reality. For Rorty, Kant is still trapped within the metaphysical tradition he aimed to overcome.

I have no complains on your using AI since I always do that but with reservations.

As I had stated, I have read Rorty's "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" very thoroughly.

Rorty critiqued Kant in Chapter III

• Chapter III The Idea Of A "Theory of Knowledge" 131
  1. Epistemology And Philosophy's Self-Image 131
  2. Locke's Confusion Of Explanation With Justification 139
  3. Kant's Confusion Of Predication With Synthesis 148
  4. Knowledge As Needing "Foundations" 155

As I had stated, Rorty's critique of Kant is not significant, if so, there would be a lot of 'noise' against Rorty from the Kantian community.

Yes, Kant did refer to representations in some restrictive perspective, but Kant did not claim what is supposedly represented is mind-independently real. The p-realists on the other hand claim that-which-is-represented [noumenon aka thing-in-itself] is mind-independently real and Kant critiqued that as chasing an illusion.

Nevertheless Kant accept the 'that-which-is-represented [noumenon aka thing-in-itself]' can be thought of in the mind and it is a VERY useful [pragmatic] illusion; in this case, Kant is a pragmatist.
For example an illusory God is a useful illusion for theists to soothe their angst from a no way out situation for them.
To a child, Santa is a mind-independent real person but any rational person will know it is merely an illusion in the mind of the child.

Rorty did not understand Kant thoroughly that while Kant referred to "representations" in the mind, they are ultimately illusory but nevertheless are useful illusions; in Kant's case, this illusion is necessary and useful [pragmatism as applied] for his Morality & Ethics project in striving Towards Perpetual Peace; all these are within a Complete System.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Rorty’s Ambivalent Relationship With Kant
James Tartaglia


Abstract
I argue that Kant is a key figure in understanding Rorty’s work, by drawing attention to the fact that although he is ostensibly the principal villain of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, at the end of that book Kant provides the basis of Rorty's positive proposal that we view the world “bifocally”. I show how this idea was re-worked as “irony” in Continency, Irony, and Solidarity, and became central to Rorty’s outlook. However, by allowing this Kantian influence into his thinking, Rorty made his position untenable. For Rortyan pragmatism undercuts the higher stance required by the concept of irony; and yet without this Kantian influence, Rorty would have been unable to justify his pluralism.

Rorty could not live with Kant but could not live without him either.

Link

[Veritas Aequitas]

Where and How Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature misinterpreted Kant;

I have never assimilated the writings of Descartes or Locke with sufficient care to assess Rorty's competence to discuss, much less dismiss, them.
I have, however, done so with respect to those of Kant and can affirm that Rorty knows not of what he writes.

I suspect, therefore, that his dismissal of Descartes and Locke is equally misguided.
-Evan Wm. Cameron

For the details,
see:
https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/serv ... d3/content