W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC
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Here is a detailed exposition of Wittgenstein's concept of 'Framework' that aligns with my Framework and System of Realization of Reality and Cognition [knowledge] FSRC;
From Wittgenstein Dictionary by Glock:
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Framework
One of the principles of Wittgenstein's early philosophy was the autonomy of sense: whether a proposition makes sense must not depend on another proposition's truth (NM 117; TLP 2.0211).
Language is a self-contained abstract system governed by rules of LOGICAL SYNTAX.
Recognizing the importance of the surroundings of Language is a major achievement of Wittgenstein's later reflections.
His first step is to radicalize the Tractatus's CONTEXTUALISM: a word has meaning only as part of a LANGUAGE-game, which itself is part of a communal FORM OF LIFE.
The second is a kind of naturalism.
Our linguistic and non-linguistic activities are conditioned by certain 'facts of nature'.
Our concepts rest on a 'scaffolding of facts' in that different facts of nature would make intelligible different 'concept-formations' (PI 11 230; RPP 1 {48; Z #350, 387-8).
In context Wittgenstein distinguishes three elements:
- 1. the GRAMMATICAL rules which constitute a Language-game like that of measurement;
2. the application of these rules in empirical propositions (specific measurements);
3. the framework or 'scaffolding' which allows us to operate the Language-game.
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
If Language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also in judgements.
135
This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.
It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement.
But what we call 'measuring' is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (PI "240— 2; see OC 5156)
This passage can be rendered consistent if 'agreement . . . in form of life' is not exhausted by agreement in definitions/judgements (i.e., opinions), but includes 'a consensus of action', of applying the same technique (LFM 183 4).
The idea that Language requires agreement in judgements as well as definitions would abolish logic, if communal consensus determined whether or not a particular measurement is correct.
This is why Wittgenstein insists that what counts as the correct application of rules (an accurate measurement) is determined by the rules themselves, which are our standards of correctness; the definition of 'correct measurement' is not 'what people agree on'.
These rules specify neither the results of particular measurements (b) — nor that there is general agreement in applying them (c) (RFM 322—5, 359—66, 379—89, 406—14; Z #319, 428—31; see RULE-FOLLOWING; TRUTH).
Nevertheless, without such agreement, the rules would 'lose their point' (PI 5142; RFM 200); a technique which did not produce such consensus would not be called 'measuring' (according to Wittgenstein, therefore, in this exceptional case the rules themselves do include a reference to consensus).
The required consensus in application is less stringent for emotion-terms, for example (LW Il 23—4; PI Il 224—8), and minimal for essentially contested terms like 'corrupt'.
Moreover, communal agreement is not the only framework or background condition for playing certain Language-games.
Thus, our concepts of measures work only in a world with relatively stable rigid objects; but this is not laid down in the rules of, for example, metric measurement.
What Wittgenstein calls 'facts of nature' play the same role (although sometimes by allowing consensus).
These facts fall into three groups:
General regularities concerning the world around us.
Objects do not vanish or come into existence, grow or shrink, etc., in a rapid or chaotic manner (PI 42).
Biological and anthropological facts concerning us. Our perceptual capacities allow us to discern such-and-such colours (Z #345, 368; PLP 250—4), our memory permits calculations of a certain complexity (MSI 18 131), our shared patterns of reaction allow us to teach (AWL 102; LFM 182)
— OSTENSIVE DEFINITION, for example, presupposes that human beings look not at the pointing finger (as cats do), but in the direction in which it points.
Socio-historical facts concerning particular groups or periods.
Our ways of speaking express practical needs and interests (REM 41, 80—1) shaped by history.
Given these facts, certain forms of representation will be 'practical' or 'impractical' (AWL 70).
Provided that the world is as it is, people who employed alternative ways of calculating or measuring for purposes similar to ours would have to make tedious adjustments.
By the same token, drastic changes in these facts could render our rules inadequate in this pragmatic sense.
They might not' only become impractical but even be inapplicable (PI {569; RFM 51—2, 200).
If objects constantly and unpredictably vanished or sprang into existence, our Language-game of counting would loose its 'point' or become 'unusable'.
So too would our colour-concepts if objects constantly changed their colours at random.
The rules of tennis do not include that it is to be played at Earth-gravity.
But tennis would be pointless on the moon (every serve would be an ace) and could not be played on Jupiter.
Although the framework conditions do not determine what the rules of the Language-game are, they partly determine what Language-games are played.
Hence they impose limits on the possibility of adopting different grammatical rules (see AUTONOMY OF LANGUAGE).
'Yes, but has nature nothing to say here?
Indeed she has — but she [Nature] makes her voice audible in another way.
"You'll surely run up against existence and non-existence somewhere!"
But that means against facts, not concepts' (Z {364).
The way we speak is part of human practice, and hence subject to the same kinds of factors that determine human behaviour in general.
However, these facts of nature do not provide a naturalistic justification of our grammar.
A change in the framework conditions would render our rules not incorrect (false to the facts) but pointless or obsolete (PG 109—10; Z "366-7; RPP 11 *347-53).
Wittgenstein would not even concede that given such-and-such framework conditions we are causally forced to adopt specific Language-games (Z \351).
The relative stability of the material world is a condition for measurement, but does not force us to adopt the metric system (that is a prerogative of the EC Commission).
Similarly, common colour discriminatory abilities and the relative constancy of the colours of things are framework conditions of any colour grammar, but these are compatible with widely differing colour grammars among the various Languages of mankind.
This is at odds with the idea that the right, or perhaps just inevitable, rules are those which we find natural.
Wittgenstein acknowledges that we find certain rules 'natural' (AWL 67; LFM e.g. 183, 243), but adds that this is relative to people and circumstances; it is not biologically fixed, but malleable, for example through education (Z Y87; PI *595—6).
contd..
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