Harbal wrote: ↑Fri Mar 29, 2024 11:36 am
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Mar 29, 2024 2:21 am
Harbal wrote: ↑Wed Mar 27, 2024 4:57 pm
It's not a question of its working.
It is, because your answer doesn't "work" as a logical statement. Consequences and intention are very different and sometimes even oppositional touchstones for working out what is moral.
Intentions are always about producing consequences.
Yes, they are: but often, what was intended notoriously does not issue in the expected consequence.
If you make a moral decision (a decision that has moral implications), the moral desirability of the anticipated consequences is an intrinsic part of your decision making process.
A part? Yes, of course. But if it's the major consideration, then that's Consequentialism. And Consequentialism holds that intentions are secondary to consequences, so if a person intended evil and, as so often happens, failed to get the negative result he aimed at, he still did a morally-right thing...even if he was acting on a deadly hatred for his neighbour.
If you talked a woman out of having an abortion, and then both she and her baby died during childbirth, because of some unforeseen complications, would that make your decision to dissuade her from having the abortion a morally bad decision? I would say not,...
Wait...now you're a Deontologist? Deontologists believe the motive is everything and the outcome can't be foreseen. So now you're arguing the opposite?
Do you see the problem there? Consequentialism would say I did the wrong thing. Deontology would say I did the right thing. So now, we need a meta-system, something "above" both Deontology and Consequentialism, to tell us whether what I did was moral or not.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:If a decision is made on what are considered to be
By whom? Who establishes what "good moral grounds" are?
You, me, the man next door, God; whoever is involved in making the decision.
That's no good, unless you want to accept that Hitler, Stalin and Mao are just as morally reliable as you and I are.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:...those who considered it to have been made on good moral grounds would regard it as a morally good decision, even if the consequences turned out to be disastrous.
So now you're going with intentions, and rejecting consequentialism.
No, I'm not changing anything. Even you, when you make a moral decision based on "objective moral truth" cannot guarantee that the consequences will be what you intended.
That's a Deontological argument. You are rejecting Consequentialism, then?
Harbal wrote:I don't think we are any kind of "specially exalted" creature, and I do think we are just another kind of beast. I do think human beings are a special case, but that is only because I am a member of the species.
Today's Lefties call that "speciesism," and damn it as as great sin as racism. They're nuts, of course...but they do have this much of a point: it's that if we are beasts, then there's no longer a reason to think of ourselves as better than or exempt from the natural laws governing beasts. And that leads to all kinds of absurdities and paradoxes, of course; so you might want to find a better reason to regard human beings as a "special case" than that you're just pulling for your own team.
I believe our sense of morality and our capacity for caring about the welfare of one another is a product of human evolution; it enables us to much more successfully function as a social species.
Except it often doesn't. People understand "caring" in different ways, and even when they don't, they often find that being "caring" ends up costing them something of serious value. A straightforward Social Darwinism would instruct them to seek out their own interests, and if they survive, they survive by survival-of-the-fittest; and if they die, they deserved to die by survival-of-the-fittest, and it's survival-of-the-fittest that promotes evolution and the ultimate good of the race, not some absurd attempt to manage outcomes (which, as you note, we cannot successfully do, anyway) in the interests of the "species" instead of ourselves.
Species survival is a moral imperative to a lot of people, but I am talking about it in the context of its being an evolutionary imperative.
Evolution has no "imperatives." It causes things to live, and it kills things...often whole species. If you think Evolution loves you, or loves the human race, and makes it imperative for them to win at the game of Evolution, then you'll have to explain why you think that.
Reason can only help with morality once you have a moral framework to which you can refer.
Now you've got it. That's why it's not reason alone that's necessary. You need the moral framework within which it can reason. Reason itself is a neutral property like mathematics: it is indifferent to content, and can be used for all kinds of content. So the substantive content upon which reason will be premises has to come before reason can do any work.
What you call "revelation" is just something that was written down a long time ago, and that you have chosen to accept as some kind of truth.
Do you have a better method for God to reveal the essential framework to mankind? If you do, I'd be interested in hearing what you think it should have been.
I can make a rational judgement to check that my behaviour is in tune with my moral principles; however, I didn't accumulate those principles by means of any rational process, but, rather, by an emotional one. I'm not trying to make a case for how effective or desirable that state of affairs is, I am just trying to explain my concept of what morality is.
I get that. But now you've made twinges the ultimate and final moral authority. If your emotions or feelings tell you something, then that becomes your "moral" premise. However, as you know, feelings are very treacherous little things. They change not only between people, but within you, all the time. So your moral framework is currently set on a foundation of sand. You cannot safely even trust it yourself, let alone structure an argument, a moral position, a judicial result, a social system, or anything else on it.
But it only makes them wrong is someone else's opinion.
And some opinions are right, and some are wrong.
But it can do that, because morality is relative, not absolute.
No, because as Aristotle so precisely pointed out, it is not possible for two equal and opposite claims to be true at the same time, in the same way. So it cannot be both moral and immoral to murder your baby.
As its being wrong is part of the definition of "murder", I daresay you are correct in that.
Say, "deliberately kill," then.
That point of view may well demonstrate good religion, but not good philosophy.
It's very good philosophy, too. Because Emotivism is not a sound basis for morality...and that's a generally-recognized truism among moral philosophers today. I don't think any real thinker since Hume has really made any case for Emotivism, and Hume's case was a kind of rearguard action to keep his is-ought from tipping over into Nihilism...a feint on which Nietzsche called him, actually.
You've said things about objectively morality, but you still have given no reason to think that such a thing could possibly exist. What you have is something along the lines of an unproven theory.
I have said a great deal more than Subjectivism has to offer. I have pointed out that IF God exists, then morality can be made intelligible and rational. IF God did not exist, it could not. That's a great deal more than nothing. At the very least, it lets us rule out Subjectivism. And then we face the choice Hume tried to avoid by recourse to Emotivism -- the choice between faith and Nihilism.
Those are the only rational choices there actually are. Subjectivism just doesn't work.