Conceptual Relativism

[Veritas Aequitas]

Conceptual Relativism aligns with my FSRC, i.e.

My principle of reality [FSRC];
All of reality, existence, facts, truths, justification, knowledge, description, and objectivity are contingent [conditioned] upon an embodied human-based Framework and System of Realization of Reality and Cognition [Knowledge] [FSRC].


Conceptual Relativism is;

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#ConRel
4.2 Conceptual Relativism

Conceptual Relativism is a narrowly delineated form of Relativism where ontology, or what exists, rather than ethical and epistemic norms, is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks.
In this sense, conceptual Relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine rather than as variant of epistemic or cultural Relativism.

The underlying rationale for this form of Relativism is the anti-realist thesis that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved; rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of categorizing and conceptualizing it [the world & reality].
Reflection on the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity, is the primary engine driving various forms of conceptual Relativism, but data from anthropology and linguistics are also used in its support.

The thought, at least since Kant, is that the human mind is not a passive faculty merely representing an independent reality; rather, it has an active role in shaping, if not constructing, the “real”.
The conceptual Relativist adds, as Kant did not, that human beings may construct the real in different ways thanks to differences in language or culture.

In the 20th century, a variety of positions sympathetic to conceptual Relativism were developed.
Quine’s ontological relativity, Nelson Goodman’s “irrealism” with its claim of the plurality of “world-versions” and Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity are prominent examples.
What these authors have in common is an insistence that there could be more than one “right” way of describing what there is, that incompatible “manuals of translation” and “world-versions” can be equally correct or acceptable.

Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity, probably the most influential of 20th century approaches to conceptual relativity, is expressed both in an epistemic as well as in a stronger metaphysical form.

Quine supports an epistemic thesis when he claims that incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available to us (his underdetermination thesis) and that “there are various defensible ways of conceiving the world”, (Quine 1992: 102).
But his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation makes the stronger claim that different incompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge, a position that leads to unavoidable ontological relativity.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Conceptual Relativism .. cont...

Nelson Goodman’s irrealism is an even more radical claim to the effect that the existence of many adequate, and indeed correct, but irreconcilable descriptions and representations of the world
shows that there is no such thing as one unique actual world;
rather there are many worlds, one for each correct description (e.g., Goodman 1975; cf. Sider 2009).

Hilary Putnam disagrees with Goodman’s formulation of relativity with its radical talk of “world-making” but relies on arguments from conceptual plurality to reject metaphysical realism, the view that there is one single correct account of what the world is like (cf., Arageorgis 2017).

According to Putnam, our most basic metaphysical categories, e.g., objecthood and existence, could be defined variously depending on what conceptual scheme we use.
What counts as an object itself, he argues, is determined by and hence is relative to the ontological framework we opt for.

Thomas Kuhn’s highly influential discussion of the governing role of paradigms in science (see §4.4.3) has also been interpreted as a form of conceptual Relativism by friends (Kusch 2002) and critics (Davidson 1974) of Relativism alike.

The key difficulty facing conceptual Relativism is that of formulating the position in a coherent but non-trivial manner.
Trivial versions allow that the world can be described in different ways, but make no claims to the incompatibility of these descriptions.
The charge of incoherence arises from the claim that there could be genuinely conflicting and equally true accounts or descriptions of one and the same phenomenon.
To use an example that is the corner-stone of Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity, Putnam claims that the simple question how many objects there are (say on a given table) could be answered variously depending on whether we use “a mereological or a Carnapian, common-sense, method of individuating objects”.

In circumstances where a Carnapian counts three objects A, B and C,
a mereologist will count seven: A, B, C, plus the mereological sum objects A+B, A+C, B+C, A+B+C.

As Putnam puts it:

The suggestion … is that what is (by commonsense standards) the same situation can be described in many different ways, depending on how we use the words.
The situation does not itself legislate how words like “object”, “entity”, and “exist” must be used.
What is wrong with the notion of objects existing “independently” of conceptual schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions apart from conceptual choices.
(Putnam 1988: 114).

The puzzle is to explain how both the Carnapian and mereological answers to the one and same question could be correct and yet mutually incompatible, for unless we abandon the most fundamental law of logic, the law of non-contradiction, we cannot deem one and the same proposition true and not true.
Relativists respond that both answers are correct, each relative to the conceptual scheme it invokes.

So, once we accept the insight that there is no Archimedean vantage point for choosing among conflicting frameworks, we no longer face a genuine contradiction.
The response invokes, often implicitly, a relativized conception of truth, which as we shall see below, faces its own difficulties.

There are ways to explain away those difficulties.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Skepdick]

Categories! Categories! Categories! So many different categories!

Every idiot is attempting to make their category-schema normative.

No wonder you are all confused.

[Iwannaplato]

Conceptual Relativism aligns with my FSRC, i.e.

My principle of reality [FSRC];
All of reality, existence, facts, truths, justification, knowledge, description, and objectivity are contingent [conditioned] upon an embodied human-based Framework and System of Realization of Reality and Cognition [Knowledge] [FSRC].


Conceptual Relativism is;

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#ConRel
4.2 Conceptual Relativism

Conceptual Relativism is a narrowly delineated form of Relativism where ontology, or what exists, rather than ethical and epistemic norms, is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks.
In this sense, conceptual Relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine rather than as variant of epistemic or cultural Relativism.

The underlying rationale for this form of Relativism is the anti-realist thesis that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved; rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of categorizing and conceptualizing it [the world & reality].
Reflection on the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity, is the primary engine driving various forms of conceptual Relativism, but data from anthropology and linguistics are also used in its support.

The thought, at least since Kant, is that the human mind is not a passive faculty merely representing an independent reality; rather, it has an active role in shaping, if not constructing, the “real”.
The conceptual Relativist adds, as Kant did not, that human beings may construct the real in different ways thanks to differences in language or culture.

In the 20th century, a variety of positions sympathetic to conceptual Relativism were developed.
Quine’s ontological relativity, Nelson Goodman’s “irrealism” with its claim of the plurality of “world-versions” and Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity are prominent examples.
What these authors have in common is an insistence that there could be more than one “right” way of describing what there is, that incompatible “manuals of translation” and “world-versions” can be equally correct or acceptable.

Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity, probably the most influential of 20th century approaches to conceptual relativity, is expressed both in an epistemic as well as in a stronger metaphysical form.

Quine supports an epistemic thesis when he claims that incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available to us (his underdetermination thesis) and that “there are various defensible ways of conceiving the world”, (Quine 1992: 102).
But his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation makes the stronger claim that different incompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge, a position that leads to unavoidable ontological relativity.

This is certainly closer to your positions, but immediately causes problems with your ontology of morality. Because then, again, it leads to relativism. Because the numb er of moral theories for any given action can be very large.

Incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available

Incompatible moral theories can account equally adequately for the data available.

You can try to tell them that we should have better mirror neurons and they can argue we should have more aggression neurons.
You can try to tell them that we should follow the oughtness to breathe and always respect others right to breathe and they can argue from their axioms about when one is allowed to shut off someone else's right to breathe, or right to be aggressive or right to defend themselves or .... and so on. Because those moral axioms are outside of the body and no amount of analysis of the body will make any compelling meta-shoulds.

It can tell us what any particular body needs to continue living.
It cannot tell us how long everyone should live, what physiological processes we should enhance, suppress, or in what situations we are allowed to do these things.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is certainly closer to your positions, but immediately causes problems with your ontology of morality. Because then, again, it leads to relativism. Because the numb er of moral theories for any given action can be very large.

Incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available

Incompatible moral theories can account equally adequately for the data available.

You can try to tell them that we should have better mirror neurons and they can argue we should have more aggression neurons.
You can try to tell them that we should follow the oughtness to breathe and always respect others right to breathe and they can argue from their axioms about when one is allowed to shut off someone else's right to breathe, or right to be aggressive or right to defend themselves or .... and so on. Because those moral axioms are outside of the body and no amount of analysis of the body will make any compelling meta-shoulds.

It can tell us what any particular body needs to continue living.
It cannot tell us how long everyone should live, what physiological processes we should enhance, suppress, or in what situations we are allowed to do these things.

I am confident of what I have proposed and have sufficient arguments to support it.
I won't waste time discussing it at present and in this instance.

You are interpreting from your very narrow perspective.
You still have a lot of thinking to do.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Categories! Categories! Categories! So many different categories!

Every idiot is attempting to make their category-schema normative.

No wonder you are all confused.

Which point of the author in the above from SEP are you referencing and critiquing?

[Skepdick]

Categories! Categories! Categories! So many different categories!

Every idiot is attempting to make their category-schema normative.

No wonder you are all confused.

Which point of the author in the above from SEP are you referencing and critiquing?

Their entire methodology! Everything the author used; and the approach the author took in order to make the point.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Categories! Categories! Categories! So many different categories!

Every idiot is attempting to make their category-schema normative.

No wonder you are all confused.

Which point of the author in the above from SEP are you referencing and critiquing?

Their entire methodology! Everything the author used; and the approach the author took in order to make the point.

Conceptual Relativism is no different from the Model Dependent Realism of Hawkins in terms of "what exists" and reality which is 'relative' to a model.