Anti-Realism Proper

[Skepdick]

First of all, a new theory (Einstein's in particular) does not negate the old one (Newton's in particular), but complements it, because Einstein's equations naturally transform into Newton's at low speeds. Newton's theory is still valid at speeds small compared to the speed of light.

But the fundamental theoretical descriptions of "what gravity is" changes between the theories!
Newton says "gravity is a force".
Einstein says "gravity is NOT a force".

Newton says "The observed phenomena are a consequence of gravity."
Einstein says "The observed phenomena are a consequence of the curvature of spacetime."

The utility of the two theories aside the two theories paint a very different picture of what gravity is. So where's the "realism"?

And secondly, you don't seem to deny at all that anti-realism is also practically anti-useful at the same time.

You expected me to even engage with such stupidity?!? Even in the form of denial?

[nemos]

Newton says "The observed phenomena are a consequence of gravity."
Einstein says "The observed phenomena are a consequence of the curvature of spacetime."

You expected me to even engage with such stupidity?!? Even in the form of denial?

I still don't see the contradictions, Newton didn't have access to the facts used by Einstein, which means a different understanding and formulation for the same objectivity. Objectivity is not denied, but explained in depth.
About the same way a 5-year-old child, a lumberjack, a carpenter or a botanist could explain the concept of a tree. Everyone will have different explanations, but everyone will describe the same objectivity and each part of the truth according to everyone's understanding, and it is likely that none of them will be completely false or true. As I said, the description/model of reality will always be more or less incomplete (like the number π, which can only be described with any necessary approximation accuracy, but not absolutely accurately), because the values will be subjective.

Yes, and stupidity is a double-edged sword, so be careful when using it.

[seeds]

Ok, I got your point but what do you mean?

You asked us to "imagine a situation" in which the perceiver does not exist, and I provided you with one such situation.

Well, actually the perceiver exists as far as there is a change. I call the perceiver the mind.

Yes, many of us are guilty of doing that. However, in truth, it is the "I Am-ness"...

(the mind's living, self-aware "agent")

...that does the perceiving. Therefore, it is a misnomer to call the perceiver the mind, for the mind is simply the spatial "arena" in-which the perceiving (and manipulation of mental holography) takes place.

And like I discussed with you in your "The whole is boundless" thread, even though like the universe, minds appear to be infinite (boundless) as seen from the inside, they are nevertheless bounded by reason of the limited (finite) amount of the life essence that makes up the sum-total of each individual mind itself.

By the object of experience, I mean the stuff you experience, namely Quidia.

Once again, you asked us to imagine a situation in which the object of experience does not exist, and once again I provided one.

Well, if the mind exists then it simply means that the object of experience also exists.

Yes, if the mind exists, then the mind (or the boundless spatial "arena" mentioned earlier) would indeed be one of the many objects that the perceiver (the "I Am-ness/agent") would experience.

Furthermore, bahman, please do a Google search of the word "Quidia" and see if it means what you think it means. I'm pretty sure the word you are looking for is "Qualia.". We've been over this before, except last time you called it "Quadia."

Yes, we have been through this. I however distinguish between Quidia and Qualia, the first one is the object of experience and the second one is the property of the first.

You could instantly settle this little dispute if you would simply provide a link to any online dictionary, or to anywhere on the Internet where the word "Quidia" is not only presented as an actual word, but as a word that is used to describe an "object of experience."

So, do it, bahman, give us the link. And if it proves to support your argument, I will apologize for doubting you.

However, if you can't do that, then just admit your, perhaps, "unintentional" error and we'll move on.

I believe in Bohmian interpretation.

I too like Bohm's ideas.

However, I see a problem with his promotion of the "pilot wave" theory, because even though the proponents of the theory think they are being sensible by suggesting that the subatomic particles themselves are real objects, and that a so-called "pilot wave" allegedly guides the particles into their varying positions on, for example, the phosphorescent screen of the double slit experiment,...

...the theory nevertheless doesn't seem to explain what the "pilot wave" itself is made of.

On the other hand, I really like his musings on what he calls the "Implicate Order"...

(meaning the superpositioned/entangled, "non-local" reality of the quantum realm)

...and the "Explicate Order"...

(meaning the "local reality" of the phenomenal [3-D] features of the universe)

...and how it all seems to be "holographic-like" in nature.

He even goes so far as to call the entangled "Implicate Order" the "Holomovement."

I also appreciate Bohm because he wasn't afraid to risk his credibility by exploring metaphysical ideas with men like Jiddu Krishnamurti...

I didn't study his thoughts to that extent. Good to know about them, some food to eat! To me, his idea is attractive because it removes all the absurdity of other interpretations, such as Schrodinger cat,...

Yeah, but like I said, it doesn't explain what the "pilot wave" is made of.

Therefore, even though it may remove the absurdity of the Schrödinger's cat paradox derived from the Copenhagen Interpretation, unfortunately, it does it in a way that is similar to Everett's "Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" (MWI), which is even more absurd than the Copenhagen and Pilot Wave interpretations combined.

Indeed, British physicist David Deutsch summed it up nicely in an article he wrote many years ago...

"...In short, pilot-wave theories are parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial..."

To me, pilot waves are real and actually exist.

Okay, then please give us an unambiguous description of what the "pilot waves" are made of.
_______

[Skepdick]

Newton says "The observed phenomena are a consequence of gravity."
Einstein says "The observed phenomena are a consequence of the curvature of spacetime."

You expected me to even engage with such stupidity?!? Even in the form of denial?

I still don't see the contradictions, Newton didn't have access to the facts used by Einstein, which means a different understanding and formulation for the same objectivity. Objectivity is not denied, but explained in depth.

You don't see the contradiction in Newton calling it a force, and Einstein rejecting it as a force? What the fuck?
Do you see a contradiction in you calling it "objectivity" and me calling it a "non-objectivity" ?

[puto]

"The Brain in the Vat," is about certainty and perceptions of the external world. Fundamental about the nature of reality and limits of human knowledge, Using, induction as a problem solver. There is no rational justification the future will resemble the past. Evidence and the limits of human knowledge. Please read some Descartes' for, "The Brain in the Vat," and Hume for, "The problem of Induction." Like I used to say, "That is my opinion, I could be wrong." I am more than an opinion, now. I dislike the Cynics.

[bahman]

You asked us to "imagine a situation" in which the perceiver does not exist, and I provided you with one such situation.

Well, actually the perceiver exists as far as there is a change. I call the perceiver the mind.

Yes, many of us are guilty of doing that. However, in truth, it is the "I Am-ness"...

(the mind's living, self-aware "agent")

...that does the perceiving. Therefore, it is a misnomer to call the perceiver the mind, for the mind is simply the spatial "arena" in-which the perceiving (and manipulation of mental holography) takes place.

And like I discussed with you in your "The whole is boundless" thread, even though like the universe, minds appear to be infinite (boundless) as seen from the inside, they are nevertheless bounded by reason of the limited (finite) amount of the life essence that makes up the sum-total of each individual mind itself.

To me, the mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause. It is omnipresent in spacetime.

Once again, you asked us to imagine a situation in which the object of experience does not exist, and once again I provided one.

Well, if the mind exists then it simply means that the object of experience also exists.

Yes, if the mind exists, then the mind (or the boundless spatial "arena" mentioned earlier) would indeed be one of the many objects that the perceiver (the "I Am-ness/agent") would experience.

Yup.

Furthermore, bahman, please do a Google search of the word "Quidia" and see if it means what you think it means. I'm pretty sure the word you are looking for is "Qualia.". We've been over this before, except last time you called it "Quadia."

Yes, we have been through this. I however distinguish between Quidia and Qualia, the first one is the object of experience and the second one is the property of the first.

You could instantly settle this little dispute if you would simply provide a link to any online dictionary, or to anywhere on the Internet where the word "Quidia" is not only presented as an actual word, but as a word that is used to describe an "object of experience."

So, do it, bahman, give us the link. And if it proves to support your argument, I will apologize for doubting you.

However, if you can't do that, then just admit your, perhaps, "unintentional" error and we'll move on.

To me, Quidia refers to the stuff that the mind experiences and causes. That includes physical substance, forces,... Well, I don't know of another word that can explain the idea well. I took the idea from the link that Skepdick provided but that link does not exist anymore.

I too like Bohm's ideas.

However, I see a problem with his promotion of the "pilot wave" theory, because even though the proponents of the theory think they are being sensible by suggesting that the subatomic particles themselves are real objects, and that a so-called "pilot wave" allegedly guides the particles into their varying positions on, for example, the phosphorescent screen of the double slit experiment,...

...the theory nevertheless doesn't seem to explain what the "pilot wave" itself is made of.

On the other hand, I really like his musings on what he calls the "Implicate Order"...

(meaning the superpositioned/entangled, "non-local" reality of the quantum realm)

...and the "Explicate Order"...

(meaning the "local reality" of the phenomenal [3-D] features of the universe)

...and how it all seems to be "holographic-like" in nature.

He even goes so far as to call the entangled "Implicate Order" the "Holomovement."

I also appreciate Bohm because he wasn't afraid to risk his credibility by exploring metaphysical ideas with men like Jiddu Krishnamurti...

I didn't study his thoughts to that extent. Good to know about them, some food to eat! To me, his idea is attractive because it removes all the absurdity of other interpretations, such as Schrodinger cat,...

Yeah, but like I said, it doesn't explain what the "pilot wave" is made of.

Therefore, even though it may remove the absurdity of the Schrödinger's cat paradox derived from the Copenhagen Interpretation, unfortunately, it does it in a way that is similar to Everett's "Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" (MWI), which is even more absurd than the Copenhagen and Pilot Wave interpretations combined.

Indeed, British physicist David Deutsch summed it up nicely in an article he wrote many years ago...

"...In short, pilot-wave theories are parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial..."

To me, pilot waves are real and actually exist.

Okay, then please give us an unambiguous description of what the "pilot waves" are made of.
_______

To me everything, including the mind, physical, forces, and pilot wave are substances. It is not proper to say for example what physical are made of. The same applies to the pilot wave.

[nemos]

To me everything, including the mind, physical, forces, and pilot wave are substances. It is not proper to say for example what physical are made of. The same applies to the pilot wave.

I could describe my vision with quite similar words. I just don't know if the words will also express a similar content:
There is nothing immaterial. Anything that interacts with us, directly or indirectly, is material(in the meaning, that something can be created from it, for example dreams and hopes) and cognizable. Anything that does not interact with us, not even indirectly, is non cognizable and does not exist for us.

[bahman]

To me everything, including the mind, physical, forces, and pilot wave are substances. It is not proper to say for example what physical are made of. The same applies to the pilot wave.

I could describe my vision with quite similar words. I just don't know if the words will also express a similar content:
There is nothing immaterial. Anything that interacts with us, directly or indirectly, is material(in the meaning, that something can be created from it, for example dreams and hopes) and knowable. Anything that does not interact with us, not even indirectly, is unknowable and does not exist for us.

Correct.

[Iwannaplato]

Metaphysical antirealists are actually metaphysical realists

Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a mind-independent reality that exists and has properties independently of our thoughts, perceptions, or language. Metaphysical antirealism is the view that denies one or more of these claims. However, I will argue that metaphysical antirealists are actually committed to a form of metaphysical realism, because they cannot avoid making some assumptions or assertions about the nature of reality that go beyond perspectives, including intersubjective ones. My ten objections.

The problem of criterion: Metaphysical antirealists often challenge metaphysical realists to provide a criterion for determining what is real and what is not. However, this challenge presupposes that there is a correct or objective way of answering this question, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such criterion, then the challenge is meaningless. If there is such a criterion, then the antirealist must either accept it or provide an alternative, which also implies a form of realism

The paradox of fiction: Metaphysical antirealists often appeal to fictional entities or scenarios to illustrate their view that reality is mind-dependent or language-dependent. However, this appeal is paradoxical, because it assumes that there is a distinction between fiction and reality, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such distinction, then the appeal is irrelevant. If there is such a distinction, then the antirealist must either explain it or admit it, which also implies a form of realism

The self-refutation argument: Metaphysical antirealists often claim that their view is true or better than the realist view. However, this claim is self-refuting, because it assumes that there is a truth or a standard of comparison that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such truth or standard, then the claim is meaningless. If there is such a truth or standard, then the antirealist must either acknowledge it or justify it, which also implies a form of realism

The pragmatic argument: Metaphysical antirealists often argue that their view is more useful or practical than the realist view. However, this argument is pragmatic, because it assumes that there is a value or a purpose that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such value or purpose, then the argument is pointless. If there is such a value or purpose, then the antirealist must either accept it or explain it, which also implies a form of realism

The coherence argument: Metaphysical antirealists often contend that their view is more coherent or consistent than the realist view. However, this contention is coherent, because it assumes that there is a logic or a system that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such logic or system, then the contention is arbitrary. If there is such a logic or system, then the antirealist must either follow it or account for it, which also implies a form of realism

The empirical argument: Metaphysical antirealists often rely on empirical evidence or observations to support their view. However, this reliance is empirical, because it assumes that there is a reality or a world that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such reality or world, then the reliance is baseless. If there is such a reality or world, then the antirealist must either admit it or interpret it, which also implies a form of realism

The modal argument: Metaphysical antirealists often invoke modal notions or possibilities to defend their view. However, this invocation is modal, because it assumes that there is a necessity or a contingency that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such necessity or contingency, then the invocation is vacuous. If there is such a necessity or contingency, then the antirealist must either recognize it or explain it, which also implies a form of realism.

The semantic argument: Metaphysical antirealists often use semantic concepts or terms to express their view. However, this use is semantic, because it assumes that there is a meaning or a reference that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such meaning or reference, then the use is meaningless. If there is such a meaning or reference, then the antirealist must either acknowledge it or define it, which also implies a form of realism.

The ontological argument: Metaphysical antirealists often posit ontological categories or entities to explain their view. However, this positing is ontological, because it assumes that there is a being or an existence that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such being or existence, then the positing is groundless. If there is such a being or existence, then the antirealist must either concede it or describe it, which also implies a form of realism.

The epistemological argument: Metaphysical antirealists often adopt epistemological positions or methods to justify their view. However, this adoption is epistemological, because it assumes that there is a knowledge or a justification that is independent of their own view, which implies a form of realism. If there is no such knowledge or justification, then the adoption is unjustified. If there is such a knowledge or justification, then the antirealist must either agree with it or criticize it, which also implies a form of realism.

Therefore, metaphysical antirealists are actually metaphysical realists, because they cannot avoid making some assumptions or assertions about the nature of reality that go beyond perspectives, even intersubjective ones. This argument shows that metaphysical antirealism is either incoherent, self-defeating,