The fact is, moral-fact-deniers' 'what is fact' is very superficial, redundant and grounded upon an illusion.
Note: mind-independent is the same as independent of human conditions, i.e. things exist regardless there are humans or not.
R. W. Newell in OBJECTIVITY, EMPIRICISM AND TRUTH
argued there are "Two Faces of Objectivity"
see: viewtopic.php?t=41214
The first face of Objectivity is based on mind-independent things and reality. This 1st face is adopted by realists [philosophical].
The 2nd face is somehow conditioned upon the human conditions and actions on a collective-of-subjects basis.
Newell argued,
Another way, p-realists attempt to sustain 'objectivity' is to relate to 'facts'.Objectivity's first face makes objectivity a redundant concept.
It is replaceable by the notions it tries to explain, and to characterize ‘the problem of the external world’ as ‘the problem of objectivity’ is just to redescribe the issue.
It might be allowed that the term ‘objectivity’, as it is used in the context of the first picture, has a broadly summarizing function and serves as a kind of shorthand description of what would otherwise be a more prolix statement.
That the term [objective 1st face] does have this summarizing role to a large extent in philosophical writing emphasizes again its essential redundancy, for it could possess such a role only if it is implicitly recognized as a near-replacement for the more lengthy stories it abbreviates.
The first of objectivity's two faces is of little interest beyond any interest there may be in the issues of outer objects and their representation.
But the relating objectivity with facts introduce a dilemma making facts problematic and redundant.Nevertheless it [p-realists] may continue to influence attempts to preserve the independence of beliefs from things outside them by broadly identifying objective particulars with ‘the facts’.
For it may be thought that the objectivity of an empirical judgment is ensured if it successfully mirrors the facts which it is about, giving it a topic of reference independent of awareness.
The search for objectivity would, once again, be a search for ‘real’ properties guaranteeing interpersonal commensurability.
The realistic and practical point is this:The importance of facts is usually seen to lie in the capacity to explain truth.
Since the evidence for the truth of a judgment about the world lies elsewhere than in its being asserted or believed,
it is persuasively argued that whatever makes such a judgment true must have the same sort of independence from self [aperson] as is credited to objective particulars in their role of outer objects, and it seems that facts alone can do this.
Thus a fact is a container of a set of objects, relations and properties
which gives a judgment the truth-value it has,
and to say that a judgment is true is to say that there is some fact which it [a judgment] is about.
Alternatively it has been argued that the expression ‘a fact’ is never an answer to the question ‘What are true judgments about?’
for facts are not things in the world, nor do true judgments correspond to them;
instead, judgments state facts when they are true.'
Yet the attaching of facts either to the world or to language yields an unhappy dilemma:
attached to the world, facts become items to be picked out or identified,
but they can be picked out only by statements that are already true;
and attached to language, facts become identified with the true statements which pick them out, making facts redundant.
‘Facts’ remain as elusive as ever.
Thus to establish what is fact-proper is testify [verify and justify] its objectivity within "an appropriate and correct way" i.e. via a human-based Framework and System of Realization [FSR] and Knowledge [FSK].Of course, what true statements state hardly encompass unstated facts, so that the identification of ‘fact’ and ‘what a true statement states’ seems wrong without severe qualification, ultimately admitting facts in addition to statements;
and with their admission it seems essential to free the notion of ‘fact’ from any internal connection with belief or awareness if the occurrence of facts is to explain truth.
The expedient recipe is to envisage the facts’ as independent non-linguistic correlates of judgments and allow facts to become bearers of objectivity.
Why do we say that something is a ‘fact’?
The unexceptional answer is that if something is a fact it actually happened or really is so.
When it is said that a man's having jaundice, being in debt or being a musician is a fact, what is meant is that he actually has jaundice, is in debt and is a musician, that it is not speculation, that it is so with him.
It is natural to think that the fact is his jaundiced condition or his condition of being in debt, or of being a musician; and since his condition is something in the world, the fact, too, is something in the world.
Yet this line of thought returns directly to the earlier impasse about facts and again to the question: what kind of things must facts be?
It might be replied that facts are not things beyond states of affairs, for calling something a fact is an assertion of the occurrence of what was said to be the fact.
So why not drop the expression ‘fact’ altogether and just state what happened?
This tempting economy cuts facts loose from a further job they must perform.
Fact-stating expressions stake two claims, that a thing is so and that it has been found to be so.
By saying that such and such ‘is a fact’ a person conveys more than merely that his statement is true, for he also conveys that what he calls ‘a fact’ has been established to be the case.
To assert that a man's jaundice or indebtedness is a fact is to testify to others that it has been ascertained in an appropriate and correct way to be so.
What is a [FSK-ed] Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
The fact is, the moral-fact-deniers' [MFDs] 'what is fact' is very superficial, redundant and grounded upon an illusion. If MFDs still insist their 'what is fact' is realistic, prove your claim.