The qualia problem does not exist-here's why

[Joseph Ball]

The alleged qualia problem is at the heart of the so-called problem of consciousness. I studied this at college over 30 years ago, so bear with me. The qualia problem was used as a critique of mind-body identity by my (brilliant) idealist tutor (Professor Howard Robinson) at the University of Liverpool. He stated that materialist concepts of the mind could not explain qualia (perceptions of objects, taste sensation, sounds etc.) It is true we know what causes qualia-electrical signals between neurons, but that does not explain what a qualia is. A qualia is not knowledge of a neuron firing. It is, supposedly, a 'mental picture' of a red shirt or whatever.

This notion creates a separate 'mental phenomenon' that in turn creates room for notions of the soul, dualism, or in Professor Robinson's case idealism. It also underlines our (I believe false) notion that we have this mysterious 'consciousness' which is seemingly impossible to explain.

Imagine, however, a super-being that does not perceive red shirts and the taste of orange juice. Instead, it is just aware of where the various neurons are in the brain that give rise to such perceptions in humans and it is aware when neurons are firing in certain patterns. Knowing these patterns enables the super-being to navigate its way around the world, putting on red t-shirts and deciding to drink orange juice. After all, it can learn, just like a human, what happens when it puts on a shirt, it knows the undesirable 'cold' neuron patterns stop firing. The super-being, however, has no qualia or perceptions of t-shirts or orange juice. The super-being has perception on an entirely materialist basis with no question of anything giving rise to a 'mental substance'.

Fine, you may say, but we are not super-beings, and we do have qualia. But what if qualia are just a crude, macro form of what the super-being perceives?

Let's imagine the super-being is analogous to another super-being that only sees things at an atomic level and never perceives things as rocks, trees, rivers etc. No one would say a human has some metaphysically different perception of the world than a being that can see things at a more microscopic level.

The analogy suggests, in my view, that our original qualia-free super-being is simply experiencing the contents of their mind at a much deeper level than a mere human who experiences the neurons firing as an experience of a red shirt appearing in their mind.

The objection might be made that their knowledge of the position of neuron patterns is in itself a 'qualia experience', but to me, this would be redundant. The super-being does not need human language to tell themselves where the neurons are firing or 'mental pictures' of them. Their awareness is just of the firing they can sense what the patterns are and this sense creates other patterns of firing as they respond to stimuli by initiating behaviour. Labelling this a 'conscious experience' is unnecessary. As Ryle might say why double up an experience to make it a 'qualia experience' or a 'conscious experience' once you are not making mental pictures or saying things to yourself in your mind in human language?

This thought experiment, I believe, creates a plausible model of consciousness. Whether biological reality quite accords with the idea of qualia as macro-representations of neurons firing is not so important. Once we have one logically correct materialist model of the mind, we know at least that it is possible to find a coherent basis for discovering a materialist model that is fully in accordance with the empirics of biology.

[Iwannaplato]

Imagine, however, a super-being that does not perceive red shirts and the taste of orange juice. Instead, it is just aware of where the various neurons are in the brain that give rise to such perceptions in humans and it is aware when neurons are firing in certain patterns.

If the superbeing is aware, then it is experiencing qualia. If it is merely reacting, like a complicated robot, then perhaps it does not experience qualia.

The analogy suggests, in my view, that our original qualia-free super-being is simply experiencing the contents of their mind at a much deeper level than a mere human who experiences the neurons firing as an experience of a red shirt appearing in their mind.

And again' experiencing'. This implies qualia. If it is reacting, like a fire alarm or some other device, if at a very complicated level, and not experiencing, fine. Then it has no qualia.

The objection might be made that their knowledge of the position of neuron patterns is in itself a 'qualia experience', but to me, this would be redundant. The super-being does not need human language to tell themselves where the neurons are firing or 'mental pictures' of them.

If it's experiencing something, is aware of it, then it there are qualia involved.

Their awareness is just of the firing they can sense what the patterns are and this sense creates other patterns of firing as they respond to stimuli by initiating behaviour. Labelling this a 'conscious experience' is unnecessary.

Awareness, same issue.

As Ryle might say why double up an experience to make it a 'qualia experience' or a 'conscious experience' once you are not making mental pictures or saying things to yourself in your mind in human language?

Certainly consciousness/awareness/qualia could all be a facet of matter. But then we have to ask ourselves why some matter is conscious and some is not (if that is our position - iow if we are not panpsychists for example).

This thought experiment, I believe, creates a plausible model of consciousness. Whether biological reality quite accords with the idea of qualia as macro-representations of neurons firing is not so important. Once we have one logically correct materialist model of the mind, we know at least that it is possible to find a coherent basis for discovering a materialist model that is fully in accordance with the empirics of biology.

What does materialist mean? Which will entail explaining what 'matter' means.

As far as I can see what get's called matter is an expanding set with increasing variation of qualities. I don't think the term means anything except 'considered real' by those who are materialists.

[Sculptor]

The alleged qualia problem is at the heart of the so-called problem of consciousness. I studied this at college over 30 years ago, so bear with me. The qualia problem was used as a critique of mind-body identity by my (brilliant) idealist tutor (Professor Howard Robinson) at the University of Liverpool. He stated that materialist concepts of the mind could not explain qualia (perceptions of objects, taste sensation, sounds etc.) It is true we know what causes qualia-electrical signals between neurons, but that does not explain what a qualia is. A qualia is not knowledge of a neuron firing. It is, supposedly, a 'mental picture' of a red shirt or whatever.

This notion creates a separate 'mental phenomenon' that in turn creates room for notions of the soul, dualism, or in Professor Robinson's case idealism. It also underlines our (I believe false) notion that we have this mysterious 'consciousness' which is seemingly impossible to explain.

Imagine, however, a super-being that does not perceive red shirts and the taste of orange juice. Instead, it is just aware of where the various neurons are in the brain that give rise to such perceptions in humans and it is aware when neurons are firing in certain patterns. Knowing these patterns enables the super-being to navigate its way around the world, putting on red t-shirts and deciding to drink orange juice. After all, it can learn, just like a human, what happens when it puts on a shirt, it knows the undesirable 'cold' neuron patterns stop firing. The super-being, however, has no qualia or perceptions of t-shirts or orange juice. The super-being has perception on an entirely materialist basis with no question of anything giving rise to a 'mental substance'.

Fine, you may say, but we are not super-beings, and we do have qualia. But what if qualia are just a crude, macro form of what the super-being perceives?

Let's imagine the super-being is analogous to another super-being that only sees things at an atomic level and never perceives things as rocks, trees, rivers etc. No one would say a human has some metaphysically different perception of the world than a being that can see things at a more microscopic level.

The analogy suggests, in my view, that our original qualia-free super-being is simply experiencing the contents of their mind at a much deeper level than a mere human who experiences the neurons firing as an experience of a red shirt appearing in their mind.

The objection might be made that their knowledge of the position of neuron patterns is in itself a 'qualia experience', but to me, this would be redundant. The super-being does not need human language to tell themselves where the neurons are firing or 'mental pictures' of them. Their awareness is just of the firing they can sense what the patterns are and this sense creates other patterns of firing as they respond to stimuli by initiating behaviour. Labelling this a 'conscious experience' is unnecessary. As Ryle might say why double up an experience to make it a 'qualia experience' or a 'conscious experience' once you are not making mental pictures or saying things to yourself in your mind in human language?

This thought experiment, I believe, creates a plausible model of consciousness. Whether biological reality quite accords with the idea of qualia as macro-representations of neurons firing is not so important. Once we have one logically correct materialist model of the mind, we know at least that it is possible to find a coherent basis for discovering a materialist model that is fully in accordance with the empirics of biology.

The idea of qualia and the conclusions of your professor bring us no nearer to understanding consciousness.
What qualia theory shows is that to each of us there is a potentially unique way we perceive the world, which is not understandable simply by reference to the material realities of the thing perceived . So that there is nothing apriori about that wavelength of light which suggests "redness", but for each of us through convention we all agree that the quale for "red" is what we call "red".
Mononchrome Mary could never recognise red when she sees it finally emerging into the colourful world until another person shows her which of the colours she now sees are the ones she knows scientifically with her instruments.
None of this gives us the answers to conscious perception, but what it does do is to demonstrate the physical mechanisms of the process; to wit -colour, smell and taste are not "out there", but are how human perception represents certain critical factors of our environment.
For instance. Each day I walk the dogs and take them to thei hunting ground. I cast bits of chopped carrot (which they love) over an area, and they get enrichment by hunting for them. For my observations it is pretty clear that they cannot see "orange", and rely on something which, for me is paulty in comparison. The dogs do not so much see the carrots as smell them. For me carrots have a minor smell, which I have to have my nose up against to detect, but I can see them metres away on the grass, conversely the dogs smell them for some distance but cannot see them unless they are close up.
The carrots are colourless and have no smell. There are characteristics about carrots the we can detect which are part of out conscious experience.
Thus we are not observing the world objectively, neither are the dogs. If we were we would be seeing and smelling the same thing.
Yet all of this points to a very materialistic world view. It not only relies on various characteristics of the objects of our perception, but of the structures and equipment we possess in our brains. Dog's organs of perception are different - so their world is different.
None of this even implies a non material basis for perception.
What it can tell us is that all living things have evolved systems whereby the material world in which they strive to seek food and warmth have taken different pathways, which best approximate their niches in the biota.

[Atla]

The alleged qualia problem is at the heart of the so-called problem of consciousness. I studied this at college over 30 years ago, so bear with me. The qualia problem was used as a critique of mind-body identity by my (brilliant) idealist tutor (Professor Howard Robinson) at the University of Liverpool. He stated that materialist concepts of the mind could not explain qualia (perceptions of objects, taste sensation, sounds etc.) It is true we know what causes qualia-electrical signals between neurons, but that does not explain what a qualia is. A qualia is not knowledge of a neuron firing. It is, supposedly, a 'mental picture' of a red shirt or whatever.

This notion creates a separate 'mental phenomenon' that in turn creates room for notions of the soul, dualism, or in Professor Robinson's case idealism. It also underlines our (I believe false) notion that we have this mysterious 'consciousness' which is seemingly impossible to explain.

Imagine, however, a super-being that does not perceive red shirts and the taste of orange juice. Instead, it is just aware of where the various neurons are in the brain that give rise to such perceptions in humans and it is aware when neurons are firing in certain patterns. Knowing these patterns enables the super-being to navigate its way around the world, putting on red t-shirts and deciding to drink orange juice. After all, it can learn, just like a human, what happens when it puts on a shirt, it knows the undesirable 'cold' neuron patterns stop firing. The super-being, however, has no qualia or perceptions of t-shirts or orange juice. The super-being has perception on an entirely materialist basis with no question of anything giving rise to a 'mental substance'.

Fine, you may say, but we are not super-beings, and we do have qualia. But what if qualia are just a crude, macro form of what the super-being perceives?

Let's imagine the super-being is analogous to another super-being that only sees things at an atomic level and never perceives things as rocks, trees, rivers etc. No one would say a human has some metaphysically different perception of the world than a being that can see things at a more microscopic level.

The analogy suggests, in my view, that our original qualia-free super-being is simply experiencing the contents of their mind at a much deeper level than a mere human who experiences the neurons firing as an experience of a red shirt appearing in their mind.

The objection might be made that their knowledge of the position of neuron patterns is in itself a 'qualia experience', but to me, this would be redundant. The super-being does not need human language to tell themselves where the neurons are firing or 'mental pictures' of them. Their awareness is just of the firing they can sense what the patterns are and this sense creates other patterns of firing as they respond to stimuli by initiating behaviour. Labelling this a 'conscious experience' is unnecessary. As Ryle might say why double up an experience to make it a 'qualia experience' or a 'conscious experience' once you are not making mental pictures or saying things to yourself in your mind in human language?

This thought experiment, I believe, creates a plausible model of consciousness. Whether biological reality quite accords with the idea of qualia as macro-representations of neurons firing is not so important. Once we have one logically correct materialist model of the mind, we know at least that it is possible to find a coherent basis for discovering a materialist model that is fully in accordance with the empirics of biology.

Sorry I just can't express this in understandable English. But anyway:

Yes, the Occam's razor view is that qualia ARE simply what a part of your neural network is like from the internal perspective. So the qualia problem probably doesn't exist.

But of course we'll have to invert the usual picture a bit, where we start from neurons, and then try to fit qualia to them as somehow representative of neurons firing / somehow the same thing as neurons firing.

In truth, we always have to start from the qualia. Everything we experience are qualia. All our perceptions, ideas, theories, abstractions etc. about the external world are technically made of qualia. Our idea of a 'neuron' is technically a quale too. And a 'neuron' is a representation of something, viewed from the outside. It's a pointer, not the thing itself.

A quale that points to other quales, conceptualized in a certain way and in a certain context, from an outside perspective.

So it's more like: we have to start from qualia, and then try to fit our ideas of neural networks to these qualia. That these ideas of neural networks are somehow representative of these qualia / somehow the same thing as these qualia.

The above is a nondual picture. There is only experience. The "physical" world is the conceptualized structure of experience. Experience is what the physical world is from the first person perspective. I'm not aware of any good reason to think that the Western dualistic pictures, which aren't the Occam's razor choices, would be the correct ones. Guess your professor was relying on some kind of circular reasoning, when he used the qualia problem as a critique of mind-body identity.

[lorenzosleakes]

We are all dualists from a practical coomon-sense standpoint even if we think that it is an illusion and only monism is real. That is there is great practical value in thinking that I as a conscious entity experience a world of real objects external to me from a particular perspective or point of view. The mistake which Galileo started was in believing that qualities such as colors exist only in the mind and not in the physical world. This creates a dual problem - the brain must create colors, sounds, etc, but also bind them together into a single self. More practical to not conflate and view these as two seperate problems: how the brain creates qualities and how they are bounded, observed and acted on. If qualities are part of the physical world then the brain uses pre-existing psycho-physical laws to generate qualities, the same physical laws that generate qualities external to brains.
see https://philarchive.org/rec/SLESTU

[Atla]

We are all dualists from a practical coomon-sense standpoint even if we think that it is an illusion and only monism is real. That is there is great practical value in thinking that I as a conscious entity experience a world of real objects external to me from a particular perspective or point of view. The mistake which Galileo started was in believing that qualities such as colors exist only in the mind and not in the physical world. This creates a dual problem - the brain must create colors, sounds, etc, but also bind them together into a single self. More practical to not conflate and view these as two seperate problems: how the brain creates qualities and how they are bounded, observed and acted on. If qualities are part of the physical world then the brain uses pre-existing psycho-physical laws to generate qualities, the same physical laws that generate qualities external to brains.
see https://philarchive.org/rec/SLESTU

Dude you can't just show up on this forum and post something that makes a lot of sense. That's not how we do things around here. Pretty sure there's a rule somewhere against it.

What's next, interesting debates, insightful discussions?

just kidding welcome to the forum

[Atla]

We are all dualists from a practical coomon-sense standpoint even if we think that it is an illusion and only monism is real. That is there is great practical value in thinking that I as a conscious entity experience a world of real objects external to me from a particular perspective or point of view. The mistake which Galileo started was in believing that qualities such as colors exist only in the mind and not in the physical world. This creates a dual problem - the brain must create colors, sounds, etc, but also bind them together into a single self. More practical to not conflate and view these as two seperate problems: how the brain creates qualities and how they are bounded, observed and acted on. If qualities are part of the physical world then the brain uses pre-existing psycho-physical laws to generate qualities, the same physical laws that generate qualities external to brains.
see https://philarchive.org/rec/SLESTU

I read the first 9 pages of the pdf. I generally agree with everything for the first 5 pages or so, where our views diverge is this whole dualistic idea of matter "generating" qualities.

I go with the non-dual view that matter and qualities are literally one and the same thing. There is only one kind of thing, not two. I think that's the Occam's razor choice. I'm curious why did you go with this "generate" philosophy? (Or maybe I just misunderstood.)