Morality: Theism vs Deism

[Iwannaplato]

Deism, pantheism and panentheism all shared the same belief, i.e. God exists but there are differences between them.

Yes, they are all theisms. I wasn't denying they are theisms. If you had then gone on to say they believe in God, that would have been non-controversial.

Each of these perspectives offers a different understanding of the relationship between the divine and the world. Deism emphasizes a distant Creator, pantheism identifies everything with God, and panentheism sees God in everything while acknowledging a transcendent aspect.

Yeah, they are different theisms. Pantheism and Panentheism share a lot in common, but are quite unlike deism. And no more like deism than many other deisms. Choosing those two in the context of the thread and in the context of morality was just confusing. An absent God and a completely immanent all present deity are opposites,within the various theisms. Something like Christianity (which has a subset of Christian deism) is much closer since most of the Time God is beyong experience and in many Christianities interferes as an exception. (and if the urge comes to tell me that they are different from deism, well sure)

In the context of morality, pantheisms can be all over the place.

I do think belief systems can be a factor in violence. But the OP was lumping some theism together randomly and then making the implicit claims about deists based on less than weak arguments.

[Skepdick]

Well, Spinoza was a decided determined and denied free will specifically. It would be good to use another term in a philosophical context, if you are describing pantheists in general. Deists tend to believe in free will. Hinduism is mixed.
And, again, while Spinoza likely reasoned his way to his position - or at least later reasoned to its justification. Pantheists need not have done this. I doubt most throughout human history have. Most religious people grew up in their worldviews.

The problem with this approach comes the moment we pre-suppose the correspondence theory of truth.

Does any description of a belief correspond with the actual belief?

All you get from the process of reason/introspection is self-definition. But is your self-definition true/correct?

And so you can't even go any further in the process of reason if you don't also self-define some criteria for self-checking and self-correction of your self-definition.

Otherwise you are just constructing a tautology. It's not even wrong.

Determinism and free will are simply two languages of self-description/self-conception. Being modal creatures we actually use both of them to speak about ourselves in different contexts. When we analyze ourselves in hindsight we were pre-determined to do everything that we did. Otherwise we would've done better than our best.

Foresight emerges to do better in future.

[Veritas Aequitas]

There is a significant difference between Pantheism vs Panentheism;

From ChatGPT as above;

• Deism: There's a distant Creator who set things in motion but doesn't intervene.
  
  Pantheism: Everything is God; there's no separation between the divine and the world.
  
  Panentheism: God is in everything, but there's also a transcendent aspect beyond the world, i.e. there is a separation between the divine and the world.

Re ChatGPt has to be taken with reservations.
Any takers the above difference is wrong?

Unlike pantheism, which holds that the divine and the universe are identical,[2]
panentheism maintains an ontological distinction between the divine and the non-divine and the significance of both.

[Iwannaplato]

Well, Spinoza was a decided determined and denied free will specifically. It would be good to use another term in a philosophical context, if you are describing pantheists in general. Deists tend to believe in free will. Hinduism is mixed.
And, again, while Spinoza likely reasoned his way to his position - or at least later reasoned to its justification. Pantheists need not have done this. I doubt most throughout human history have. Most religious people grew up in their worldviews.

The problem with this approach comes the moment we pre-suppose the correspondence theory of truth.

Does any description of a belief correspond with the actual belief?

No. But then some communication is more misleading than others. Perhaps you meant that you believed my approach (if it was mine you meant) was really good and had only advantages. But then the word 'problem' in that sentence was probably a poor choice. I don't assume a complete understanding of where you are going with the sentence with the word 'problem' in it, but it is likely better a better word choice (in a correspondency sort of way) than some other words. Perhaps even 'opportunity' would have been more misleading and, I would guess, it's most likely 'sexuality' would have been. I don't rule out some aspects of opportunity, though lean towards thinking those nuances are secondary to what you are trying to tell me first off.

I tend to think of language, at least when I am mulling more abstractly, as a set of tools and/or something to elicit experiences in other people (and ourselves). So, it's what happens when I use those words, not what they 'contain' (the conduit metaphor) nor what they correspond to. I think VA's choices of words are going to lead to experiences that are counterproductive, even for his goals.

He seemed to agree about his use of brackets in the OP, for example, was misleading.

When he responds, I may find out that I have been incorrect, about any of the above. Looking at words in correspondance terms is also a tool. I tend to agree it's not a good base ontology to think language is all about correspondance or that's a good model. Nevertheless it can be useful to look at the communication that way.

It's a bit like teaching a foreign language. Wordlists tend to be terrible tools, I think. On the other hand, sometimes it's best to translate directly, just as shorthand.

All you get from the process of reason/introspection is self-definition. But is your self-definition true/correct?

And so you can't even go any further in the process of reason if you don't also self-define some criteria for self-checking and self-correction of your self-definition.

Otherwise you are just constructing a tautology. It's not even wrong.

Determinism and free will are simply two languages of self-description/self-conception. Being modal creatures we actually use both of them to speak about ourselves in different contexts. When we analyze ourselves in hindsight we were pre-determined to do everything that we did. Otherwise we would've done better than our best.

Foresight emerges to do better in future.

Yes, most people act/speak like they are determinists and believers in free will.

[Skepdick]

Well, Spinoza was a decided determined and denied free will specifically. It would be good to use another term in a philosophical context, if you are describing pantheists in general. Deists tend to believe in free will. Hinduism is mixed.
And, again, while Spinoza likely reasoned his way to his position - or at least later reasoned to its justification. Pantheists need not have done this. I doubt most throughout human history have. Most religious people grew up in their worldviews.

The problem with this approach comes the moment we pre-suppose the correspondence theory of truth.

Does any description of a belief correspond with the actual belief?

No. But then some communication is more misleading than others. Perhaps you meant that you believed my approach (if it was mine you meant) was really good and had only advantages. But then the word 'problem' in that sentence was probably a poor choice. I don't assume a complete understanding of where you are going with the sentence with the word 'problem' in it, but it is likely better a better word choice (in a correspondency sort of way) than some other words. Perhaps even 'opportunity' would have been more misleading and, I would guess, it's most likely 'sexuality' would have been. I don't rule out some aspects of opportunity, though lean towards thinking those nuances are secondary to what you are trying to tell me first off.

What I am pointing is pre-communication. At the moment of self-conception/self-definition.

Suppose you claim/describe/self-conceptualize as having free will. Is that a true claim about your belief?
Suppose you claim/describe/self-conceptualize as not having free will. Is that a true claim about your belief?

There's no way to check for correspondence; so there's no way to check whether the self-claim is even true or false.
And if there's no way to check which claim is true; there's no way for you to check "what you trully believe."

Your claim is neither true; nor false. It's just the way you speak about yourself.

I tend to think of language, at least when I am mulling more abstractly, as a set of tools and/or something to elicit experiences in other people (and ourselves).

Right, so from the perspective of experience elicited in self. I see no difference between "I have free will" and "I don't have free will".

They aren't claims about anything - just different languages.

They are both coherent and neither one corresponds to anything.

In practical terms I don't thik either language limits one from expressing themselves.

The cherry on top is that you can translate between the languages. Irrespective of what people claim to believe.

Spinoza may have denied free will, but didn't deny having a will - so we could always appeal to his sense of duty/morality (that which constrains his freedom) to persuade his will.

[Iwannaplato]

What I am pointing is pre-communication. At the moment of self-conception/self-definition.

OK!

Suppose you claim/describe/self-conceptualize as having free will. Is that a true claim about your belief?
Suppose you claim/describe/self-conceptualize as not having free will. Is that a true claim about your belief?

Maybe, maybe not. I think people can be incorrect about what their beliefs are. It's not binary, generally. Beliefs have degrees and shift over time, and so on. But I think one can even be fundamentally wrong about what you believe. I've experienced this myself when I realized I never believed X, though I would have answered (in a sense honestly and certianly not lying) that I did believe in X.

There's no way to check for correspondence; so there's no way to check whether the self-claim is even true or false.
And if there's no way to check which claim is true; there's no way for you to check "what you trully believe."

I think that's too negative for me. I think some people are better able to tell what they believe than others. I can't prove that, but man it fits with my observations. Also I think one can come to a better self-knowledge about these things over time. You probably have to sit with cognitive dissonance. You have to be able to deal with contrasting feelings and unpleasant emotions (about yourself, life, God, other people). And have some interest in introspection and some skill at it. Getting some of the signs of this is what I think I am supposed to say and this is what I really believe.

Fallibility is assumed here. But I don't experience this as a you never know, there are no gradations/degrees, it's a crapshoot.

Your claim is neither true; nor false. It's just the way you speak about yourself.

So, I disagree. And I would guess that if you and I interviewed 50 people about the beliefs about themselves and their beliefs, we would find some people we both thought had a decent idea of themselves and others we thought were deluded in the main and them a fuzzy mixed group in the middle.

We couldn't prove this, but I think it's been useful, for me at least. I2've also been on both ends of a situation where someone points out contraditions between what I claim to believe and what I say and do otherwise when not 'taking a position on the belief'. Sometimes I disagree when this is pointed out to me, but other times I have been convinced and I don't think it's merely mood and random.

I think some people are better at introspection and also that people can get better.

Right, so from the perspective of experience elicited in self. I see no difference between "I have free will" and "I don't have free will".

Good point and I tend to agree. But I do see a difference elicited between I believe in free will and I believe in determinism. And I leave open the possibility that I might decide I have free will or I don't. Not saying those decisions would be correct.

They aren't claims about anything - just different languages.

They are both coherent and neither one corresponds to anything.

OK, it's a nice line. I can see what you're getting at.

In practical terms I don't thik either language limits one from expressing themselves.

The cherry on top is that you can translate between the languages. Irrespective of what people claim to believe.

I don't understand what free will means. So, I don't know that I can translate. I'm not saying I'm a determinist, but I have a sense of what that means.

Spinoza may have denied free will, but then you could've appealed to his sense of duty/morality to make him choose anyway.

Choose what?

[Atla]

"Notes: T.B.A" or "Notes: KIV" is for my personal interests.

As I had stated, my participation in this particular forum is for my own VERY SELFISH reason to refresh or add-to what I have learned in my knowledge database.
I am indifferent to whether my discussions and posts benefit or offend [within rules of the forum and common courtesy] other posters.

I agree "Notes: KIV" is more appropriate which is to add new thoughts and information relevant to the OP in the next post for MY future references; this is to avoid me searching for these new thoughts and information when the thread is turned into a dumpster of rubbish [as evident] by various posters.

You react too much to dead people

[Skepdick]

What I am pointing is pre-communication. At the moment of self-conception/self-definition.

OK!

Suppose you claim/describe/self-conceptualize as having free will. Is that a true claim about your belief?
Suppose you claim/describe/self-conceptualize as not having free will. Is that a true claim about your belief?

Maybe, maybe not. I think people can be incorrect about what their beliefs are. It's not binary, generally. Beliefs have degrees and shift over time, and so on. But I think one can even be fundamentally wrong about what you believe. I've experienced this myself when I realized I never believed X, though I would have answered (in a sense honestly and certianly not lying) that I did believe in X.

Right and wrong doesn't even feature here. I am coming from a place of suspended judgment.

The narrative "I believe in free will" or "I don't believe in free will" doesn't correspond to anythingtangible; so it can't be right or wrong with respect to anything.

It's the speech-act of synthesising a belief, it's not the speech-act of describing a belief.

You believe it BECAUSE you say it.
You don't say it BECAUSE you believe it.

I think that's too negative for me. I think some people are better able to tell what they believe than others.

It's neither negative nor positive. It's mistaking language-synthesis for description.

I can't prove that, but man it fits with my observations.

It fits mine too. I can speak perfectly coherently as somebody who "doesn't have free will" (doing the Lord's work - my choices are not up to me).
And I can speak perfectly coherently as somebody who "has free will" (I am responsible for my actions)

Also I think one can come to a better self-knowledge about these things over time. You probably have to sit with cognitive dissonance. You have to be able to deal with contrasting feelings and unpleasant emotions (about yourself, life, God, other people). And have some interest in introspection and some skill at it. Getting some of the signs of this is what I think I am supposed to say and this is what I really believe.

Fallibility is assumed here. But I don't experience this as a you never know, there are no gradations/degrees, it's a crapshoot.

Zero dissonance. it's just code-switching

Obviously in your daily life you may default to one language more than the other for socio-political reasons.

So, I disagree. And I would guess that if you and I interviewed 50 people about the beliefs about themselves and their beliefs, we would find some people we both thought had a decent idea of themselves and others we thought were deluded in the main and them a fuzzy mixed group in the middle.

And you would be confirming nothing other than the way people speak about themselves is the way people speak about themselves.

We couldn't prove this, but I think it's been useful, for me at least. I2've also been on both ends of a situation where someone points out contraditions between what I claim to believe and what I say and do otherwise when not 'taking a position on the belief'. Sometimes I disagree when this is pointed out to me, but other times I have been convinced and I don't think it's merely mood and random.

I think some people are better at introspection and also that people can get better.

At the end of this process you discover the paradox of free will.

Having two narratives to choose from
1. I have free will
2. I have no free will

I believe in free will because my neurons made me choose this narrative. Obviously - what choice did I have?

Good point and I tend to agree. But I do see a difference elicited between I believe in free will and I believe in determinism. And I leave open the possibility that I might decide I have free will or I don't. Not saying those decisions would be correct.

Correct with respect to what? I don't beelieve it's possible to determine whether determinism is true. It's coherent, but does it correspond?

It's just another conceptual toy - different ways of thinking/speaking. Nothing ontological about it.

I don't understand what free will means. So, I don't know that I can translate. I'm not saying I'm a determinist, but I have a sense of what that means.

It's probably something like "I am acting on my own agency.". But like... "I am acting on my own agency when doing my principal's bidding".

And the principal-agent problem emerges.

You can also interpret it as "I am taking responsibility for my choices", but what if circumstances left you no choice except the shitty one?

Ignorant people make shitty choices because the circumstances of their ignorance prevented them from making better ones.

Is it their fault that they are ignorant? Sometimes. The times it's not their fault - taking responsibility for the choice is erroneous. They only have to take responsibility for never repeating the same mistake.

Choose what?

Whatever you are trying to sell him through persuasion.
Or you can use his axiom as a guidance on how to choose your own words - don't say anything that would contradict/trigger his belief (or he won't trust you).

At the very least Spinoza chose his narrative. He chose "I have no free will" over "I have free will". And he chose that freely

Don't undermine his choice in language. It's the only one he speaks. He's not a codeswitcher.

[Iwannaplato]

Right and wrong doesn't even feature here. I am coming from a place of suspended judgment.

The narrative "I believe in free will" or "I don't believe in free will" doesn't correspond to anythingtangible; so it can't be right or wrong with respect to anything.

It's the speech-act of synthesising a belief, it's not the speech-act of describing a belief.

You believe it BECAUSE you say it.
You don't say it BECAUSE you believe it.

Are you saying this about beliefs in general or specfically about free will/determinism?

It seems to me you say it, or some people say it, due to some kind of process of reasoning/reviewing memory and experience. One can't do a in-the-moment check of oneself and say 'Oh, yeah, I feel that determinism chugging away causing everything.' But in reviewing memory and performing some reasoning one might find oneself convinced one or the other is true and then say it and not the other.

It's neither negative nor positive. It's mistaking language-synthesis for description.

Again, in general or with this issue and similar ones?

It fits mine too. I can speak perfectly coherently as somebody who "doesn't have free will" (doing the Lord's work - my choices are not up to me).

And I can speak perfectly coherently as somebody who "has free will" (I am responsible for my actions)[/quote]My point was more about beliefs in general and other people. Or myself over time. That one can compare and see different abilities to evaluate.

Also I think one can come to a better self-knowledge about these things over time. You probably have to sit with cognitive dissonance. You have to be able to deal with contrasting feelings and unpleasant emotions (about yourself, life, God, other people). And have some interest in introspection and some skill at it. Getting some of the signs of this is what I think I am supposed to say and this is what I really believe.

Fallibility is assumed here. But I don't experience this as a you never know, there are no gradations/degrees, it's a crapshoot.

Zero dissonance. it's just code-switching

Obviously in your daily life you may default to one language more than the other for socio-political reasons.

Again, on this issue or regarding any belief one has?

So, I disagree. And I would guess that if you and I interviewed 50 people about the beliefs about themselves and their beliefs, we would find some people we both thought had a decent idea of themselves and others we thought were deluded in the main and them a fuzzy mixed group in the middle.

And you would be confirming nothing other than the way people speak about themselves is the way people speak about themselves.

You don't encounter people who claim they believe things and you doubt them. But others less so?
Have you never experienced realizing that you would have been wrong (in the main) about one of your beliefs when you were younger? Beliefs about yourself that is. I've had this experience where I thought I was optimistic that X would happen or continue but then noticed my incredible shock and surprise that it went that way. I could feel at that time that really most of me expected to die, be fired, be left whatever. But I had been suppressing this.

It's a bit like the official position of a company or government agency. The spokeperson may well believe what they are saying, but the bulk of the company or agency knows it's BS.

Correct with respect to what? I don't beelieve it's possible to determine whether determinism is true. It's coherent, but does it correspond?

It's just another conceptual toy - different ways of thinking/speaking. Nothing ontological about it.

Is this how you think in general, about most issues? most beliefs? Or is it a certain subset?

Whatever you are trying to sell him through persuasion.
Or you can use his axiom as a guidance on how to choose your own words - don't say anything that would contradict/trigger his belief (or he won't trust you).

At the very least Spinoza chose his narrative. He chose "I have no free will" over "I have free will". And he chose that freely

Don't undermine his choice in language. It's the only one he speaks. He's not a codeswitcher.

Wouldn't it be accepting his choice of narrative if I point out to someone that he didn't believe in free will, if that's what he said.

[Skepdick]

Are you saying this about beliefs in general or specfically about free will/determinism?

Not in general, because "I believe I have free will" and "I believe I had tea for breakfast" aren't the same kind of "believe".

I'm talking about metaphysical self-descriptions/definitions. Identity construction simply on the basis of your understanding of the meaning of the words. A priori any testable/falsifiable criteria.

It seems to me you say it, or some people say it, due to some kind of process of reasoning/reviewing memory and experience. One can't do a in-the-moment check of oneself and say 'Oh, yeah, I feel that determinism chugging away causing everything.' But in reviewing memory and performing some reasoning one might find oneself convinced one or the other is true and then say it and not the other.

That's just a sleight of hand. You can make any observation fit either definition. It's just (re?)interpretation.

It's all hermeneutics at play.

Again, in general or with this issue and similar ones?

in general. Within the context of metaphysics.

You can then argue that everything is hermeneutics when it comes to self-interpretation; so everything is metaphysics.

My point was more about beliefs in general and other people. Or myself over time. That one can compare and see different abilities to evaluate.

Yeah. All of that stuff is hermeneutics. Self-interpretation. Self-the-infividual; and self-the-group.

It's logically undecidable without an objective/external criterion; but the criteria themselves are self-determined.

Again, on this issue or regarding any belief one has?

I guess you could say I am talking about beliefs pertaining to one's own state of being.

If it has no logical implications (positive or negative) it's just a tautology.

I believe in global warming. Do you? Is that a testable/falsifiable claim about the part of reality you call "your state of mind" ?

What observation would falsify your self-claim?

Or... I believe I can ride a bycicle. Do you? if you fall off the bike on your first 5 attempts to ride it - was your belief true?

You don't encounter people who claim they believe things and you doubt them. But others less so?

So lets work on the distinction between doubting the state of the world; and doubting one's own state of being in the world.

Have you never experienced realizing that you would have been wrong (in the main) about one of your beliefs when you were younger? Beliefs about yourself that is. I've had this experience where I thought I was optimistic that X would happen or continue but then noticed my incredible shock and surprise that it went that way. I could feel at that time that really most of me expected to die, be fired, be left whatever. But I had been suppressing this.

I have experienced it - plenty. Only to realize that I was never "wrong". I was just persuaded to switch belief-systems and languages.

But all that changed was the way I speak and think about the world.
Not the way I acted in the world.

My goals and values remained unchanged.

It's a bit like the official position of a company or government agency. The spokeperson may well believe what they are saying, but the bulk of the company or agency knows it's BS.

That's just equivocation on "believe".

I believe in Democracy means "I want to bring about more democracy to the world"
I believe in global warming doesn't mean "I want to bring about more global warming to the world".

One is about future reification.
One is state of current affairs.

Is this how you think in general, about most issues? most beliefs? Or is it a certain subset?

So lets work on the distinction between doubting the state of the world; and doubting one's own state of being in the world.

Do I believe in belief? Yes? No?

Either is a valid choice. If I go with "No" It just means I reject the concept of "belief", but then I'd have to replace it with something functionally equivalent for inter-personal communication.

Whatever that new thing is - it'll still be coherent

And so atheists reject God, and they've replaced it with one-or-many functionally equivalent concepts. Morality, Big Bang.

etc. etc. etc.

Wouldn't it be accepting his choice of narrative if I point out to someone that he didn't believe in free will, if that's what he said.

See, now you are drawing a distinction between narrative and belief.

Spinoza clearly chose his narrative. The narrative that he doesn't believe in free will. He really did choose that narrative. Freely.

Which amounts to a performative contradiction. So now - do you beat him over the head with this (because philosophy); or do you accept his framing/paradigm (because science/learning)?

War or peace? Your choice.

All systemic failures are communication failures. Humans have far more in common than they know, but they can't get over the language barrier to figure it out.

[Iwannaplato]

Not in general, because "I believe I have free will" and "I believe I had tea for breakfast" aren't the same kind of "believe".

I'm talking about metaphysical self-descriptions/definitions. Identity construction simply on the basis of your understanding of the meaning of the words. A priori any testable/falsifiable criteria

Could you give a range of examples? Of those where you think they are not meaningful beyond linguistic identification. Also you mention testable/falsifiable. Does this mean only those things that others/the community can test/falsify or does it include things that have an experiential difference for the individual but which he or she cannot demonstrate to others?

It seems to me you say it, or some people say it, due to some kind of process of reasoning/reviewing memory and experience. One can't do a in-the-moment check of oneself and say 'Oh, yeah, I feel that determinism chugging away causing everything.' But in reviewing memory and performing some reasoning one might find oneself convinced one or the other is true and then say it and not the other.

That's just a sleight of hand. You can make any observation fit either definition. It's just (re?)interpretation.

How do you know what others can experience? But also even if it is sleight of hand, it's not this ex nihilo decision to identify.

IOW it sounded in your explanation like someone simply decides (on a whim?) that they are a free willer. Even if their process, to you, is sleight of hand, it's still not this one step process.

It's all hermeneutics at play.

Could be. But hermeneutics can be a complex process over time.
IOW there are two issues: is it really just interpretation? then is it this mere leap or is there a process that leads to the choice/decision?

You can then argue that everything is hermeneutics when it comes to self-interpretation; so everything is metaphysics.

Then breakfast is back 'on the table', pun semi-intended.

Yeah. All of that stuff is hermeneutics. Self-interpretation. Self-the-infividual; and self-the-group.

It's logically undecidable without an objective/external criterion; but the criteria themselves are self-determined.

So, you're saying one cannot rationally decide that John is quite unaware of his own beliefs, feelings, intentions while Jay is quite good. There would be no way to determine this?

That simply does not fit my experience.

Nor when I am deciding things about myself.

[Skepdick]

Not in general, because "I believe I have free will" and "I believe I had tea for breakfast" aren't the same kind of "believe".

I'm talking about metaphysical self-descriptions/definitions. Identity construction simply on the basis of your understanding of the meaning of the words. A priori any testable/falsifiable criteria

Could you give a range of examples? Of those where you think they are not meaningful beyond linguistic identification.

The standard choice between "I have free will" and "I don't have free will".

It's clear that you've chosen your narrative. Did you choose it freely or not?

What should I make of the fact that I can choose either narrative and feel no difference in what I am actually experiencing; or how I am actually behaving?

Also you mention testable/falsifiable. Does this mean only those things that others/the community can test/falsify or does it include things that have an experiential difference for the individual but which he or she cannot demonstrate to others?

What's the experential difference?

If I mistake my free will for lack thereof - how would I know?
If I mistake my absence of free will for having one - how would I know?
If I've gotten the experience "linguistically right" - how would I know?
If I've gotten the experience "linguistically wrong" how would I know?

How do you know what others can experience? But also even if it is sleight of hand, it's not this ex nihilo decision to identify.

I have no idea what others can or can't experience. I am only questioning how they've come to know that they are getting their experiences "linguistically right"; and not "linguistically wrong".

How do you know your description of your experiences is "correct"?

IOW it sounded in your explanation like someone simply decides (on a whim?) that they are a free willer. Even if their process, to you, is sleight of hand, it's still not this one step process.

It may well be a calculated choice. An instrumental choice.

But does it correctly describe the state of one's mental affairs?

Could be. But hermeneutics can be a complex process over time.
IOW there are two issues: is it really just interpretation? then is it this mere leap or is there a process that leads to the choice/decision?

Well, sure. There's some process. Is the process motivated or descriptive?

And now you are back into the trap of adjectives. Is it truly motivated; but you are saying it's descriptive; or is it trully descriptive but you are saying motivated.

My understanding of my target audience determines my expressions.

I might say "motivated" if it's personal notes for my own attention in future.
I might say "descriptive" if it's for other people's attention.

Knowledge of the interpreter drives the choice.

So, you're saying one cannot rationally decide that John is quite unaware of his own beliefs, feelings, intentions while Jay is quite good. There would be no way to determine this?

I'm saying that when you attach adjectives to your choices you are judging your judgments.

That simply does not fit my experience. Nor when I am deciding things about myself.

How so? It's pretti clear that you are capable of choices/judgments.

Going to 2nd order thinking: how are you judging your judgments as being "free" or "not free" ?

[Iwannaplato]

The standard choice between "I have free will" and "I don't have free will".

It's clear that you've chosen your narrative. Did you choose it freely or not?

What should I make of the fact that I can choose either narrative and feel no difference in what I am actually experiencing; or how I am actually behaving?

I meant a range of examples of what you consider metaphysical ideas.

Also you mention testable/falsifiable. Does this mean only those things that others/the community can test/falsify or does it include things that have an experiential difference for the individual but which he or she cannot demonstrate to others?

What's the experential difference?

If I mistake my free will for lack thereof - how would I know?
If I mistake my absence of free will for having one - how would I know?
If I've gotten the experience "linguistically right" - how would I know?
If I've gotten the experience "linguistically wrong" how would I know?

I don't close the door on the free will issue, but I am asking about the range of issues, not that one.

I am raising the issue, not in the free will case, but in general, of some things being rational to believe in even though they cannot or cannot now be demonstrated to the community. IOW one can have excellent grounds for believing certain things are true, but not be able to demonstrate this to others. The example I raised somewhere else is that one has been raped. Obviously sometimes this can be demonstrated and/or falsified. But there are situations where the community can neither falsify nor confirm, but the victim has good grounds for the belief. It seemed like you were categorizing everything that could not be tested/falsified as metaphysical. So, I am asking if that includes things that one has excellent grounds to believe in given one's experiences but for whatever reasons cannot be demonstrated to others or falsified.

How do you know what others can experience? But also even if it is sleight of hand, it's not this ex nihilo decision to identify.

I have no idea what others can or can't experience. I am only questioning how they've come to know that they are getting their experiences "linguistically right"; and not "linguistically wrong".

Well, if you don't know what their experiences are, then you can't assume that because you can't imagine what you could experience that would mean free will was the case or determinism is the case, you may be ruling out what others can or have experienced on poor grounds.

How do you know your description of your experiences is "correct"?

That's beside the point and/or covers everything, everything distinction - metaphysical vs whatever one counterposes to that. All the arguments, any conclusion that this is self-labeling linguistically as opposed to I had eggs for breakfast. One can questions oneself about those conclusions, all of them, whether they are correct or 'correct'.

It may well be a calculated choice. An instrumental choice.

But does it correctly describe the state of one's mental affairs?

'Correct?'

Well, sure. There's some process. Is the process motivated or descriptive?

And you are weighing in on motivated, if I have understood right. I'm not sure how you know that.

And now you are back into the trap of adjectives. Is it truly motivated; but you are saying it's descriptive; or is it trully descriptive but you are saying motivated.

I'm asking you about your position.

So, you're saying one cannot rationally decide that John is quite unaware of his own beliefs, feelings, intentions while Jay is quite good. There would be no way to determine this?

I'm saying that when you attach adjectives to your choices you are judging your judgments.

Sure. I do that about whether I ate eggs for breakfast.

How so? It's pretti clear that you are capable of choices/judgments.

Going to 2nd order thinking: how are you judging your judgments as being "free" or "not free" ?

I'm not arguing in favor of either position. I am looking at what seemed like certainty on your part that X is a group of metaphysical beliefs and so it's self-labelling and Y is the other group and here we are actually drawing conclusions and describing.

[Skepdick]

I meant a range of examples of what you consider metaphysical ideas.

Stuff like "the fundamental nature of thoughts or reality".
Judgments about the freedom (or lack thereof) of your will.
Thinking about thinking.
Judgments about judgments.
Moralising about morality.
Analysing analysis.
Assessing the quality of your assessments.
Attempting to account for the machinery of your mind.

etc.

I am raising the issue, not in the free will case, but in general, of some things being rational to believe in even though they cannot or cannot now be demonstrated to the community. IOW one can have excellent grounds for believing certain things are true, but not be able to demonstrate this to others. The example I raised somewhere else is that one has been raped.

That's not really the sort of stuff that I am talking about. Those are memories of past experiences; not descriptions/accounts of how your mind works.

Obviously sometimes this can be demonstrated and/or falsified. But there are situations where the community can neither falsify nor confirm, but the victim has good grounds for the belief. It seemed like you were categorizing everything that could not be tested/falsified as metaphysical.

I don't do categories... I do fuzzy/proximate matches.

So, I am asking if that includes things that one has excellent grounds to believe in given one's experiences but for whatever reasons cannot be demonstrated to others or falsified.

I can't demonstrate to you in any way that I am experiencing thoughts. it's kinda moot.

Some of the thoughts originate externally.
And I also have thoughts about these words on my screen.

But they aren't the same sort of thoughts - qualitatively.

Well, if you don't know what their experiences are, then you can't assume that because you can't imagine what you could experience that would mean free will was the case or determinism is the case, you may be ruling out what others can or have experienced on poor grounds.

The case is the case. How have you determined whether "the case" is free will; or determinism?

That's beside the point and/or covers everything, everything distinction - metaphysical vs whatever one counterposes to that. All the arguments, any conclusion that this is self-labeling linguistically as opposed to I had eggs for breakfast. One can questions oneself about those conclusions, all of them, whether they are correct or 'correct'.

Sure. Memory skepticism could be infinite. But I am talking about judgment skepticism, not memory skepticism.

I know I had breakfast.
And I know I have a will; or a choice; or the ability to choose.

Were the eggs "free" or "not free"?
Was my will "free" or "not free"?

It seems to be the quality is being prescribed not described.

Correct?

Are you describing or prescribing that your will is "free" or "not free" ?

And you are weighing in on motivated, if I have understood right. I'm not sure how you know that.

I know it because I can express the exact same computations/thoughts/conclusions in a deterministic; as well as a non-deterministic vocabulary.

I lose nothing in content/expressivity. All I've changed is style.

I can attain coherence and capture my feelings, thoughts and intended meaning either way.

I'm asking you about your position.

My position is always logical undecidability.

You can express yourself in whichever vocabulary you choose. It'll be coherent.
You could even translate across vocabularies. It'll remain coherent.

Because language doesn't describe - it encodes meaning.
Any private language can be meaningful/coherent/self-interpreting.

Sure. I do that about whether I ate eggs for breakfast.

Were they deterministic or non-deterministic eggs?

How so? It's pretti clear that you are capable of choices/judgments.

I mean sure. The eggs really felt non-deterministic to me, but don't ask me what I'm really trying to say.

I'm not arguing in favor of either position. I am looking at what seemed like certainty on your part that X is a group of metaphysical beliefs and so it's self-labelling and Y is the other group and here we are actually drawing conclusions and describing.

I'm simply leaning hard onto expressivism. I am expressing myself in expressions that feel expressive.

But there's this fleeting moment of me choosing a word for a symphony of feelings; emotions and memories.
And then that moment's gone - that symphony disappears - and the word doesn't help me recall the music.

It was the right word at the time - the right conduit for my passions, but it's meaningless now.

And it almost feels like magic; a miracle even - that some of these words cause any kind of recall.