Realism vs Anti-Realism View of the Self

[Veritas Aequitas]

It's true that the self represents itself in an illusory way, the "philosophical ego" is illusory. So the self is not quite what we normally think it is.
But that doesn't make it completely anti-realistic.

These are the following stances in the Realism vs antiRealism view of the Self.
Extracted from Link
Self-Philosophical Considerations by Tekin

1. The hardcore philosophical-realist who insist the Self is so real [as a soul] and evaluation independent to the extent that the immutable Self will survive physical death to the beyond; this is typical of the theists. [Descartes]

2. The hardcore philosophical realist insist on absolute mind independent things but not the Self as a normal thing. In this case he is philosophical-realist about things but anti-realist re his Self and other Selves. [e.g. Dennett, Rorty, Hume]

3. The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [e.g. George Graham ]

4. The Anti-philosophical_realist who view the Self as a psychological construct and thus cannot be mind-independent. [e.g. Foucault]

5. The Anti-philosophical_realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but insist the Self is real as an immutable Self will survive physical death to the beyond; this is typical of the theists. [Berkeley]

6. The Pragmatist who insist the Self is a Real thing. [William James]

7. There may be other categories of view of Self in term of realism vs anti-realism or other views.

that doesn't make it completely anti-realistic.

This is view 3, i.e.

• The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [George Graham ]

This is the sort of hardcore philosophical realists who transposed the idea of noumenon on the Self.
The point is the noumenon is such a faraway thing that can be speculated, they are unable to do the same for the Self which within.
As such, they merely remain Agnostic to secure that psychological consonance to soothe their pains of cognitive dissonance if they are to give up on the idea of the Self as a real thing.

The point is,
the hardcore philosophical realists on things [non-self] [e.g. PH] but is an anti-realist about the self or the Agnostic [either realist or anti-realist] [e.g. Atla] SHOULD give up the idea of philosophical-realism totally regarding non-self things and the Self.
However, it is extremely difficult for them to do so because of the psychological bondage to absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism], clinging to an evolutionary default [illusory] as a useful [more like life or death] illusion.

The above is open for Discussion.
Views??

[Iwannaplato]

1) I couldn't find the word 'hardcore' in the link.
2) So, what's your position on the self, realist, antirealist?
3) Nice use of ad hom and condescension. These always further discussions.

[Atla]

This is view 3, i.e.

• The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [George Graham ]

This is the sort of hardcore philosophical realists who transposed the idea of noumenon on the Self.
The point is the noumenon is such a faraway thing that can be speculated, they are unable to do the same for the Self which within.
As such, they merely remain Agnostic to secure that psychological consonance to soothe their pains of cognitive dissonance if they are to give up on the idea of the Self as a real thing.

The point is,
the hardcore philosophical realists on things [non-self] [e.g. PH] but is an anti-realist about the self or the Agnostic [either realist or anti-realist] [e.g. Atla] SHOULD give up the idea of philosophical-realism totally regarding non-self things and the Self.
However, it is extremely difficult for them to do so because of the psychological bondage to absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism], clinging to an evolutionary default [illusory] as a useful [more like life or death] illusion.

He made a new thread again?

Other selves are noumenal to me.

My self is a part of my mind, so my self isn't noumenal to me. (At best, some parts of my self could be noumenal to me, the parts of my self that aren't active phenomena right now.)

I see zero reason to give up realism on the noumenon. It breaks all of science. It breaks everything. Nothing makes sense then.

You should give up your kind of anti-realism, because it makes absolutely no sense. To me, it just looks like something you cling to to soothe some kind of psychological pains.

(But then again you believe in direct perception, so you don't know the first thing about the self.)

[Iwannaplato]

As such, they merely remain Agnostic to secure that psychological consonance to soothe their pains of cognitive dissonance if they are to give up on the idea of the Self as a real thing.

As such, VA, despite being a non-realist about 'things' merely remains a moral realist to secure that psychological consonance to soothe his pains of cognitive dissonance if he is to give up on the idea of objective morals as a real thing.

Oh, now I see how this kind of psychologizing people one is angry at helps philosophical discussions. It really brings us closer to a good analysis of the reality or not of morals, selves, etc.

[Veritas Aequitas]

1) I couldn't find the word 'hardcore' in the link.
2) So, what's your position on the self, realist, antirealist?
3) Nice use of ad hom and condescension. These always further discussions.

The 'hardcore' is implicit in the above context as in contrast to the 'Agnostic' view.

My view of the self is 4.
4. The Anti-philosophical_realist who view the Self as a psychological construct and thus cannot be mind-independent or evalution-independent. [e.g. Foucault] with the following nuance view to it.

As an ultimately Anti-philosophical_realist, I have a sub-view of the self from the Empirical Realist [Kantian] perspective.
In this case I take the relative mind-independent view of the self [not the absolute mind-independent view], i.e. the self and other selves are empirical-rationally objective as conditioned upon a specific human-based FSR-FSK.
As such, I recognize other selves [mind] exist relatively independent from my self [thus no question of solipsism].

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is view 3, i.e.

• The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [George Graham ]

This is the sort of hardcore philosophical realists who transposed the idea of noumenon on the Self.
The point is the noumenon is such a faraway thing that can be speculated, they are unable to do the same for the Self which within.
As such, they merely remain Agnostic to secure that psychological consonance to soothe their pains of cognitive dissonance if they are to give up on the idea of the Self as a real thing.

The point is,
the hardcore philosophical realists on things [non-self] [e.g. PH] but is an anti-realist about the self or the Agnostic [either realist or anti-realist] [e.g. Atla] SHOULD give up the idea of philosophical-realism totally regarding non-self things and the Self.
However, it is extremely difficult for them to do so because of the psychological bondage to absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism], clinging to an evolutionary default [illusory] as a useful [more like life or death] illusion.

He made a new thread again?

Other selves are noumenal to me.

My self is a part of my mind, so my self isn't noumenal to me. (At best, some parts of my self could be noumenal to me, the parts of my self that aren't active phenomena right now.)

I see zero reason to give up realism on the noumenon. It breaks all of science. It breaks everything. Nothing makes sense then.

You should give up your kind of anti-realism, because it makes absolutely no sense. To me, it just looks like something you cling to to soothe some kind of psychological pains.

(But then again you believe in direct perception, so you don't know the first thing about the self.)

You are suffering from the delusion that Kant warned about;

There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know* to something else of which we have no Concept,
and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions {noumenon } are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational,
although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title {rational},
since they {conclusions} are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of Reason.
They {conclusions} are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself.

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397

[Iwannaplato]

The 'hardcore' is implicit in the above context as in contrast to the 'Agnostic' view.

Hardcore is not a contrast with agnostic.
For example, with theism you might have theist, agnostic, atheist - this is an oversimplified schema, but I'm sure you get the idea. You don't need to add hardcore to theist to give some kind of clarity.
And it certainly wasn't abstracted from the article that manages to make categories clear without that value laden term.

My view of the self is 4.
4. The Anti-philosophical_realist who view the Self as a psychological construct and thus cannot be mind-independent or evalution-independent. [e.g. Foucault] with the following nuance view to it.

Do you think there is identity persistance over time?

As an ultimately Anti-philosophical_realist, I have a sub-view of the self from the Empirical Realist [Kantian] perspective.
In this case I take the relative mind-independent view of the self [not the absolute mind-independent view], i.e. the self and other selves are empirical-rationally objective as conditioned upon a specific human-based FSR-FSK.
As such, I recognize other selves [mind] exist relatively independent from my self [thus no question of solipsism].

But then, in reality there is no hard boundary between you and others. As you say the self is a psychological contruct. There is no real PH out there that is separate from you or who persists through time.

[Atla]

You are suffering from the delusion that Kant warned about;

There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know* to something else of which we have no Concept,
and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions {noumenon } are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational,
although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title {rational},
since they {conclusions} are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of Reason.
They {conclusions} are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself.

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397

Could you be any more vague? What "Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses" did I use, that weren't consistent with modern science?

[Veritas Aequitas]

The 'hardcore' is implicit in the above context as in contrast to the 'Agnostic' view.

Hardcore is not a contrast with agnostic.
For example, with theism you might have theist, agnostic, atheist - this is an oversimplified schema, but I'm sure you get the idea. You don't need to add hardcore to theist to give some kind of clarity.
And it certainly wasn't abstracted from the article that manages to make categories clear without that value laden term.

My view of the self is 4.
4. The Anti-philosophical_realist who view the Self as a psychological construct and thus cannot be mind-independent or evaluation-independent. [e.g. Foucault] with the following nuance view to it.

Do you think there is identity persistance over time?

Note an analogy of that of a hurricane, e.g. the recent Hurricane Idalia which left a trail of damages in Florida a few day ago.
From its origin in from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, there is some persistence identity that identify it as "Hurricane Idalia' i.e. it is some kind of dynamic-permanence till it died overland.

The self of an individual is similar to that of a hurricane with its origin after conception sustaining a persistence of a semi-permanence [identity] with underlying sub-changes of multiple sub-selves over time till physical death.

Note Heraclitus,
it is claimed there is a river Nile [persistent identity] since Stone Age, but as Heraclitus,
there is no way one can step in the same Nile twice.
"No man ever steps in the same river twice."

As an ultimately Anti-philosophical_realist, I have a sub-view of the self from the Empirical Realist [Kantian] perspective.
In this case I take the relative mind-independent view of the self [not the absolute mind-independent view], i.e. the self and other selves are empirical-rationally objective as conditioned upon a specific human-based FSR-FSK.
As such, I recognize other selves [mind] exist relatively independent from my self [thus no question of solipsism].

But then, in reality there is no hard boundary between you and others. As you say the self is a psychological contruct. There is no real PH out there that is separate from you or who persists through time.

This is a strawman without the relevant contexts.

At the same time,
there is a PH's self that is separated from mine and other selves
and also there is PH's self that is not separated from mine and other selves
BUT both must be taken in different senses and contexts.

It would be stupidity to conflate the above sense and contexts that would be a contradiction.

In logic, the law of non-contradiction (LNC) states that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time,

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are suffering from the delusion that Kant warned about;

There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know* to something else of which we have no Concept,
and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions {noumenon } are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational,
although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title {rational},
since they {conclusions} are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of Reason.
They {conclusions} are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself.

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397

Could you be any more vague? What "Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses" did I use, that weren't consistent with modern science?

Your noumenon is not an empirical object but inferred by reason as an intelligible object [object of reason] from empirical evidences.

[Atla]

Your noumenon is not an empirical object but inferred by reason as an intelligible object [object of reason] from empirical evidences.

Again, that's word salad, nonsense. You seem to start the sentence with a pre-Kantian or Kantian meaning of "empirical", and end the sentence with "empirical evidences" as in modern scientific evidences. These two have little to do with each other.

Wake up, since Kant we figured out that human perception isn't direct.

So of course my noumenon is an empirical object according to modern science. That's what modern science IS. Science deals with empirical noumena. Even the scientists themselves and their scientific tools are form my perspective, noumena.

[Atla]

According to ChatGPT

Kantian philosophy and indirect realism can be compatible to some extent, but they also have significant differences that need to be carefully considered.

Kantian Philosophy:
Immanuel Kant's philosophy is known for its emphasis on the relationship between the mind and reality. He proposed a framework called transcendental idealism, which suggests that our knowledge of the external world is shaped by the interaction between our sensory experiences and certain innate mental structures or categories of understanding. Kant argued that while we can never know things as they are in themselves (the noumenal realm), we can have knowledge of how they appear to us through our senses (the phenomenal realm). He distinguished between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, with the former being the world of our perceptions and the latter being the unknowable reality behind those perceptions.

Indirect Realism:
Indirect realism, on the other hand, is a theory of perception that posits that we do not have direct access to the external world. Instead, we perceive the world indirectly through the mediation of mental representations or sense data. According to indirect realism, the objects we perceive are not the external objects themselves but mental representations or sense data that are caused by external objects.

Compatibility:
There is some compatibility between Kantian philosophy and indirect realism in the sense that both recognize the role of the mind in shaping our perception of the external world. Kant's emphasis on the role of mental structures and categories in shaping our experiences aligns with the idea that our perception is mediated by mental representations, as suggested by indirect realism. Both views acknowledge that our knowledge of the external world is not a direct, unmediated grasp of reality.

However, there are also significant differences between Kantian philosophy and indirect realism. Kantian philosophy ultimately argues that our knowledge is limited to the phenomenal realm, and we can never access the noumenal realm, which is beyond our perceptual experiences. In contrast, indirect realism does not necessarily make claims about the existence of a noumenal realm; it focuses on the mediation of perception by mental representations without necessarily positing an unknowable reality behind them.

So, while there are some points of intersection between Kantian philosophy and indirect realism in their recognition of the role of the mind in perception, they differ in their broader metaphysical and epistemological commitments. Whether they are considered compatible or not may depend on how one interprets and synthesizes these philosophical perspectives.

I argue that deciding to limit our knowledge to the phenomenal world is nonsensical. Kant's philosophy is outdated, it made sense when direct perception was inherently assumed, but now we know that not to be the case.

With indirect perception, when we try to limit our knowledge to phenomena, we end up with almost nothing, and pure chaos.

The only alternative I see (if we can call it that) is to reject the entire established science and psychology of perception, and then stick with Kant. No thanks.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Rorty's anti-realist view of the Self; Rorty's view is the concept of Self is constructed linguistically via linguistic practices which is of course, cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

Thus logically whatever the FOLLOW, i.e. reality, existence, facts, knowledge and objectivity cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

To divorce whatever the FOLLOW logically from the above as absolutely mind-independent is fallacious and delusional.

Similar to Foucault, Richard Rorty argues that there is no unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self.
While Foucault emphasized the idea that the Self is a product of society and culture,
Rorty also considers it to be a product of linguistic practices (Rorty, 1989).

Just as an author or a poet creates a novel or poem from scratch, a person creates and transforms herself through the stories (or narratives) she tells to herself about herself at particular times in particular situations.
Thus, just like a novel or a poem, the Self is a contingent phenomenon; it is dependent on the subject’s perceptions and evaluations of herself.

For Rorty, this makes the realist claim that the Self is a timeless, fixed unity, wrong
Link

[Iwannaplato]

I argue that deciding to limit our knowledge to the phenomenal world is nonsensical.

If we go beyond that and say there is nothing beyond phenomena, which, at least sometimes, VA does, phenomena are the real and the world. But I don't think we should then use the word 'perception'.

the ability to see, hear, or become aware of something through the senses.

c. 1300, perceiven, "become aware of, gain knowledge of," especially "to come to know by direct experience,"

Because it entails a subject object split and a sensing via a medium.
VA will sometimes talk about what is directly experienced as opposed to things that are not directly experienced. But this no longer makes sense in his move from the agnostic Kant (about thingsthemselves) to an atheist position (there are not thingsthemselves).
We know no longer have perception. There is only the phenomenon.

The self is not only not mind independent: it is not object independent. In fact, those words would also be misleading. Since they imply an interaction between two things. When in fact there is only phenomena (pardon the odd grammar but I think it's necessary.)

Identity not only does not persist through time, but the very concept is confused. 'I' is a fundamental hallucination.