Why must God be the Perfect Being

[Iwannaplato]

I think he thinks he's not a solipsist, because Kant said so. I still think that you only exist to him tentatively as long he's using an FSK that allows this (he's so generous that he even grants you a mind of your own, as long as you exist to him). But ultimately you don't really exist to him.

One can be a de facto solipsist, without formally, even to oneself, having the thought 'I am the only one who exists'. Narcissists can be like this - not saying he is one.

I think that when the issue of other minds comes up, yes, he goes to an FSK that supports other minds. But he seems to forget that 'really' those FSKs are not as real as the Science (qm portion) FSK which leads to HIS antirealsim which does not allow for anything as a source of sense data that itself isn't also directly experiencable to exist.

(my prediction was correct, he tries to use other FSKs to assume there are other minds.
viewtopic.php?p=652887#p652887


I also think his antirealism should not simply get rid of the object, but also the self, the subject. Though this will fit with his Buddhism rather well, so I doubt he'd feel cornered by this.

There's also subjective idealism which I think is entailed by his position...
https://www.britannica.com/topic/subjective-idealism
and other times is not entailed.

And then, if there are other minds, why do they find such similar spaces. You leave the kitchen and I go in. Of course there are anomolies, but generally speaking if I think we own a toaster and the walls have a pattern of kids playing in the wall papers and we have an electric stove, how come others nearly all the time find the same room? Why aren't there more regular inconsistancies? Even strangers walking into my kitchen, if asked to write down what is there, will find the same objects? Why not other ones and pets I don't own and a gas stove and four chairs instead of three. What leads to the consistancy we face?

I actually take antirealism quite seriously and think it might be the case. But it needs to explain such things or have a very, very different ontology than anything I have heard from VA.

[Atla]

I think he thinks he's not a solipsist, because Kant said so. I still think that you only exist to him tentatively as long he's using an FSK that allows this (he's so generous that he even grants you a mind of your own, as long as you exist to him). But ultimately you don't really exist to him.

One can be a de facto solipsist, without formally, even to oneself, having the thought 'I am the only one who exists'. Narcissists can be like this - not saying he is one.

I think that when the issue of other minds comes up, yes, he goes to an FSK that supports other minds. But he seems to forget that 'really' those FSKs are not as real as the Science (qm portion) FSK which leads to HIS antirealsim which does not allow for anything as a source of sense data that itself isn't also directly experiencable to exist.

(my prediction was correct, he tries to use other FSKs to assume there are other minds.
viewtopic.php?p=652887#p652887


I also think his antirealism should not simply get rid of the object, but also the self, the subject. Though this will fit with his Buddhism rather well, so I doubt he'd feel cornered by this.

There's also subjective idealism which I think is entailed by his position...
https://www.britannica.com/topic/subjective-idealism
and other times is not entailed.

And then, if there are other minds, why do they find such similar spaces. You leave the kitchen and I go in. Of course there are anomolies, but generally speaking if I think we own a toaster and the walls have a pattern of kids playing in the wall papers and we have an electric stove, how come others nearly all the time find the same room? Why aren't there more regular inconsistancies? Even strangers walking into my kitchen, if asked to write down what is there, will find the same objects? Why not other ones and pets I don't own and a gas stove and four chairs instead of three. What leads to the consistancy we face?

I actually take antirealism quite seriously and think it might be the case. But it needs to explain such things or have a very, very different ontology than anything I have heard from VA.

Well all I can say with some confidence is: that's one big mess.

With some less confidence I can say that I think his anti-realism mainly comes from his dogmatic belief in the negative noumenon, the rest follows from that. His beginner misunderstanding of QM is just something he found that he thinks proves his position.

I see the science-FSK as perfectly compatible with other minds, so I don't know what you meant there.

[Iwannaplato]

I see the science-FSK as perfectly compatible with other minds, so I don't know what you meant there.

I agree that in general the various science FSKs support other minds. The relevant science FSKs are realist. Biology is realist. It's only qm which some people argue is antirealist. But when he is arguing with other people the qm fsk demonstrates antirealism. Let's grant that his interpretation - and some physicists agree with him - is the case. Even so notice that he doesn't go to physics, he has to go to other portions of science to support the existence of other minds. But those portions are all realist. So, really, deep down, given that he considers physics the most real FSK when it comes to ontology, we only know things exist that we experience via sense data. Well, we dont experience other minds via sense data. We have to use deduction.

[Atla]

I see the science-FSK as perfectly compatible with other minds, so I don't know what you meant there.

I agree that in general the various science FSKs support other minds. The relevant science FSKs are realist. Biology is realist. It's only qm which some people argue is antirealist. But when he is arguing with other people the qm fsk demonstrates antirealism. Let's grant that his interpretation - and some physicists agree with him - is the case. Even so notice that he doesn't go to physics, he has to go to other portions of science to support the existence of other minds. But those portions are all realist. So, really, deep down, given that he considers physics the most real FSK when it comes to ontology, we only know things exist that we experience via sense data. Well, we dont experience other minds via sense data. We have to use deduction.

No, his deep down ontology is the negative noumenon. Science-FSK is always "subsumed" in it, but he lies about it in a way which makes it seem that Science-FSK is his primarily ontology.

That's why you can never be fundamentally real to him, because the negative noumenon doesn't allow it. Ultimately he's just making you up, but in a very weird way where you're part of an entire universe he made up.

Actually, I can't even conceive of a fully anti-realist interpretation of QM. I've never heard of such a thing.
The most anti-realistic interpretation I can think of is where consciousness is a real/existent entity, and everything outside consciousness is unreal/non-existent when not observed, and real/existent when observed. So it's a mix of realism and anti-realism.

[Iwannaplato]

No, his deep down ontology is the negative noumenon. Science-FSK is always "subsumed" in it, but he lies about it in a way which makes it seem that Science-FSK is his primarily ontology.

We're close to saying the same thing, you and I. There are some physicists who are antirealist and think that certain experiments strongly support antirealism. What VA does is say those experiments prove antirealism. Period. But he knows full well that most science is realist - there are exceptions, some scientists, even in other disciplines.

But if we are talking about reality, out there in general, he turns to the most really real FSK qm and his interpretation and certainty around the implications of some experiments. That's fine in and of itself. He believes in antirealism points to experiments that could support this. Peachy.

But when called out on the implications of his sense data, experienced things only exist, there are no noumena he turns to other portions of science to support other minds.

But those other portions of science are clearly realist.

That's why you can never be fundamentally real to him, because the negative noumenon doesn't allow it. Ultimately he's just making you up, but in a very weird way where you're part of an entire universe he made up.

And that's what I'm trying to get him to take a stand on, now in that other thread.

Actually, I can't even conceive of a fully anti-realist interpretation of QM. I've never heard of such a thing.
The most anti-realistic interpretation I can think of is where consciousness is a real/existent entity, and everything outside consciousness is unreal/non-existent when not observed, and real/existent when observed. So it's a mix of realism and anti-realism.

I think you are taking the label anti-realism too literally. It means you are against realism, not that you think there is nothing real. He also calls himself anti-philosophical realist. But I've pointed out the problems with that from a native speaker perspective.

Anti-realism need not and does not in nearly all the main forms say nothing is real. They are anti some portion of realism. For example the idea that there is a mind independent reality. And anti realists can also take positions on epistemology, for example, and not ontology so much.

So an antirealist is not saying nothing is real. And VA is not saying that. Just that there is no noumenal source for appearances. But appearances and minds (or phenomena/experiences if one combines these) are real.

[Atla]

No, his deep down ontology is the negative noumenon. Science-FSK is always "subsumed" in it, but he lies about it in a way which makes it seem that Science-FSK is his primarily ontology.

We're close to saying the same thing, you and I. There are some physicists who are antirealist and think that certain experiments strongly support antirealism. What VA does is say those experiments prove antirealism. Period. But he knows full well that most science is realist - there are exceptions, some scientists, even in other disciplines.

But if we are talking about reality, out there in general, he turns to the most really real FSK qm and his interpretation and certainty around the implications of some experiments. That's fine in and of itself. He believes in antirealism points to experiments that could support this. Peachy.

But when called out on the implications of his sense data, experienced things only exist, there are no noumena he turns to other portions of science to support other minds.

But those other portions of science are clearly realist.

That's why you can never be fundamentally real to him, because the negative noumenon doesn't allow it. Ultimately he's just making you up, but in a very weird way where you're part of an entire universe he made up.

And that's what I'm trying to get him to take a stand on, now in that other thread.

Actually, I can't even conceive of a fully anti-realist interpretation of QM. I've never heard of such a thing.
The most anti-realistic interpretation I can think of is where consciousness is a real/existent entity, and everything outside consciousness is unreal/non-existent when not observed, and real/existent when observed. So it's a mix of realism and anti-realism.

I think you are taking the label anti-realism too literally. It means you are against realism, not that you think there is nothing real. He also calls himself anti-philosophical realist. But I've pointed out the problems with that from a native speaker perspective.

Anti-realism need not and does not in nearly all the main forms say nothing is real. They are anti some portion of realism. For example the idea that there is a mind independent reality. And anti realists can also take positions on epistemology, for example, and not ontology so much.

So an antirealist is not saying nothing is real. And VA is not saying that. Just that there is no noumenal source for appearances. But appearances and minds (or phenomena/experiences if one combines these) are real.

None of this makes sense to me. Negative noumenon means that there is just the appearance. That's incompatible with science including any interpretation of QM. So the only way out is a weird form of solipsism where we made up the entire universe.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have proven,
Philosophical Realism is Solipsistic.
viewtopic.php?t=40197

Any p-realist who condemned others of solipsism is delusional.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Many posters has conflated the negative noumena with the positive noumena and do not understand what they are talking about with reference to Kant's CPR.

I have posted Kant's Chapter on Phenomena vs Noumena and has referred to it many times.

Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]
viewtopic.php?t=40170
Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B306-B315]
viewtopic.php?t=39987

Since I have provided the appropriate reference from Kant, anyone who keep insisting in their own wrong interpretations of Kant is a numbskull and philosophical immature.

Note the relevant reference from Kant re Phenomena vs Noumena and what is noumena in the Negative and Positive Sense.

1. B306 …, if we entitle certain Objects, as Appearances, Sensible entities 2 (Phenomena),
then since we thus distinguish the Mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in-themselves,
it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter [in-themselves], considered in their own nature,
although we do not so intuit them, or that we place other Possible Things, which are not Objects of our Senses but are Thought as Objects merely through the Intellect,
in opposition to the former [Phenomena, Sensible entities],
and that in so doing we entitle them Intelligible Entities 1 (Noumena).

In the above, Kant identify Phenomena as Sensible Entities [verified empirically] while Noumena are Intelligible Entities [i.e. mere thought only].

5. And since the Intellect yields no Concepts additional to the Innate-Programs,
it {Intellect} also supposes that the Object-in-itself must at least be Thought through these Pure Concepts [Innate-Programs],
and so is misled into treating the entirely indeterminate Concept of an Intelligible entity, namely, of a something-in-General outside our Sensibility,
as being a Determinate Concept of an entity that allows of being known in a certain [purely Intelligible] manner by means of the Intellect.

The above point out how the Intellect confuses the noumena as a Determinate Concept.
To differentiate the noumena from the Phenomena we need to identify the noumena in the negative and positive sense.

6. If by 'Noumenon' we mean a Thing so far as it is not an Object of our Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, and so abstract from our Mode of Sensing it, {then} this is a Noumenon in the negative sense of the term.

If the noumena is to be related to the sensible phenomena, then this is a Noumenon in the negative sense, i.e. it can never be an sensible empirical object.

7. But if we understand by it [the thing] an Object of a non-Sensible Objectifying-Faculty,
we thereby presuppose a special Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the Possibility. This would be 'Noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.

If the noumena is taken in the positive sense, then it has to be cognized with with an intellectual intuition which humans do no possess.
As such it is impossible to be real for any humans.
This noumena in the positive sense is the same as the assumption in science adopted by P-realists.

8. The Doctrine of Sensibility is likewise the Doctrine of the Noumenon in the negative sense, that is, of Things which the Intellect must think without this reference to our Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, therefore not merely as Appearances but as Things-in-Themselves. B308

As such when we consider the Doctrine of Sensibility with a sensible intuition, the noumenon is in the negative sense which the intellect can think of, but not to objectify the noumena.

So, when we deliberate on what is phenomena we can assume there is a corresponding noumena, this is taken in the negativesense for theory sake. This is as best merely a thought and can never be something that is empirically real.

But to insist the noumena is a really real referent, this is taking the noumena in the positive sense; this is an impossibility to be real because humans do not have the intelligible intuition to realize this intelligible object.

[Iwannaplato]

None of this makes sense to me. Negative noumenon means that there is just the appearance. That's incompatible with science including any interpretation of QM. So the only way out is a weird form of solipsism where we made up the entire universe.

You'll have to tell the scientists who are antirealists that they are incompatible with science, then.
But sure, the word, appearance is problematic, given what it implies.
Even VA gives oddly realist explanations for reality's dependence on humans. He's repeatedly posted images of the quantum foam before perception. IOW before an act of perception collapses the foam into something. Which basically goes against his whole position since he has labels and images of what's there when no perception is happening. Metaphysical antirealism, if generalized, is hard to think and write about, so we can be gentle, I suppose, about pointing that out.

But it wouldn't be, even in the extreme version, that we made up the whole universe. It would just mean that consciousness is present in all of what is real. A component in every real moment. That doesn't make humans little deities. It just means that there is nothing in the absence of perception.

'Which makes his descriptions of the Big Bang and stuff prior to humans silly.

He points to FSKs supporting the Big Bang, but ultimately, as he would say, the most really real explanation is that there was no Big Bang where humans or some sentience was not present. That is impossible.

He mocks people for believing in an external mind independent reality, but he gets to name and consider real such things and point to FSKs to support them....
when it's convenient for some line of argument.

[Atla]

You'll have to tell the scientists who are antirealists that they are incompatible with science, then.
But sure, the word, appearance is problematic, given what it implies.
Even VA gives oddly realist explanations for reality's dependence on humans. He's repeatedly posted images of the quantum foam before perception. IOW before an act of perception collapses the foam into something. Which basically goes against his whole position since he has labels and images of what's there when no perception is happening. Metaphysical antirealism, if generalized, is hard to think and write about, so we can be gentle, I suppose, about pointing that out.

The problem is even worse imo, according to science, the "collapsed" stuff is also the noumenon. So unobserved/not-collapsed things would be, like, noumenon type A within the noumenon type B, or noumenon squared, or I don't know?

Unless we resort to naive ralism, which fixes the above noumenon-squared issue but breaks another half of science.

And then the problem is even worse than that, imo. Let's address the elephant in the room. Nothing is NOTHING. Nothing can't follow any rules, because it's nothing, there's nothing there that could follow any rules. So then how can QM's nothing follow the Schrödinger equation perfectly?