The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Veritas Aequitas
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The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 13, 2023 1:43 pm Ostension is not the primitive, primary and uncomplicated method for teaching the use of signs - precisely because nomenclaturist, representationalist or correspondence or maker/bearer theories of truth are mistaken. And if you're intellectually constipated with one of those theories, a dose of later Wittgenstein can usually loosen your brain-bowels. Assuming you have a brain.
Wittgenstein?

Note Wittgenstein went through 3 phases, i.e.
  • 1. Early-Wittgenstein -Tractatus

    2. Later-Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation

    3. Late -Wittgenstein - On Certainty
The Early-Wittgenstein was totally out of touch with reality and the later-Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation, did not do any better.

However, his "On Certainty" [late Wittgenstein] is closer to reality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Certainty
The genesis of On Certainty was Wittgenstein's "long interest" in two famous papers by G. E. Moore, his
1939 Proof of the External World and
earlier Defence of Common Sense (1925).[2]
Wittgenstein thought the latter was Moore's "best article", but despite that he did not think Moore's 'proof' of external reality decisive.
1939 Proof of the External World is grounded on Philosophical Realism, i.e. the same Philosophical Realism of mind-independence or human-conditions independence that you rely upon to define your [PH-Fact] 'what is fact', i.e. existing in the external world being independent of the human-conditions [aka modern mind].

Moore's proof is in response of Kant's challenge that the external world is illusory in one sense;
It seems to me that, so far from its being true, as Kant declares to be his opinion,
that there is only one possible proof of the existence of things outside of us,
namely the one which he has given, I can now give a large number of different
proofs, each of which is a perfectly rigorous proof; and that at many other times
I have been in a position to give many others. I can prove now, for instance,
that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as
I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as
I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing
this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see
that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply
examples.
https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd ... Moore1.pdf
On the CPR, Kant challenged Philosophical Realists to prove their claim of the absolute existence of the external world.
Kant in CPR wrote:However harmless Idealism may be considered in respect of the essential aims of Metaphysics (though, in fact, it is not thus harmless),
it still remains SCANDAL to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole Material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
CPR Preface B54
This is what I have been challenging PH to prove conclusively the absoluteness of the existence of the external world [his definition of what is fact] is really real.
So far, he had not even attempt to do so but arrogantly insisting on his claim of 'what is fact' as absolutely independent of the human conditions. [modern mind].

In his 'On Certainty' Wittgenstein indirectly support Kant's idea that there is no thing-in-itself or fact-in-itself but rather whatever is a fact is leveraged on a FSK [river beds and hinges].

As such, even with Wittgenstein [late] the concept of a FSK prevails as in Kant's view and my human-based moral FSK, thus objective moral facts, so Morality is Objective [qualified] ultimately.
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Flannel Jesus »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 7:29 am a FSK
I have to assume that in your head, you're still pronouncing it as "fisk".
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Harbal
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Harbal »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 7:51 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 7:29 am a FSK
I have to assume that in your head, you're still pronouncing it as "fisk".
I have started pronouncing it FFS. :roll:
Peter Holmes
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 7:29 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 13, 2023 1:43 pm Ostension is not the primitive, primary and uncomplicated method for teaching the use of signs - precisely because nomenclaturist, representationalist or correspondence or maker/bearer theories of truth are mistaken. And if you're intellectually constipated with one of those theories, a dose of later Wittgenstein can usually loosen your brain-bowels. Assuming you have a brain.
Wittgenstein?

Note Wittgenstein went through 3 phases, i.e.
  • 1. Early-Wittgenstein -Tractatus

    2. Later-Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation

    3. Late -Wittgenstein - On Certainty
The Early-Wittgenstein was totally out of touch with reality and the later-Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation, did not do any better.

However, his "On Certainty" [late Wittgenstein] is closer to reality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Certainty
The genesis of On Certainty was Wittgenstein's "long interest" in two famous papers by G. E. Moore, his
1939 Proof of the External World and
earlier Defence of Common Sense (1925).[2]
Wittgenstein thought the latter was Moore's "best article", but despite that he did not think Moore's 'proof' of external reality decisive.
1939 Proof of the External World is grounded on Philosophical Realism, i.e. the same Philosophical Realism of mind-independence or human-conditions independence that you rely upon to define your [PH-Fact] 'what is fact', i.e. existing in the external world being independent of the human-conditions [aka modern mind].

Moore's proof is in response of Kant's challenge that the external world is illusory in one sense;
It seems to me that, so far from its being true, as Kant declares to be his opinion,
that there is only one possible proof of the existence of things outside of us,
namely the one which he has given, I can now give a large number of different
proofs, each of which is a perfectly rigorous proof; and that at many other times
I have been in a position to give many others. I can prove now, for instance,
that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as
I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as
I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing
this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see
that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply
examples.
https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd ... Moore1.pdf
On the CPR, Kant challenged Philosophical Realists to prove their claim of the absolute existence of the external world.
Kant in CPR wrote:However harmless Idealism may be considered in respect of the essential aims of Metaphysics (though, in fact, it is not thus harmless),
it still remains SCANDAL to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole Material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
CPR Preface B54
This is what I have been challenging PH to prove conclusively the absoluteness of the existence of the external world [his definition of what is fact] is really real.
So far, he had not even attempt to do so but arrogantly insisting on his claim of 'what is fact' as absolutely independent of the human conditions. [modern mind].

In his 'On Certainty' Wittgenstein indirectly support Kant's idea that there is no thing-in-itself or fact-in-itself but rather whatever is a fact is leveraged on a FSK [river beds and hinges].

As such, even with Wittgenstein [late] the concept of a FSK prevails as in Kant's view and my human-based moral FSK, thus objective moral facts, so Morality is Objective [qualified] ultimately.
In my opinion, this is to misunderstand what the later Wittgenstein was doing; the nature of his interest in and critique of Moore's two essays; the continuity between the Investigations and On Certainty; and the profound significance of W's realisation that meaning is use - and its bearing on philosophical realism.
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Skepdick »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 9:07 am In my opinion, this is to misunderstand what the later Wittgenstein was doing; the nature of his interest in and critique of Moore's two essays; the continuity between the Investigations and On Certainty; and the profound significance of W's realisation that meaning is use - and its bearing on philosophical realism.
A significance so "profound" it's useless in practice.

You can't even explain how you use the term "use" without making your goal for using the term "use" explicit.
use verb /juːz/ 1. take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something; employ.
And since goals always describe the future you necessarily have an unstated "ought" in mind.
Impenitent
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Impenitent »

describing the future is not a moral ought

one believes the billiard ball will move after being struck

it ought to move

there is no hardwired moral obligation in the potentiality of actions, just an expectation in the observers created by habit of previous viewings...

-Imp
Skepdick
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Skepdick »

Impenitent wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 11:29 am describing the future is not a moral ought
What's the difference when you are describing a future you are capable of; and going to reify?
Impenitent wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 11:29 am one believes the billiard ball will move after being struck

it ought to move
So it ought to move. And it will move if you strike it. And you strike it. And it moves.

That's how causality works.
Impenitent wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 11:29 am there is no hardwired moral obligation in the potentiality of actions, just an expectation in the observers created by habit of previous viewings...
Modus tollens doesn't care.

Whatever its potentiality the ball didn't move - therefore nothing (yourself included) struck it.
Why didn't you strike it if it ought to have moved?

What got in your way of reifying the future you said ought to happen?
Impenitent
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Impenitent »

got in the way? Hume's fallacy of induction...

-Imp
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 9:07 am
............
In his 'On Certainty' Wittgenstein indirectly support Kant's idea that there is no thing-in-itself or fact-in-itself but rather whatever is a fact is leveraged on a FSK [river beds and hinges].

As such, even with Wittgenstein [late] the concept of a FSK prevails as in Kant's view and my human-based moral FSK, thus objective moral facts, so Morality is Objective [qualified] ultimately.
In my opinion, this is to misunderstand what the later Wittgenstein was doing; the nature of his interest in and critique of Moore's two essays; the continuity between the Investigations and On Certainty; and the profound significance of W's realisation that meaning is use - and its bearing on philosophical realism.
I agree there is some relation between "use" and "meaning" of a word but Wittgenstein's "meaning is use" as a sort of maxim has been debunked.

There are loads of articles critiquing W's "meaning is use" as a sort of maxim has failed.

Here is one point;

"meaning is use" as a sort of maxim,
In another respect, Davidson and Dummett (1925–) are on the same side. Like many icons of mid-century analytic philosophy (Wittgenstein, linguistic philosophy, Quine, Sellars) they adopt a third-person perspective on language, holding that the meaning of words and sentences is determined by observable behavior. All of the aforementioned also tend to assign priority to language over thought. Both claims conflict with a powerful recent trend.

The slogan that meaning is use came under scrutiny by Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicatures.
Paul Grice (1913–88) maintained that many of the patterns of linguistic use highlighted by conceptual analysts are semantically irrelevant, since they are due not to the meaning of specific expressions, but to pragmatic principles governing discourse in general (Grice 1989).


Furthermore, a common theme in linguistic philosophy is that language is a form of intentional behavior. This suggested to Austin that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of action. Taking this proposal one step further, Grice and John Searle (1932–) turned it into a sub-domain of the philosophy of mind, by trying to reduce semantic notions to psychological ones like intention.

Chapter 2:
The development of analytic philosophy: Wittgenstein and after 76
HANS-JOHANN GLOCK in PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
You stated "In my opinion" where are your supporting arguments and references [at least some clues and leads]?
If none, your opinion is merely groundless.

My linkage of W 'On Certainty' from Moore to Kant makes sense, that W toward the end of his life was veering towards the Kantian FSK basis.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Sat Apr 15, 2023 7:27 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Agent Smith »

"What's that mi amigo?"

"That's Timmy hombre!"

"I thought that was a ..."

"Woof, woof!"

"Timmy! Come here Timmy!"

"He's limping amigo!"

"Get my gun."
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Impenitent wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 11:29 am describing the future is not a moral ought

one believes the billiard ball will move after being struck

it ought to move

there is no hardwired moral obligation in the potentiality of actions, just an expectation in the observers created by habit of previous viewings...

-Imp
Assuming you are the typical normal person,
pari-passu, had you or would you torture, rape and kill a toddler to death for your pleasure at this moment or in the future?

If you are a normal human person, you will categorically state NO!
WHY?
It is because, like all other normal human being, you are programmed with an inhibitor of 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure'.
Regardless of your opinions, that physical neural correlates that has the above inhibiting function is in your brain.
If it is in your brain, then at least to you, it should be an objective moral fact.
Can you deny this?

The existence of this inhibitor as physical objective moral fact is testable.
As a normal person who is reasonably knowledgeable, you will accept that any human being can be brainwashed to do things against his norms, even to kill any humans at will, e.g. brainwashed suicide bombers.
As such, it is possible for you to be brainwashed to "rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure" against the inherent 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure' inhibitor.

The 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure' is a moral element to counter any evil tendencies that is contrary to that 'ought-not'.

From the above, there are hardwired moral obligation [e.g. 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure'] existing in the brains of ALL human beings with different degrees of activeness.
Impenitent
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Impenitent »

conditioning says otherwise...

-Imp
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Iwannaplato »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Apr 15, 2023 7:44 am
Impenitent wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 11:29 am describing the future is not a moral ought

one believes the billiard ball will move after being struck

it ought to move

there is no hardwired moral obligation in the potentiality of actions, just an expectation in the observers created by habit of previous viewings...

-Imp
Assuming you are the typical normal person,
pari-passu, had you or would you torture, rape and kill a toddler to death for your pleasure at this moment or in the future?

If you are a normal human person, you will categorically state NO!
WHY?
It is because, like all other normal human being, you are programmed with an inhibitor of 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure'.
Regardless of your opinions, that physical neural correlates that has the above inhibiting function is in your brain.
If it is in your brain, then at least to you, it should be an objective moral fact.
Can you deny this?

The existence of this inhibitor as physical objective moral fact is testable.
As a normal person who is reasonably knowledgeable, you will accept that any human being can be brainwashed to do things against his norms, even to kill any humans at will, e.g. brainwashed suicide bombers.
As such, it is possible for you to be brainwashed to "rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure" against the inherent 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure' inhibitor.

The 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure' is a moral element to counter any evil tendencies that is contrary to that 'ought-not'.

From the above, there are hardwired moral obligation [e.g. 'ougth-not-to-rape-torture-kill-babies-for-pleasure'] existing in the brains of ALL human beings with different degrees of activeness.u5
The problems here are
1) if it is a value VA does not like, then brainwashing is necessary to create it. For example above he attributes our not wanting to torture/kill babies solely to biology. It's as if he hasn't notice how much children are told not to be aggressive and violent with each other. Work in a daycare would quickly dissuade VA of this oversimplification. Children will hurt each other for a variety of reasons, and sometimes for no discernable reason'. The daycare staff must put in time 'brainwashing' the children not to engage in these behaviors.
2) he puts morals in things that are not moral. We are born with tendencies to be both aggressive and empathetic. The former more likely in many ways to express earlier because very young children are not quite away of other subjects as experiencers. They have to learn this. The potential for empathy is there, but there is not a full understanding that the other person feels pain, has needs, is separate in some way from the world of objects. These tendencies are not objective moral facts, but tendencies. Parsimony or occam's razor could be used to decide to leave out the creation of this 'oughtness' he attaches to tendencies toward behavior and attitudes.
3) if what is present in neuronal structures is considered objective moral facts, then whatever is found are objective moral facts. This would mean that there is no need to change anything. VA occasionally mentions that he sees the need to improve our morals. But we have the brains we have, these lead to the behaviors/attitudes we have. But VA thinks that we need to enhance the structures related to empathy and not those related to aggression. On what grounds? It cannot be neuronal structures, since these would support the current ration of empathetic to aggressive neuronal structures. He draws his morality from some other source than brains. Fine. But he justifies his morals on brains. So, where is the actual moral part of his morality coming from?
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Re: The Early-, Later-, and Late- Wittgenstein

Post by Skepdick »

Impenitent wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2023 9:09 pm got in the way? Hume's fallacy of induction...

-Imp
You were talking about causality.When did you start talking about induction?

If you ought to have a cup of tea - make one. Or ask somebody to make you one.

If you ought to have a cup of tea but you didn’t get one then there has to be some explanation on why you didn’t get what you ought to have.
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