Two Senses of Ought

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why so many are dogmatically stuck with Hume's 'No Ought from Is' [NOFI], kept harping on the rightness and wrongness of pseudo-morality [Peter Holmes and gang] is they missed out the point that there are two senses of 'ought' in relation to morality.

There are two senses of 'ought' to be considered;

• 1. The typical ought arising from personal or unjustified group opinions and beliefs which Hume had critiqued.
  
  2. The scientifically verifiable ought, e.g. potentials that is applicable to sentient Agents i.e. human subjects.

1. The typical 'ought' arising from personal or unjustified group opinions and beliefs which Hume had critiqued.

Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739):

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.[3][4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem

In modern times, "Hume's law" often denotes the informal thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements; or, more broadly, that one cannot infer evaluative statements (including aesthetic statements) from non-evaluative statements.
-ibid

2. The scientifically verifiable oughtness, e.g. potentials that is applicable to sentient Agents i.e. human subjects.

The oughts in the second sense are scientifically verifiable and justifiable oughtness inherently within all humans as human nature.
These objective oughtness [2] are the matter-of-facts that trigger the subjective oughts [1] within individuals.

Such oughts or oughtness are objective moral facts based on the Neurobiological Facts grounding the inherent Moral Sense related to Moral Sentiments proposed by Earl of Shaftesbury, Hume, Reid, Hutchinson, and other modern moral sense theorists exploring into moral psychology, evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences.

Whist Hume denounced NOFI in the first sense, his morality based on moral sense and sentiments is actually grounded on objective moral facts of oughtness, which as with his time, he was ignorant of the real objective facts of morality.

Arguably the most prominent defender of moral sense theory in the history of philosophy is David Hume (1711–1776).
While he discusses morality in Book 3 [Part 1 Section 1&2*] of his Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40),
Hume's most mature, positive account of the moral sense is found in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_sen ... ry#History

The basis of Hume's Morality is Sympathy [modern = empathy].

In the Treatise Hume details the causes of the moral sentiments, in doing so explaining why agreeable and advantageous traits prove to be the ones that generate approval.
He claims that the sentiments of moral approval and disapproval are caused by some of the operations of sympathy, which is not a feeling but rather a psychological mechanism that enables one person to receive by communication the sentiments of another (more or less what we would call empathy today).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#symp

The imply Hume's b]sentiments of moral approval and disapproval[/b] are actually the ought-ness and ought-not-ness are driven by operations of empathy from a mechanism, a psychological mechanism.
It is this psychological mechanism that represent the oughts in the 2nd sense which can now be verified and justified scientifically and considered within a moral FSK as objective moral facts.

There are loads of research pointing to mirror neurons [neurobiological facts] as having an impact on empathy [sympathy -Hume]

Many scholars believe that the mirror neurons, or at least a mirroring mechanism, can account for some basic forms of empathy. Link:

Btw, mirror neurons and empathy [sympathy] is not the sole basis for morality but there is a whole suite of neurobiological facts represent the various activities of what is morality proper that had evolved overs eons and is aligned with human nature.

[FlashDangerpants]

2. The scientifically verifiable ought, e.g. potentials that is applicable to sentient Agents i.e. human subjects.[/list]

That's hypothetical imperative. In other words it's an ought from another ought, not an ought that can be derived from an is.

If there's a "scientific ought" that somebody ought not to be prevented from breathing, that's derived via a totally normal moral ought about not killing people.

It's about 5 years since I first explained that one to you. Back then I also predicted you would never learn.

[Peter Holmes]

Without equivocation on the word ought, VA has no argument.

[promethean75]

yeah VA you're tryna make a connection that simply ain't there man. your intents and efforts are noble tho as were Kant's and other deontologists.

check this out tho. let's say there are only two kinds of 'ought' application in language. one is the predictive ought... like the theory that a storm is coming becuz such conditions usually produce one.... or that the tire ought to blow becuz the tread is gone, etc. causally predictive statements.

the second is a prescriptive use. statements declaring that x should be done so that y can happen. these involve the hypothetical imperatives F. D. Pants mentions up there and, some philosophers claim, categorical imperatives saying that x should be done becuz x is good and the right thing to do regardless of y.

the former hypothetical calls x good and right only if it works to accomplish some end or standard. so u see the difference. and i know u already know all this stuff but you've got it all connected up wrong.

the prob with the categorical imperative is that it presumes there is teleology in the universe by the decree of some transcendent god thing. for there can't be any essential mistakes, errors or accidents concerning the design of a thing and how it acts/behaves if there is nothing there to determine what it is supposed to be, to become, what kind of design it is to have, etc.

without such, nothing in the universe would be 'the wrong thing' essentially, unless it were an evaluation based on a hypothetical imperative that says 'this x does not get us y so it is wrong'.

[FlashDangerpants]

Without equivocation on the word ought, VA has no argument.

It's sort of surprising he hasn't drawn a distinction yet between "ought" and "ought-proper" for this purpose.

[Iwannaplato]

2. The scientifically verifiable ought, e.g. potentials that is applicable to sentient Agents i.e. human subjects.[/list]

That's hypothetical imperative. In other words it's an ought from another ought, not an ought that can be derived from an is.

If there's a "scientific ought" that somebody ought not to be prevented from breathing, that's derived via a totally normal moral ought about not killing people.

It's about 5 years since I first explained that one to you. Back then I also predicted you would never learn.

If we look at number 2, which you quoted above, it has nothing to do with morals, even in his 'potentials applicable to sentient agents.' Potentials are not morals.

When he explicates we get...

The oughts in the second sense are scientifically verifiable and justifiable oughtness inherently within all humans as human nature.
These objective oughtness [2] are the matter-of-facts that trigger the subjective oughts [1] within individuals.

So, these potential trigger subjective oughts.
Fine. Yes, there are likely parts of our physiology that can lead to moral judgments or tendencies toward moral judgments.

That's not objective morality, nor does it lead to objective moral facts.

No one here doubts that humans have the potential to generate moral judgments and that physiology is related to that.

Sorry to aim this at you, but he, at least officially has me on ignore.

[FlashDangerpants]

Sorry to aim this at you, but he, at least officially has me on ignore.

He has me on triple ultra ignore, but nevermind.

There's always been two senses of ought and as VA is the world's greatest Kant expert he knows that those are the imperatives categorical (an ought that is just an ought all to itself) and the hypothetical (the ought that is an ought relative to some form of goal or target).

If VA intends to add a third sort of ought into the mix then he really ought (in a goal derived hypothetical sense) to be titling his little thread "Three Senses of Ought" However the way his moral theorising has always gone thus far, always rvolves around not understanding what a hypothetical imperative is and avoiding recognition of such.

That's the fundamentals of his notorious "oughtness to breathe" argument, and everything he's based off of that ever since. It's always been a case of pretending there is no hypothecated target involved.

[Iwannaplato]

There's always been two senses of ought and as VA is the world's greatest Kant expert he knows that those are the imperatives categorical (an ought that is just an ought all to itself) and the hypothetical (the ought that is an ought relative to some form of goal or target).

Agreed.

If VA intends to add a third sort of ought into the mix then he really ought (in a goal derived hypothetical sense) to be titling his little thread "Three Senses of Ought" However the way his moral theorising has always gone thus far, always rvolves around not understanding what a hypothetical imperative is and avoiding recognition of such.

That's the fundamentals of his notorious "oughtness to breathe" argument, and everything he's based off of that ever since. It's always been a case of pretending there is no hypothecated target involved.

At least the oughtness to breathe moved things forward. I mean for us, if not for him. He seems hesitant about giving examples nowadays, keeping things abstract.

[Veritas Aequitas]

yeah VA you're tryna make a connection that simply ain't there man. your intents and efforts are noble tho as were Kant's and other deontologists.

check this out tho. let's say there are only two kinds of 'ought' application in language. one is the predictive ought... like the theory that a storm is coming becuz such conditions usually produce one.... or that the tire ought to blow becuz the tread is gone, etc. causally predictive statements.

the second is a prescriptive use. statements declaring that x should be done so that y can happen. these involve the hypothetical imperatives F. D. Pants mentions up there and, some philosophers claim, categorical imperatives saying that x should be done becuz x is good and the right thing to do regardless of y.

the former hypothetical calls x good and right only if it works to accomplish some end or standard. so u see the difference. and i know u already know all this stuff but you've got it all connected up wrong.

the prob with the categorical imperative is that it presumes there is teleology in the universe by the decree of some transcendent god thing. for there can't be any essential mistakes, errors or accidents concerning the design of a thing and how it acts/behaves if there is nothing there to determine what it is supposed to be, to become, what kind of design it is to have, etc.

without such, nothing in the universe would be 'the wrong thing' essentially, unless it were an evaluation based on a hypothetical imperative that says 'this x does not get us y so it is wrong'.

There is no god thing here.
What we have is evolution that has programmed human nature [the agent] with an oughtness to act.
That all human breathe is because there is an 'oughtness' that is inherent and intrinsic within all humans to breathe without any hypothetical alternative.
It is not that it is wrong or right that one should breathe.
It is just natural that one breathe naturally.

What I argued is there are moral oughts and ought-not-ness that are inherent and intrinsic within all humans with different degrees of activeness, example, an 'ought-not-ness to kill human' an 'ought-not-ness to incest' to torture babies and the likes.

Being humans these natural oughts and ought-not-ness are overshadowed by other impulses, e.g. the necessary oughtness to kill in self-defense or misdirected to kill humans due to pathological reasons.

Morality-proper is about recognizing these natural oughts and ought-not-ness then clear away all the contaminating elements to make them pure so that the moral agent [within a collective] can be spontaneously moral without having to make difficult moral judgments full of dilemmas.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Without equivocation on the word ought, VA has no argument.

There is no contradiction nor issue if they are used in different senses and time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction

Regardless of the term 'ought' the point is to verify and justify there are objective moral facts which can be used as an objective standard and where the agent's moral status can be improved upon those moral standards.

The impulse of empathy is directed for various purposes of which morality is one of the purpose and this is represented by the relevant neural algorithm comprising the mirror neurons amongst others.

You understand how mirror neurons work?
Mirror neurons trigger the exact mental state of the external party and one will feel the same pain of the other.
The threat of death arising from the threat to kill invoke terrible fears, worries, mental pains and sufferings.
A moral agent who has higher activeness of degree the inherent and intrinsic 'ought-not-ness to kill-human' will have high degrees of empathy.
This high degrees of empathy will trigger the same terrible fears, worries, mental pains and sufferings of a threat of death re killing another in the intended killer.
This is how the 'ought-not-ness to kill-human' inhibit the 'ought to kill' potential in a moral agent from killing humans.

The whole process is very complicated and I will not go into the details.
The point is, this 'ought-not-ness to kill-human' system is represented by physical neural elements which are verifiable by the scientific FSK and moral FSK as objective moral facts.

By recognizing the above inherent oughtness and 'ought-not-ness' as objective moral facts, we will have the potential to expedite the moral progress of humanity in the FUTURE [not now] by improving the relevant physical neural moral system by relying on the advancing scientific and other relevant knowledge.

[Iwannaplato]

This is how the 'ought-not-ness to kill-human' inhibit the 'ought to kill' potential in a moral agent from killing humans.

Or
This is how the ought-to-kill potentiall overrides the 'ought-not-ness-to-kill human potential and allows the person to kill other humans.

And can't you see that you are assuming what is moral when looking at brains and focusing on those parts of the brain that support what you think are morally good behaviors?

You assume a morality, then cherry pick brain parts to support your hypothesis.

And, yeah, I like empathy too. And I prefer that in most cases we don't kill.

Though one of the huge problems we have today is that we can and do kill at a distance, blips on a screen, or words on a screen leading to explosions or policies that kill, for example. The mirror neurons are no help here.

So, apart from the basic philosophical error you are making, there are some huge practical problems with your model.

It's certainly a way of looking at how to encourage certain potentials we like and discourage others we don't, but it is no way way at all an objective morality. It is an approach to moving toward things that you like and many others also. And to make such plans one can use objective facts about human brains. But there is no objective morality produced.

[Peter Holmes]

Without equivocation on the word ought, VA has no argument.

There is no contradiction nor issue if they are used in different senses and time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction

If, in the assertion 'humans ought not to kill humans', the word ought is being used non-morally, then that is not a moral assertion, and it doesn't and can't assert a so-called moral fact.

And in that case, to claim that 'humans ought not to kill humans' asserts a moral fact is to equivocate on the word ought.

Your whole argument rests on that equivocation.

[Impenitent]

just a thought... if humans are "evolving" a biological imperative toward certain "moral" actions, wouldn't they necessarily be extra linguistic? biological and outside of language...

-Imp