As I said, it is an essential principle of science that, all things being equal, an experimenter can repeat a procedure. I am that experimenter and my procedure, on this occasion, consists of typing pairs of characters. After I demonstrate that I can type 01, it is a required assumption, for the conduct of science, that I can again type 01, unless there is some significant change of circumstances, such as my computer breaking down, intruders attacking me, my suffering a stroke, etc. And of course, I can demonstrate that I'm still capable of typing 01, as I just did. I can type it multiple times; 01 01 01 01 01 01, I 01 can 01 type 01 it 01 between 01 words 01, etc. In short, if there is repeatability in science, then I can repeat a procedure that I have demonstrated that I can perform, if I have suffered no physical impediment and my equipment is equally functional. And if there is no repeatability in science, then there is no useful science, at best, but probably no science at all.MGL wrote:What exactly are realisable alternatives? I get the impression you are saying that something has realisable alternatives when it has simply been observed to perform different actions.
The point of the demonstration is to show that the denier can only deny that free will is observable by denying essential principles of science. In any case, determinism is a metaphysical thesis, if the denier claims that their metaphysical theory is inconsistent with the observation, then by principle 1c they again lose recourse to science. The demonstration is aimed at refuting free will denial (that is only incompatibilist determinists) by establishing an observation, it has no immediate metaphysical ambitions.MGL wrote:If that is all, this seems to be quite compatible with determinism.
I have ways of adding to the demonstration which argue for the conclusion that the probability of my actions being either determined or locally caused, is infinitely small, but first let's establish that there is a demonstration.
Consciousness is part of the definition, without consciousness, what would be meant by "will"? In any case, if there are people who want to claim that computers are conscious and have free will, I dont mind. I think such a position is less irrational than free will denial, though it seems just as silly to me.MGL wrote:A conventional computer can be programmed to select a choice set from an option set, but does that really give it a free-will? Or is it just the addition of consciousness that turns such an ability into free-will?