Let's begin by listing a definition that falls short of what the UN has in mind, so that as we approach the UN definition by adding further qualifying clauses, we might see why the UN definition adds the particular criteria it does. Let's refer to these definitions that fall short as "Preliminary Definitions."United Nations Convention Against Torture wrote:Article 1.1 of the Convention defines torture as:
For the purpose of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him, or a third person, information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
Preliminary Definition #1 (PD1): Torture is any act by which severe pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person.
Note that this definition leaves out the particular 'purpose' behind intentionally inflicting this severe pain and suffering. Why is PD1 unsatisfactory? Well, because it would be defeated by any intentional inflicting of severe pain or suffering which we would not deem torture. In other words: a counter-example. If we could provide one example in which intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering was not considered an act of torture, then PD1 would be false. And it's easy enough to give such examples, particularly in cases of self-defense, where we might find it necessary to shove an attacker into a giant vat of acid as the only means of saving our lives. We can simply stipulate that we know dying by acid is severely painful, so we have intentionally inflicted severe pain or suffering upon our attacker. Do we think that we have tortured him? Clearly not. So, PD1 fails easily.
Now we can appreciate why the UN didn't use a definition like PD1.
Preliminary Definition #2 (PD2): Torture is any act by which severe pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person for the purpose of obtaining information.
Let's note that we've narrowed our scope from 'acts of intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering', simpliciter, to 'acts of intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering for the purpose of obtaining information'. What is gained by narrowing the scope? This definition escapes the criticism against PD1. In our first self-defense example we noted that we shoved the attacker into a giant vat of acid, but that's clearly not an act of trying to obtain information, so our first objection doesn't apply now. Well, at least that's the apparent rationale. In other words, we haven't found a counter-example because PD2 applies only to cases of trying to obtain information, not your typical self-defense scenarios (as described previously). I think there's something incoherent with this rationale, but I will leave it as is for now. We will return to this paragraph and this rationale much later in this thread. Still, given this rationale, which we'll assume is coherent for now, there are objections we can make.
There are two objections I want to make, but I will only pursue the second one because it's the one pertinent to my inquiry. By the way, when I say "objections", I mean objections to the coherency of the UN definition. I think something is amiss with this definition, but I haven't quite put my finger on it. That's what I'm trying to do here with these objections. I'm not trying to undermine the definition just yet (or maybe ever); I first want to fully understand it and everything presupposed by it. That's my purpose: to fully understand it.
First objection: the UN definition is ad hoc. The UN simply states but doesn't not explain why certain acts of intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering are torture if done for the purpose of trying to obtain information but not torture if done in typical self-defense scenarios (as described previously). In other words, if two similar acts are acts of intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering, but one is torture because it's done in order to obtain information and the other is not torture because it's done in a typical self-defense scenario, then what explains this seemingly ad hoc designation of 'torture' in the former case but 'not torture' in the latter? Frankly, no explanation is given. So, my objection is that the UN has simply given us an ad hoc definition of torture. But, let me repeat, this is not an argument I want to pursue, and not because I think there's a good response to it -- but it's outside the scope of my inquiry in this thread. So, onto the Second objection.
Second objection: There doesn't seem to be anything immoral or torturous about trying to obtain information. We do it all the time: "Hi. What's your name?" "Professor, when is the exam?" "Do you speak English?" "Where are you planning to attack us next?" -- all of these polite questions are for the purpose of obtaining information. So, the idea of trying to obtain information seems perfectly benign. So, my question is: How does adding this stipulation, the purpose stipulation of 'trying to obtain information', make an act (one of intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering) an act of torture if the act itself cannot be deemed an act of torture on its own terms?
To get a grip on what I'm getting at, consider this scenario. I corner you against the wall and kiss your forehead. Basically, I kiss your forehead without consent. Have I tortured you? If you're having trouble, think of whether I could be tried in court for torture. Pretty ridiculous, right? Right. I think reasonable people will say that this isn't enough to constitute torture. I mean, even the UN seems to think severe pain or suffering is required. Notice that I didn't mention the reason for kissing your forehead. We're just looking at the act of my kissing your forehead without your consent, and we're asking whether this constitutes torture. Clearly not. Now let's say that I somehow lure you to my dungeon and restrain you while I slowly cut off your fingers. Am I torturing you? I think most reasonable people would say yes. Why is this torture? Well, obviously I'm causing you severe pain without your consent. So the difference in these two examples is the 'level of pain or suffering' that I caused you.
Question 1: If you give me your consent to cause you severe pain, am I torturing you?
If I can indeed torture you despite your given consent, then the consent doesn't seem to play a role in making some act an act of torture. It would then seem to be just the severity of the act.
Question 2: What if I said this: "I'm not torturing you because I'm not doing it in order to get information from you"? Would this matter in whether the act was an act of torture or not? And I ask this because the UN definition would require the act to be one of trying to get information. (Yes, I know they have other criteria, but I want to just focus on the 'obtaining information' stipulation for now. Again, I'm trying to understand their conception of torture. I'm not here arguing for or against CIA water boarding.)
Question 3: What if I said this: "I'm not torturing you because I'm doing it for scientific research"? Would this matter in whether the act was an act of torture or not? I've chosen this reason as a seemingly utilitarian reason, not one of malice or immorality.
Question 4: What if I said this: "I'm not torturing you because you have information about a terrorist plot"? Would this matter in whether the act was an act of torture or not? Now, I know some of you will jump on this to defend your thesis that CIA water boarding is torture, but I'm not interested in your off-topic answers. I want to know whether the purpose matters. I've chosen a variety of different purposes to see if perhaps some purposes can or do change an act of 'non-torture' to 'torture', or vice versa, from torture to non-torture.
Well, that's all for now. I have more to say, but it's late and perhaps I've already given you too much to think about.