Free Will vs Determinism

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davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

The upshot of the above on an infinite past: Whether there are an infinite number of past events is not known. However, since there definitely can be an infinite number of past events, then Ican's argument -- that there must be a first cause, because there can't be an infinite number of past events -- simply collapses.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Londoner wrote: Mon Nov 20, 2017 10:16 am Nor do I believe in linear time as if it was a thing in itself, which it plainly is not.
Plainly?

How do you arrive at that?
Me: That causal determinism ends up in metaphysics...
I don't think it does, though.
It is metaphysical in that it is outside physics. Otherwise, what piece of physical evidence could disprove it? As I say, it is no different to declaring that everything that happens is directed by God's will. Again, there is no physical evidence could disprove that.
Oh. I see.

You mean it's unfalsifiable. Yes, I think that's true. You can neither prove nor disprove it by scientific means, so if one wanted to believe in Determinism one would have to do it by metaphysics. Yes.
Perhaps there isn't anything real beyond the physical-causal world, but we cannot know that.
Well, I think it depends on what one means by "know." If we mean "have absolute certainty," then we don't get that outside of closed systems of symbols, and we never get it in science. But if we mean "have good inductive indicators that X or Y is true," then I think we do have good ways of "knowing" that.

Consider the process in which you and I are presently engaged. You cannot "know" in sense 1 that I am here at all, that I am a mind, and that you are talking to me; nor can I "know" in any absolute way, the same about you. But we both feel perfectly rational in assuming that, and in operating as if it were certain to us. Now, if "knowing" requires absolute certainty, then we would be behaving irrationally. But I think we're not.

If good, inductive reasons are enough to warrant "knowledge," then we have reason to "know" that things like minds, selves, morality, intellection, science, and so forth do, in fact exist -- and we have "knowledge" that very likely, physicalist explanations offered for these things are probably reductional and inadequate.
I think there are versions of Determinism, but the ones being used regarding 'free will' seemed to amount to either some sort of metaphysical construct or defining 'free will' into some sort of an oxymoron.
Yes; "Compatibilism" does this. It talks about "free will," but stops short of speaking of it as "free" from strict, physical predetermination. So there's no longer anything "free" in their concept of "free will." It's all just an oxymoron, then.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 6:26 pm ...there definitely can be an infinite number of past events,
"Definitely," you say? :shock:

Well, then you must have very strong evidence that it is so. You wouldn't lie to me about that, now, would you? Of course not. So let's have that definite evidence. We'll do it by test.

Since it's so easy to show "definitely," I have to wonder why I am still waiting for you to produce that string of consequent integers without a "first" one. You haven't even got started, so far as I can tell.

Here: I'll help you along. I'll even let you skip as many numbers as you want. As usual, we can begin at "1" or at "0"; from there, I'll let you jump back to -1,000,000. Or -1,000,000,000. You pick wherever you go back to...as far as you like.

But you know what's going to happen, don't you? If you pick -1,000,000,000,000., then I'm going to remind you that in a causal sequence, you'd have to say "-1,000,000,000,001" first, and before that, you'd need to have already said "-1,000,000,000,0002," and so on.

You're never going to do it. You can't win this one. But I'm happy for you to try. Please, commence.
...then Ican's argument -- that there must be a first cause, because there can't be an infinite number of past events -- simply collapses.
Then go ahead..."definitely" prove me wrong.

But if you can't do it, then what you maybe should do is to face it. And I'm afraid then that not my claim, but rather your ability to avoid it, that ends up being what "simply collapses."
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Belinda wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 5:13 pm The usual answer is that things necessarily are as they are.
There's nothing "usual" about that explanation. Rather, most people make a distinction between "necessary" and "contingent," between events or phenomena that "have to" happen, and those that "could be" another way. Only Fatalists don't.
I'd say that explaining is what scientists do, whereas metaphysicians describe.
To "describe" grants the existence of the thing described. I can "describe" Belinda only if she (in some sense) exists. Otherwise, I am not "describing" but "inventing" or "imagining" Belinda.

"Explaining" implicates causality. One "explains why" X or Y happened...and that presumes contingency, not necessity.
(Belinda wrote)
There are also causal circumstances, and (apparently) nomic causes which we commonly refer to as "laws of nature" or " laws of science".
(IC)Are you trying to say these are "non-causal" in some way? A "law of nature" is not that which implicates a causal prerequisite, you think? You suppose there is no reason for, say, entropy, or gravity, or atomic forces, or the surface tension of liquids? These are just "laws" without further explanation, you say?
Each category has 'cause' or 'causal' so your objection has no substance.
Ummm...that IS my objection. :shock: It's that you're assuming causality without realizing you are.
Laws of nature or of science are ways we try to understand the world. No scientist would claim that any law of science or of nature was an eternal truth.
This directly contradicts what you said at the very top of your message. First, you told me these things were "necessarily as they are," and now you are telling me they are contingent (i.e. "not an eternal truth," but presumably, something that could have been otherwise than it happens to be).

Which is it? :shock:
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

In this discussion, one must distinguish between a potential infinity and an actual infinity. Ican has not made this distinction.

It is true that one can never “form” an actual infinity by successively adding to a potential infinity — but a potential infinity is defined as one that has a starting point.

An actual infinity has no starting point — and one CAN successively add new events to an infinite set.

Therefore, Craig’s argument against an infinite past simply begs the question.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

In-depth discussion on infinite past events here, for any who may be interested. Very nice work.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 7:31 pm In this discussion, one must distinguish between a potential infinity and an actual infinity. Ican has not made this distinction.

It is true that one can never “form” an actual infinity by successively adding to a potential infinity — but a potential infinity is defined as one that has a starting point.
You've given away the game again, david. You can't get away from the problem by stipulating a difference between "potential" and "actual" infinity.

"Potential," you have defined as "not actual." But if "potential" actually has no potentiality to be real, then it's not "potential" at all. If you have "potential" to be a fireman, then it must mean you "could be" a fireman. But you have already declared that what you mean by "potential" CANNOT become actual. In other words, it's not actually "potential" at all: it's speculative or imaginary. The minute you try to make it real or actual, it doesn't work.

So what kind of world do we actually live in? A "potential" one that actually has no potentiality to actually exist, or an actual one? For the referent in our discussion is "universe." This "universe."
An actual infinity has no starting point
Right. So you're talking about something that can never become actual. But I think you would have to concede that this is an (or "the") actual universe. So its origin cannot be accounted for with reference to merely imaginary infinities. It would have to be an actual chain of infinite causes.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Immanuel Can wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 8:01 pm Right. So you're talking about something that can never become actual.
Of course it can be actual. That's the point.

The argument that Craig musters against an actual infinite past presupposes that only potential infinities can exist -- which is untrue! That's why his argument is question-begging.

I'm sure you did not read the link to the in-depth discussion above that I gave -- you would not have had time. Maybe you should read a little before reflexively spouting off? :?
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

To reiterate simply: a potential infinity can never become actually infinite, by successive addition of number/events. But an actually infinite set can always successively accommodate new events! See Cantor. These means past events can be infinite, without conflicting with successive addition.
Londoner
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Londoner »

Immanuel Can wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 7:02 pm
Me: Nor do I believe in linear time as if it was a thing in itself, which it plainly is not.
Plainly?

How do you arrive at that?
Because time is measured by events. It is not a substance. If it was, I would like somebody to give me a few years as a Christmas present.
You mean it's unfalsifiable. Yes, I think that's true. You can neither prove nor disprove it by scientific means, so if one wanted to believe in Determinism one would have to do it by metaphysics. Yes.

Well, I think it depends on what one means by "know." If we mean "have absolute certainty," then we don't get that outside of closed systems of symbols, and we never get it in science. But if we mean "have good inductive indicators that X or Y is true," then I think we do have good ways of "knowing" that.
I do not think we can have any indicators that any particular metaphysical idea is true, because they would be indicators for every alternative theory too. 'Things fall because of gravity; look at that apple!' ... 'Yes, look at that falling apple! A clear example of God's will in action'. ... 'Rubbish. What I see is the Matrix is sending us yet another illusory perception' etc.
Consider the process in which you and I are presently engaged. You cannot "know" in sense 1 that I am here at all, that I am a mind, and that you are talking to me; nor can I "know" in any absolute way, the same about you. But we both feel perfectly rational in assuming that, and in operating as if it were certain to us. Now, if "knowing" requires absolute certainty, then we would be behaving irrationally. But I think we're not.
The theory that there are 'other minds' works as a model. But so would the theory that I am a brain in a vat, and what I think of as 'other minds' are deceptive signals sent to my brain by the controller of the vat. Since it makes no practical difference it doesn't matter.
If good, inductive reasons are enough to warrant "knowledge," then we have reason to "know" that things like minds, selves, morality, intellection, science, and so forth do, in fact exist -- and we have "knowledge" that very likely, physicalist explanations offered for these things are probably reductional and inadequate.
I would say we have to be careful. Certain metaphysical theories do seem more probable than others, but that is not a rational judgement. If we cannot know, then we simply cannot know. If we just go with what feels right, then if that is limited to the metaphysical it doesn't matter, but there is a tendency to apply it elsewhere. For example, the idea of linear time, where we are on a conveyor belt that is taking us from 'the past' to 'the future' also certainly feels right, but when considered it makes no sense; it is self-contradictory.

I think we are also trapped by language. Language incorporates certain metaphysical assumptions. I've mentioned linear time. Also, if we speak of the 'brain in a vat' scenario our words are robbed of meaning because they assume we are referring to things, rather than thoughts. I think there is something of this problem in causal determinism; we communicate in terms of cause-and-effect but (as with linear time) it presents a flawed model.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 8:24 pm To reiterate simply: a potential infinity can never become actually infinite, by successive addition of number/events. But an actually infinite set can always successively accommodate new events! See Cantor. These means past events can be infinite, without conflicting with successive addition.
It's not "successive addition" that's the problem, david. It's how a causal sequence can even commence.

You say "an actually infinite set" can always accommodate new events." That misses the point completely, but I'll grant it to you for now.

Again, let's see you count one. And I'm happy for you to make as many "accommodations of new events" and "successive additions" (such as -1/2, or -1/3, as you wish to make); just make sure that each integer is said before the one that comes after it, as it must in a chain of causes. Keep them genuinely "successive," and consequential, and if you're right, you should be able to do it.

P.S. -- The problem of a beginning is also the problem Morriston misses, by the way. He just posits the idea of an actual infinite with no beginning, and says, well, you can always add to such a thing. Totally not the point: the point is that you can't even create such a thing. It cannot "get going," because the prerequisites for its its existence are swallowed up by infinity.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Imagine this a different way. I tried to illustrate this graphically, but the shitty software here won't let me.

Imagine a line, a double vector: there is a line with two arrows at each end. The arrow at the left end of the line points left, and the arrow at the right end points right. We're going to label this line "space." The left-pointing arrow is labeled "west" and the the right-pointing arrow is labeled "east."

In the middle of the line, equidistant from the left- and right-pointing arrows, are the words: YOU ARE HERE.

QUESTION: Is there any reason to believe that the west pointing arrow, and the east pointing arrow, don't go on forever in their respective spatial directions?

Now we are going to duplicate this double-arrowed vector and label it "time."

The left-pointing arrow is labeled "past" and the right-pointing arrow is labeled "future."

In the middle of the line, equidistant from the left- and right-pointing arrows, are the words: YOU ARE NOW.

QUESTION: Is there any reason to believe that the past-pointing arrow, and the future-pointing arrow, don't go on forever in their respective temporal directions?

Remember that under general relativity, space and time are fused: spacetime. This means that every event in spacetime has four coordinates: three of space and one of time. From this it follows automatically that if space is infinite, so is time.
Last edited by davidm on Wed Nov 22, 2017 10:02 pm, edited 1 time in total.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

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Immanuel Can wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 9:03 pm P.S. -- The problem of a beginning is also the problem Morriston misses, by the way. He just posits the idea of an actual infinite with no beginning, and says, well, you can always add to such a thing. Totally not the point: the point is that you can't even create such a thing. It cannot "get going," because the prerequisites for its its existence are swallowed up by infinity.
It's just the opposite. Craig and you posit the idea of a potential infinity with a beginning, and if you do that, then yes, you can never form an actual infinite. But this argument begs the question because it fails to show that an actual infinite is not possible. It assumes an actual infinite is not possible; but this is precisely what you and Craig need to prove! One cannot reason from: "one can't form an actual infinite by adding to a potential infinite" to "one can't form an actual infinite by adding to an actual infinite." One CAN do the latter. So whether an actual past infinite exists becomes an empirical matter and cannot logically be dismissed, as you and Craig would like to do. See my double-vector analysis above.
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Belinda »

There cannot be an infinite number of past events because differentiation of existence itself into events is conceptualisation, and only special beings can conceptualise.

To claim that differentiated events transcendentally exist is tantamount to claiming that God created things from the elemental chaos.
Viveka
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Viveka »

Immanuel Can wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 9:03 pm
davidm wrote: Wed Nov 22, 2017 8:24 pm To reiterate simply: a potential infinity can never become actually infinite, by successive addition of number/events. But an actually infinite set can always successively accommodate new events! See Cantor. These means past events can be infinite, without conflicting with successive addition.
It's not "successive addition" that's the problem, david. It's how a causal sequence can even commence.

You say "an actually infinite set" can always accommodate new events." That misses the point completely, but I'll grant it to you for now.

Again, let's see you count one. And I'm happy for you to make as many "accommodations of new events" and "successive additions" (such as -1/2, or -1/3, as you wish to make); just make sure that each integer is said before the one that comes after it, as it must in a chain of causes. Keep them genuinely "successive," and consequential, and if you're right, you should be able to do it.

P.S. -- The problem of a beginning is also the problem Morriston misses, by the way. He just posits the idea of an actual infinite with no beginning, and says, well, you can always add to such a thing. Totally not the point: the point is that you can't even create such a thing. It cannot "get going," because the prerequisites for its its existence are swallowed up by infinity.
Who's to say that the infinity can't be traversed? Zeno's Paradoxes are examples of infinity traversed.
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