Free Will vs Determinism

[thedoc]

The choice may be random if say the menu is in Chinese, or it may be be a caused choice. To say that the breakfaster's Free Will was involved would be to oppose the famous edict of William of Ockham.

First I will assume that the man does not read Chinese, but I still don't see how this invokes Ockham's razor.

[Immanuel Can]

Determinism isn't fatalism.

"Determinism" (Causal) is a theory of metaphysics. Fatalism is the logical consequence of actually believing and practicing it. The first is a philosophical position, and the second is a description of attitude and action that rationally derives from that philosophical position.

You may as well NOT toss a coin, then.

Right and if you don't toss it, fatalism is false.

Well, unless you were fated NOT to toss it. You'll never know, will you?

I think that's one thing that makes Determinism so appealing to people: it's unfalsifiable, so people mistake that for an indicator that it must be true.

It's similar when you talk to people who believe in Egocentrism: they argue that all altruism is secretly selfish, and they can always find some way to "explain away" any act of kindness as ultimately self-serving, as in "You only did that because you wanted to see yourself as a charitable person." And it's really hard to falsify that, because no explanation you can give is ever so clear that the Egocentrists can't offer an alternate, less-altruistic version of why you did it.

But in both cases, unfalsifiability doesn't argue for truth. If Karl Popper was at all right, it may well actually be one reason to think that maybe the theory is simply, ultimately irrational.

[Immanuel Can]

If the rider chose the more dangerous option he would have been deranged. IYO does Free Will operate for a madman?

Of course. The madman does things for reasons unrelated to reality, and known only to him...that's why we call him "mad." But his free will is "unfree" in a different sense...it's unfree because he's not in control of himself...but not because he's more "causal" or more subject to Determinism than anyone else.

To say that the breakfaster's Free Will was involved would be to oppose the famous edict of William of Ockham.

Actually, it does not.

There's a similar mistake made in the movie "Contact," if you've ever seen that. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAp3jT8n6Qs It's a corny movie, but this segment makes two good points: firstly, that Jodie Foster (or the writers) has no idea what Occam's Razor really said, and secondly, that it doesn't address everything her character is portrayed as having experienced.

What Occam said was that, all things being equal, the explanation requiring the fewest number of factors was to be preferred. But he put huge conditions on that. Firstly, that it was merely ceteris paribus, meaning "only if all things are truly, genuinely equal," and then he also intended it only probabilistically, not absolutely... it leads to the "preferred" explanation, not necessarily the "right" one. For it was quite clear to him that sometimes there were other factors that made a more complex explanation to be the better one, and that there were were kinds of explanation that were just TOO simple to account for the phenomenon they attempt to describe.

So against (your too slim version of) William of Occam, I would raise Leibniz, and the idea of "The Law of Sufficient Cause." Determinism is, in my estimation, not sufficient, in a Leibnizian sense, to account for many of the observable phenomena involved in the world (such as free will, personal identity, the self, consciousness, mind, morality, intelligibility, argumentation, and so on).

[Belinda]

Immanuel Can referred to a the idea of a madman:

But his free will is "unfree" in a different sense...it's unfree because he's not in control of himself.

IMO this is the only unfreedom that applies to selves. You think that Free Will confers absolute freedom. I think that reason confers as much of freedom as any in this relative world is capable of.

Not being in control of self is the preserve not only of madmen but also people who are distraught and lack insight into the causes and nature of their own emotions. Reason is what shows the way to self control. When I praise reason please note that I am not derogating happiness, joy, and kindness as those can and do consist with reason.

IC wrote:

"The Law of Sufficient Cause." Determinism is, in my estimation, not sufficient, in a Leibnizian sense, to account for many of the observable phenomena involved in the world (such as free will, personal identity, the self, consciousness, mind, morality, intelligibility, argumentation, and so on).

IMO determinism is necessary and sufficient to account for all of those. Always bearing in mind that uncertainty is a mainstay of reason.

My story about the breakfaster was very short and like all story tellers I selected what was relevant to my story. Within the terms of my story such as it was it fulfilled all that you quoted from William of Ockham. If I had told a longer story I'd have included a lot more about the breakfaster's character. The breakfaster's character was caused to be as it was.
Do you think that he could have demonstrated to himself that he had Free Will by choosing to eat bacon when he detested bacon ?

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can referred to a the idea of a madman:

But his free will is "unfree" in a different sense...it's unfree because he's not in control of himself.

IMO this is the only unfreedom that applies to selves.

If you think ANY does, you're not a Causal Determinist, then.

You think that Free Will confers absolute freedom.

Nope. Never said that. That's your interpretation of what I said, but it's not actually what i said. If you look back, you'll see that I gave the nod to the idea that some choices are constrained in some ways. That's not "absolute." But it is "free."

I think that reason confers as much of freedom as any in this relative world is capable of.

In Causal Determinism, your "reason" doesn't matter: it's not a causal element, because it's a phenomenon of mind, and mind is a mere epiphenomenon (essentially, an illusion) of causal chains in the brain. So if you believe reason has any influence in the situation, you're again not a Causal Determinist.

Do you think that he could have demonstrated to himself that he had Free Will by choosing to eat bacon when he detested bacon ?

That begs the question. Did he choose bacon at all?

You can't "choose" what is the product of Causal Determinist forces. So if your diner thinks he "detests" bacon, it's not because he chose to. It's because of prior biochemical compounds in his body, which are products of his original assembling and his environment, and these are products of prior forces in an endless regressive chain of causes. Thus, there is no sense in which we can say there was a "reason" for his not choosing bacon; instead, it just happens that he didn't have bacon, because of the entirely contingent arrangement of prior causal factors, going back infinitely. His delusion that he "detested" bacon is a mere product of his neurochemicals, not a decision he made, but one that was actually made for him long before he happened to experience the feeling of "making" that decision; and it was certainly not anything for which "reason" was a causal contributor, according to CD.

[Londoner]

You can't "choose" what is the product of Causal Determinist forces. So if your diner thinks he "detests" bacon, it's not because he chose to. It's because of prior biochemical compounds in his body, which are products of his original assembling and his environment, and these are products of prior forces in an endless regressive chain of causes.

'Endless' would be right. So, since it is endless, why would we call any of them 'causes', since each one would not be a cause but only an effect?

Unless God is going to make a surprise appearance here, then this is not saying that things are 'determined' because there is no determiner, i.e there is no 'cause' to set this chain off. As a theory it denies the notion of causation altogether.

(Or if we did want to have causes, that is to say 'things that act on other things', then why can't the diner be one of them?)

[Immanuel Can]

You can't "choose" what is the product of Causal Determinist forces. So if your diner thinks he "detests" bacon, it's not because he chose to. It's because of prior biochemical compounds in his body, which are products of his original assembling and his environment, and these are products of prior forces in an endless regressive chain of causes.

'Endless' would be right. So, since it is endless, why would we call any of them 'causes', since each one would not be a cause but only an effect?

Good question. Well put.

And here's your follow up question, reworded a bit: if the chain of causes is allegedly "endless," then how did it get started at all? For x-ininity had to happen before x-1,0000000, which had to happen before x-100, which had to happen before x-1, which has to happen before x+1 can happen at all. But x-infinity isn't a particular point in time, but an endless regression.

So there was no "first cause" point, and no first event to get the chain going, if that's the case.

Unless God is going to make a surprise appearance here, then this is not saying that things are 'determined' because there is no determiner, i.e there is no 'cause' to set this chain off. As a theory it denies the notion of causation altogether.

Well, I wouldn't say "surprise," because we all know darn well there's only one plausible First Cause. If we're "surprised," then we shouldn't be.

[OuterLimits]

(Or if we did want to have causes, that is to say 'things that act on other things', then why can't the diner be one of them?)

The things that 'act' on other things do so automatically. Each is a conduit for the cause-and-effect movement of energy.

Whether you call the individual particle within the diner a cause or effect or both doesn't matter.

25,000 Dominoes!!!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXtDChNB3gc

People quibble over 'determinism' and what it means but these conversations would often get more to the point by focusing on 'reductionism'.

[Londoner]

And here's your follow up question, reworded a bit: if the chain of causes is allegedly "endless," then how did it get started at all? For x-ininity had to happen before x-1,0000000, which had to happen before x-100, which had to happen before x-1, which has to happen before x+1 can happen at all. But x-infinity isn't a particular point in time, but an endless regression.

So there was no "first cause" point, and no first event to get the chain going, if that's the case.

It is not a question to me, because I was not trying to explain people eating their dinner in terms of cause-and-effect. I do not think causal determinism makes sense because it ends up in such absurdities.

Well, I wouldn't say "surprise," because we all know darn well there's only one plausible First Cause. If we're "surprised," then we shouldn't be.

Since I do not think the concept of causal determinism makes sense, I do not think a 'first cause' makes sense. That causal determinism ends up in metaphysics is a sign that it is really a mystical rather than common sense idea.

[Immanuel Can]

It is not a question to me, because I was not trying to explain people eating their dinner in terms of cause-and-effect. I do not think causal determinism makes sense because it ends up in such absurdities.

Yeah, I agree.

Since I do not think the concept of causal determinism makes sense, I do not think a 'first cause' makes sense.

You don't have to believe in CD, of course; but if you believe in linear time plus causality (as at least an empirical, material explanation), then you're inevitably also going to be stuck with a First Cause.

That causal determinism ends up in metaphysics...

I don't think it does, though.

It certainly can, if one adds in a Determinist God, as in the case of Calvinism; and it certainly does have implications for metaphysics...most importantly, that there is no such thing as Metaphysics -- at least, not as a Metaphysics that refers to real entities. It's fundamental claim is that there is nothing real beyond the physical-causal world, and all explanation must collapse into a physical-causal kind of explanation.

Or, wait a minute...did you mean that Determinism issues in Metaphysics because it logically requires a First Cause? I think that's more a function of the two things I pointed out before: linear time, plus material causality. And in that case, you're quite correct to say that it pushes us there.

[davidm]

A first cause is not required in a materialist view of reality, and it is perfectly possible that existence stretches infinitely into the past. The big bang is a starting point for the universe as it is currently constituted; it is perfectly logically possible that the universe existed in a different form before the bang, though we have no evidence for this since it doesn't seen possible to get such evidence. But it is certainly possible as a matter of logic. Cosmological arguments for God always end up hoist on their own petard. Thesis: Everything has a cause. Reply: Then what caused God? Counter-thesis: Everything that begins to exist has a cause. God did not begin to exist. Counter-counter-thesis: the universe did not begin to exist. And so on.

[Immanuel Can]

A first cause is not required in a materialist view of reality,

That is true only if matter itself is eternal and non-linear, and not in any entropic condition. All three we can verify scientifically are not true.

and it is perfectly possible that existence stretches infinitely into the past.

This isn't the case.

If a thing is a caused product of something, then that thing has to come first. You cannot say that a thing "caused" another if it did not happen or exist before that effect came into being. The chain has to work the other way.

To illustrate, I cannot "cause" my own parents, and they cannot be the "cause" of my grandparents. But if there was an eternal regression of ancestors in my lineage, then that lineage did not start; for it never had a starting point. And I don't exist right now, because infinity means "forever." That means there wasn't ever a first great, great, great, great...grandparent, who could get the chain going.

Only a finite causal chain can serve as a causal explanation in the present. An infinite causal chain, by definition, never starts.

The big bang is a starting point for the universe as it is currently constituted; it is perfectly logically possible that the universe existed in a different form before the bang, though we have no evidence for this since it doesn't seen possible to get such evidence.

The Big Bang has to be, by any account, a comparatively "recent" cause in the chain. Something had to "cause" the BB. And whatever that was, something had to "cause" that...and so on.

The important thing is that none of these causes can begin without its prior cause having first taken place. Yet there is an infinite regress of questions one could ask about "What had to come before...X." And an infinite regress of prerequisite causes cannot actually have a start point, and a literally infinite span of time between the commencement and now.

Look at it another way. We know our universe is entropic. We even know the rate at which energy and order are being reduced. But let's suppose we didn't...just that there was such a thing as entropy. And let's even suppose that at one time in the early universe, its rate was 1-1,000,000,000th of what is as we measure it today. Even so, if infinity has already passed, then entropy has already reduced our universe to inert particles -- and has done so an infinite amount of time ago! (After all, though 1,000,000,00 is a very high number, infinity is infinitely higher). We are then already living in the condition known scientifically as "Heat Death."

Look around: does this look like Heat Death to you?

But it is certainly possible as a matter of logic. Cosmological arguments for God always end up hoist on their own petard. Thesis: Everything has a cause. Reply: Then what caused God?

Too easy.

God IS the First Cause. The First Cause, is, by definition, uncaused. And that we must suppose an uncaused First Cause is quite evident by the impossibility of infinite causal regression.

Counter-counter-thesis: the universe did not begin to exist.

Except that since Edwin Hubble, we can no longer believe that is true. We know the universe is not eternal.

"With the proof now in place, cosmologists can no longer hide behind the possibility of a past-eternal universe. There is no escape, they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning." -- Cosmologist A. Vilenkin.

[davidm]

Just to reply briefly for now, it is simply not true that there cannot be an infinite past. The maths show otherwise.

Entropy is statistical, not a governing law. It means that there are many more ways for closed systems to be disordered than ordered, so we should expect disorder as a matter of probability. However, in a universe of infinite time span, negentropy will occur spontaneously infinitely many times, even if vast time spans pass between such occurrences.

[Immanuel Can]

The maths show otherwise.

Which maths?

Let's start with the simplest maths.

Try counting back from a particular number. Let's start with "1". But before you say "1," say "0" first. But before you can say "0," say "-1," and before you say that, say "-2"...and so on until infinity.

Let me know when you get started.

Yet that is the problem of the "infinite regress." It posits a universe in which event -2 is the "cause" of event -1, which is the "cause" of event 0, which is the "cause" of event 1...but infinitely so. So there's no point at which the chain gets going, just as you cannot actually perform the mathematical exercise I propose above.

Essentially, it's the same problem.

[davidm]

The maths show otherwise.

Which maths?

Cantor?

Let's start with the simplest maths.

Try counting back from a particular number. Let's start with "1". But before you say "1," say "0" first. But before you can say "0," say "-1," and before you say that, say "-2"...and so on until infinity.

Let me know when you get started.

Does it work or not work both ways? Do we have similar problems counting forward as backward?

Yet that is the problem of the "infinite regress." It posits a universe in which event -2 is the "cause" of event -1, which is the "cause" of event 0, which is the "cause" of event 1...but infinitely so. So there's no point at which the chain gets going, just as you cannot actually perform the mathematical exercise I propose above.

Essentially, it's the same problem.

Physics suggest that the universe is time symmetric -- at its fundamental level, there is no way to distinguish an "arrow" of time. Yet we do experience such arrows -- seven or eight of them, iirc.

This suggests that the "arrows" of time are epistemic and not ontic.

William Lane Craig has devoted a great deal of time to trying to disprove an infinite past. But he is also a presentist -- an adherent of the A theory of time, as opposed to the B theory. Special and general relativity suggest that presentism is false and eternalism (B theory) is true. On eternalism, an actual infinite past (and future) is not a problem at all.