Free Will vs Determinism

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Oneandall
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Oneandall »

If Determinism is true, Everything moves as one. Everyone and everything is interconnected. Everything clockwork and in harmony. The opinions I have seen on this thread have been human. I think, or, you said that but i think... whereas the truth could be that there is no meaning of life. As life is a human made concept. It seems to me that you all want to find the truth, or at least defend your truth, one must first realise that there may be no truth. No meaning to anything. Scary to any human.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Immanuel Can wrote: Wed Jul 19, 2017 2:08 am No. I mean that the physicalist must accept that the human person is not the buck-stopping point of the causal chain. Materialism has to hold that "a human chose to do X" is not a good explanation, because "chose" must be nothing but a failed way to describe the previous causal chain. All "choices" are merely products of prior material forces, to which the human person and his or her "decision" actually adds nothing.
This sounds like a shallow sketch of a Consequence Argument against compatibilism, which I'll address later.

Two quick points first:

1. If hard determinism were true (it's not) why should the "physicalist" care?

2. Do you think there are any problems for free will on the assumption of theism? I've already helpfully disproved one of them -- the idea that god's infallible foreknowledge precludes human free will. It doesn't. (You're welcome.)

Do you think there might be any other problems for free will under the theist assumption, though?
Belinda
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Belinda »

Oneandall wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 12:58 am If Determinism is true, Everything moves as one. Everyone and everything is interconnected. Everything clockwork and in harmony. The opinions I have seen on this thread have been human. I think, or, you said that but i think... whereas the truth could be that there is no meaning of life. As life is a human made concept. It seems to me that you all want to find the truth, or at least defend your truth, one must first realise that there may be no truth. No meaning to anything. Scary to any human.
In other words, or which is what I'd claim, God is that which makes order out of chaos.
That-Which-Makes-Order-Out-Of -Chaos is either 1. a concept, or 2. what is the case, or 3. Both of those.

That-Which-Makes-Order-Out-of-Chaos is imaged by Genesis 1, and my favourite particular image is the spirit of God moving over the waters. I wonder if there is a good picture that .
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Noax
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Noax »

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote: Fri Jul 21, 2017 8:43 pm The Godel incompleteness theorem isn't actually an objection to determinism at all, I'm just saying this was an objection inspired from it that I've seen made on forums before.
No, the theorem acts more as a rebuttal to deterministic arguments. "If determinism, the future is, in priniciple at least, computable." Gödel showed that it is not possible even in principle.
It's an interesting one, because it actually makes me think of our consciousness in a different and unique way. We're one of the only things whose variables can depend on the mere presentation of another variable.
I could effortlessly build a trivial device that does exactly that, one with really simple algorithm that is trivial to predict.
I've seen extrapolations which state that this means that no prediction could ever be made about anything, because this alone messes with the butterfly effect.
Only true of chaotic systems. A non-chaotic event can be predicted, and without all the complication of simulating all the state of the universe.
Are you a determinist?
Not a yes/no question, but empirical physics demonstrates that I don't have a set future, except under Bohmian mechanics interpretation which I suspect is bunk because it requires the ability to alter the past.
As I have been discussing with IC, the free will debate here doesn't hinge on hard determinism. We agree on that point. A monist still says the will is the product of physical processes, unless it finds useful data in the randomness and leverages it. We have no such structure, so IC's argument holds to that point. Of course, his view also requires some structure that picks up on some non-predictable input, and there he falls utterly flat.
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Noax
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Noax »

Immanuel Can wrote: Fri Jul 21, 2017 8:54 pm
The robot comprehends enough to make the choice.
"Comprehends" is not a verb one can use literally about robots. They "comprehend" nothing at all.
Not talking about human comprehension, and your refusal to use the word elsewhere holds no weight unless you can say how I different from the robot except in degree of complexity, without premises borrowed from the non-physical view. Your continued application of the premise that humans are special is clouding your ability to analyze anything.
You notice I reach for the simple examples (thermostat say) to learn the nature of words (like 'choice'), then just scale that up to understand more complex things where the algorithm is too complex to follow. If you refuse to use any of these nouns and verbs elsewhere, then learning becomes impossible. I'm not suggesting we should make thermostats into citizens.
Your will cannot act, because if it could, it would be part of the material. This, BTW, is what I meant several posts ago when I say you don't state your position.
If I understood your question, I would attempt an answer.
I will attempt to clarify. You will to evade a rock rolling towards you, but your physical body operates on physical principles all in the same way that is always argued in these determinism debates. No, I don't think there is hard determinism either, but your immediate behavior is still pretty much determined by prior state. How do you effect your choice to evade? I do it the automaton way: Notice the rock, assess danger, take action. But your view has the body with no will of its own, so how does the will translate to some physical difference that initiates the evasion act?
If you say that instance would be an automatic response, then pick an example where it is not. This is the falsification test your view suggests. Demonstrate a violation of known physics, else the body is acting exactly in the way a physicalist would suggest.
There were other issues you always evade, but that was the one I referenced in the piece above.
What is the function of the soul? Not asking how it works. OK, it has will and higher experience (qualia and such). How about cognition, intelligence and memory? What does the brain do on the other hand. Sure, heartbeat and such, but where's the cutoff?
In effect, I'm asking what you expect to take with you into the afterlife, and what gets lost/replaced in the afterlife.
I cannot word it that way to all dualists since not all of them believe in an afterlife for the mental component.

This is incorrect. You should read Searle's "Chinese Room" thought experiment, and you'd understand why it's wrong.
I have. Was unaware that it was about 'will', but then I didn't draw Searle's concluson either. It was a poor conception of something designed to fail a black box Turing test.
You've misunderstood the Turing Test if you suppose it's a rejoinder to the Chinese Room problem. Turing was interested in quite a different question than Searle. Searle wanted to ask, "Can computers think?" and Turing wanted to say, "Forget that: can computers fool people into imagining that they are thinking beings?" These are separate issues.
I'm interested in that. What "comfort" do you get from Materialism or Determinism?
Decline. You'd interpret it your way.
The JWs actually forbid thinking about it for exactly that reason. It is a sin to be rational.

Good thing I'm not a JW. :D I wouldn't cotton to that.
I hear ya there. That's the way to get them not to come back when they visit. Start making them think.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 4:52 am
1. If hard determinism were true (it's not) why should the "physicalist" care?
If hard Determinism is true, then it won't be his choice to "care." He will be made to "care" or "not care" by the previous causal chain.
2. Do you think there are any problems for free will on the assumption of theism?
Not on the mere mention of Theism. The existence of God, considered all by itself, does not argue anything for Determinism.
I've already helpfully disproved one of them -- the idea that god's infallible foreknowledge precludes human free will. It doesn't. (You're welcome.)
I don't know whom you were disproving it to. It certainly wasn't any assumption of my mind that foreknowledge entailed determinism. But your declaration of success will perhaps be granted by others who were labouring under that impression, and they may indeed be thankful for that.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Noax wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 2:28 pm
Not talking about human comprehension,...
Good. Then lets avoid such anthropomorphisms. They deceive the unthoughtful, and our goal as philosophers is to be accurate about this question, rather than to be misled by metaphors. "Comprehend" is a human word. The matter to be settled is the possibility of robots. Lets keep those separate until we have established something as a basis of comparison. "Comprehension" will not do that.
I'm not suggesting we should make thermostats into citizens.
I would hope not. :D
If I understood your question, I would attempt an answer.
I will attempt to clarify. You will to evade a rock rolling towards you, but your physical body operates on physical principles all in the same way that is always argued in these determinism debates. No, I don't think there is hard determinism either, but your immediate behavior is still pretty much determined by prior state. How do you effect your choice to evade? I do it the automaton way: Notice the rock, assess danger, take action. But your view has the body with no will of its own, so how does the will translate to some physical difference that initiates the evasion act?
The bolded statements above are all statements with which I would not agree. Hence, the problem is not that I am evading the question: it's that the question presupposes the wrong things about my position. And I cannot answer for what is NOT true about what I am arguing, only for what IS true. So if you'll simplify and rephrase, perhaps I can answer. But you'll have to remove the assumptions bolded above.
There were other issues you always evade, but that was the one I referenced in the piece above.
Well, now we know why...it wasn't my view at all.
Sure, heartbeat and such, but where's the cutoff?
See, this is a sentence fragment. I can't even see what the real question IS here. How can I be expected to answer it? "Cutoff" for what? :shock: Why does it have a "where"? Between what and what? :shock:

Now, if you will stick to single (rather than compound) and grammatically sound (rather than fragmented) question-asking, then I'm happy to respond to anything. But in a barrage of different questions, some of them fragments, it's impossible to see what you're really wanting to ask. If I answer one question, you then think I'm dodging two others you asked at the same time; or if I respond to a fragment, you would think I was responding disingenuously if I get the missing noun or verb wrong...

Simplify. I'll answer.
In effect, I'm asking what you expect to take with you into the afterlife, and what gets lost/replaced in the afterlife.
How did we get from free will to afterlife? :shock:
I'm interested in that. What "comfort" do you get from Materialism or Determinism?
Decline. You'd interpret it your way.
Now who's "evading" the question? :wink:

It's a very simple one, and you are, as always, quite free to disagree with any "interpretation" you think I'm making. But I am genuinely interested in any answer you can give me about that.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Immanuel Can wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 2:40 pm
davidm wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 4:52 am
1. If hard determinism were true (it's not) why should the "physicalist" care?
If hard Determinism is true, then it won't be his choice to "care." He will be made to "care" or "not care" by the previous causal chain.
But your previous posts make it sound as if you think the “physicalist” is forced to accept this grudgingly; i.e., he wishes it were not so. I’m asking why you think that the “physicalist” would find hard determinism to be a bad thing? Unless you meant “must accept” in the more apposite sense, that in a hard determinist universe, everything “must” be a certain way. In any case, under hard determinism, whether someone likes hard determinism or not is completely out of his or her hands, right?
2. Do you think there are any problems for free will on the assumption of theism?
Not on the mere mention of Theism. The existence of God, considered all by itself, does not argue anything for Determinism.
You keep using the word “determinism” as if it were in any and all the cases the opposite of, or defeater of, free will. This is only true of hard determinism. QM shows that hard determinism is false.

In any event, you seem to be saying that if naturalism is true, we have no free will -- that something about naturalism precludes it. How does adding God into the picture suddenly give us free will? After all, it’s the same universe, and functions the same way, whether God exists or not.

I've already helpfully disproved one of them -- the idea that god's infallible foreknowledge precludes human free will. It doesn't. (You're welcome.)
I don't know whom you were disproving it to. It certainly wasn't any assumption of my mind that foreknowledge entailed determinism. But your declaration of success will perhaps be granted by others who were labouring under that impression, and they may indeed be thankful for that.
I’m offering a “you’re welcome” to what should be at least your implicit thanks to me (an atheist) for doing the heavy lifting for you, a theist, in providing a logical demonstration of why God’s foreknowledge doesn’t preclude free will. Unfortunately, judging by the responses, people aren’t getting the argument. Oh, well. At least theDoc finally got it.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 3:35 pm But your previous posts make it sound as if you think the “physicalist” is forced to accept this grudgingly; i.e., he wishes it were not so.
In a sense, that's true. I've never met a Determinist who could live consistently with his own Determinism. The pattern is to affirm Determinism, but only so as to get "freedom" of some kind for some kind of "person." But both concepts are incoherent if Determinism is true; so the inconsistency suggests a reluctance to be a whole-hog Determinist.
In any case, under hard determinism, whether someone likes hard determinism or not is completely out of his or her hands, right?
As per consistent Determinism, yes.
You keep using the word “determinism” as if it were in any and all the cases the opposite of, or defeater of, free will. This is only true of hard determinism.
It is.

And QM just delivers us to QM-Determinism. It doesn't prove Determinism false.
How does adding God into the picture suddenly give us free will? After all, it’s the same universe, and functions the same way, whether God exists or not.

Yes: but the question is, "Is the way it actually DOES function deterministic or not? If it's not, then "the same way" is a free will way. If it is, then "the same way" is a deterministic way. And from inside the cosmos itself, as a creature of it, I don't know of any indisputable way to show exactly which way "the same way" actually means.

All by itself, adding A god would not change anything. It would have to be the right kind of God, with a specific kind of relationship to the cosmos.

For example, Calvinists add a god to their universe, but a Deterministic one. That doesn't help anyone. Deists try to preserve free will by adding an indifferent Absentee-Landlord god to the universe, and that doesn't help either, if the processes the Deist god put in place are subsequently predeterministic physical forces. So one can have "a god" or get that "god" out of the equation, and you'll still end up with Determinism -- unless the specific nature of God is such that free will is part of who He is and how He chooses to interact with the cosmos.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Immanuel Can wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 3:53 pm
davidm wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 3:35 pmHow does adding God into the picture suddenly give us free will? After all, it’s the same universe, and functions the same way, whether God exists or not.

Yes: but the question is, "Is the way it actually DOES function deterministic or not? If it's not, then "the same way" is a free will way. If it is, then "the same way" is a deterministic way. And from inside the cosmos itself, as a creature of it, I don't know of any indisputable way to show exactly which way "the same way" actually means.
OK, I just want to be clear, because you seem to be backtracking a bit. You're conceding it's possible we have free will even if the universe is naturalistic and no God exists, right? This would seem to be at odds with what you've previously said about naturalism and free will/determinism.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

I should say -- and this not directed at I Can or anyone in particular -- that if people want to discuss free will and determinism, they've really got to be clear on what their definitions of these things are. The thread title itself, "free will vs. determinism" already sets up a necessary conflict between the two, which is denied by compatibilists. So are people talking about hard determinism? Soft determinism? Superdeterminism? Are they talking about compatibilist free will? Libertarian free will? Some other conception? If you are an incompatibilist, are you a hard incompatibilist? If all this stuff isn't clarified the conversation will inevitably descend into a hopeless muddle.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 4:02 pm OK, I just want to be clear, because you seem to be backtracking a bit.
No, I'm explaining.
You're conceding it's possible we have free will even if the universe is naturalistic and no God exists, right?
Quite the opposite. I'm only conceding that the mere mention of "a god" as an unnuanced concept will not automatically gain us freedom from Determinism. However, a different view of God would not entail Determinism.

Au contraire to your suggestion, I would argue that if the universe is a "material" one only, then there is zero chance of us escaping Determinism. For any "material" explanation of things like volition or personhood are bound to have to have recourse to causality and "materials" of some kind, by definition -- and whether we fall back on simple Hard Determinism or QM Determinism, human volition is going to have no more reality in either telling of the story.

The only difference between what I have called above SH Determinism and QM determinism is whether or not we think, even in principle, we can understand the forces that control us.
  • The SH Determinist is going to say, "I don't understand ALL the material processes that make me what I am, perhaps; but I'm sure all of them are material, and so if I had access to all the knowable, then I would find a comprehensive answer for my individual choice-making there."
  • The QM Determinist is going to have to say, "Though I do NOT understand all the processes that make me what I am (because they are at the QM level), these non-understood forces are the comprehensive answer for what appears to be my individual choice-making."
But both are admitting that it is not "them" that is even part of the buck-stopping explanation for why their choices are what they are; instead some "force" or "operation" outside of themselves is the comprehensive explanation for those choices.

They're both admitting to being puppets...but one to a "known" and the other to an "unknown" master.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by Immanuel Can »

davidm wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 4:06 pm I should say -- and this not directed at I Can or anyone in particular -- that if people want to discuss free will and determinism, they've really got to be clear on what their definitions of these things are. The thread title itself, "free will vs. determinism" already sets up a necessary conflict between the two, which is denied by compatibilists. So are people talking about hard determinism? Soft determinism? Superdeterminism? Are they talking about compatibilist free will? Libertarian free will? Some other conception? If you are an incompatibilist, are you a hard incompatibilist? If all this stuff isn't clarified the conversation will inevitably descend into a hopeless muddle.
Maybe, david...and your caveat is probably helpful. But another question is whether or not Compatibilism itself is more than a fence-sitting move. As you have yourself mentioned, with enthusiastic irony earlier, Compatibilism is seen, by many of us, as just Determinism in other clothes. So there's an important question as to whether or not Compatibilism is worthy of philosophical special-status at all.

And I would say that the Compatibilist must first show us that Compatibilism is any important advance on Determinism, so that it warrants special attention as distinct from Determinism. I can't see that it really is.
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Immanuel Can wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 4:30 pm
Au contraire to your suggestion, I would argue that if the universe is a "material" one only, then there is zero chance of us escaping Determinism.
But then you did write:
And from inside the cosmos itself, as a creature of it, I don't know of any indisputable way to show exactly which way "the same way" actually means.
Which I took to mean that you don't have any way of knowing whether the universe is the same way -- either free will or no free will -- whether God exists or not. This implies at least that you must be agnostic on the question of free will in a materialist universe, even if you believe it doesn't exist.

I would like to know how "the right kind" of God gives us free will, in a universe where you think determinism reins, and which determinism you think rules out free will. (I disagree with this, but will return to that later.)
davidm
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Re: Free Will vs Determinism

Post by davidm »

Immanuel Can wrote: Sat Jul 22, 2017 4:35 pm
Maybe, david...and your caveat is probably helpful. But another question is whether or not Compatibilism itself is more than a fence-sitting move. As you have yourself mentioned, with enthusiastic irony earlier, Compatibilism is seen, by many of us, as just Determinism in other clothes.
Hm, did I say that? If I said anything like that I'm pretty sure I didn't use those words ...
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