Eodnhaj,
I mention (in passing) up-thread the idea that free will may be a nondeterministic algorithm.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nondete ... _algorithm
*three more placeholders that don't really mean anything[/quote]
I agree that there is a level of non determinism, so I will not argue for or against it because we would probably end in agreement.
However, there are deterministic elements in the Wikipedia example. Now as to whether the author put them intentionally or not is a separate issue. There is a definite causal chain on the left hand corner. My point is not so much to argue against a deterministic system but rather to point out different dimensions of interpretation.
When I look at a causal system, the most obvious response for me or anyone is the standard a→b→c.
However an equally valid approach would be to look at the standard a→b→c and see the manifestation of ratios that further imply definition.
a→b→c→ψ can equal:
a∋(b,c) where (b,c)= aΩ
b∋(a,c) where (a,c)= bΩ
c∋(a,b) where (a,b)= cΩ
******with ∋ translated as (Contains as an element) and Ω translated as dimensional limits observed.
as "a→b→c→ψ" is an observation of the dimensional limits of interjoined primitives/axioms. Now these dimensional limits are subject to flux (Δ), however this flux to due to further observation, so in many respects flux is equal in definition (≜) to the degree of observation (O) or:
ΩΔ ≜ dO
Now as to what constitutes a degree of definition the manifestation of further dimensions or forms through the application curvature (lines,angles, boundaries, etc.) is the most probable solution.
dO≈ x∮x
It is this perspective of determinism as the manifestation of ratios that I find very difficult to ignore as a necessary element of structure within all primitives/axioms. It is this manifestation of definition that the will seems to have a degree of freedom.
The nature of free will being, possibly, a nondeterministic algorithm would require that all result actions are inherent approximation of what one intends, however intention is would be just as approximate due to it stemming from an approximate. Now this works to a degree until a specific ideal is the determining intention of the action of the will. In this case one could not argue against a level of specificity determining the action, and making it observable deterministic up to a point where randomness is only observed. This is reflective of chaos theory (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory) which in turn would back up your non-deterministic argument.
Now the standard Platonic forms could be considered as probabilistic functions (ex: the form of a tree has a multitude of possibilities with probable outcomes to specific circumstances) while maintain a certain stability in form alone (ex: a form of a tree is a form of a tree).
We see again a duality of stability and flux within the forms that compose both the intentions and actions of the will.
The issue I have with your argument is not the possibility that the will has non deterministic elements its rather equivocating the will to function the same as an algorithm simply because of its definition:
"The nondeterministic algorithms are often used to find an approximation to a solution, when the exact solution would be too costly to obtain using a deterministic one."
The non deterministic algorithm was created to create an efficiency in cost analysis not to overwrite determinism. It is in this element of "cost analysis forming an algorithm to promote efficiency" that a definite causal chain can be observed.
