Free Will vs Determinism

[Immanuel Can]

Yes! Compatibilists are determinists! Not closet determinists! -- full, out-of-the-closet, pro-determinist marriage determinists! Hooray for your staggering insight!

I already knew this.

[davidm]

Where did you get the idea I was saying that QM provides a "crack" through which one can introduce free will?

My entire point in bringing QM up was to rebut the idea that you introduced, of a computer that in principle could predict all future events. That would require Laplacean or hard determinism, which was rendered obsolete by QM.

[davidm]

Yes! Compatibilists are determinists! Not closet determinists! -- full, out-of-the-closet, pro-determinist marriage determinists! Hooray for your staggering insight!

I already knew this.

Then why did you call them closet determinists -- as if they were hiding their determinism?

[Immanuel Can]

I already knew this.

Then why did you call them closet determinists -- as if they were hiding their determinism?

Oh, that's easy. They DO hide it. If they didn't, they'd just say, "We are Determinists."

What they want to be "compatible" is free will with Determinism. They don't want to lose the latter, but will by no means question the former. So they end up self-presenting as if they're saying something radically insightful and new, and that they have found some covert basis to assert the reality of free will, when all they really are is old-school Determinists...but rationally inconsistent ones.

They cannot find any basis for their affirmation of free will, so they just say, "Well, somehow, mysteriously, these things turn out to be compatible." But they do not.

[davidm]

They cannot find any basis for their affirmation of free will, so they just say, "Well, somehow, mysteriously, these things turn out to be compatible."

Of course, that is NOT what they say. Can't you even be intellectually honest enough to correctly characterize the positions of those who hold views with which you disagree?

It is possible that compatibilists are wrong -- but they surely do not say, "Well, somehow, mysteriously, these things turn out to be compatible."

[Noax]

Actually, what davidm argues, even if conceded entirely, would only deliver the Materialist to a different mechanical process known as "randomness." The situation of the individual will would be no less Deterministic: it would just be determined by forces of another name.

I'm actually willing to concede something along those lines, as I have already posted. The point I saw being missed by other posters shows itself here:

Nothing about "randomness" makes it more genuinely human or free-will-producing than simple causality: it's just a process that is even less predictable.

My bold throughout. You seem to imply that a physical human with physical mechanism for making choices is not genuinely human. Why is that? Are you claiming this is what a physicalist must accept?

For that reason, some philosophers worry that things like quantum dynamics, far from being an improvement on mechanical causality, are actually even one step worse. After all, wouldn't you rather be a cog in a predictable machine than a toy of mere capricious chance? Either way, there is no power in the individual will.

If your quest for truth rests on what you'd rather be, the argument is rationalized, not rational.

So your "choice" was nothing but the sum of previous events, and involved no independent volitional action emanating from personhood.

Again the definition of being a person not coming from the monist. All you're demonstrating is that the physical view is not compatible with your view, which is not news.

We may not like that Materialism deprives us of morals, of personhood, of volition

It deprives us only of your definition of those things, a fact which I like just fine thank you. What I like is still irrelevant, but you seem to gravitate to the story with the fairy tale ending that looks more enticing so long as you don't really think about it too hard.

I'll leave it at that for now since I think I found what I was looking for. You leave me disappointed that the argument required begging definitions of personhood like that.

[Noax]

But if that's a fair definition, then where does volition or will fit in? Is it a "material" too? If I want to stay a Materialist, I have to say it is. And if so, then the phenomenon I perceive as my own volition or will is really nothing other than an interaction of matter, energy and scientific laws. Even my feeling or impression that volition is my own is merely a phenomenon caused by an interaction of matter, energy and scientific laws.

I do not think the last sentence can be right. If I have a feeling about my volition, then I am not identical with that volition. And the same with everything else I see in the world; in one sense I am part of it, but in another I am an observer of it.

If that is the case, then all that matter, energy and scientific laws have not determined just one thing, in humans they have determined two contrasting things, human consciousness is an indeterminate state.

I actually agree with that entirely.

Of course you agree. The quote is yours (from 906), not mine. Just trying to get that straight.

[Immanuel Can]

It is possible that compatibilists are wrong -- but they surely do not say, "Well, somehow, mysteriously, these things turn out to be compatible."

What do you imagine them as saying? Every one I've ever talked to pulls the "profound mystery" card. But if you know a different line, then spin it.

[Immanuel Can]

My bold throughout. You seem to imply that a physical human with physical mechanism for making choices is not genuinely human. Why is that? Are you claiming this is what a physicalist must accept?

No. I mean that the physicalist must accept that the human person is not the buck-stopping point of the causal chain. Materialism has to hold that "a human chose to do X" is not a good explanation, because "chose" must be nothing but a failed way to describe the previous causal chain. All "choices" are merely products of prior material forces, to which the human person and his or her "decision" actually adds nothing.

For that reason, some philosophers worry that things like quantum dynamics, far from being an improvement on mechanical causality, are actually even one step worse. After all, wouldn't you rather be a cog in a predictable machine than a toy of mere capricious chance? Either way, there is no power in the individual will.

If your quest for truth rests on what you'd rather be, the argument is rationalized, not rational.

Right. The Materialist would have to be willing to accept that his or her very natural and understandable distaste for such explanations would not count as any reason against them being true.

Of course, I'm no Materialist myself, but I see their problem.

All you're demonstrating is that the physical view is not compatible with your view, which is not news.

True. But what I'm also demonstrating, I would hope, is that the physicalist or Materialist view is not a happy one, and results in some very, very unsavoury consequences. That does not, in itself, make it a wrong explanation; but it does mean that anyone who is willing to buy it consistently is going to have to live with those unsavoury consequences. And that is a good incentive to be at least a little bit open to a better explanation, I would say. If nothing else, it gives us plenty of reason not just to settle on Materialism as if doing so will cost nothing.

What I like is still irrelevant...

Yes. But give yourself more credit: I think it's more than a matter of mere "dislike." Maybe you're actually on to something.

What seems rather to be the case is that every time Materialism is asked to talk intelligently about things like choice, personhood, identity, values or (gasp) soul, it turns hollow and tinny. And I think that's really indicative of something: that no matter if it explains some things, there are some other things that it is really pretty terrible at explaining. And when it comes to those, it goes sour.

Ironically, those things at which Materialism has the weakest and worst explanations turn out to be the things that most human beings seem to consider most important to a significant life. I don't think that failure is a coincidence.

[surreptitious57]

But what I am also demonstrating I would hope is that the physicalist or materialist view is not a happy one and results in some very very
unsavoury consequences. That does not in itself make it a wrong explanation but it does mean that anyone who is willing to buy it consistently is

Any position I hold that cannot be proven may be less than absolutely true. And so it is with materialism. While I therefore have no problem in labelling myself one I do not hold it to be infallible. Even if it actually is. Because I cannot demonstrate such truth to that degree of certainty

[Belinda]

Immanuel Can wrote:

Omnipresence means "present everywhere," not "imminent in everything."

And actually, the first definition of each pair suits the Western traditions of Theism. The second (the "not this" side) actually describes the ideas about the Supreme Being held by the Eastern traditions, by Pantheists, Panentheists and Determinists of various kinds.
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this pantheist knows the difference between imminent and immanent

Also, Immanuel, how is it that your god is omnipotent yet unnecessary? Is your God not necessarily good,necessarily all-powerful, and necessarily all-knowing; the corollary being that if your god lacks any of those it is not your god?

[davidm]

It is possible that compatibilists are wrong -- but they surely do not say, "Well, somehow, mysteriously, these things turn out to be compatible."

What do you imagine them as saying? Every one I've ever talked to pulls the "profound mystery" card. But if you know a different line, then spin it.

I, myself, have never met a compatibilist who pulled such a card. I have to wonder if you know the definition of compatibilism.

[Immanuel Can]

Also, Immanuel, how is it that your god is omnipotent yet unnecessary?

Point to where I said either, and I'll happily tell you. You need to explain what you mean by "omnipotent," since it's your word, and I did not use it. And then, for "unnecessary," I certainly did not say that.

[Immanuel Can]

I, myself, have never met a compatibilist who pulled such a card. I have to wonder if you know the definition of compatibilism.

I have to wonder what you mean by "Compatibilism" too.

Please enlighten me.

[Immanuel Can]

But what I am also demonstrating I would hope is that the physicalist or materialist view is not a happy one and results in some very very
unsavoury consequences. That does not in itself make it a wrong explanation but it does mean that anyone who is willing to buy it consistently is

Any position I hold that cannot be proven may be less than absolutely true. And so it is with materialism. While I therefore have no problem in labelling myself one I do not hold it to be infallible. Even if it actually is. Because I cannot demonstrate such truth to that degree of certainty

Well, I wasn't aiming at indicting you at all...I was just explaining my own angle, and why I believe a Materialist will want to think very carefully before continuing as a Materialist. It has some pretty terrible corollaries, which, if one is wanting to be rationally consistent, one will have to live with.

But I think that points to the deeper problem: namely, that Materialism is existentially bankrupt. It's the most desolate and sad of all dogmas, really: no morals, no purpose, no teleology, no hope, no soul, no God and no person. What one gets in exchange is a very temporary "freedom". But it's not much freedom, because the facts of the world will constrain one where morality no longer will. One will only, "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die." And even one's "eating and drinking" will always be less satisfying than it should be. Then there's death, and there's the end of it all, forever.

Fortunately, I think the human psyche is created to detect the falsehood of such a creed in advance. We sense there ought to be more because we are, to use a Biblical phrase," made in the image of God" -- constituted as free will beings capable of spiritual awakening and awareness. And it is this side of us that will keep us from the mistake of ideological Materialism, I would suggest.

But certainty...none of us has that. All we have is relative probability...but that's actually a pretty good thing to have, at least most of the time. It certainly works well for science, among other things.