Deleuze Studies:

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d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

“It is not much of a dice throw, but what I like most is that the dice are still rolling in a Deleuzian century (Yes, yes, yes, yes. . .).” -Williams, James (2013-01-15). Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide . Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

I have, for some time now, recognized the underlying metaphysic of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, the fundamental understanding that even a pure repetition can, at best, consist of different instances of the same thing. What I have neglected so far is the implication of the above: that what, at bottom, is always repeated is difference. Perhaps this will draw me closer to Deleuze’s notion of pure difference. The profound thing about it is the subtle mix of metaphysics and the analytic (which is usually diametrically opposed to the metaphysical: that of which we cannot speak (that may well have managed to make the existential leap from the semantic to the empirical (reality as is (which tends to be an obstacle to many analytic assertions. I mean we can almost express it in a syllogistic manner:

A pure repetition, at best, can consist of different instances of the same thing.

Therefore:

The purest repetition, that which underlies it all, is difference.

There is, of course, some room for contention as to whether this manages to make the existential leap. But, at the very least (in terms of analytic assertions, it is a hell of an attempt –especially for the product of a dice roll.

“This means that the principle becomes ‘Connect with everything’. However, the second principle ‘It is best to select our thoughts so that everything is left behind’ or, in a shorter version, ‘Forget everything’, implies a problem in following the first. It seems to counsel us to go against completeness, indeed, to move away from things in general. This is as if a philosopher encouraged us to leave behind all possessions, whilst also encouraging us to taste all things.” Ibid (p. 5)

I, myself, am starting to see a lot of connections: an expansion of my rhizomatic experiment with Deleuze. I am, first of all, reminded here of Brian Massumi’s (in his bounce off of Capitalism and Schizophrenia (interpretation of D & G’s manifesto: to just keep moving, even while standing still –a state given some validation (at a sensible, intuitive, and even ontological level (by the Sartean forward flight embraced in Being and Nothingness. But don’t we also see a progression towards the rhizomatic system of machinic/desiring production described in D & G’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia? That is via Deleuze’s turn, in Logic of Sense, towards series (singularities, events (that which produces change, and individuation (the territorialization engaged in by the individual: that transit point defined by various sub transit points caught in an infinite network of other transit points.

(And let us make yet another connection to an analogy offered by Layotard in The Postmodern Condition in which we imagine a ball floating through space with all these ball bearings clinging to it and bouncing against each other in acts of displacement: communication. I'm thinking Rorty's pragmatic emphasis on discourse here.
(the postmodern attempt to traverse the infinite via the finite….

At the same time, we have to ask if the ecstasy that Williams’ experiences from Deleuze (I mean we experience it, don’t we? (hasn’t led him to superimpose (territorialize (things he has learned from other books on and readings of Deleuze on this particular book. But wouldn’t that be an honest mistake? Or would it? It could be exactly how Deleuze wanted us to read him: his series, events, and offered process of individuation, his way of inspiring us to find our own way through him. Perhaps his attempt at desiring production: a desire to play with anyone that happened to enter his playground and impress (while being impressed: how else would it work? (in the process.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

“Maybe we could connect this to to oriental philosophy, and think the pure difference as vacuity, or as a pure "in-between"... or is it maybe the Higgs bosom? I think there is a very important statement for Deleuze´s thinking, which is "relations are external to terms", so the pure relation doesn't belong to anybody and seems to have its own life, it has an agency. Passions seem to be kind of that. And there is a strong link between passions and events. So, pure events or pure differences (in Logic of sense, a difference between bodies and statements, that in Foucault are things and words) are in the middle. A middle that seems empty but induces actions and passions. So, difference has to have two terms, but there´s a third in the middle as a the relation itself, and finally, and maybe would be a fourth as the pure relation between the other three (and despite being a vacuity, it would be not an immobile motor, but an active vacuity which generates actions and passions, a pure becoming). That´s how I imagine a deleuzian "dialectics". Crazy!” –Mario Martinez

First of all Mario, I apologize for repeating what has already been said. But given the window I have to work in, it sometimes works better for me to post a response as a whole, then break it down and zero in on specific quotes to which I can respond to. It’s a kind of technology I have developed for working on the boards.

Alright then:

“That´s how I imagine a deleuzian "dialectics". Crazy!”

I would first note that you have a sense of the dialectic that has evolved beyond the philosophy 101 (mis)interpretation of Hegel involving the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. And you may well be ahead of me in that I have only recently come to recognize (via my reading of and about Deleuze (that the dialectic and its main agenda, the synthesis, is about describing any process by which we come to know the world. And once we understand the full implications of the two terms, the thought of folding eastern (oriental (philosophy into our understanding of Deleuze (as well as structuralist to poststructuralist (w/ existentialism folded in (to postmodern thought makes perfect sense. This, as I am coming to realize, has been a central theme for my German brother who, unfortunately, is always expressed to me through the face book translator:

“THe guru of India is nothing with authority, he helps you to solve your problemsm trucky enough by imposing the "essentuasl" problens arf first and not to waiotm until one has lost enouggh alreadym, so atht teh solution of the probelms wil be impssible, "A öot hacve beeb lost in that nattle-its a quesrion of dead and life , of happines and tristess " in the body without organs! HTHat is whatz dEleute/Guazzasru trzed to do b writbf such a lot on psycholgym, on the categotzues whicg explain one to onesewlf and the othes to onerself. DEsire, feelomgs, realtions of power., happiness.. Like will be dromwnog üpeople. who are tuasgt to learn swimming!!”

I know it’s hard to read. And God knows I try to translate it. But two concepts that tend to pop up a lot together in his writings is eastern ideologies and practices and Deleuze. And let’s not underestimate the cultural tradition of the Germans.

And there is every reason for it that I believe goes back to Van Gogh’s inclusion of Eastern motifs in his paintings. And I would argue that it lies in a kind of Zen Nihilism (or the nihilistic perspective (that has haunted our culture since its beginning. This, unfortunately, tends to offend people on both the intellectual and spiritual sides since nihilism tends to be associated with the more negative associations of destruction and negativity.

I consider this a superficial understanding. I consider nihilism (or rather the nihilistic perspective (as that which is tapped into the underlying nothingness entwined in the fact that we are, as we are (as compared to the infinite other things we could be, as compared to just not being. As I understand it, my attempt to even explain it is superficial and falls short since the nihilistic perspective is not something one can confront directly and describe through crude words. Once you try to explain it or even justify it, you have lost it completely. It’s not something you can say “sounds like good idea” and pursue. You have to arrive at it through an eternal process of self deconstruction that brings you to realize that all assertions break down to assumptions and all assumptions float on thin air.

But there I go again: trying to crystallize what won’t stand still or be crystallized. I talk against myself in the process and read like someone who doesn’t know what they’re talking about. I likely don’t.

But having been there, I am all that closer to understanding what Deleuze was struggling with (that which glances the corner of the eye: the Zen nihilism of capturing nothingness in its flight (the becoming (towards something.

Damn!!!! Fucked it up again.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

In light of the internet, one can better appreciate the prophetic nature of Deleuze and Guattarri’s rhizomatic model (one I think fuses into Layotard’s (described in The Postmodern Condition (model: the matrix of communicative displacement (especially as concerns the relationships we tend to form on the boards. It’s like an endless forward flight of relationships formed and soon moved beyond. We connect and, with a kind of ease, move beyond the connection. Connect and forget as Deleuze implores us to do. And after a while of this kind of training, it becomes (perhaps frighteningly so (even easier. And this is because no matter who moves on themselves or what board we get rejected by, there is always somewhere else to go (someone else to interact with (another step forward in our individual process. And I know this sounds cold. But it is this coldness (almost psychopathic in nature (and that in which we are trained on the boards (that allows us to carry on with the sense of self worth needed to carry on.

It’s certainly changed me. When I first started on the boards and anyone attacked me, I retreated into my paranoid/fascist center, re-gathered, bared my teeth, and lunged for the other's throat. This has gotten me kicked off of or suspended from many boards. But as I was discovering then, there is always somewhere else to go. Getting kicked off or suspended was little more than a speed-bump:“What was that?” Still, there was the problem of how I reacted: the guilt of having lost my cool. And it was the training of the boards (that is as they developed (that brought me to understand that I have no commitment to anyone whatsoever, not to mention someone I consider to be an asshole, and that the only real solution to such an asshole was to simply ignore them thereby making clear to them the one reality of the boards they seem to forget: that there is nothing they have to say that is so important to us that we would put up with the disrespect and abuse to get it. Such people are clearly suffering from the kind of fancy (and consequent pretension (one might develop from watching too much of the TV series House.

But the boards have taught me to let go. Now it has come to a point where I will let an individual go simply because they threaten to turn it into a pissing contest. I just don’t need it. And this is my process! Now my training has brought me to point where I will shut someone out of MY PROCESS well before the point that they have become intolerable, that is at the point I recognize that it is not a matter of whether they are an asshole, of whether it is THEIR entire fault or mine, but that we simply cannot get along. And FaceBook accommodates me in that when I block this individual they become lacunae, a nothingness, at the same time I become lacunae to them: a part of our individual forward flights that are no longer part of our individual forward flights.

(And I would note here that since I have come to this realization, it has been a while since I have been kicked off of a board.)

I see the same dynamic at work with those I actually like –only less hostile. In that case, people just move on. And that coldness that the boards has trained me in tells me to just let go, that there is no reason to stalk them down and force them to be my friend forever. Once again:

Connect and forget

:the very motto of the rhizomatic model and manifesto. I mainly bring this up because I noticed today how this sensibility has bled into my real world life. I (a man who has his Einstein’s wardrobes (do the same thing every day –that is while the world around me changes constantly. People (pretty much like they do on the boards (come and go. I have come to a point where I forget their names if they have been gone too long.

This is because their names become buried in the vast rhizomatic network I have built for myself: forgotten words in an always evolving language. I love, but always love based on what furthers my process. I am always with you while clearly being alone. I love you; but make no mistake about my willingness to let go of what was never mine in the first place. I want to impress (seduce even (but could give a tinkers fuck about winning. The rhizomatic matrix (with no center (precludes it.

It is in this sense that Deleuze teaches me how to live.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

The following are quotes from Deleuze’s book on Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.

“As Deleuze will say, we always start from the middle of things; thought has no beginning, just an outside to which it is connected.” –from Robert Hurley’s preface.

And I would say the same about any intro or preface to a book: it’s never the beginning; it is only the point at which the thinker began to record their thoughts in any possible kind of lasting way. As Deleuze, with Guatarri, pointed out in A Thousand Plateaus:

A book doesn’t reflect the world as much as form a rhizome with it.

And even here we see, in one of Deleuze’s early books, one of the primary themes (the rhizomatic approach (that provided a backbone to pretty much everything else Deleuze wrote after that. It tends to show up in all of Deleuze’s writings as well as writings about him. It could, in fact, be the main thing that anyone that only wanted to dabble in him needed to understand. But in order to truly understand it, one needs to understand the mechanistic model that Deleuze utilized (more for convenience than any final statement about the nature or existence of free will (as described by Hurley:

“Deleuze opens us to the idea (which I take as a contribution to ecological thought) the elements of the different individuals we compose may be nonhuman within us.”

The creative act (that which gives us the experience of free will (never being that far from the back of Deleuze’s mind, he encourages us to treat ourselves as nodal points in a vast rhizomatic network of discourse (much like the model provided in Layotard’s The Postmodern Condition: the earth as a ball drifting through space with individual ball bearings stuck to it, via gravity, clacking against each other in acts of displacement (so that we may participate in the communal creative act he considers himself to be a part of –that is as compared to the leader of it all with some kind of grand narrative.

And while those of a more neo-classicist sensibilty or who, embarrassed by the term “Postmodern” (that which is Passé (would either try to fix him in the post-structuralist category or argue that regardless of how most people take him, he is offering some kind of fixed meaning as his use of scientific and mathematical terms suggests , I would argue that to understand Deleuze is to understand the postmodern sensibility: which is always about participation as compared to control. This is why he works in the elusive style he does, to encourage us to read him in the same way we might a poem. Once again, Hurley:

“The fact is that Spinoza is difficult. And this book on Spinoza is difficult. But the situation is helped by the author’s word to the wise: one doesn’t have to follow every proposition, make every connection –the intuitive or affective reading may be more practical anyway. What if one accepted the invitation –come as you are- and read with a different attitude, which might be more like the way one attends to poetry.”

And if you think about it, the movement of philosophy has been one of moving from the control of Plato’s classicism to the postmodern emphasis on participation laid out by Deleuze.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

You know that point in a philosophical process with a given philosopher and a given text where you’re starting to see (or feel (these vague connections that you’re not very confident about articulating? I had such an experience tonight with my study point in Deleuze’s book on Spinoza. In the 4 pages I got through, I filled my notebook with all kinds of points. And as Deleuze encourages me to do, I’m going to have to do a little (maybe a lot of (chancing and write at the edge of what I know (think: Difference and Repetition (and go randomly through the quotes –that is to see what happens and hope I manage to make some kind of sense:

“Adam does not understand the rule of the relation of his body with the fruit, so he interprets God’s word as a prohibition.”

And this refers to an earlier point:

“But because Adam is ignorant of causes, he thinks that God morally forbids him whereas God only reveals the natural consequence of ingesting the fruit. Spinoza is categorical on this point: all the phenomena that we group under the heading of Evil, illness, and death, are of this type: bad encounters, poisoning, intoxication, relational decomposition.”

Now I would note the connection with the joyful and sad effects described in Deleuze’s lecture on Spinoza (http://www.gold.ac.uk/media/deleuze_spinoza_affect.pdf) which is basically about power relationships. A joyful effect is one in which the individual is empowered while the sad effect is one in which the individual is disempowered. Easy enough to understand for anyone who has went through a shit phase. Such sad effects have even led to suicide.

But the more subtle point at hand is the distinction being made between Morality, which is social (even socially mandated (in nature and Ethics which is a study of the relationship between sad and joyful effects. In other words (and as I understand it, Spinoza’s book on Ethics makes the revolutionary step of moving beyond the socially mandated (morality (and into the study of how power relationships should best be arranged to maximize joyful effects (ethics: a kind of prelude to utilitarianism and even pragmatism if you think about it.

But even more interesting to me is how this anticipates Deleuze’s work with Guatarri and the notion of social or machinic production. Once again:

“Adam does not understand the rule of the relation of his body with the fruit, so he interprets God’s word as a prohibition.”

As has been often said of Deleuze’s earlier studies: one never knows where the philosopher he is studying ends and he begins. And here we see the larval beginnings of what he and Guatarri described in the Anti Oedipus: this sense of ourselves as nodal points in a vast system of exchange: the plane of immanence. This eventually led to the manifesto of conceptual play for the sake of the creation of concepts laid out in What is Philosophy. In this sense, he eventually comes to a prescription for the failure of Adam.

And don’t even get me started on the univocity of Being –at least not tonight.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

“Finally, in this book it seemed to me that the powers of difference and repetition could be reached only by putting into question the traditional image of thought. By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals when we try to think. For example, we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and the thinker a good will (naturally to ‘want’ the true); we take as a model as model the process of recognition –in other words, a common sense or employment of all the faculties on a supposed same object; we designate error, nothing but error, as the enemy to be fought; and we suppose that the true concerns solutions –in other words, propositions capable as serving as answers. This is the classic image of thought, and as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult to conceive of thought as encompassing those problems which point beyond the propositional mode; or as involving encounters which escape all recognition; or as confronting its true enemies, which are quite different from thought; or as attaining that which tears thought from its natural torpor and notorious bad will, and forces us to think. A new image of thought -or rather, a liberation of thought from those images which imprison it: this is what I had already sought to discover in Proust. “–from Deleuze’s preface to the English version of Difference and Repetition

Now there is a lot going on here in terms of crystallizing previous understandings I have extracted from Deleuze –especially as concerns this particular book. And I’m guessing that anyone of those understandings will easily take up one of my 500 word windows (my rhizomes) which means that this one quote could result in several separate posts and that I’ll have to work on it issue by issue. Today I want to start with the issue at work in Deleuze’s notorious obscurity which, I believe, has to do with the sense of him never having the creative act that far from his mind. I would first focus on here:

“This is the classic image of thought, and as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult to conceive of thought as encompassing those problems which point beyond the propositional mode; or as involving encounters which escape all recognition; or as confronting its true enemies, which are quite different from thought; or as attaining that which tears thought from its natural torpor and notorious bad will, and forces us to think. A new image of thought -or rather, a liberation of thought from those images which imprison it: this is what I had already sought to discover in Proust. “

The question we tend to confront while confronting the opaque prose of a writer like Deleuze is: why? Why make your point in such an allusive way? It almost reeks of a point made in Nietzsche’s Zarathrustra: those who would muddy their pools in order to make them seem deep. But as Deleuze points out in the above quote, what we are always looking for is that which works beyond the “propositional mode”. And I would note here last line in which Deleuze describes it as what he sought to discover in Proust.

Once again, the creative act never seems to be that far from his mind. And this seems to be because Deleuze is always seeking exactly that which every artist, musician, or writer is seeking: that subtle understanding that refuses to be put into words. This is why the experience of philosophy often feels like a discourse on LSD: a doomed and futile attempt to describe what is on one’s mind. Still, the experience is one worthy of being described. So we have to keep trying, don’t we?

This, of course, tends to frustrate us when we start out with the assumption that philosophy is something like science: that which seeks to directly impart meaning. We want it to be like water boiling at 212 degrees at atmospheric pressure. It is also why we will find ourselves relating, at a cognitive level, to certain concepts, while not really getting it until we feel them, or until we have assimilate the concept enough to feel what the philosopher we are reading is feeling. In other words, in order to truly understand a philosopher like Deleuze, we have to embrace the oblique manner in which they are imparting meaning. We have to approach reading it in the same way as those engaging in meditative practices (as my German Jam-mate Harald points out (of just doing it until something happens.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

Today's meditative reading of Difference and Repetition (And I call it meditative because, at that point, I'm just reading the text from the beginning to end of a given section without worrying whether I'm getting it or not. I'm basically letting it flow through me just to see what happens. Compare this, for instance, to the study point I return to later and take my time to take notes: that which results in pretty much almost every post I make here.) brought back to me the moral element involved in repetition. One of the main oppositions (as I understand it (and that is among modern and postmodern thinkers (against representation is the overcoding of reality that it represents, often in the form of assuming something that can be perfectly repeated. We see this, for instance, in Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This, consequently, is the main motivation behind the post(modern gravitation towards the eternal elusiveness of difference: that which art specializes in as compared to science. And in that sense of it, we can see Difference and Repetition as Deleuze’s attempt to rescue Repetition (that is given its import to the creative process (from those who would turn it into a moral imperative.

That said (and I apologize for the clumsy segway (?: does anyone know how that word is actually spelled; I keep getting the finger wag from Word (allow me to connect this with the quote I offered yesterday:

“Finally, in this book it seemed to me that the powers of difference and repetition could be reached only by putting into question the traditional image of thought. By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals when we try to think. For example, we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and the thinker a good will (naturally to ‘want’ the true); we take as model the process of recognition –in other words, a common sense or employment of all the faculties on a supposed same object; we designate error, nothing but error, as the enemy to be fought; and we suppose that the true concerns solutions –in other words, propositions capable as serving as answers. This is the classic image of thought, and as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult to conceive of thought as encompassing those problems which point beyond the propositional mode; or as involving encounters which escape all recognition; or as confronting its true enemies, which are quite different from thought; or as attaining that which tears thought from its natural torpor and notorious bad will, and forces us to think. A new image of thought -or rather, a liberation of thought from those images which imprison it: this is what I had already sought to discover in Proust. “–from Deleuze’s preface to the English version of Difference and Repetition

Only this time I want to focus on the first part:

“Finally, in this book it seemed to me that the powers of difference and repetition could be reached only by putting into question the traditional image of thought. By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals when we try to think. For example, we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and the thinker a good will (naturally to ‘want’ the true); we take as model the process of recognition –in other words, a common sense or employment of all the faculties on a supposed same object; we designate error, nothing but error, as the enemy to be fought; and we suppose that the true concerns solutions –in other words, propositions capable as serving as answers.”

Now here, we (by which I mean “I” but tend to work and write better with the philosophical convention of “we” –excuse the arrogance or, rather, cockiness of it (can see the reference to overcoding that evolved into Deleuze’s (as well as Guatarri’s (sense of overcoding involved in the Anti-Oedipus, mainly as concerns the Oedipal Complex as described by Freud and possibly elaborated on by Lacan. And this resistance and rejection of overcoding seems to be an important theme throughout the process of Deleuze as well as post(modern thought: think, for instance, of Roland Barthes’ Mythologies. Deleuze didn’t work in a vacuum.

This was the import of the Image of Thought as well as Common sense which, as Deleuze describes it, involves a stimulation of all the faculties (sensibility, imagination, memory, and thought) in such a way that the subject is deluded into believing they have achieved some kind of final epiphany. And this is what comes from taking “the model of recognition”, the process described in the doctrine of the faculties, as the model of thought: as that by which we come to true knowledge.

And, once again, we return to the oblique and poetic approach Deleuze chooses (over straight denotation (as a kind of strange attractor towards that which even he can’t fully describe and invites us (like two people on Acid (to describe with him. Joe Hughes, in his reader guide to Difference and Repetition, describes Deleuze’s free indirect discourse as a kind of exchange with whatever great writer he has participated in an “engagement” with. But I, with all humility, would argue that he is also (if not equally (interested in his “engagement” with his reader.

He, like Rorty, is more interested in stimulating discourse in ways that most people are not interested or willing to do –that is as compared to controlling it: of overcoding- and sees that as the only way out of the mess we have created for ourselves.
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

“Even beyond the pleasure principle, the form of a bare repetition persists, since Freud interprets the death instinct as a tendency to return to the state of inanimate matter, one which upholds the model of a wholly physical or material repetition.” -from Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition

I, tending to work best in the overlaps between philosophers (as well as other intellectually/creatively curious types (want to risk (and experiment w/ (several connections here:

First I would note the connection between Freud’s description of the death instinct (that which wants to return to inanimate matter (likely that of the body (and Sartre’s concept of Bad Faith in which being-for-itself (basically consciousness (longs to be more like being-in-itself: the rock that stubs your toe. This goes a great way towards crystallizing the death instinct for me, which has always been slow in coming.

I would further note a connection to a point made by Zizek concerning the death instinct as expressed by the anorexic: the way they seem to literally want to eat the nothingness, the very nothingness (as described by Sartre (curled into Being –like a worm.

And we can finally return this to Deleuze’s sense of repetition as concerns inanimate objects (the rock that stubs your toe (in terms of his sense of time. First I would note the general scientific notion that time is an illusion: a human construct that measures change. As Raymond Tallis points out, it doesn’t move. Time doesn’t move or flow; things do. And this would seem to pre-empt the rock that stubs our toe from repetition. Still, for us, that rock is always the same thing at different points in time –even if it is just our time. Difference is always there, even in the most seemingly stable things. And that difference could not really exist without repetition -at the very least: the repetition of difference.

And we only observe this from a finite position. From an infinite one, that rock is in a state change in that due to the forces of change (for instance: erosion (that which is defined by and defines time (that rock would look significantly different a 1000 years down the line than it does now: a state of becoming.

This, of course, brings us up against a problem with the scientific notion of time as an illusion and only a measurement of change: if that rock is always in a state of change (of becoming (wouldn’t change (becoming (therefore Time (exist regardless of whether there was anyone around to measure it?
Jaded Sage
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by Jaded Sage »

Does this mean creativity is a religious experience? I once read a paper in college about how art could be seen as a new religion, but I've forgotten what it said specifically, and where to find it.

I wonder if some art is more religious than others. For instance, the painting of the last supper. Or if some pieces of art less religious than others, like that painting compared to a single-line pencil drawing of a cross, or that compared to the statue of liberty (perhaps 'give me your tired, your poor, etc' could be seen as a religious expression).
d63
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

Post by d63 »

“Does this mean creativity is a religious experience? I once read a paper in college about how art could be seen as a new religion, but I've forgotten what it said specifically, and where to find it.

I wonder if some art is more religious than others. For instance, the painting of the last supper. Or if some pieces of art less religious than others, like that painting compared to a single-line pencil drawing of a cross, or that compared to the statue of liberty (perhaps 'give me your tired, your poor, etc' could be seen as a religious expression).”

Well it can certainly feel like one. However, I think Deleuze (as well as Rorty (is looking at a more secular source for it. And in terms of philosophy, Karl Jaspers (a Christian existentialist I believe), in Man and the Modern Age, defines it as that which gives shelter to those for whom organized religion no longer works.

As to your second question, whether some works of art are more religious than others, I would say yes to the extent that that the works you mention are specifically aimed at religious images. But religion is a social category for a given social system. What seems to be embedded in your question is whether art can be thought of as a mystical or spiritual experience. And that changes the dynamic entirely; although, my answer to it remains the same:

It can certainly feel like one.

I myself have thought of art as a kind of witchcraft in that it takes natural elements (color, shape, sound, words, and whatever I have missed here (and puts them together (a kind of bricolage (into a transcendent experience: that which works through seduction and resonance. But then this can be, in a secular sense, explained as a result of the artistic or creative process in which the individual collects elements that give them pleasure and puts them together in ways that give them even more pleasure, pleasure which they can then share through our common wiring.

But to really understand how the dynamic changes, we need only look at the bible. In terms of religion, we can say it is more religious since it is aimed specifically at religion. However, if we change it to an issue of the mystical and spiritual, we can now see it as literature that is inspired in the same way any other work of art is. In other words, it is no more divinely inspired than say a Shakespeare play or a Van Gogh painting. And while the bible loses the edge of sacred script, it regains legitimacy as an important work of literature. And we saw as much with Freud who was undermined by the discoveries of neuroscience.

At the same time, we have to be weary of such associations of the creative with the mystical and spiritual. As a book on making art pointed out to me: one of the mythologies of art making is the idea of art as a mystical act. It has to be looked at as an activity. This, of course, is a major letdown for a young artist who has a lot of high-minded ideas about what they’re doing. It was for me. But then I eventually realized how important this to understand for an artist since to think of it as a mystical act can lead to the assumption that one can only do what they do when they’re inspired. This can paralyze a creative person. To keep going, we have to look at what we do as not that different from what the cabinet maker does. We have to be willing to engage in what is little more than an activity. That way we can develop our craft and be more ready when inspiration (that experience of the divine (draws us along and, thereby, make the best of it.
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

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“At the same time, we have to be weary of such associations of the creative with the mystical and spiritual. As a book on making art pointed out to me: one of the mythologies of art making is the idea of art as a mystical act. It has to be looked at as an activity. This, of course, is a major letdown for a young artist who has a lot of high-minded ideas about what they’re doing. It was for me. But then I eventually realized how important this to understand for an artist since to think of it as a mystical act can lead to the assumption that one can only do what they do when they’re inspired. This can paralyze a creative person. To keep going, we have to look at what we do as not that different from what the cabinet maker does. We have to be willing to engage in what is little more than an activity. That way we can develop our craft and be more ready when inspiration (that experience of the divine (draws us along and, thereby, make the best of it.”

Here we see a reconnection to the postmodern aesthetic, pioneered by Deleuze, as expressed in the creative manifesto of transcendental empiricism, the plane of immanence, and the rhizomatic approach. It is conditionally materialist in that it sees the individual as a single acting thing (composed of a lot of single acting things (acting in a vast network of acting things. In this sense, it becomes an aesthetic of the discourse (what I like to call the jam and Wittgenstein referred to as language games. It frees us to engage creatively with our environment: that vast (externally and internally (rhizomatic network which we must negotiate our way through.

And we can see as much, in a more provincial way, in the pragmatism of Rorty. Thereby, Deleuze becomes a practical matter of how to act creatively in the world. And it is our evolutionary right. One only need look at the way language evolves to see it. I say something built off of all previous statements made by me and the other, then you say something built off of all previous statements made by you and the other (including me (and the feedback loop goes on. Once again: the jam.

The consequence of this is that even great works of art, literature, or even science must be seen as nodes in this process; they’re just nodes that have had a more powerful and expansive impact on other nodes in the matrix. It is only special to the extent that more nodes than usual are responding to it and its various sub-nodes –that is via the sub-nodes of other nodes: or what Deleuze and Guatarri referred to as social production.

And it is a good thing too given that we have reached a point (as Baudrillard rightly tells us (where there is nothing new left to be done. The mythology of the lone genius (like Van Gogh or Einstein (is behind us. Now we need to take our cue from computer programmers (working off of the work of the other (if we are to break through the next creative hymen, if we are to work our way beyond the competitive stage of our mental evolution and ancestors (that in which our baser impulses use our higher cognitive functions for baser purposes (to the cooperative one in which our baser impulses see it in their interest to team up with the higher cognitive functions.

We need to look at Deleuze’s practical side and Rorty’s pragmatism as more than philosophies. We need to see the aesthetic involved as an important evolutionary milestone.
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

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"Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In which ever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition.” –from Gille Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition

But hold on! Let me retrace my steps here. This is what, in my study points, I managed to anchor on. But that doesn’t change the awkward feeling (that of slipping into wet clothes (I have approaching the book yet again with the feeling that my filters have developed but not quite enough to feel like I’m working in any kind of comfort zone. Once again:

Damn the French and their weird obscure philosophies anyway!

Still, I have to do something with it. And this leaves me with no other choice than to follow Deleuze’s advice, write at the edge of what I know, and run the risk of mucking it up. And should I do so, I would only ask that you offer me the same courtesy you would a psychotic stomping down the sidewalk engaged in some incomprehensible discourse: just step aside and let me and my own little semiotic bubble pass. And feel free to chuckle and joke if you will.... I doubt I’ll hardly notice.

Like a painter, I start with the broad swashes: 3 points that have become central to how I understand Difference and Repetition at this point thus far:

1. Joe Hughes’ point in his reader’s guide to the book: that it is primarily a critique of representation. It is here that I see a pragmatic overlap with Rorty, no matter what differences the two may have shared.

2. (And this is where I risk going off the grid: the analytic/metaphysical understanding and core I have extracted from the book and secondary text:

a: even a pure repetition can only consist of different instances of the same thing

therefore b: the only thing that is ever repeated is difference

And, finally, 3. The creative act is never that far from Deleuze’s mind.

And it is in these three that we see the import of the above:

"Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In which ever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition.”

And looking at it now, I can see why Deleuze would describe the book as a kind of detective novel in that the above feels like an approach to solving the greatest crime of the century: representation. In the above, I see Deleuze describing why representation is a crime in that it denies us the right to use basic everyday experience (what he called engagements in his A to Z interview (in our philosophical process. Once again: the creative act is never that far from his mind. And this is why he takes the route of free indirect discourse (the metaphorical approach (and encourages us to read him as we would a poet: for the sake an oblique approach to meaning (that which we can only sense as compared to recognize (which he sees as the only way to influence (not direct (us towards that which defies language.
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

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“Like a painter, I start with the broad swashes: 3 points that have become central to how I understand Difference and Repetition at this point thus far:

1. Joe Hughes’ point in his reader’s guide to the book: that it is primarily a critique of representation. It is here that I see a pragmatic overlap with Rorty, no matter what differences the two may have shared.

2. (And this is where I risk going off the grid: the analytic/metaphysical understanding and core I have extracted from the book and secondary text:
a: even a pure repetition can only consist of different instances of the same thing

therefore b: the only thing that is ever repeated is difference.

And, finally, 3. The creative act is never that far from Deleuze’s mind.”

And in hindsight, I now realize there is yet a 4th point: that in terms of the analytic/metaphysical dyad of the two, Deleuze seeks to take the privilege given to repetition throughout our cultural history and give it to difference: a clearly postmodern move. And as I see it at this point, much of the book is a survey of the various strategies he has found to do exactly that.

But for today, I would like to focus on one he pursues in Chapter Three, “The Image of Thought”. In it, he seeks to undermine the notion of recognition (that which we do with the objects that occupy our space (as the basic model of thought. And it is a seductive image in that it seems to lie at the very foundation (especially in evolutionary terms (of the various things we can do with mind and brain. We assume, by studying this basic act, we can somehow find clues to the more complex activities of our minds such as philosophy. But if we really look at it, the act of recognition seems too automatic to account for the kinds of things that philosophy (along with the arts and sciences (try to do. Deleuze writes:

“On one hand, it is apparent that acts of recognition exist and occupy a large part of our daily life: this is a table, this is an apple, this the piece of wax, Good morning Theaetetus. But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognize, we are thinking?”

And later:


“However, the criticism that must be addressed to this image of of thought is precisely that it has based its principle upon extrapolation from certain facts, particularly insignificant facts such as Recognition, everyday banality in person; as though thought should not seek its models among stranger and more compromising adventures.”

This is why he makes the distinction between the passive synthesis of sensibility, memory, imagination, and thought and (with the overlap of thought)that of the active synthesis: where we creatively create concepts and engage in philosophy.

And we see the folly of this misguided image of thought even today in scientism and Rand’s objectivism which talks a lot about facts (as if they were simple acts of recognition (then steps into conjecture while acting as if they were simple facts. Once again, it’s like saying:

“1+1=2; therefore Capitalism is only valid economic system on the face of the earth.”

Or:

“We can demonstrate and correlate mental activities with brain activity; therefore, all mental activity is little more than brain activity.”

It’s as if we are to be so impressed with the incontestable premise that we should automatically accept the conjecture of the conclusion. In other words, the image of thought that conflates thought with recognition leads to a common doxa (socially programmed responses to socially programmed cues (that those engaged in power discourses can use to shut down the discourses of others. We need only look at what facts can actually tell us in order to understand how erroneous the above jumps and conclusions actually are:

1+1=2

If I hold up a pencil and let it go, it will fall to the ground

And even a relativistic hippy knows better than to step in front of moving bus

Enough said. So how do we, as Deleuze asks, get from recognition (and simple facts like water, at atmospheric pressure, boils at 212 degrees (to the kind of things that philosophy concerns itself with? How else do we approach what philosophy is actually interested in (that which distinguishes it from science: that which can only be sensed as compared to known (but through literary and metaphorical methods?
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

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Having had some success with the wide swashes, I decided to return to a place where the widest swashes could be found in the words of the man himself (the preface to the English Edition of Difference and Repetition:

"It is very difficult to say why one becomes attached to a particular problem: why was it difference and repetition which preoccupied me rather than something else, and why the two together rather than separately? These were not exactly new problems, since the history of philosophy, and especially contemporary philosophy, dealt with them constantly. But perhaps the majority of philosophers had subordinated difference to identity or to the Same, to the Similar, to the Opposed or to the Analogous: they had introduced difference into the identity of the concept, they had put difference in the concept itself, thereby reaching a conceptual difference, but not a concept of difference.”

First let me make a confession: one of the main obstacles, as I now realize, I face with this book (that is being self taught( is my lack of foundation in the classics of philosophy, that is since I had no idea that difference and repetition had been an issue throughout our philosophical history. I had read Plato, Aristotle, and even went all the way through Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason back before I actually focused on philosophy like I do now. But I find myself completely clueless on that count as it was never brought up in my Philosophy 101 understanding of it.

Still, the above quote feels like a “told you so” moment in that it offers some confirmation to my previous points. And now that I’ve wore out my bragging rights, focusing on this point:

“But perhaps the majority of philosophers had subordinated difference to identity or to the Same, to the Similar, to the Opposed or to the Analogous: they had introduced difference into the identity of the concept, they had put difference in the concept itself, thereby reaching a conceptual difference, but not a concept of difference.”

:we can first connect this with the very first statement Deleuze makes in his introduction:

“Generality is not repetition.”

Generality is the domain of the scientistic approach to philosophy while it makes claims to perfect repetition. It is confident in making this claim because it works with isolated systems, then assumes that it can translate the understandings gained from finite systems to assertions about the infinite. And we see as much with Logic which focuses on finite statements about finite situations (the cat is on the mat (which is so attractive to those fixated on identity and the fantasy of perfect representation. Generality only says: “this is how things happen in general.” Still, common doxa, in its self absorption (its power discourses, confuses this for pure repetition which, as I have pointed out, can never be pure because it can, at best, consist of different instances of the same thing.

(And another confession: it could well be that I am writing my own process into Deleuze’s.)

This reminds me of something that came up in secondary text on Deleuze, that there are 3 ways to confirming an assertion:

1. The syntactic which consists of arguments like A=B, B=C, therefore A=C.

2. The semantic which can be seen in Aristotle’s syllogism: Man is a rational animal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is a rational animal.

And 3. The existential in which (as compared to the finite approach of the previous (our assertions (finite as they are (must be tested against the infinite potential of the reality we face.

And part of that infinite potential is that which overflows the finite nature of language. Hence Deleuze’s propensity towards the poetic and oblique approaches to meaning: he asks us to make the existential leap from the isolated systems that give us the security of knowing something to the full potential of philosophy: that of engaging with reality in creative ways.

But in order to do that, our mission, should we choose to accept it, is to understand (feel (or sense (perhaps (what the concept of difference actually is –that is if it can actually be understood.
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Re: Deleuze Studies:

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I have, of course, already posted this quote. And I apologize for how long it makes this. But I feel obligated to do so in order to give some context –not just for the reader, but me and my 70’s addled mind as well:

"Finally, in this book it seemed to me that the powers of difference and repetition could be reached only by putting into question the traditional image of thought. By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals when we try to think. For example, we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and the thinker a good will (naturally to 'want' the true); we take as a model the process of recognition -in other words, a common sense or employment of all the faculties on a supposed same object; we designate error, nothing but error, as the enemy to be fought; and we suppose that the true concerns solutions -in other words, propositions capable of serving as answers. "

Delueze immediately follows this with what I quote separately so as to focus on it:

“This is the classic image of thought, and as long the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult of thought as encompassing those problems which point beyond the propositional mode; or as involving encounters which escape all recognition; or as confronting its true enemies, which are quite different from thought; or as attaining that which tears thought from its natural torpor and notorious bad will, and forces us to think. A new image of thought -or rather, a liberation of thought from those images which imprison it: this is what I had already sought to discover in Proust.”

Now I could break this down to its individual components. But today (actually tonight (I want to work in wide swashes in the context of a point made by Zona in the following discourse:

“Deleuze's argument amounts to not just identifying difference, but propagating it as well. "Multiply differences", as he suggests in terms of his book. And I share his enthusiasm. But it could become a hard sell to people who are already in a constant state of change and feeling the effects.” –me

“This is an objection I get a lot from some of my activist friends, and of course there's no certain interpretation of it, but all I know to say is that it doesn't seem like the kind of imposed, subjectivizing turmoil experienced by, say, workers under late capitalism or those displaced by colonial violence is really commensurate with what D advocates by the multiplication of difference. Idk if I can theorize it, but the nature of that kind of turmoil seems altogether static despite the movement it engenders.” –Zona

The first thing I would point out here is that we have to distinguish theory from social practice. To give a for instance: I find that whenever a Democrat is in the Whitehouse, I tend towards the more abstract. With Clinton as president, it was more about Sartre. And with Obama, it has become a lot about Deleuze. Even my lean towards Rorty and Zizek has been more focused on the abstract aspects of their philosophies. However, when a Republican is in, I find myself drawn to the political and social. What this suggests to me is that there is a kind of (almost (Bourgeoisie complacency about abstraction and theory. Hence: the flak that Zona is getting from his activist friends. And the main problem I am pointing to as concerns theory is its natural gravitation to the radical: that which it seeks out in order to contrast itself from all other theory.

Still, Deleuze’s latter point has application to the extent that it frees us from the land of the lotos eaters involved in the semiotic systems we tend to work in. We have to question the deferred systems of meaning that come with every word we use. For instance, while we can sympathize with those giving Zona the flack, we also have to question how activist milleus have broken the problem up into individual issues that fail to address the over-riding problem: producer/consumer Capitalism. And Capitalism is only too happy to exploit this by, for instance, advertising its embrace of multiculturalism all over media in the candy-coated way that media does. But what is never addressed is Capitalism itself. Or we should say that it is addressed only to the extent that it sells a product, such as Bill Maher’s Real Time, and gives it a fallback:

“How can you say Capitalism is against freedom? We give you Bill Maher.”

And even the supposedly democratic enterprise of the universities and higher thought has been compromised by the very image of thought that Deleuze describes: that which activism is rooted in.

The problem with theory is that it complicates things (drives so deep to the common core of right and wrong assertions (that it paralyzes right action: makes it feel as if it is deluded since it is working under the same delusions as wrong action. The problem with activism is that it must always oversimplify things and thereby succumbs to the very image of thought that bad action does: that which is usually propped up by the given power discourse and symbolic order.
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