In a recent New Yorker article, ‘The Threshold of Violence’ (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/ ... f-violence), Malcolm Gladwell makes the argument that the recent increase in mass shootings in America can be seen as a kind of slow motion mob mentality. The mob mentality, as is well known and reasonably described, is a matter of different people with different thresholds at which they break from normal social protocol. It’s a matter of acceleration: a group of people gather together to protest some unifying issue, people of a lower threshold start acting violently, the status quo (or its representatives (react with more force until the next lowest threshold responds thereby creating a feedback loop of escalation until everyone is caught up in it.
(And I have seen this dynamic at work in less consequential ways. Back when I was working as a custodian in a local university, one of my trainers explained to me that the cleaner you leave a classroom, the cleaner it will be when you come back to it the next morning. And it proved to be true. And I can only assume that it was a matter of the different thresholds at which people will resist being pigs before they give in to the mob and make their own contribution.)
The thing was I was, at first, skeptical of Gladwell’s assertion in that I found it hard to connect the unified nature and focus of a protest turned riot (as well as a group of students who choose to trash a classroom) to the diverse and individualistic nature and seeming absurdity of shooting sprees, of how, for instance, one can connect an autistic teenager shooting grade school children with two religious fanatics killing people in San Bernardino.
Then the anti-Capitalist in me slapped me on the forehead and realized there is a common cause: the increasing pressure being put on people in a world in which a few are feasting at the table while the rest of us fight for the crumbs. Note, for instance, a point made by Michael Moore in Bowling for Columbine: that Canada, at the time, had more guns per capita than America while having a far lower murder rate. And I think we can attribute this to Canada’s stronger safety net (the feeling of security it offers (as compared to America’s everyman-for-themselves hubris. There is a reason it is mainly happening in America. And it will likely increase in other western industrialized nations as austerity measures take hold.
In this sense, we can agree with while revising the old NRA motto:
Guns don’t kill people; desperate people with guns do.
Postcards:
Re: Postcards:
As one who sees philosophy as a form of intellectual play, who embraces the chance understandings of a decentered/rhizomatic process as compared to a single minded pursuit of Truth, and as one who lives in ways that might be consider 'unwise', I'm not sure I'm one to be dispensing wisdom or advice. Ironically, it’s that tolerance for chaos that disposes me to creating and collecting those little pearls of wisdom, those memorable sound bites that serve as momentary stays against confusion. Think: Robert Frost.
As far as received wisdom, I would quote either Russell or Whitehead (I'm not sure which): "Humble yourself or the world will do it for you". As concerns the creative act, the best I ever received was from a famous cook, that the main ingredient (excuse the pun) of a good cook is a good taster, to which I would add that, as we are what we eat, we are what we take in. As far as crisis situations, the best advice I got was the survivor's M.O. from a documentary on people stranded in snow storms: someone who doesn't waste energy on assigning blame, who accepts that they have a situation and that if they just trudge on, one way or the other, it will pass. To this I would add that faced with adversity, anxiety, or hesitation, sometimes the only way out is through. (And confidence in the face of uncertainty; courage in the face of the absurd.) And, oh yeah! The only real secret to a lasting relationship is that it…. well, lasts.
On the other hand, gun to head and someone snarling "Quit jacking around fool!", I would suggest that while we believe in things like afterlives, higher powers, and higher principles, our point A to point B is pretty much a given. And what better could we do with that than see what consciousness can experience and our minds can do?
But there is no gun and I refuse to be taken seriously. So if I had to crown any of them, it would be the three assumptions by which I work, that which underlies all the offerings above:
1. Everything takes its natural course. Even when we intervene it merely becomes part of that course.
2. Everything must be questioned, including and most importantly ourselves.
And, finally, 3. Assumptions are like promises: they're made to be broken. (Refer to 1.)
As far as received wisdom, I would quote either Russell or Whitehead (I'm not sure which): "Humble yourself or the world will do it for you". As concerns the creative act, the best I ever received was from a famous cook, that the main ingredient (excuse the pun) of a good cook is a good taster, to which I would add that, as we are what we eat, we are what we take in. As far as crisis situations, the best advice I got was the survivor's M.O. from a documentary on people stranded in snow storms: someone who doesn't waste energy on assigning blame, who accepts that they have a situation and that if they just trudge on, one way or the other, it will pass. To this I would add that faced with adversity, anxiety, or hesitation, sometimes the only way out is through. (And confidence in the face of uncertainty; courage in the face of the absurd.) And, oh yeah! The only real secret to a lasting relationship is that it…. well, lasts.
On the other hand, gun to head and someone snarling "Quit jacking around fool!", I would suggest that while we believe in things like afterlives, higher powers, and higher principles, our point A to point B is pretty much a given. And what better could we do with that than see what consciousness can experience and our minds can do?
But there is no gun and I refuse to be taken seriously. So if I had to crown any of them, it would be the three assumptions by which I work, that which underlies all the offerings above:
1. Everything takes its natural course. Even when we intervene it merely becomes part of that course.
2. Everything must be questioned, including and most importantly ourselves.
And, finally, 3. Assumptions are like promises: they're made to be broken. (Refer to 1.)
Re: Postcards:
As I enter into my first immersion into Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (mind), I’m starting to see the value of going back to the old-schoolers. Up until recently, I had found it hard to read anything written before the 60’s. But my immersions in my personal holy triad: Deleuze, Rorty, and Zizek (as well as the principle of diffe̕rrance: the deferred meaning involved in any philosophical text which is always referring to previous philosophers: have elicited my curiosity.
I have found this value in the fact that, while I have managed, at best, shallow scratches on the titanium surface of the book, I’m finding hope (enticements perhaps (in the overlaps: the common terms that Hegel is using such as “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself” (thank you, Sartre! (his occupation with the notion of nothingness (once again: thank you, Sartre! (as well as the concept of edification. Hegel wags his finger at Rorty and Deleuze. At the same time, he seems to be on the same page in his understanding of what it is philosophy actually does:
“The Absolute on this view is not to be grasped in conceptual form, but felt, intuited; it is not its conception, but the feeling of it and intuition of it that are to have the say and find expression.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Locations 427-428). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
And he does go on later in the preface to address complaints about the obscurity of philosophical exposition which sound a lot like the explanations given complaints about Deleuze’s use of free indirect discourse: that a true understanding of philosophical concepts require a kind of oblique approach to meaning. (I'm thinking Claire Colebrook's explanation here.)
At the same time, there seems to be a contradiction in that Hegel seems to want philosophy to have the same status as a science which, as far as I know, tends to take a more direct approach to meaning. Perhaps my German jam-mate, Harald, can help me with this. That said, I can see a kind of common sense of it (w/departure (in paragraph 1.:
“In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous, but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For whatever it might be suitable to state about philosophy in a preface—say, an historical sketch of the main drift and point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about the truth—this cannot be accepted as the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Locations 360-365). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
He then goes on to say:
“Moreover, because philosophy has its being essentially in the element of that universality which encloses the particular within it, the end or final result seems, in the case of philosophy more than in that of other sciences, to have absolutely expressed the complete fact itself in its very nature; contrasted with that the mere process of bringing it to light would seem, properly speaking, to have no essential significance.”
It just seems to me that philosophy is a matter of moving from the general to the particular. At the same time I would agree with him to the extent that understanding the general (that which resides in the overlaps (and stopping there does not constitute a philosophical process. Still (and excuse my opportunistic attempt to toss my own thoughts into the mix: it seems to me that any relationship (including that with philosophy (is a matter of turning content into form. For instance, the process by which we come to know a good friend, or even a lover, starts with their physical appearance and what they do the very first time we see them. Beyond that, it is a process of unfolding in which everything we come to understand about them participates in (conditions even (how we come to see them. And the same goes for philosophy or any philosophical text we might choose to engage.
Therefore, while I would agree with Hegel that such general understandings are not a true indication of what philosophy can actually do, I would disagree that the wide swashes of a typical preface are “superfluous” in that they are the perfectly natural steppingstone by which one penetrates the individual process.
I have found this value in the fact that, while I have managed, at best, shallow scratches on the titanium surface of the book, I’m finding hope (enticements perhaps (in the overlaps: the common terms that Hegel is using such as “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself” (thank you, Sartre! (his occupation with the notion of nothingness (once again: thank you, Sartre! (as well as the concept of edification. Hegel wags his finger at Rorty and Deleuze. At the same time, he seems to be on the same page in his understanding of what it is philosophy actually does:
“The Absolute on this view is not to be grasped in conceptual form, but felt, intuited; it is not its conception, but the feeling of it and intuition of it that are to have the say and find expression.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Locations 427-428). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
And he does go on later in the preface to address complaints about the obscurity of philosophical exposition which sound a lot like the explanations given complaints about Deleuze’s use of free indirect discourse: that a true understanding of philosophical concepts require a kind of oblique approach to meaning. (I'm thinking Claire Colebrook's explanation here.)
At the same time, there seems to be a contradiction in that Hegel seems to want philosophy to have the same status as a science which, as far as I know, tends to take a more direct approach to meaning. Perhaps my German jam-mate, Harald, can help me with this. That said, I can see a kind of common sense of it (w/departure (in paragraph 1.:
“In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous, but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For whatever it might be suitable to state about philosophy in a preface—say, an historical sketch of the main drift and point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about the truth—this cannot be accepted as the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Locations 360-365). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
He then goes on to say:
“Moreover, because philosophy has its being essentially in the element of that universality which encloses the particular within it, the end or final result seems, in the case of philosophy more than in that of other sciences, to have absolutely expressed the complete fact itself in its very nature; contrasted with that the mere process of bringing it to light would seem, properly speaking, to have no essential significance.”
It just seems to me that philosophy is a matter of moving from the general to the particular. At the same time I would agree with him to the extent that understanding the general (that which resides in the overlaps (and stopping there does not constitute a philosophical process. Still (and excuse my opportunistic attempt to toss my own thoughts into the mix: it seems to me that any relationship (including that with philosophy (is a matter of turning content into form. For instance, the process by which we come to know a good friend, or even a lover, starts with their physical appearance and what they do the very first time we see them. Beyond that, it is a process of unfolding in which everything we come to understand about them participates in (conditions even (how we come to see them. And the same goes for philosophy or any philosophical text we might choose to engage.
Therefore, while I would agree with Hegel that such general understandings are not a true indication of what philosophy can actually do, I would disagree that the wide swashes of a typical preface are “superfluous” in that they are the perfectly natural steppingstone by which one penetrates the individual process.
Re: Postcards:
As I scratch at the titanium surface of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (and find myself, as yet, only a sliver less confused than when I started (I can still see the filters I have developed reading more modern philosopher’s at work. I can, for instance, see where Rorty got his distinction between the edifying and systematic:
“What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Location 444). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
And:
“This easy contentment in receiving, or stinginess in giving, does not suit the character of science. The man who only seeks edification, who wants to envelop in mist the manifold diversity of his earthly existence and thought, and craves after the vague enjoyment of this vague and indeterminate Divinity—he may look where he likes to find this: he will easily find for himself the means to procure something he can rave over and puff himself up withal. But philosophy must beware of wishing to be edifying.”
And Hegel makes clear throughout the preface that edification is something to be avoided. Furthermore, even though I cannot pull up the quote, he is very clear about his embrace of systems –that which Nietzsche described as a lack of integrity. At the same time, we can see this as Hegel’s response to the Romanticism of the time:
“When such minds commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that, by putting a veil over self-consciousness, and surrendering all understanding, they are thus God’s beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep. This is the reason, too, that in point of fact, what they do conceive and bring forth in sleep is dreams.”
And his lean to the scientific side of the spectrum: the no man’s land between Science and Literature:
“To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science—that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge—that is what I have set before me.”
Here we see the roots of the analytic/continental divide (as in Hegel’s smug dismissal of the literary approach quoted above (that characterizes the philosophical culture today. We can see here why postmodernist thinkers so vehemently dismiss him (Deleuze considered him too reprehensible to even consider (while thinkers like Zizek (and I’m guessing Habermas (those who have to believe that the truth is out there (engage in apologetics/revisions of Hegel.
At the same time, from what I gather from the audio book beyond the preface, he does seem to put his money where his mouth is. While hardly understanding any of it, all the self being for itself is its self in itself in relation to the self that was before the self (it is truly a phenomenology), I can’t help but feel he has put together a very articulate and complex system that would make perfect sense if one had the time to break it down to its individual components, assimilate each, then put it back together in a coherent whole. And this confirms the atomistic description of the dialectic offered by my audio book about Hegel.
At the same time, as my respected peer and jam-mate Steven Orslini points out, one might go through all that just to find out that it is little more than mystification.
“What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Location 444). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
And:
“This easy contentment in receiving, or stinginess in giving, does not suit the character of science. The man who only seeks edification, who wants to envelop in mist the manifold diversity of his earthly existence and thought, and craves after the vague enjoyment of this vague and indeterminate Divinity—he may look where he likes to find this: he will easily find for himself the means to procure something he can rave over and puff himself up withal. But philosophy must beware of wishing to be edifying.”
And Hegel makes clear throughout the preface that edification is something to be avoided. Furthermore, even though I cannot pull up the quote, he is very clear about his embrace of systems –that which Nietzsche described as a lack of integrity. At the same time, we can see this as Hegel’s response to the Romanticism of the time:
“When such minds commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that, by putting a veil over self-consciousness, and surrendering all understanding, they are thus God’s beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep. This is the reason, too, that in point of fact, what they do conceive and bring forth in sleep is dreams.”
And his lean to the scientific side of the spectrum: the no man’s land between Science and Literature:
“To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science—that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge—that is what I have set before me.”
Here we see the roots of the analytic/continental divide (as in Hegel’s smug dismissal of the literary approach quoted above (that characterizes the philosophical culture today. We can see here why postmodernist thinkers so vehemently dismiss him (Deleuze considered him too reprehensible to even consider (while thinkers like Zizek (and I’m guessing Habermas (those who have to believe that the truth is out there (engage in apologetics/revisions of Hegel.
At the same time, from what I gather from the audio book beyond the preface, he does seem to put his money where his mouth is. While hardly understanding any of it, all the self being for itself is its self in itself in relation to the self that was before the self (it is truly a phenomenology), I can’t help but feel he has put together a very articulate and complex system that would make perfect sense if one had the time to break it down to its individual components, assimilate each, then put it back together in a coherent whole. And this confirms the atomistic description of the dialectic offered by my audio book about Hegel.
At the same time, as my respected peer and jam-mate Steven Orslini points out, one might go through all that just to find out that it is little more than mystification.
Re: Postcards:
“I see phenomenology as basing truth and existence on what we experience, as in seeing "phenomena", and what we do with the observation or what it means to us. That is similar to existentialism, but existentialism does not try to be scientific, and existentialism endorses subjectivity rather than work to resolve it.” -David
I would argue, David, that it runs a little deeper than that in that it does consider the nature of the body and the brain (the logic of it if you will (in that based on pure perception there is no way we could have come to understand that for every external event (noema) there is a corresponding internal event (noesis). We simply would have thought of it in realist terms in which everything is just out there and we are in here. It is that break from experience-in-itself that led to Sartre’s recognition of the underlying nothingness of consciousness –something there is no way he could have perceived directly. Still, we have a lot of common ground here:
“In what way can phenomenology be considered 'scientific' I wonder?” –Steven
“I see phenomenology as the basis of science. For instance, before we had such a vast knowledge base of scientific information, what did people do? They looked at stuff and formed from it what opinion they could. Now I think we get caught up in the significance of the amount of knowledge accumulated and forget the phenomenological origin of science.”
You, Husserl, and Hegel as well:
“It is this process by which science in general comes about, this gradual development of knowing, that is set forth here in the Phenomenology of Mind. Knowing, as it is found at the start, mind in its immediate and primitive stage, is without the essential nature of mind, is sense-consciousness.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Locations 679-681). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
Now focusing in on an individual point:
“For instance, before we had such a vast knowledge base of scientific information, what did people do? They looked at stuff and formed from it what opinion they could.”
Yes: we have to remember that there was a time when philosophy and science were basically one thing (think Aristotle here. And I would add that it wasn’t just the lack of accumulated knowledge, but the lack of technology as well –hence the change in the philosophy of mind based on neuroscience and its brain scanning technology.
Still, in its time, phenomenology was the best technology we had available to study consciousness. And Hegel goes to great lengths to make it feel like science: those complex (almost mathematical (descriptions of the relationship between the various terminology that we still used well after him: consciousness, being-for-itself, being-in-itself, nothingness, the now which is always behind us the minute we point to it, etc.. (Technologies in themselves. Hegel doesn’t just say; he actually attempts to show. And I, as one who leans to the more poetic side of the philosophical spectrum, can entertain a little forgiveness for his scientific lean. I can even forgive his analytic smugness and dismissal of more poetic approaches, perhaps even chuckle at the cleverness of:
“When such minds commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that, by putting a veil over self-consciousness, and surrendering all understanding, they are thus God’s beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep. This is the reason, too, that in point of fact, what they do conceive and bring forth in sleep is dreams.”
That is the preface, as I come familiarize myself with it, seeming like it could have been subtitled the state of philosophy in Hegel’s time.
I would argue, David, that it runs a little deeper than that in that it does consider the nature of the body and the brain (the logic of it if you will (in that based on pure perception there is no way we could have come to understand that for every external event (noema) there is a corresponding internal event (noesis). We simply would have thought of it in realist terms in which everything is just out there and we are in here. It is that break from experience-in-itself that led to Sartre’s recognition of the underlying nothingness of consciousness –something there is no way he could have perceived directly. Still, we have a lot of common ground here:
“In what way can phenomenology be considered 'scientific' I wonder?” –Steven
“I see phenomenology as the basis of science. For instance, before we had such a vast knowledge base of scientific information, what did people do? They looked at stuff and formed from it what opinion they could. Now I think we get caught up in the significance of the amount of knowledge accumulated and forget the phenomenological origin of science.”
You, Husserl, and Hegel as well:
“It is this process by which science in general comes about, this gradual development of knowing, that is set forth here in the Phenomenology of Mind. Knowing, as it is found at the start, mind in its immediate and primitive stage, is without the essential nature of mind, is sense-consciousness.” -Hegel, Georg W. F. (2010-06-24). The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind) (Kindle Locations 679-681). Neeland Media LLC. Kindle Edition.
Now focusing in on an individual point:
“For instance, before we had such a vast knowledge base of scientific information, what did people do? They looked at stuff and formed from it what opinion they could.”
Yes: we have to remember that there was a time when philosophy and science were basically one thing (think Aristotle here. And I would add that it wasn’t just the lack of accumulated knowledge, but the lack of technology as well –hence the change in the philosophy of mind based on neuroscience and its brain scanning technology.
Still, in its time, phenomenology was the best technology we had available to study consciousness. And Hegel goes to great lengths to make it feel like science: those complex (almost mathematical (descriptions of the relationship between the various terminology that we still used well after him: consciousness, being-for-itself, being-in-itself, nothingness, the now which is always behind us the minute we point to it, etc.. (Technologies in themselves. Hegel doesn’t just say; he actually attempts to show. And I, as one who leans to the more poetic side of the philosophical spectrum, can entertain a little forgiveness for his scientific lean. I can even forgive his analytic smugness and dismissal of more poetic approaches, perhaps even chuckle at the cleverness of:
“When such minds commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that, by putting a veil over self-consciousness, and surrendering all understanding, they are thus God’s beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep. This is the reason, too, that in point of fact, what they do conceive and bring forth in sleep is dreams.”
That is the preface, as I come familiarize myself with it, seeming like it could have been subtitled the state of philosophy in Hegel’s time.
Re: Postcards:
Once again, being a progressive/liberal has never felt so boring and dry as this first entrance into Rawls via The Laws of the Peoples. A lot of it feels like being told what I already intuited in some rather dry almost mathematical language. I did, however come across a point that gets me beyond myself:
“The last cause [for immigration] is population pressure in the home territory, and among its complex of causes is the inequality and subjection of women. Once that inequality and subjection are overcome, and women are granted equal political participation with men and assured education, these problems can be resolved.”
In this, I believe we can see a crucial element in our evolution as a species from the competitive model (in which our baser impulses put our higher cognitive functions in their service) to the cooperative one: in which our baser impulses see it in their interest to act in tandem with our higher cognitive functions. And let’s be very clear about this: the inequality and subjection of women is an expression of the competitive model. We only need look at Islamic societies to see that. They claim that it is about women being sacred. But ultimately it shows itself to be an expression of fear and the patriarchal need for power and dominance. And this need for power and dominance is what is, in third world countries, driving an unsustainable population growth that lies at the bottom of every other problem we are having: such as manmade climate change and the unwillingness of high wealth to share resources.
We can get some confirmation for this as well as concerns the problem of immigration in America from South American countries. In Mexico, for instance, it is customary for men to keep their women barefoot and pregnant so that they’ll stay home while the men visit the brothels. What results from this, as Rawls points out, is a population pressure that drives Mexican immigration into America. The hypocrisy among American conservatives on this issue is their obliviousness to the issue and tendency to attach gag orders on birth control to foreign aid. And we see that same kind of patriarchal nonsense in such reality TV shows as 19 and Counting which, if you set aside the scandals that surrounded it, was already despicable since the idea was for us to fawn over such a big tight-knit family when all it should have inspired in us was the elimination of the child tax credit after the second or third child. Our population growth (whether it comes from third or first world countries (is unsustainable.
Rawl’s point seems perfectly and profoundly correct in that as long as we delegate women to the role of baby making machines, we will only perpetuate the problem of an unsustainable population growth. However, if we allow women to participate in the power structure on equal terms, we give them an incentive to defer childbearing while being more selective in their role (as one social Darwinist pointed out to me (as genetic gatekeepers.
In other words: when women win, we all win.
“The last cause [for immigration] is population pressure in the home territory, and among its complex of causes is the inequality and subjection of women. Once that inequality and subjection are overcome, and women are granted equal political participation with men and assured education, these problems can be resolved.”
In this, I believe we can see a crucial element in our evolution as a species from the competitive model (in which our baser impulses put our higher cognitive functions in their service) to the cooperative one: in which our baser impulses see it in their interest to act in tandem with our higher cognitive functions. And let’s be very clear about this: the inequality and subjection of women is an expression of the competitive model. We only need look at Islamic societies to see that. They claim that it is about women being sacred. But ultimately it shows itself to be an expression of fear and the patriarchal need for power and dominance. And this need for power and dominance is what is, in third world countries, driving an unsustainable population growth that lies at the bottom of every other problem we are having: such as manmade climate change and the unwillingness of high wealth to share resources.
We can get some confirmation for this as well as concerns the problem of immigration in America from South American countries. In Mexico, for instance, it is customary for men to keep their women barefoot and pregnant so that they’ll stay home while the men visit the brothels. What results from this, as Rawls points out, is a population pressure that drives Mexican immigration into America. The hypocrisy among American conservatives on this issue is their obliviousness to the issue and tendency to attach gag orders on birth control to foreign aid. And we see that same kind of patriarchal nonsense in such reality TV shows as 19 and Counting which, if you set aside the scandals that surrounded it, was already despicable since the idea was for us to fawn over such a big tight-knit family when all it should have inspired in us was the elimination of the child tax credit after the second or third child. Our population growth (whether it comes from third or first world countries (is unsustainable.
Rawl’s point seems perfectly and profoundly correct in that as long as we delegate women to the role of baby making machines, we will only perpetuate the problem of an unsustainable population growth. However, if we allow women to participate in the power structure on equal terms, we give them an incentive to defer childbearing while being more selective in their role (as one social Darwinist pointed out to me (as genetic gatekeepers.
In other words: when women win, we all win.
Re: Postcards:
“I mean isn't Global Capitalism the kind of thing America started out fighting against?”
“Not really, D, considering how even early Americans used trade with foreign countries as a means to generate wealth. Our military even fought wars to defend and expand our economic opportunities and leverage. The Spanish American war was HARDLY fought for the principals taught to us in Public Schools, and neither were the smaller scale wars in individual Central and South American countries during and after...such as those in Panama and Ecuador. We were not the originators of Globalism (I think it's safe to say that the British Empire and it's various 'trade companies' were), but we learned it well enough.” -Shawn
In a dramatic reversal from my initial impression of Rawl’s, I find him getting more interesting as I get further into the audio book -that is while I actually read it. Maybe it was the dramatic plot twists or the really luscious sex scenes, or maybe it was just Rawl’s analytic insistence on the precision of terms (Voltaire: if you want to talk to me, define your terms (that is giving me a lot of new terminology and distinctions to play with: that which satisfies the criteria by which I approach any text (in the postmodern sense/hermeneutic of what can be interpreted: a matter of what I can use.
(And I would note how much I appreciate (even if it is not a style I would choose work in and despite my resentment towards Analytic smugness which dismisses continental approaches (the way Rawls (much like Searle (builds his arguments in such a concise way. Rawls seems to work really hard to get his point clearly across to the reader as can be seen in his tendency to repeat important points to his thesis.)
In this case, I would like to focus on the connected terms of the rational and the reasonable. The rational can be primarily focused on what is in the interest of a given individual or group that individual happens to reside in. The reasonable has to do with how a given proposal affects those outside of the individual or individuals that propose it. I return to Shawn’s point to apply the point:
“Not really, D, considering how even early Americans used trade with foreign countries as a means to generate wealth. Our military even fought wars to defend and expand our economic opportunities and leverage. The Spanish American war was HARDLY fought for the principals taught to us in Public Schools, and neither were the smaller scale wars in individual Central and South American countries during and after...such as those in Panama and Ecuador. We were not the originators of Globalism (I think it's safe to say that the British Empire and it's various 'trade companies' were), but we learned it well enough.”
What we see here is what Rawls would consider a misuse of war according to the Laws of Peoples –that is war, according to him, being mainly delegated to self defense. What Shawn is describing here is a perfectly rational use of war in that it serves the interest of the individuals instigating it. We have to put in mind here is that rationality is about what serves the purposes of a given goal. Reasonableness, on the other hand, is about looking beyond one’s self interest and considering the self interest (the rationality (of the other. Therefore, what we see in Shawn’s description is America’s rational application of war while also seeing an equally unreasonable application of it. And this is a direct violation of the Laws of Peoples, that which must transcend the infrastructural technologies (doctrines, laws, etc. (we put in place if we are to be a truly free and just society.
What I see in this is Rawl’s relationship and reaction to his relationship with Robert Nozick (a famous libertarian (who was also a peer and friend to Rawls. Rawls, at one point, directly criticizes the libertarian position which I will try to quote later. But his argument that rationality and the reasonable are both crucial to the Laws of the Peoples while giving the import he does to the reasonable strikes me as a criticism folded into the respect he felt for his friend. And we can see this as well in:
“A reasonably just Law of Peoples is Utopian in that it uses political (moral) ideals, principles, and concepts to specify the reasonably right and just political and social arrangements for the Society of Peoples. In the domestic case, liberal conceptions of justice distinguish between the reasonable and the rational, and LIE BETWEEN ALTRUISM ON ONE SIDE AND EGOISM ON THE OTHER [emphasis mine]”
“Not really, D, considering how even early Americans used trade with foreign countries as a means to generate wealth. Our military even fought wars to defend and expand our economic opportunities and leverage. The Spanish American war was HARDLY fought for the principals taught to us in Public Schools, and neither were the smaller scale wars in individual Central and South American countries during and after...such as those in Panama and Ecuador. We were not the originators of Globalism (I think it's safe to say that the British Empire and it's various 'trade companies' were), but we learned it well enough.” -Shawn
In a dramatic reversal from my initial impression of Rawl’s, I find him getting more interesting as I get further into the audio book -that is while I actually read it. Maybe it was the dramatic plot twists or the really luscious sex scenes, or maybe it was just Rawl’s analytic insistence on the precision of terms (Voltaire: if you want to talk to me, define your terms (that is giving me a lot of new terminology and distinctions to play with: that which satisfies the criteria by which I approach any text (in the postmodern sense/hermeneutic of what can be interpreted: a matter of what I can use.
(And I would note how much I appreciate (even if it is not a style I would choose work in and despite my resentment towards Analytic smugness which dismisses continental approaches (the way Rawls (much like Searle (builds his arguments in such a concise way. Rawls seems to work really hard to get his point clearly across to the reader as can be seen in his tendency to repeat important points to his thesis.)
In this case, I would like to focus on the connected terms of the rational and the reasonable. The rational can be primarily focused on what is in the interest of a given individual or group that individual happens to reside in. The reasonable has to do with how a given proposal affects those outside of the individual or individuals that propose it. I return to Shawn’s point to apply the point:
“Not really, D, considering how even early Americans used trade with foreign countries as a means to generate wealth. Our military even fought wars to defend and expand our economic opportunities and leverage. The Spanish American war was HARDLY fought for the principals taught to us in Public Schools, and neither were the smaller scale wars in individual Central and South American countries during and after...such as those in Panama and Ecuador. We were not the originators of Globalism (I think it's safe to say that the British Empire and it's various 'trade companies' were), but we learned it well enough.”
What we see here is what Rawls would consider a misuse of war according to the Laws of Peoples –that is war, according to him, being mainly delegated to self defense. What Shawn is describing here is a perfectly rational use of war in that it serves the interest of the individuals instigating it. We have to put in mind here is that rationality is about what serves the purposes of a given goal. Reasonableness, on the other hand, is about looking beyond one’s self interest and considering the self interest (the rationality (of the other. Therefore, what we see in Shawn’s description is America’s rational application of war while also seeing an equally unreasonable application of it. And this is a direct violation of the Laws of Peoples, that which must transcend the infrastructural technologies (doctrines, laws, etc. (we put in place if we are to be a truly free and just society.
What I see in this is Rawl’s relationship and reaction to his relationship with Robert Nozick (a famous libertarian (who was also a peer and friend to Rawls. Rawls, at one point, directly criticizes the libertarian position which I will try to quote later. But his argument that rationality and the reasonable are both crucial to the Laws of the Peoples while giving the import he does to the reasonable strikes me as a criticism folded into the respect he felt for his friend. And we can see this as well in:
“A reasonably just Law of Peoples is Utopian in that it uses political (moral) ideals, principles, and concepts to specify the reasonably right and just political and social arrangements for the Society of Peoples. In the domestic case, liberal conceptions of justice distinguish between the reasonable and the rational, and LIE BETWEEN ALTRUISM ON ONE SIDE AND EGOISM ON THE OTHER [emphasis mine]”
Re: Postcards:
A potential tool (or concept if you will (that is emerging in my present immersion in Rawls involves how we approach ideologies. And what I’m mainly thinking about here is the issue of Capitalism –that is even though it can be (and probably has been (applied to a lot of other ones as well. I would go back to a point made in (I believe (Joe Hughes’ secondary text on Delueze’s Difference and Repetition. In it, he describes three means by which we can confirm our beliefs:
1: the syntactic which focuses on how one assertion follows the other. For instance: because of A, B; because of B, C; therefore, because of A, C.
2: the semantic which focuses on the meaning of what we say and attempts to streamline it. This is the domain of the analytic.
And 3: the existential which tends to deal with reality as it presents itself with all its inconsistencies and deviations from the models provided by the semantic: what is thought of by many thinkers as the ironic.
And what I’m noting in Rawl’s book is a subtle shift (vacillation (between the semantic and the existential, that is while his primary focus seems to be on the semantic in that he seems to be putting a lot of emphasis on clearly defining his terms –for instance: the distinction he’s trying to make between a Law of Peoples and the state. Still, he finds himself always having to bring in the existential, such as the histories he describes, in order to confirm the abstract/semantic models he is presenting. There are even points where he utilizes the existential to put his abstract/semantic models into question.
But I could better make my point by working in my own comfort zone: the ideology of Capitalism. A lot of the time I am talking about and critiquing it, I am working in the semantic/abstract realm of its very logic. This is why, for instance, I can’t help but feel that the present income gap is unsustainable by the very logic of Capitalism since the real buying power created by it can no longer meet (Capitalism being about the flow of money (the general exchange value it produces. For instance, the true believers tend to work from the equation that exchange value=buying power. But if this was true, money would just sweep through the population and everyone would get what they needed. But from an existential perspective, we find that as buying power works towards the top, it doesn’t defuse as much as contract. Rich people, for instance (and while having the same basic needs as everyone else, don’t shop at Walmart which creates a lot of buying power through the people it employs. They rather buy their goods from elite providers who, while getting way more money for their goods than any Walmart employee or any third world slave that made the product sold, employ far less people.
So we have to ask: is the semantic approach as isolated from the existential as it claims to be –as the analytics claim it to be? We (or I (can claim that the semantic is pure in that it strictly works in the terms that define a given term or ideology –in my case: Capitalism. But is there any way of truly full proofing it from the existential?
1: the syntactic which focuses on how one assertion follows the other. For instance: because of A, B; because of B, C; therefore, because of A, C.
2: the semantic which focuses on the meaning of what we say and attempts to streamline it. This is the domain of the analytic.
And 3: the existential which tends to deal with reality as it presents itself with all its inconsistencies and deviations from the models provided by the semantic: what is thought of by many thinkers as the ironic.
And what I’m noting in Rawl’s book is a subtle shift (vacillation (between the semantic and the existential, that is while his primary focus seems to be on the semantic in that he seems to be putting a lot of emphasis on clearly defining his terms –for instance: the distinction he’s trying to make between a Law of Peoples and the state. Still, he finds himself always having to bring in the existential, such as the histories he describes, in order to confirm the abstract/semantic models he is presenting. There are even points where he utilizes the existential to put his abstract/semantic models into question.
But I could better make my point by working in my own comfort zone: the ideology of Capitalism. A lot of the time I am talking about and critiquing it, I am working in the semantic/abstract realm of its very logic. This is why, for instance, I can’t help but feel that the present income gap is unsustainable by the very logic of Capitalism since the real buying power created by it can no longer meet (Capitalism being about the flow of money (the general exchange value it produces. For instance, the true believers tend to work from the equation that exchange value=buying power. But if this was true, money would just sweep through the population and everyone would get what they needed. But from an existential perspective, we find that as buying power works towards the top, it doesn’t defuse as much as contract. Rich people, for instance (and while having the same basic needs as everyone else, don’t shop at Walmart which creates a lot of buying power through the people it employs. They rather buy their goods from elite providers who, while getting way more money for their goods than any Walmart employee or any third world slave that made the product sold, employ far less people.
So we have to ask: is the semantic approach as isolated from the existential as it claims to be –as the analytics claim it to be? We (or I (can claim that the semantic is pure in that it strictly works in the terms that define a given term or ideology –in my case: Capitalism. But is there any way of truly full proofing it from the existential?
Re: Postcards:
“PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Location 57). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.
“The first answer to the riddle of existence, therefore, is that substance exists, and exists necessarily.” -Scruton, Roger (2002-05-30). Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Location 835). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
Here, of course, we might see a possible connection to existentialism –that is with the provision of recognizing that Existentialism did not necessarily see the existence of substance (or existence of any kind (as necessary. And it (as refers to the conflicted sensibility as concerned existence and substance at the time (when you consider Leibniz’s question:
“Why all this rather than nothing?”
Whereas Spinoza found certainty, Leibniz clearly found doubt. This is evident in Spinoza’s assumption that nothing could not exist. And suggests a possible contradiction in that Spinoza sees God as Substance as the perfect possibility of anything that could possibly exist. And if we set aside the ontological terminology of Being and Nothingness and turn (as Sartre did –perhaps without realizing it (to the phenomenological terminology of Presence and Absence, we begin to see that Nothingness (Pierre not in the café (is a very real possibility within the conceptual matrix of Spinoza’s God as substance –at least within the rationalist framework in which he worked –that is as Leibniz demonstrated. And here we see one of the vulnerabilities of the rationalist approach: a propensity towards circular arguments in which the one making it succeeds by defining the premise in such a way that the conclusion must necessarily result. And we have to put in mind here that Spinoza did start most of his chapters in The Ethics with definitions. My German jam-mate, Harald, argues (and I will try to clean it up to the best of my ability in the window I have:
“Ethics, philosophy and even everyday life is mostly about the usual "master and servant”: THE "Human alone, by oneself" is a very rare situation and "problem"..(centrally by Nietzsche "alone" (little joke)) Therefore "pop-analyses" is the "faculty" of "professor challenger" in genealogy of morals. Most other philosophers, as they accuse Spinoza and his "followers" of doing, neglect the "pre-assumptions" they make…. including their critics. Therefore, the critics are often not on the same level of "scientific reasoning" [by which I assume Harald (being a true believer (means the geometrical approach of Spinoza] but far more "shallower" in every respect.”
This, I assume, was a response to a point in yesterday’s rhizome:
“What impresses me most is that Scruton wrote one of the books on philosophy that I read a long time ago and very early in my process that I found (instinctively that is (a little too classicist in nature. Still, he impresses me here, especially in terms of the criticisms he is offering as concerns Spinoza’s assumptions.”
But I would respectfully implore Harald to consider the kind of operationalism (a term I stole from Marcuse (involved in making arguments based purely on how we define terms. I mean doing so could (for anyone clever enough (open us up to having to accept any argument that seems semantically consistent. Therefore, I would have to stand with Scruton in being critical of Spinoza’s assumptions.
Most telling to me is how Spinoza’s resonance and seduction (based on semantics (seems rooted (that is, possibly, without Spinoza recognizing it (in the nature of consciousness and intentionality as described by Husserl’s phenomenology:
“Substance is ‘that which is in itself and is conceived through itself’, that the conception of which does not require the conception of some other thing (E 1, Definition 3).” -Scruton, Roger (2002-05-30). Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Locations 829-830). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
As phenomenology and the concept of intentionality point out: consciousness is always consciousness of something; therefore, in order to exist, consciousness must, at bottom, perceive that it exists. And I cannot help but suspect that Spinoza’s notion of Substance might be a metaphorical response to this basic human dynamic. Hence: the source of its resonance and seduction as a semantic argument.
“The first answer to the riddle of existence, therefore, is that substance exists, and exists necessarily.” -Scruton, Roger (2002-05-30). Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Location 835). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
Here, of course, we might see a possible connection to existentialism –that is with the provision of recognizing that Existentialism did not necessarily see the existence of substance (or existence of any kind (as necessary. And it (as refers to the conflicted sensibility as concerned existence and substance at the time (when you consider Leibniz’s question:
“Why all this rather than nothing?”
Whereas Spinoza found certainty, Leibniz clearly found doubt. This is evident in Spinoza’s assumption that nothing could not exist. And suggests a possible contradiction in that Spinoza sees God as Substance as the perfect possibility of anything that could possibly exist. And if we set aside the ontological terminology of Being and Nothingness and turn (as Sartre did –perhaps without realizing it (to the phenomenological terminology of Presence and Absence, we begin to see that Nothingness (Pierre not in the café (is a very real possibility within the conceptual matrix of Spinoza’s God as substance –at least within the rationalist framework in which he worked –that is as Leibniz demonstrated. And here we see one of the vulnerabilities of the rationalist approach: a propensity towards circular arguments in which the one making it succeeds by defining the premise in such a way that the conclusion must necessarily result. And we have to put in mind here that Spinoza did start most of his chapters in The Ethics with definitions. My German jam-mate, Harald, argues (and I will try to clean it up to the best of my ability in the window I have:
“Ethics, philosophy and even everyday life is mostly about the usual "master and servant”: THE "Human alone, by oneself" is a very rare situation and "problem"..(centrally by Nietzsche "alone" (little joke)) Therefore "pop-analyses" is the "faculty" of "professor challenger" in genealogy of morals. Most other philosophers, as they accuse Spinoza and his "followers" of doing, neglect the "pre-assumptions" they make…. including their critics. Therefore, the critics are often not on the same level of "scientific reasoning" [by which I assume Harald (being a true believer (means the geometrical approach of Spinoza] but far more "shallower" in every respect.”
This, I assume, was a response to a point in yesterday’s rhizome:
“What impresses me most is that Scruton wrote one of the books on philosophy that I read a long time ago and very early in my process that I found (instinctively that is (a little too classicist in nature. Still, he impresses me here, especially in terms of the criticisms he is offering as concerns Spinoza’s assumptions.”
But I would respectfully implore Harald to consider the kind of operationalism (a term I stole from Marcuse (involved in making arguments based purely on how we define terms. I mean doing so could (for anyone clever enough (open us up to having to accept any argument that seems semantically consistent. Therefore, I would have to stand with Scruton in being critical of Spinoza’s assumptions.
Most telling to me is how Spinoza’s resonance and seduction (based on semantics (seems rooted (that is, possibly, without Spinoza recognizing it (in the nature of consciousness and intentionality as described by Husserl’s phenomenology:
“Substance is ‘that which is in itself and is conceived through itself’, that the conception of which does not require the conception of some other thing (E 1, Definition 3).” -Scruton, Roger (2002-05-30). Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Locations 829-830). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
As phenomenology and the concept of intentionality point out: consciousness is always consciousness of something; therefore, in order to exist, consciousness must, at bottom, perceive that it exists. And I cannot help but suspect that Spinoza’s notion of Substance might be a metaphorical response to this basic human dynamic. Hence: the source of its resonance and seduction as a semantic argument.
Re: Postcards:
“According to Aristotle in his treatise, The Art of Rhetoric, a speaker or writer has three ways to persuade his audience: ethos (appeal to the speaker’s character), pathos (appeal to emotion), and logos (appeal to logic). Aristotle believed that out of the three means of persuasion, logos was superior and that ideally all arguments should be won or lost on reason alone.” –Brett
“Russell wrote in his History of Philosophy of the Western World, that philosophy and science developed in reaction to the errors of Aristotle, The joke ,nowadays, is that almost only emotions, affected with morals (ethos in intellectual circles) are the only "logic" by which we change the mind of the masses -take, for instance, the influence of media.” –Harald (cleaned up to the best of my ability…
I think the growing popularity and success of Donald Trump, Harald, pretty much makes your point. (And as an aside, I would also point out Deleuze and Guatarri’s complaint in What is Philosophy about how marketers are taking over the role of the production of concepts: that which gets some real shine from Baudrillard’s point that real power (which excludes lotto winners (lies in the ability to control the signs of consumption.) And we should note that Hitler basically worked through the same kind of resonance and seduction.
And herein lays the conundrum those of a more postmodern or pragmatic anti-representationalist position face -that is given their acceptance of the role resonance and seduction plays (and has played (in our cultural evolution. And it is, of course, the very weak spot that the neo-classicist analytic school tends to hammer on.
But the anti-classicist/representationalist position is not just a prescriptive reaction to the kinds of tyranny that have resulted from the hierarchal implications of Plato and Aristotle’s hierarchal models (that based on representation and identity (but the recognition and concession that no matter what we do, resonance and seduction will always play a role in it as Wittgenstein recognized when he conceded to the value of language games.
And what the neo-classicists fail to recognize is that, first of all, they, given the influence of corporate financing on academic life anymore, have conceded to the new tyranny of Capitalism. Secondly, they need to recognize the role that resonance and seduction has played in their decision to ally their selves with the neo-classicist/analytic cause, the need for order (in a chaotic world (that brought them there.
That said, all the anti-representationalists (the pragmatics and postmodernists: pragmatism being an explicitly American form of the postmodern sensibility (such as that of Deleuze: w/ and w/out Guatarri (can argue is:
Of course, a Hitler or a Trump is always a risk. But it was the hierarchal structures established by classicism (that which would deny the role of resonance and seduction (that made them possible in the first place. This is why every tyrant that has come along act as if they are the one telling everyone the ‘real Truth’. Therefore, all we of an anti-representationalist sensibility can do, the pragmatics and postmoderns, those of a more reasonable (not rational: think Rawls (disposition can do is utilize our powers of resonance and seduction until our language game overpowers theirs.
Hence the import of art and literature as testified to by both Deleuze and Rorty. We as progressives have got to continue to do what we have always done: continue to prove ourselves more beautiful, more resonant, more seductive than anything the status quo has ever offered. Or as Camus argues: all arguments for beauty are, at bottom, arguments for freedom.
Anyway, in the words of great thinker of my day and age: that’s all I gotta say about that.
“Russell wrote in his History of Philosophy of the Western World, that philosophy and science developed in reaction to the errors of Aristotle, The joke ,nowadays, is that almost only emotions, affected with morals (ethos in intellectual circles) are the only "logic" by which we change the mind of the masses -take, for instance, the influence of media.” –Harald (cleaned up to the best of my ability…
I think the growing popularity and success of Donald Trump, Harald, pretty much makes your point. (And as an aside, I would also point out Deleuze and Guatarri’s complaint in What is Philosophy about how marketers are taking over the role of the production of concepts: that which gets some real shine from Baudrillard’s point that real power (which excludes lotto winners (lies in the ability to control the signs of consumption.) And we should note that Hitler basically worked through the same kind of resonance and seduction.
And herein lays the conundrum those of a more postmodern or pragmatic anti-representationalist position face -that is given their acceptance of the role resonance and seduction plays (and has played (in our cultural evolution. And it is, of course, the very weak spot that the neo-classicist analytic school tends to hammer on.
But the anti-classicist/representationalist position is not just a prescriptive reaction to the kinds of tyranny that have resulted from the hierarchal implications of Plato and Aristotle’s hierarchal models (that based on representation and identity (but the recognition and concession that no matter what we do, resonance and seduction will always play a role in it as Wittgenstein recognized when he conceded to the value of language games.
And what the neo-classicists fail to recognize is that, first of all, they, given the influence of corporate financing on academic life anymore, have conceded to the new tyranny of Capitalism. Secondly, they need to recognize the role that resonance and seduction has played in their decision to ally their selves with the neo-classicist/analytic cause, the need for order (in a chaotic world (that brought them there.
That said, all the anti-representationalists (the pragmatics and postmodernists: pragmatism being an explicitly American form of the postmodern sensibility (such as that of Deleuze: w/ and w/out Guatarri (can argue is:
Of course, a Hitler or a Trump is always a risk. But it was the hierarchal structures established by classicism (that which would deny the role of resonance and seduction (that made them possible in the first place. This is why every tyrant that has come along act as if they are the one telling everyone the ‘real Truth’. Therefore, all we of an anti-representationalist sensibility can do, the pragmatics and postmoderns, those of a more reasonable (not rational: think Rawls (disposition can do is utilize our powers of resonance and seduction until our language game overpowers theirs.
Hence the import of art and literature as testified to by both Deleuze and Rorty. We as progressives have got to continue to do what we have always done: continue to prove ourselves more beautiful, more resonant, more seductive than anything the status quo has ever offered. Or as Camus argues: all arguments for beauty are, at bottom, arguments for freedom.
Anyway, in the words of great thinker of my day and age: that’s all I gotta say about that.
Re: Postcards:
Today, after watching Ridley Scott’s version of the Moses story, Exodus: Gods and Kings, a few connections started to form –mainly around my recent scratching at the surface of Spinoza’s explanation of God as substance. But before I go into this, I need to make clear that I, as far as my beliefs, am an agnostic: an atheist that hedges their bets. Therefore, consider all the following talk of God as a compositional convenience (given the material I am working with (and metaphorical in nature.
I would also start by pointing out something brought to my attention during my short tryst with the Unitarian church. It was something Scott got close to when his version of the burning bush described God as saying “I am” as compared to the “I am God” that we’re traditionally told it said. What connected with that is something one of the guest speakers at the church explained. He pointed, first of all, to the difficulty of translating that particular passage. He then went on to point out that many experts came to realize that what was actually being said was “I am Being”. And here we get a translation that is more philosophy-friendly if you will, specifically towards the philosophy of Spinoza.
And I would point out that my interpretation of this has to do with my inability, at this point in my process, to separate Spinoza’s notion of substance and the concept of Being. Furthermore, I cannot help but bring in Spinoza’s understanding of God as not acting out of Free Will (as such would suggest that God could make other choices which would put into question His perfectness (but its very nature in terms of the plagues that God incurred on Egypt and Ramses.
What makes the connections so exciting to me is that you can’t help but feel that Scott may have been acting from some influence from Spinoza in that everything seemed to be resulting from the nature of Egypt and Ramses at the time rooted in and as an expression of the Spinozian understanding of God always acting out of its own nature.
What makes it even more exciting for me (that which I may get an article out of (is the connection we can see between what happened in Egypt and what we are dealing with as concerns man-made climate change. We first have to consider the deterministic nature of the relationship between God and man in Spinoza’s model in that both are acting out of the nature of God. In this case though, it is as if we are acting out of some conflict within the nature of God in order to resolve it.
The thing that should scare us, though, is how that process of resolution will affect our individual lives or the individual lives of our children and grandchildren.
That said, what I also hope to bring into this is the fractal causality at work in Spinoza’s Substance as well as Deleuze and Guatarri’s BwO as compared to a linear one which allowed Spinoza, not having gotten past it (think Newton, to talk about infinite regress as did Deleuze.
And I would also point to the influence the Moses story (being a Jewish one (might have been having on Spinoza without him realizing it. It may well have been that the Jewish church excommunicated him for understanding the story of Moses better than they did.
I would also start by pointing out something brought to my attention during my short tryst with the Unitarian church. It was something Scott got close to when his version of the burning bush described God as saying “I am” as compared to the “I am God” that we’re traditionally told it said. What connected with that is something one of the guest speakers at the church explained. He pointed, first of all, to the difficulty of translating that particular passage. He then went on to point out that many experts came to realize that what was actually being said was “I am Being”. And here we get a translation that is more philosophy-friendly if you will, specifically towards the philosophy of Spinoza.
And I would point out that my interpretation of this has to do with my inability, at this point in my process, to separate Spinoza’s notion of substance and the concept of Being. Furthermore, I cannot help but bring in Spinoza’s understanding of God as not acting out of Free Will (as such would suggest that God could make other choices which would put into question His perfectness (but its very nature in terms of the plagues that God incurred on Egypt and Ramses.
What makes the connections so exciting to me is that you can’t help but feel that Scott may have been acting from some influence from Spinoza in that everything seemed to be resulting from the nature of Egypt and Ramses at the time rooted in and as an expression of the Spinozian understanding of God always acting out of its own nature.
What makes it even more exciting for me (that which I may get an article out of (is the connection we can see between what happened in Egypt and what we are dealing with as concerns man-made climate change. We first have to consider the deterministic nature of the relationship between God and man in Spinoza’s model in that both are acting out of the nature of God. In this case though, it is as if we are acting out of some conflict within the nature of God in order to resolve it.
The thing that should scare us, though, is how that process of resolution will affect our individual lives or the individual lives of our children and grandchildren.
That said, what I also hope to bring into this is the fractal causality at work in Spinoza’s Substance as well as Deleuze and Guatarri’s BwO as compared to a linear one which allowed Spinoza, not having gotten past it (think Newton, to talk about infinite regress as did Deleuze.
And I would also point to the influence the Moses story (being a Jewish one (might have been having on Spinoza without him realizing it. It may well have been that the Jewish church excommunicated him for understanding the story of Moses better than they did.
Re: Postcards:
“Spinoza subscribed to a modified form of Descartes’ method, and drew the standard philosophical conclusion. He became convinced that the fundamental premises of human knowledge must be established, not by experience but by reason, since reason alone can provide insight into the essence of things – an essence being precisely that which is captured in a ‘clear and distinct idea’.” -Scruton, Roger (2002-05-30). Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Locations 701-703). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
And here we see the shortcoming and circular nature of the rationalist approach. Ultimately, what this argument comes down to is the assumption that such essences are found rather than made. If they are made, which the rationalist approach gives us reason to suspect, then the argument turns against itself in that the essences are attributed to a given subject rather than imminent within them. If they are found, then we see the rationalist approach fully dependent on the empirical approach -in other words: experience. And I would also point out that what I’m fumbling around with here gets at the reason that while Anselm’s and Spinoza’s argument for God are convincing within themselves (within their given systems, many of us have ended up agnostic, if not outright atheist.
It basically comes down to something pointed out to me in (I believe (Joe Hughes’ readers guide to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, that there are 3 approaches to making an argument:
1: the syntactic as can be seen in the argument:
A=B
B=C
Therefore A=C
2: the semantic as can be seen in Aristotle’s syllogisms:
Men are rational animals.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is a rational animal.
(And I would note how even here the semantic is dependent on the next method, the Existential which involves experience. )
And, finally, 3: the existential in which we test our conceptual systems against reality itself.
And by recognizing these three, we can more accurately analyze the disconnect between Anselm’s and Spinoza strong arguments for God and our willingness to accept them. What we see here is how their arguments work perfectly within the syntactic and semantic (the domain of the rationalist approach (while failing to make the existential leap. We see a similar problem at work in paradoxes such as Zeno’s arrow which, while convincing, fails to inspire us to go prancing around between an archer and their target.
Therefore, what we have to do is make the existential leap of putting Spinoza (as well as Anselm (in their historical context. We have to recognize that, at the time, mathematics was an emerging and exciting technology that inspired Spinoza, in his enthusiasm, to put a little more faith in the geometrical method than it actually warranted. At the same time, I would hesitate to pass off Spinoza’s effort as irrelevant. As Scruton later points out:
“(The proof of the second proposition involves, when traced back to its original axioms, something like 100 steps; this idea of a mathematics of laughter seems less strange when set beside Spinoza’s view that merriment is more easily conceived than observed.)”
We can easily see here the justification for the rationalist approach. It is clearly easier to form concepts about merriment and work with that than actually observe it and form any workable proposition about it. It may even be, if you think about it, impossible without mental concepts about it.
I mean think about it: can we ever really think about a moment when we’re actually in it? Don’t the two seem inherently exclusive?
And to justify putting this on the Pragmatic board:
We can also see the import of the pragmatic truth test (that which just works (as a synthesis of the traditional deductive and inductive truth tests in that it made both valid ways to work and added something more. This, of course, would give some validation to the deductive tendency to appeal to the inductive and resolve the inherent self contradiction in doing so.
And here we see the shortcoming and circular nature of the rationalist approach. Ultimately, what this argument comes down to is the assumption that such essences are found rather than made. If they are made, which the rationalist approach gives us reason to suspect, then the argument turns against itself in that the essences are attributed to a given subject rather than imminent within them. If they are found, then we see the rationalist approach fully dependent on the empirical approach -in other words: experience. And I would also point out that what I’m fumbling around with here gets at the reason that while Anselm’s and Spinoza’s argument for God are convincing within themselves (within their given systems, many of us have ended up agnostic, if not outright atheist.
It basically comes down to something pointed out to me in (I believe (Joe Hughes’ readers guide to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, that there are 3 approaches to making an argument:
1: the syntactic as can be seen in the argument:
A=B
B=C
Therefore A=C
2: the semantic as can be seen in Aristotle’s syllogisms:
Men are rational animals.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is a rational animal.
(And I would note how even here the semantic is dependent on the next method, the Existential which involves experience. )
And, finally, 3: the existential in which we test our conceptual systems against reality itself.
And by recognizing these three, we can more accurately analyze the disconnect between Anselm’s and Spinoza strong arguments for God and our willingness to accept them. What we see here is how their arguments work perfectly within the syntactic and semantic (the domain of the rationalist approach (while failing to make the existential leap. We see a similar problem at work in paradoxes such as Zeno’s arrow which, while convincing, fails to inspire us to go prancing around between an archer and their target.
Therefore, what we have to do is make the existential leap of putting Spinoza (as well as Anselm (in their historical context. We have to recognize that, at the time, mathematics was an emerging and exciting technology that inspired Spinoza, in his enthusiasm, to put a little more faith in the geometrical method than it actually warranted. At the same time, I would hesitate to pass off Spinoza’s effort as irrelevant. As Scruton later points out:
“(The proof of the second proposition involves, when traced back to its original axioms, something like 100 steps; this idea of a mathematics of laughter seems less strange when set beside Spinoza’s view that merriment is more easily conceived than observed.)”
We can easily see here the justification for the rationalist approach. It is clearly easier to form concepts about merriment and work with that than actually observe it and form any workable proposition about it. It may even be, if you think about it, impossible without mental concepts about it.
I mean think about it: can we ever really think about a moment when we’re actually in it? Don’t the two seem inherently exclusive?
And to justify putting this on the Pragmatic board:
We can also see the import of the pragmatic truth test (that which just works (as a synthesis of the traditional deductive and inductive truth tests in that it made both valid ways to work and added something more. This, of course, would give some validation to the deductive tendency to appeal to the inductive and resolve the inherent self contradiction in doing so.
Re: Postcards:
First of all, why would you do this to me? Where are my Rhizomes??????????
Re: Postcards:
Rhizome 4/5/16:
“I am interested: was Deleuze arguing for treating thoughts as being as real as matter? And also I want to ask are you saying, as I think that Leonardo da Vinci said, that nothingness is the impossible?” -Christopher
As promised, Chris, to answer your first question: yes. I mean think about it. What could be more objective to us than our subjective experiences which include our thoughts and our emotions? Why would a thought that passes through our head be any less real to us than the rock that stubs our toe? Especially when you consider the fact that the only reason that rock registers to us is because our brain (via the mind (tells us it’s there via the pain we experience because of it?
And because I am contractually obliged to connect this (keep on topic (with the Pragmatic board (and because it does connect (this was the very issue that Rorty was addressing when, in Philosophy as Mirror of Nature, he chipped away at the common notion of ontological status. The point (as it was with Deleuze (was to undermine this notion that there could be some reality outside of our perception of it, that we could somehow just be here and it could be there without it having to register in our brains. It was a reaction to the realist position.
And anyone that has experienced psychedelics knows better. If the realist position were true, the psychedelic experience would be one of everything looking like it normally does and the hallucinations in the brain being superimposed upon it. But that is not the experience I have ever had with Acid or Shrooms. Reality, for me, was completely transformed into something that felt kind of cartoonish –which I assume to be a throwback to when I was kid and more impressed by bright colors.
As for your second question:
“And also I want to ask are you saying, as I think that Leonardo da Vinci said, that nothingness is the impossible?”
I have to admit that, at first, I was unimpressed. I had all kinds of answers to the question that I would respectfully offer as an alternative. But when I read it before I set out to write this, I realized you’re pretty much spot on. Sometimes I’m a little slow on the uptake. But you’re right: nothingness is that kind of thing that philosophers have always struggled with in that it seems like it is something that should exist (Leibniz: why all this rather than nothing? (but that we have no way of proving that it actually exists. Sartre spent a whole chapter of Le Etre et Neant criticizing three notions of Nothingness by three great philosophers (Hegel, Heidegger, and Bergson (only to offer us the equally unsatisfying explanation (even though it was an impressive attempt (that nothingness was curled into the heart of Being like a worm. And we could address the debate over whether nothingness actually exists by switching to the more phenomenological issue of Presence and Absence. But that hardly answers the question: does Nothingness actually exist? All it offers us is a kind of representation of nothingness.
Unfortunately, I have failed to actually address your question in ways I actually set out to do. Your point about Nothingness and the impossible has implications I have somehow managed to distract myself from. And I really hope to address them before our jam on this theme is over.
“I am interested: was Deleuze arguing for treating thoughts as being as real as matter? And also I want to ask are you saying, as I think that Leonardo da Vinci said, that nothingness is the impossible?” -Christopher
As promised, Chris, to answer your first question: yes. I mean think about it. What could be more objective to us than our subjective experiences which include our thoughts and our emotions? Why would a thought that passes through our head be any less real to us than the rock that stubs our toe? Especially when you consider the fact that the only reason that rock registers to us is because our brain (via the mind (tells us it’s there via the pain we experience because of it?
And because I am contractually obliged to connect this (keep on topic (with the Pragmatic board (and because it does connect (this was the very issue that Rorty was addressing when, in Philosophy as Mirror of Nature, he chipped away at the common notion of ontological status. The point (as it was with Deleuze (was to undermine this notion that there could be some reality outside of our perception of it, that we could somehow just be here and it could be there without it having to register in our brains. It was a reaction to the realist position.
And anyone that has experienced psychedelics knows better. If the realist position were true, the psychedelic experience would be one of everything looking like it normally does and the hallucinations in the brain being superimposed upon it. But that is not the experience I have ever had with Acid or Shrooms. Reality, for me, was completely transformed into something that felt kind of cartoonish –which I assume to be a throwback to when I was kid and more impressed by bright colors.
As for your second question:
“And also I want to ask are you saying, as I think that Leonardo da Vinci said, that nothingness is the impossible?”
I have to admit that, at first, I was unimpressed. I had all kinds of answers to the question that I would respectfully offer as an alternative. But when I read it before I set out to write this, I realized you’re pretty much spot on. Sometimes I’m a little slow on the uptake. But you’re right: nothingness is that kind of thing that philosophers have always struggled with in that it seems like it is something that should exist (Leibniz: why all this rather than nothing? (but that we have no way of proving that it actually exists. Sartre spent a whole chapter of Le Etre et Neant criticizing three notions of Nothingness by three great philosophers (Hegel, Heidegger, and Bergson (only to offer us the equally unsatisfying explanation (even though it was an impressive attempt (that nothingness was curled into the heart of Being like a worm. And we could address the debate over whether nothingness actually exists by switching to the more phenomenological issue of Presence and Absence. But that hardly answers the question: does Nothingness actually exist? All it offers us is a kind of representation of nothingness.
Unfortunately, I have failed to actually address your question in ways I actually set out to do. Your point about Nothingness and the impossible has implications I have somehow managed to distract myself from. And I really hope to address them before our jam on this theme is over.
Re: Postcards:
Rhizome 4/7/16 on a discourse between me, Chris Doveton, and Christopher:
“This looks interesting! Has anybody seriously contended that thoughts aren't real? Really?” –Chris
Of course not, Chris. Although some behaviorists (what Dennett refers to as barefoot behaviorists (have attempted to argue that consciousness (which I assume to include the thoughts that constitute it (is some kind of illusion. But all one need do is ask “Illusion to what?” to recognize why that argument is rarely made anymore.
The only real issue of relevance is hinted at in Rorty’s inquiry into the issue of ontological status. While the barefoot behaviorist is pretty much a thing of the past, there is still the issue (as materialists keep insisting (as to whether our thoughts and emotions are as real as the rock that might stub our toe. The materialists insist that there is a difference in order to prop up their privilege based on a hierarchal demarcation between the subjective and the objective. Pragmatists (out of a kind of alt-materialism (insist that it is kind of silly and counter-productive to make such distinctions (or to argue over them (when the two are too intimately entwined to justify the effort when we could be doing more practical things like creating a just society or…. well, saving ourselves as a species.
I stand with the pragmatists in recognizing the tight entwinement of subject and object. As I pointed out in rhizome 4/5/16:
“And anyone that has experienced psychedelics knows better. If the realist position were true, the psychedelic experience would be one of everything looking like it normally does and the hallucinations in the brain being superimposed upon it. But that is not the experience I have ever had with Acid or Shrooms. Reality, for me, was completely transformed into something that felt kind of cartoonish –which I assume to be a throwback to when I was kid and more impressed by bright colors.”
I would also point out Christopher’s point that approaches it from a different angle:
“Chris, I don't suppose anyone would seriously contest that thoughts are not real in the sense that we experience them but what I think many humans probably do is massively underestimate the reality of their thoughts, not only on themselves, but on others.”
Deleuze (via Spinoza (kind of caps the issue off by arguing for the unvocity of Being: the recognition that a thing either exists or doesn't and that, from an ontological position, there is no in-between.
*
“Thought is not an object/thing but rather, has the status of an activity.” –Chris
Pretty much the same approach that Spinoza was taking, Chris. You’re clearly in good company.
*
“I translate "soul" here as consciousness which may have a panpsychic distribution throughout the universe, ie, as certain Eastern mystics indicate, some primal force, that we call consciousness, inhabits and is diffused throughout the entire scene.” –Chris
This seems to me a matter of defining our terms. But I think we can safely assume, from an evolutionary standpoint, that the concept of the soul came out of an experience of consciousness then evolved into the various distinctions we have made on the way. For me (post-phenomenology and the concept of intentionality: consciousness is always consciousness of something which implies that in order for us to exist, we, at bottom have to perceive that we exist (if there is a soul, it would be the perceiving thing (the fact that we are rather than not being (projecting into the world through the various symbolic webs of the brain (think Hofstadter here (that constitutes our intellect.
That said, Chris: your point kind of compliments my belief that all perceiving things are the eyes and ears of God in that we are what gives it intentionality: makes nothing something.
“This looks interesting! Has anybody seriously contended that thoughts aren't real? Really?” –Chris
Of course not, Chris. Although some behaviorists (what Dennett refers to as barefoot behaviorists (have attempted to argue that consciousness (which I assume to include the thoughts that constitute it (is some kind of illusion. But all one need do is ask “Illusion to what?” to recognize why that argument is rarely made anymore.
The only real issue of relevance is hinted at in Rorty’s inquiry into the issue of ontological status. While the barefoot behaviorist is pretty much a thing of the past, there is still the issue (as materialists keep insisting (as to whether our thoughts and emotions are as real as the rock that might stub our toe. The materialists insist that there is a difference in order to prop up their privilege based on a hierarchal demarcation between the subjective and the objective. Pragmatists (out of a kind of alt-materialism (insist that it is kind of silly and counter-productive to make such distinctions (or to argue over them (when the two are too intimately entwined to justify the effort when we could be doing more practical things like creating a just society or…. well, saving ourselves as a species.
I stand with the pragmatists in recognizing the tight entwinement of subject and object. As I pointed out in rhizome 4/5/16:
“And anyone that has experienced psychedelics knows better. If the realist position were true, the psychedelic experience would be one of everything looking like it normally does and the hallucinations in the brain being superimposed upon it. But that is not the experience I have ever had with Acid or Shrooms. Reality, for me, was completely transformed into something that felt kind of cartoonish –which I assume to be a throwback to when I was kid and more impressed by bright colors.”
I would also point out Christopher’s point that approaches it from a different angle:
“Chris, I don't suppose anyone would seriously contest that thoughts are not real in the sense that we experience them but what I think many humans probably do is massively underestimate the reality of their thoughts, not only on themselves, but on others.”
Deleuze (via Spinoza (kind of caps the issue off by arguing for the unvocity of Being: the recognition that a thing either exists or doesn't and that, from an ontological position, there is no in-between.
*
“Thought is not an object/thing but rather, has the status of an activity.” –Chris
Pretty much the same approach that Spinoza was taking, Chris. You’re clearly in good company.
*
“I translate "soul" here as consciousness which may have a panpsychic distribution throughout the universe, ie, as certain Eastern mystics indicate, some primal force, that we call consciousness, inhabits and is diffused throughout the entire scene.” –Chris
This seems to me a matter of defining our terms. But I think we can safely assume, from an evolutionary standpoint, that the concept of the soul came out of an experience of consciousness then evolved into the various distinctions we have made on the way. For me (post-phenomenology and the concept of intentionality: consciousness is always consciousness of something which implies that in order for us to exist, we, at bottom have to perceive that we exist (if there is a soul, it would be the perceiving thing (the fact that we are rather than not being (projecting into the world through the various symbolic webs of the brain (think Hofstadter here (that constitutes our intellect.
That said, Chris: your point kind of compliments my belief that all perceiving things are the eyes and ears of God in that we are what gives it intentionality: makes nothing something.