Time does not exist.

[Hobbes' Choice]

"Change", in the same way, is an anthropocentric recognition of the fact that things are not the same as they were a moment before. I'm not denying that the universe is in a state of continual flux, I simply suggest that concepts about it are not "out there" too.

Well, concepts are not extramental, of course, but we can't conflate concepts and what the concepts are about or what they're in response to. The "fact that things are not the same as they were a moment before" is change, and that is extramental. Any concept about or in response to it is going to be mental of course.

When change is identified it is a mental act. You can observe changing thing but 'change' is only a concept we append to things we observe, not residing in the thing, but across time.

You might be interested in my answer to Belinda.
I think there is a tendency, which I find disabling and often quite arrogant that our view of the universe is a matter of simply reading what is there. When you realise that we daily construct our reality, things make more sense. All disagreements make sense; race wars, religious wars and arguments, and many of our categories taken to be natural are more cultural that we could ever admit - even scientific ones.

I think its worth starting with solipsism, moving towards idealism and only take realism with a pinch of skeptical salt. This is all healthy I think.

Concepts such as morality, good, evil are not universal absolute forces. Good is that which pleaseth man, evil is that which pleaseth him not.
There is more danger from a person that believes morality is absolute and objective than from one that knows it is culturally and personally negotiated.

[Terrapin Station]

When change is identified it is a mental act.

I agree with that. However, we have to not conflate change with an identification of change.

You can observe changing thing but 'change' is only a concept we append to things we observe, not residing in the thing, but across time.

In my ontology time IS change/motion/process. IS, and all sides of the slashes there, is meant in the sense of "12 IS 3x4 or 2x6 or 24/2."

I agree with the perspectivalism of the one comment. I stress that, too.

I don't think that makes change not extramental, though.

I think its worth starting with solipsism, moving towards idealism and only take realism with a pinch of skeptical salt. This is all healthy I think.

Hmm . . . can't say I agree with that one. Re phil of perception, for example, I buy naive realism.

Concepts such as morality, good, evil are not universal absolute forces. Good is that which pleaseth man, evil is that which pleaseth him not.

I definitely agree with that. Some things are mental phenomena only. Change is not one of those things, though.

[Hobbes' Choice]

...

absolute forces. Good is that which pleaseth man, evil is that which pleaseth him not.

I definitely agree with that. Some things are mental phenomena only. Change is not one of those things, though.

And here is where you are in contradiction with yourself.

I cannot deny the real existence of external objects, yet as I can only know them as mental events we are forever separated from them and know them only as representations of a mental kind.

Sometimes the naive realism bites you on the arse, but for the most part it seems reliable. However, healthy skepticism is always my handmaiden, and she does not let me down.

[Terrapin Station]

And here is where you are in contradiction with yourself.

I'm not saying that the means of knowing something can be non-mental. I'm saying that not everything is mental. (Or in other words, there's more to the world than knowing things.)

When I say "Change is not mental," I'm not saying anything like, "My knowing about change isn't mental." Re "Change is not mental," the subject (in a grammatical sense) of that sentence is "change." The subject isn't my knowing something.

[OuterLimits]

And here is where you are in contradiction with yourself.

I'm not saying that the means of knowing something can be non-mental. I'm saying that not everything is mental. (Or in other words, there's more to the world than knowing things.)

I presume this is true. Of course, an individual has no absolute proof of this...

[Terrapin Station]

And here is where you are in contradiction with yourself.

I'm not saying that the means of knowing something can be non-mental. I'm saying that not everything is mental. (Or in other words, there's more to the world than knowing things.)

I presume this is true. Of course, an individual has no absolute proof of this...

Empirical claims are not provable.

[prothero]

I'm not saying that the means of knowing something can be non-mental. I'm saying that not everything is mental. (Or in other words, there's more to the world than knowing things.)

I presume this is true. Of course, an individual has no absolute proof of this...

Empirical claims are not provable.

Which would bring one back to "what can we know?", "what can we prove?" What does it even mean to know or prove something?"
"I think therefore I am?"
The opinions range from forms of direct or naive realism where we can know and experience the independent external reality to a high degree of certainty; to absolute idealism where there is not any external independent world or at least we can know nothing of it. I think the most reasonable conclusion is there is an independent external reality and we can know quite a lot (but certainly not everything) about it. Those committed to skepticism will of course disagree. The development of instrumentation, science and measurement has extended the range of sense experience and vastly increased our "knowledge" of the universe. Science is in many ways an inherently skeptical endeavor itself. Much of Kant is a discussion of the limits of reason and sense experience to generate knowledge and the ways we encounter and interact with independent reality. Some seem to speculate independent reality is frozen, eternal and timeless or completely beyond access and therefore can neither be experienced nor known. I think the rather amazing efficacy of science and the senses in utilitarian pragmatic terms is sufficient proof of our ability to encounter and manipulate an external independent reality and to "know" a lot of about it. Of course my definition of "knowledge" is a pragmatic one, not an idealistic one.

[Terrapin Station]

Which would bring one back to "what can we know?", "what can we prove?" What does it even mean to know or prove something?" . . .

In my view, knowing something doesn't have anything to do with certainty or proofs.

And in fact, the concern with such things--including in Decartes--has always struck me as bizarre, especially when it's approached with an attitude of "If I can't be certain of/can't prove that x in domain D, then any belief (like an evil genius, a brain in a vat, etc.) is equally up for grabs in domain D." That's ridiculous.

What matters are the reasons we have--or do not have--for believing one thing over another, where those reasons have nothing to do with certainty.

With something like a brain in a vat or an evil genius versus alternatives like realism, yes a brain in a vat or an evil genius is a possibility, but there's absolutely no reason to believe either of those things. The fact that they're possibilities isn't sufficient for belief.

On the other hand, we have phenomenal/empirical experience of a real world. That's more than just a possibility. So we have a better reason to believe that than alternatives.

When we're faced with alternatives for belief, rather than looking for proofs or certainty, we should simply look at what reasons there are, if any, to believe one thing over another. If someone suggests something that seems extremely counterintuitive, the first thing you should ask is, "Okay, why would we believe that?" If all it has going for it is that it's possible, that's not enough, because the contradictory statement is usually going to be possible, too. (For example, it's possible that we're brains-in-vats and it's possible that we're not brains-in-vats.)

[Hobbes' Choice]

And here is where you are in contradiction with yourself.

I'm not saying that the means of knowing something can be non-mental. I'm saying that not everything is mental. (Or in other words, there's more to the world than knowing things.)

I know so am I.

When I say "Change is not mental," I'm not saying anything like, "My knowing about change isn't mental." Re "Change is not mental," the subject (in a grammatical sense) of that sentence is "change." The subject isn't my knowing something.

But change is a conceptualisation, not a 'thing' in the universe. Its a category of human understanding. It is referring to the non-mental world but it is fabricated by mental substance.

I have no idea what you mean by ;"The subject isn't my knowing something.".

[OuterLimits]

With something like a brain in a vat or an evil genius versus alternatives like realism, yes a brain in a vat or an evil genius is a possibility, but there's absolutely no reason to believe either of those things. The fact that they're possibilities isn't sufficient for belief.

On the other hand, we have phenomenal/empirical experience of a real world. That's more than just a possibility. So we have a better reason to believe that than alternatives.

Profoundly misses the point - and contains circular reasoning.

Person A tells you that you are experiencing the world because it is there.

Person B tells you that you are experiencing the world because he created it a computer and attached it to your brain.

You cannot tell *which* is true - have no logical way to figure out which claim to favor, and therefore have no basis to "reasonably" "from your experience" favor either claim.

You are simply arguing from what is *easiest* or most intuitive to believe, without questioning, without analyzing, without wondering.

"Since I know the world is real and not an illusion, I have no reason to question whether it is an illusion." < circular reasoning

[Terrapin Station]

But change is a conceptualisation, not a 'thing' in the universe. Its a category of human understanding. It is referring to the non-mental world but it is fabricated by mental substance.

That's conflating the concept and what the concept is about. Change isn't a "thing" itself but a relational process of things. The concept is about that relational process.

[Terrapin Station]

Person A tells you that you are experiencing the world because it is there.

That's backwards. The world is there because one is experiencing it. In other words, one is believing that P--"The world is there" based on a reason--"I have phenomenal experience of it," where that reason isn't merely that P is possible.

Re "This is all a computer that's attached to one's brain," there needs to be a reason--some sort of empirical evidence, some sort of logical argument that rules out other possibilities, any sort of reason--to believe that. Simply the possibility of it isn't sufficient. There needs to be more than possibility for believing something.

You cannot tell *which* is true - have no logical way to figure out which claim to favor,

Sure you do. The claim for which there are more reasons for belief, and certainly not the claim for which there is only possibilty. The "brain in a vat" scenario only has possibility going for it.

"Since I know the world is real and not an illusion, I have no reason to question whether it is an illusion." < circular reasoning

I didn't say anything like that. What I said is that there are no reasons beyond possibility for buying the brain in a vat proposition. You could suggest a reason other than possibility for buying that if you believe there are any.

[Hobbes' Choice]

But change is a conceptualisation, not a 'thing' in the universe. Its a category of human understanding. It is referring to the non-mental world but it is fabricated by mental substance.

That's conflating the concept and what the concept is about. Change isn't a "thing" itself but a relational process of things. The concept is about that relational process.

You are not contradicting me.

[Terrapin Station]

But change is a conceptualisation, not a 'thing' in the universe. Its a category of human understanding. It is referring to the non-mental world but it is fabricated by mental substance.

That's conflating the concept and what the concept is about. Change isn't a "thing" itself but a relational process of things. The concept is about that relational process.

You are not contradicting me.

Cool. If you agree with that, you're spot on.

[Hobbes' Choice]

That's conflating the concept and what the concept is about. Change isn't a "thing" itself but a relational process of things. The concept is about that relational process.

You are not contradicting me.

Cool. If you agree with that, you're spot on.

The "PROCESS" of which you speak is mental.

The universe does not give a rat's arse about your generalisation. Things act to their nature, we describe that as change and or persistence.