Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Discussion of articles that appear in the magazine.

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MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote:
MGL wrote:2) To assert at T0 something about T2 that subsequently turns out to be true in the real world does not help the determinist as they have go from this assertion to the assertion that given the same state of the world at T0 there is only one possible state of the world at T2.
When was the action, to which the thought experiment asks could the agent have done otherwise?, performed?
If I remember correctly the way you put things was this:

T0 - the time a brain event occured that determinists say determine the choice at T1
T1 - the choosing of an action
T2 - athe action performed.

You refer to a truth about T2 at T0. This is what I am interpreting as an assertion made at T0 about T2 that happens to be true.
chaz wyman
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by chaz wyman »

Why Buridan's Ass ate both piles of hay by post number 4:

His action was determined by his hunger to seek sustenance and the choice of which one was irrelevant as it was the one he happened to be contemplating when his hunger determined him to move.

He has since wandered off in search of water due to his thirst determined by the amount of dry hay he has consumed.
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:This is what I am interpreting as an assertion made at T0 about T2 that happens to be true.
Quite, the thought experiment includes a truth in the future. If it is true that the agent performs action A at time two, then the agent can only perform action not-A, the so-called "do otherwise", if the agent does both A and not-A at time two, and that is impossible due to non-contradiction. So the thought experiment, by winding back time and leaving a truth in the future, assumes the world to be determined. In short, it's nonsense.
In any case, your claim that what "the thought experiment does is spell out the difference between determinism and non-determinism", is also incorrect. If we assume that somehow an equivalent thought experiment could be conducted without begging the question, and assume that the action that we're considering is my choice between pieces of pineapple or a banana. As I dont like pineapple but I do like banana, I will always choose banana (regardless of whether or not time is wound back) but that consistency of choice doesn't in any way either suggest the reality of determinism or suggest that I have no free will.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote:
MGL wrote:This is what I am interpreting as an assertion made at T0 about T2 that happens to be true.
Quite, the thought experiment includes a truth in the future. If it is true that the agent performs action A at time two, then the agent can only perform action not-A, the so-called "do otherwise", if the agent does both A and not-A at time two, and that is impossible due to non-contradiction. So the thought experiment, by winding back time and leaving a truth in the future, assumes the world to be determined. In short, it's nonsense.
In any case, your claim that what "the thought experiment does is spell out the difference between determinism and non-determinism", is also incorrect. If we assume that somehow an equivalent thought experiment could be conducted without begging the question, and assume that the action that we're considering is my choice between pieces of pineapple or a banana. As I dont like pineapple but I do like banana, I will always choose banana (regardless of whether or not time is wound back) but that consistency of choice doesn't in any way either suggest the reality of determinism or suggest that I have no free will.
1) There is no such thing as a truth in the future. There is an assertion about a future event that turns out to be true, but the thought experiment, by conjuring up an alternative world suddenly makes the truth of that assertion relative to a possible world, becasue that assertion is anchored to a possible world.
2) It is a contradiction to say that a person can do both A and not-A at time T2 in world W1, but it is not a contradiction to say that a person can do A at T2 in W1 OR not-A at T2 in W2 which is what the thought experiment is claiming. Because the actions are being performed in alternative possible worlds they are not mutually exclusive. The only thing that could make them mutually exlcusive would be the assumption of determinism.
3) Perhaps if you explain your notion of free-will I will understand your point better as the concept of free-will seems to me to depend on the principle of alternative possibilities.
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:There is no such thing as a truth in the future.
In a determined world there is, because all facts about all states of the world are true at all times. You are begging the question against determinism, by asserting that there is no such thing.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote:
MGL wrote:There is no such thing as a truth in the future.
In a determined world there is, because all facts about all states of the world are true at all times. You are begging the question against determinism, by asserting that there is no such thing.

1) Certainly to define free-will - as I understand it - is to presume that the universe is not deterministic. If that is all you are saying, that is OK, but my definition of free-will was never intended to lead to the assertion that there is free-will, just that it depended on the presumption that the universe was not deterministic. Now, I may assert that there is such a thing as free-will, but I do not intend that my assertion automatically follows from my definition of it. What follows from my assertion and my definition - IF it is true - is that determinism is false. However, I do not have an argument for free-will so I cannot demonstrate it to be real. My argument is only that a) it is possible if the universe is non-deterministic and b) there is no conclusive evidence or agument that suggests it is deterministic.

2) If you have a definition of free-will that does not depend on the assumption of non-determinism then please explain what it is.
bravox
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by bravox »

You can't have free-will without determinism. If the universe won't hold the changes that result from your choices, then you have no freedom to choose at all, it's all complete chaos.

So some determinism must necessarily exist. That is somewhat obvious and can easily be observed by the fact that the world is not chaotic.
chaz wyman
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by chaz wyman »

bravox wrote:You can't have free-will without determinism. If the universe won't hold the changes that result from your choices, then you have no freedom to choose at all, it's all complete chaos.

So some determinism must necessarily exist. That is somewhat obvious and can easily be observed by the fact that the world is not chaotic.

"Some?"

Where it suits you?
bravox
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by bravox »

chaz wyman wrote:"Some?"

Where it suits you?
Well, if I don't like the way the world is going, I can change a small portion of it - wherever it suits me!
chaz wyman
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by chaz wyman »

bravox wrote:
chaz wyman wrote:"Some?"

Where it suits you?
Well, if I don't like the way the world is going, I can change a small portion of it - wherever it suits me!
And put aside the laws of nature in the process, just here and there where it suits you?
bravox
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by bravox »

chaz wyman wrote:And put aside the laws of nature in the process, just here and there where it suits you?
What laws of nature? Those about billiard balls? :lol:
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:Certainly to define free-will - as I understand it - is to presume that the universe is not deterministic. If that is all you are saying, that is OK. . .
What I'm saying is that it's mistaken to talk about "doing otherwise", particularly in the context of the standard thought experiment with time wound back.
MGL wrote:If you have a definition of free-will that does not depend on the assumption of non-determinism then please explain what it is.
I defend a standard definition of free will; an agent has free will on any occasion when that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
MGL wrote:I do not have an argument for free-will so I cannot demonstrate it to be real
What is or isn't real is a metaphysical issue, what can be demonstrated is that free will is observable.
1) define three essential principles of science:
a) general induction- all things being equal, things are as they were and will be as they are
b) experimental repeatability- all things being equal, an experimenter can repeat an experimental procedure
c) falsifiability- if a theory is contradicted by an observation, then the theory is wrong and the observation stands.
2) define free will- an agent has free will on any occasion when that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
3) define realisable alternatives- a set of actions which it has been demonstrated can be performed by the agent, constitute, all things being equal, an option set, that is a set of realisable alternatives.
4) define a choice- a choice is the construction of a choice set, a choice set is a proper subset, with exactly one member, of an option set.
5) define conscious choice- a choice is conscious if futures have been imagined and assessed for all members of the option set, and exactly one member has been assessed as offering the best expectation for the future, and that member is the member of the choice set.
6) demonstrate two actions:
a) I can type 10
b) I can type 01
7) in conjunction with principles 1a and 1b, from 6, I have an option set of realisable alternatives {10,01}
8) by conscious consideration I select exactly one member of the option set and construct my choice set {01}
9) I enact my choice by typing 01.
10) thus I have demonstrated a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.

In order to deny the above demonstration, free will deniers must reject at least one essential principle of science. One corollary of this is that there can never be a scientific refutation of free will.
Although my definition appears to be incompatibilist, by virtue of the requirement for realisable alternatives, compatibilists use various peculiar notions of possibility in order to attempt to fit determinism with demonstrations such as the above. I reject these because none of them, which I've seen to date, meet reasonable notions of "realisable".
In short, although the reality or otherwise of determinism is a metaphysical issue, I hold that
1) there is no plausible compatibilist position
2) free will deniers have no recourse to science
3) without recourse to science, neither determinism nor free will denial have any propsect of being supportable.

ETA: Mods, please fix my number 8.
chaz wyman
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by chaz wyman »

bravox wrote:
chaz wyman wrote:And put aside the laws of nature in the process, just here and there where it suits you?
What laws of nature? Those about billiard balls? :lol:
Well you either accept that events are caused or you do not.
You seem to be positing that free-will is a special case where humans are able to ignore causality and make an independent choice, regardless of the determining factors that led up to that point.
Whilst it seems reasonable to state that an act of will, is the outward expression of the human as a causal factor. It seems there ought to be no escape that such an act of will is able to avoid internal necessity.
It is in this way that compatibilists, whilst maintaining a determinist position accept that an act of will seems free with respect to external factors, demand that the 'illusory' quality of such an act is to be understood by causal factor which have given rise to the nature and disposition of the human agent at the moment of that choice.
Sorry if that seems a mouthful, but without such an account demanding that we are free just seems to miss the mark.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote:
define realisable alternatives- a set of actions which it has been demonstrated can be performed by the agent, constitute, all things being equal, an option set, that is a set of realisable alternatives.
What exactly are realisable alternatives? I get the impression you are saying that something has realisable alternatives when it has simply been observed to perform different actions. If that is all, this seems to be quite compatible with determinism. A conventional computer can be programmed to select a choice set from an option set, but does that really give it a free-will? Or is it just the addition of consciousness that turns such an ability into free-will?
bravox
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by bravox »

chaz wyman wrote:Well you either accept that events are caused or you do not.
Causality is a statistical phenomenon. Casino owners are assured, by statistics, that in the long run they can't possibly lose money. That doesn't mean individuals players can't possibly win. There is no problem reconciling one fact with the other.

The same goes for my understanding of free-will. In the long run the universe always wins, those are the laws of physics. But individual moves can appear to go against those laws, simply because the laws are not written in stone but are simply statistical facts.
You seem to be positing that free-will is a special case where humans are able to ignore causality and make an independent choice, regardless of the determining factors that led up to that point.
Causality does not preclude independent choice. The universe is not made of Newtonian billiard balls, the present only provides statistical clues about the future.
Sorry if that seems a mouthful, but without such an account demanding that we are free just seems to miss the mark.
It's not a mouthful and it makes sense given a certain understanding of causality, which in my opinion is not realistic.

In any case, the concept of free-will is a bit misleading. One has to ask, "free from what?". In the final analysis, you can't be free from yourself so in a sense free-will can't possibly exist. Or rather, that our only free choices are the ones that make no sense at all, not even to ourselves.
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