MGL wrote:Certainly to define free-will - as I understand it - is to presume that the universe is not deterministic. If that is all you are saying, that is OK. . .
What I'm saying is that it's mistaken to talk about "doing otherwise", particularly in the context of the standard thought experiment with time wound back.
MGL wrote:If you have a definition of free-will that does not depend on the assumption of non-determinism then please explain what it is.
I defend a standard definition of free will;
an agent has free will on any occasion when that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
MGL wrote:I do not have an argument for free-will so I cannot demonstrate it to be real
What is or isn't real is a metaphysical issue, what can be demonstrated is that free will is observable.
1) define three essential principles of science:
a) general induction- all things being equal, things are as they were and will be as they are
b) experimental repeatability- all things being equal, an experimenter can repeat an experimental procedure
c) falsifiability- if a theory is contradicted by an observation, then the theory is wrong and the observation stands.
2) define free will-
an agent has free will on any occasion when that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
3) define realisable alternatives-
a set of actions which it has been demonstrated can be performed by the agent, constitute, all things being equal, an option set, that is a set of realisable alternatives.
4) define a choice-
a choice is the construction of a choice set, a choice set is a proper subset, with exactly one member, of an option set.
5) define conscious choice-
a choice is conscious if futures have been imagined and assessed for all members of the option set, and exactly one member has been assessed as offering the best expectation for the future, and that member is the member of the choice set.
6) demonstrate two actions:
a) I can type 10
b) I can type 01
7) in conjunction with principles
1a and
1b, from
6, I have an option set of realisable alternatives {10,01}
by conscious consideration I select exactly one member of the option set and construct my choice set {01}
9) I enact my choice by typing 01.
10) thus I have demonstrated a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
In order to deny the above demonstration, free will deniers must reject at least one essential principle of science. One corollary of this is that there can never be a scientific refutation of free will.
Although my definition appears to be incompatibilist, by virtue of the requirement for
realisable alternatives, compatibilists use various peculiar notions of possibility in order to attempt to fit determinism with demonstrations such as the above. I reject these because none of them, which I've seen to date, meet reasonable notions of "realisable".
In short, although the reality or otherwise of determinism is a metaphysical issue, I hold that
1) there is no plausible compatibilist position
2) free will deniers have no recourse to science
3) without recourse to science, neither determinism nor free will denial have any propsect of being supportable.
ETA: Mods, please fix my number 8.