Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

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ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:What exactly are realisable alternatives? I get the impression you are saying that something has realisable alternatives when it has simply been observed to perform different actions.
As I said, it is an essential principle of science that, all things being equal, an experimenter can repeat a procedure. I am that experimenter and my procedure, on this occasion, consists of typing pairs of characters. After I demonstrate that I can type 01, it is a required assumption, for the conduct of science, that I can again type 01, unless there is some significant change of circumstances, such as my computer breaking down, intruders attacking me, my suffering a stroke, etc. And of course, I can demonstrate that I'm still capable of typing 01, as I just did. I can type it multiple times; 01 01 01 01 01 01, I 01 can 01 type 01 it 01 between 01 words 01, etc. In short, if there is repeatability in science, then I can repeat a procedure that I have demonstrated that I can perform, if I have suffered no physical impediment and my equipment is equally functional. And if there is no repeatability in science, then there is no useful science, at best, but probably no science at all.
MGL wrote:If that is all, this seems to be quite compatible with determinism.
The point of the demonstration is to show that the denier can only deny that free will is observable by denying essential principles of science. In any case, determinism is a metaphysical thesis, if the denier claims that their metaphysical theory is inconsistent with the observation, then by principle 1c they again lose recourse to science. The demonstration is aimed at refuting free will denial (that is only incompatibilist determinists) by establishing an observation, it has no immediate metaphysical ambitions.
I have ways of adding to the demonstration which argue for the conclusion that the probability of my actions being either determined or locally caused, is infinitely small, but first let's establish that there is a demonstration.
MGL wrote:A conventional computer can be programmed to select a choice set from an option set, but does that really give it a free-will? Or is it just the addition of consciousness that turns such an ability into free-will?
Consciousness is part of the definition, without consciousness, what would be meant by "will"? In any case, if there are people who want to claim that computers are conscious and have free will, I dont mind. I think such a position is less irrational than free will denial, though it seems just as silly to me.
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

bravox wrote:you can't be free from yourself so in a sense free-will can't possibly exist
For an agent to have free will, there must be an agent. Obviously no agent is free of being the agent that they are, so it's almost equally obvious that free will doesn't require freedom from oneself.
chaz wyman
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by chaz wyman »

bravox wrote:
chaz wyman wrote:Well you either accept that events are caused or you do not.
Causality is a statistical phenomenon.

No, this is not true. It might be know by statistics and the inevitability of a succession.
It is known by induction. Obviously there are problems with induction as Hume pointed out, such as we can never tell if the sun will rise in the morning, yet it does. And it does regardless of our wishes. That is why determinism is a safe bet.
You seem to be positing that free-will is a special case where humans are able to ignore causality and make an independent choice, regardless of the determining factors that led up to that point.
Causality does not preclude independent choice.

Independent how? Based on what? Choices are made for reasons, those are determined by circumstances and a range of unavoidable causal factors some which are obvious and other that are not. TO suggest an event is independent is to suggest that something can come from nothing.

The universe is not made of Newtonian billiard balls, the present only provides statistical clues about the future.

This is a confusion of determinism and pre-determinism and fate.
Sorry if that seems a mouthful, but without such an account demanding that we are free just seems to miss the mark.
It's not a mouthful and it makes sense given a certain understanding of causality, which in my opinion is not realistic.

It seems you don't like it. But you have not given an account of why it is not realistic. With most of these things people tend to base their view on a 'must be' or 'just can't be'. But just becasue you do not like it , is not a reason for not accepting it

In any case, the concept of free-will is a bit misleading. One has to ask, "free from what?".

Exactly.

In the final analysis, you can't be free from yourself so in a sense free-will can't possibly exist. Or rather, that our only free choices are the ones that make no sense at all, not even to ourselves.

The only step you now have to take is to ask what determines the self, then you will have arrived at a determinist position known as compatibilism.

MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote: ....The point of the demonstration is to show that the denier can only deny that free will is observable by denying essential principles of science....
A number of areas are still confusing me:


1) I still don't see how observing repeatable and different behaviour is a problem for determinism


a) If it is only the addition of consciousness that gives an object with realisable alternatives a free-will it must be this that somehow makes it incompatible with determinism. But what makes consciousnes then incompatible with determinism?


b) Consciousness, ( although it is the medium of any observation ) is not itself an objectively observable phenonemon. So even if it does make a difference, it is not something that could be demonstrated scientifically. If the conscious component is important then free-will cannot be observable.

2) Determinism is a metaphysical thesis, but so is non-determinism. If you refute determinism you do have metaphysical ambitions. Or are you claiming that non-determinism is not metaphysical while its negation is?
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:1) I still don't see how observing repeatable and different behaviour is a problem for determinism
The point of the demonstration is to establish that we can observe free will. This is observation in the scientific sense, it is not something which entails ontological commitments. However, it does pose a dilemma, we must admit that free will can be observed or we must abandon essential principles of science. So, determinists are faced with this dilemma and must either choose a compatibilist position or they must attempt to support both their determinism and their free will denial, without recourse to science.
To repeat; this demonstration is aimed at free will denial, for the issue of determinism there are other arguments.
MGL wrote:a) If it is only the addition of consciousness that gives an object with realisable alternatives a free-will it must be this that somehow makes it incompatible with determinism. But what makes consciousnes then incompatible with determinism?
There is a good argument for the claim that life would be impossible in a determined world, if that argument is correct, then a fortiori, consciousness would be incompatible with determinism. But this is beside the point, it is freedom which is incompatible with determinism and it is will that requires consciousness. Free and will have meanings independent and constitutive of the term free will.
MGL wrote:b) Consciousness, ( although it is the medium of any observation ) is not itself an objectively observable phenonemon. So even if it does make a difference, it is not something that could be demonstrated scientifically. If the conscious component is important then free-will cannot be observable.
All "objectively observable phenomena" are irreducibly dependent on consciousness, so I dont think there's any manner of problem here. Any healthy human adult can perform the demonstration for themselves and any healthy human adult knows when they're conscious. Certainly, I reject any claim that I'm not conscious because I must be conscious to be faced with any such claim. If the deniers' response is to refuse to make the demonstration, like Galileo's cardinal refusing to look through the telescope, they adopt a position whose failure is transparent.
MGL wrote:2) Determinism is a metaphysical thesis, but so is non-determinism. If you refute determinism you do have metaphysical ambitions. Or are you claiming that non-determinism is not metaphysical while its negation is?
But I haven't yet made any attempt to refute determinism.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu: (paraphrased) We can observe repeatable and different behaviour. As such behaviour in conscious beings is constitutive of free will then we can observe free-will. This defintion of free-will is compatible with determinism. Therefore determinists, if they want to keep principles of science, must be compatibilist about free-will.

MGL:

1) Your own consciousness may be observable ( in a generous sense ) to yourself, but it is not perceptible to others so it cannot be an objective observation accomodated by science. However, given that you only need one instance of free-will to demonstrate its existence I will let this objection pass.

2) Given your definition of free-will and the assumption that consciousness is observable, your argument is sound.But determinists would only face this dillema if they accepted your definition of free-will.

3) Your definition of freedom allows anything that can be observed to have repeatable and different behaviour as free. Trees bending in the wind in repeatable and different ways could be considered free. This is not a very interesting notion of freedom and is compatible with both determinist and non-determinist universes as it makes determinism irrelevant to the existence of free-will. Consider a computer that consistently generates a pattern of 5 zeros followed by 5 1's. According to your definition, this would count as something exhibiting freedom and if it could be considered to be conscious it would then have free-will.
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:1) Your own consciousness may be observable ( in a generous sense ) to yourself, but it is not perceptible to others so it cannot be an objective observation accomodated by science. However, given that you only need one instance of free-will to demonstrate its existence I will let this objection pass.
This "objection" amounts to the claim that I might not be conscious, I do not take it seriously, whether you let it pass or not.
MGL wrote:2) Given your definition of free-will and the assumption that consciousness is observable, your argument is sound.But determinists would only face this dillema if they accepted your definition of free-will.
1) I have not stated that "consciousness is observable"
2) of course determinists are free to offer different definitions of free will, such definitions are irrelevant to this demonstration.
MGL wrote:3) Your definition of freedom allows anything that can be observed to have repeatable and different behaviour as free. Trees bending in the wind in repeatable and different ways could be considered free.
But this has nothing to do with "conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives", has it?
MGL wrote:This is not a very interesting notion of freedom and is compatible with both determinist and non-determinist universes as it makes determinism irrelevant to the existence of free-will.
Again, how is this relevant to my demonstration? And you are still talking about claims that I have not made, and that I have several times pointed out that I haven't made.
MGL wrote:Consider a computer that consistently generates a pattern of 5 zeros followed by 5 1's. According to your definition, this would count as something exhibiting freedom and if it could be considered to be conscious it would then have free-will.
So what? What on Earth has this to do with my demonstration that free will is observable?
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

MGL: Given your definition of free-will and the assumption that consciousness is observable, your argument is sound.But determinists would only face this dillema if they accepted your definition of free-will.

ughaibu: I have not stated that "consciousness is observable"

MGL: I have had to infer that from your assertion that free-will is observable. Otherwise you could only claim that freedom was observable

=========

ughaibu: of course determinists are free to offer different definitions of free will, such definitions are irrelevant to this demonstration
ughaibu: The point of the demonstration is to establish that we can observe free will.

MGL: you can only demonstrate we observe free-will by defining it in terms that make it observable. I could demonstrate that God exists simply by defining God as everything. Your defintion of free-will seems to be empty. It does not seem to do anything as I can't imagine what we would be like if we did not have free will in your terms.

=========

MGL: Your definition of freedom allows anything that can be observed to have repeatable and different behaviour as free. Trees bending in the wind in repeatable and different ways could be considered free.

ughaibu: But this has nothing to do with "conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives", has it?

MGL: the tree has realisable alternatives so it is just as free something that has "conscious choice among realisable alternatives". It only lacks will so it can't have a free-will. Its just that the free-part of the free-will seems to be doing nothing useful. You could say that something has a will is all you need to say. The free-part of the will seems superfluous as almost anything could be considered free under this conception of freedom.

===========

MGL: This is not a very interesting notion of freedom and is compatible with both determinist and non-determinist universes as it makes determinism irrelevant to the existence of free-will.

ughaibu: Again, how is this relevant to my demonstration? And you are still talking about claims that I have not made, and that I have several times pointed out that I haven't made.

MGL: your demonstration seems to imply that:

because:

a) free-will consists in the "conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives"
and b) that realisable alternative are simply observable repeatable and different behaviour patterns
then:
c) determinism is irrelevant to the notion of free-will and is therefore compatible with both determinism and non-determinism.



If your concept of free-will does not imply c) then presumably it either implies it is incompatible with non-determinism ( which seems strange ) or is incompatible with determinism. As you are asserting there is free-will it can't be incompatible with them both.
Can you clarify?
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:I have not stated that "consciousness is observable"
MGL: I have had to infer that from your assertion that free-will is observable. Otherwise you could only claim that freedom was observable
1) spell out the inference whereby a demonstration of conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives entails that consciousness is observable.
2) I have pointed out that this demonstration can be performed by any healthy human adult, obviously so, as all healthy human adults unavoidably make conscious choices from amongst realisable alternatives. In short, the conscious element is demonstrated by the experience of the experimenter.
3) all scientific observations are disseminated reports made by individual observers. Unless one replicates an experiment, one is taking on trust that the reporting scientist was conscious.
4) when faced with pseudo-objections, on the lines of 'you might not be conscious', I apply an equivalence strategy, and point out that I have no greater reason to suppose that the objector is conscious, than they have to believe that I am. Then I stop wasting my time trying to talk to a person who I have no reason to believe to be conscious.
MGL wrote:you can only demonstrate we observe free-will by defining it in terms that make it observable. I could demonstrate that God exists simply by defining God as everything. Your defintion of free-will seems to be empty.
It's a standard definition of free will.
MGL wrote:Your definition of freedom allows anything that can be observed to have repeatable and different behaviour as free. Trees bending in the wind in repeatable and different ways could be considered free.
This is not a very interesting notion of freedom and is compatible with both determinist and non-determinist universes
I haven't defined "freedom", the nearest I've come is to saying that "freedom is incompatible with determinism", but that's obviously not what you're talking about.
You are still not dealing with what I've written, and I'm not going to reply to you for much longer unless you do.
1) either you accept that I have demonstrated a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives, or you dont. Please state clearly which of these is your position.
2) if you do not accept that I have done so, state clearly and briefly why you think my demonstration fails, and do so without irrelevancies about computers, trees, determinism, etc.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote: ...You are still not dealing with what I've written....
If I have not it is because I still can't understand your definition of free-will. My questions and points may seem irrelevant to you, but I am asking and making them in hope that I can eliminate any preconceptions I have formed. Infortunately your responses have still left me with the feeling that your definition of free-will is empty. You can claim it is a standard definition, but surely a large part of the debate about free-will comes down to a disagreement over what it means to people, so I am sceptical there is such thing as the standard definition. There may be a set of definitions of which of which most people adhere to, but I am struggling to see yours as one of them. I get the impression your definition of free-will is compatible with both determinism and non-determinism, but I am still not sure. I am happy to accept that you have demonstrated conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives, but my question is why this should be considered a case of free-will rather than just a will. Surely having a will simply implies that there are realisable alternatives ( understood as observable repeatable and different actions )? Why bother calling it a free-will at all? Or to put it another way - what kind of will could not have realisable alternatives? Would it be a will at all?
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:I am happy to accept that you have demonstrated conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives
Thanks. So, free will is observable and in order to deny this, the denier must abandon at least one essential principle of science. This establishes that, if there is a free will issue, then that issue is irreducibly metaphysical. This puts free will denial in the same class as other forms of radical skepticism, consequently, I dont think that there is a genuine free will issue. In my experience, free will denial is supported by special pleading or unsound arguments, in itself, free will denial just seems to be silly.
This leaves the question as to why there has been so much free will anxiety, more or less throughout history. Basically, I think it comes down to attachment to suspect ideas about explanatory completeness.
MGL wrote:I get the impression your definition of free-will is compatible with both determinism and non-determinism, but I am still not sure.
In a determined world the facts about the future are fixed, so there are no realisable alternatives. Naturally there are compatibilists who try to get around this by couching realisability in terms of physical or logical possibility. However, we can tie our choices, in the demonstration, to causally isolated events, or to the toss of a coin, and thus show that the probability of our choices being either determined or locally caused (in a way which would threaten free will), is vanishingly small.
But in any case, this is all rather excessive, because on the face of it, incompatibilist free will is what we observe, and it has far higher initial plausibility than determinism has. So, the onus is on the free will denier, or the compatibilist affirmer, to make a case for the contention that there is an issue to be addressed. It doesn't follow, automatically, from that fact that there are deniers and compatibilists, that they have a non-negligible position.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote: In a determined world the facts about the future are fixed, so there are no realisable alternatives.
I'm sorry but I don't see how determinism imples - becausue the future is fixed - that there are no realisable alternatives in the way you defined them simply as observable repeatable and different patterns of behaviour.
chaz wyman
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by chaz wyman »

ughaibu wrote:
MGL wrote:I am happy to accept that you have demonstrated conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives
Thanks. So, free will is observable and in order to deny this, the denier must abandon at least one essential principle of science. This establishes that, if there is a free will issue, then that issue is irreducibly metaphysical. This puts free will denial in the same class as other forms of radical skepticism, consequently, I dont think that there is a genuine free will issue. In my experience, free will denial is supported by special pleading or unsound arguments, in itself, free will denial just seems to be silly.
This leaves the question as to why there has been so much free will anxiety, more or less throughout history. Basically, I think it comes down to attachment to suspect ideas about explanatory completeness.
MGL wrote:I get the impression your definition of free-will is compatible with both determinism and non-determinism, but I am still not sure.
In a determined world the facts about the future are fixed, so there are no realisable alternatives..
As the future remains unknown, the determined choices are only unrealisable until they becomes obvious.
So what you say is no problem.

The alternatives are chosen, going forward by external causality and internal necessity.

You are talking as if you are a god, who can see the future.
ughaibu
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by ughaibu »

MGL wrote:
ughaibu wrote:In a determined world the facts about the future are fixed, so there are no realisable alternatives.
I'm sorry but I don't see how determinism imples - becausue the future is fixed - that there are no realisable alternatives in the way you defined them simply as observable repeatable and different patterns of behaviour.
ughaibu wrote:define realisable alternatives- a set of actions which it has been demonstrated can be performed by the agent, constitute, all things being equal, an option set, that is a set of realisable alternatives.
So, at time zero, I have demonstrated two actions. As the conditions remain relevantly unchanged, by the first two principles
ughaibu wrote:a) general induction- all things being equal, things are as they were and will be as they are
b) experimental repeatability- all things being equal, an experimenter can repeat an experimental procedure
I have established that I have a set of two actions, either of which is realisable, by me, at time two.
In a determined world, at time zero there is a fact about the state of the world at time two, and that fact excludes any but exactly one fixed action by me.
Clearly there is a difference between exactly one and strictly greater than one, so I really dont see how you continue to be puzzled by this.
MGL
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Re: Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

Post by MGL »

ughaibu wrote: ...I have established that I have a set of two actions, either of which is realisable, by me, at time two...
I think what you are saying is this:

Because I can perform two different actions in identical circumstances these actions cannot be determined.

This seems to be based on the assertion that conditions remain relevantly unchanged, but I can't see how this assertion can be justified.

If you have a reason to choose one rather than the other then surely this reason forms part of the relevant conditions which will then be different on both occasions.

If you do not have a reason and a choice is made arbitrarily, how can you be certain your arbitrary choice is not the consequence of a sub-conscious deterministic process you are unaware of rather than the genuine spontaneous non-deterministic behaviour of your consciousness?
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