Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve

[ughaibu]

I think what you are saying is this:
Because I can perform two different actions in identical circumstances these actions cannot be determined.

Why would you think that? In particular, why would you think that I'm saying that "I can perform two different actions in identical circumstances" when I have several times pointed out that it is a question of either, not of both.

This seems to be based on the assertion that conditions remain relevantly unchanged, but I can't see how this assertion can be justified.

I have also mentioned the special pleading and the role of essential principles of science. So, how can you fail to see how it has been justified?

If you have a reason to choose one rather than the other then surely this reason forms part of the relevant conditions which will then be different on both occasions.

Of course it doesn't. One chooses for reasons, but one's option set isn't limited by those reasons. How could it be, when the sets have different cardinalities, by definition?

If you do not have a reason and a choice is made arbitrarily, how can you be certain your arbitrary choice is not the consequence of a sub-conscious deterministic process you are unaware of rather than the genuine spontaneous non-deterministic behaviour of your consciousness?

Obviously the choice is made for a reason, this was covered in the definition of conscious choice.

[MGL]

MGL: I think what you are saying is this:
Because I can perform two different actions in identical circumstances these actions cannot be determined.


ughaibu: Why would you think that? In particular, why would you think that I'm saying that "I can perform two different actions in identical circumstances" when I have several times pointed out that it is a question of either, not of both.

MGL: You claim that you have established that you have a set of two actions, either if which is realisable by you at time two. My understanding was that you established this from oberving past occasions when you were able to perform these actions in the same conditions. Is that not what you meant?

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ughaibu: I have also mentioned the special pleading and the role of essential principles of science. So, how can you fail to see how it has been justified?

MGL: You need to join the dots for me. If you mean by essential principles of science your principles of general induction and experimental repeatability - they are qualifed by the term "all things being equal". That is, they only apply IF conditions remain relevantly unchanged. They don't simply justify the assumption that they are unchanged. This has to be adequately demonstrated. I am not sure what you mean by "special pleading".

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ughaibu: One chooses for reasons, but one's option set isn't limited by those reasons. How could it be, when the sets have different cardinalities, by definition?

MGL: each element in the option set will presumably have one or more reasons for choosing it that are different from the reasons for choosing other options. But the choice one makes FROM the option set - if it is made for a reason and is not arbitrary - will be made for a reason that is not just a reason for performing that specific action, but will be for a reason for performing that action RATHER than any other action in the option set. It must therefore form part of the relevant conditions that prevail. It must also be different from the reason for choosing an alternative action from the option rather than the others. Therefore the relevant conditions will be different.

[ughaibu]

. . . will be for a reason for performing that action RATHER than any other action in the option set. It must therefore form part of the relevant conditions that prevail. It must also be different from the reason for choosing an alternative action from the option rather than the others.

We can choose given the conditions, if the choice itself is one of the conditions, we would be saying we can choose if we choose, and as that is always true, by identity, it's uninteresting and insufficient for experimental repeatability.
Further; one can have several different courses of action which would suit a single reason, and one can have several different reasons for performing a certain action. So there is no implication that an action performed at time two must be performed for the same reason that it has been performed before or for a different reason than the alternatives have been performed before.

[MGL]

We can choose given the conditions, if the choice itself is one of the conditions, we would be saying we can choose if we choose, and as that is always true, by identity, it's uninteresting and insufficient for experimental repeatability.

Further; one can have several different courses of action which would suit a single reason, and one can have several different reasons for performing a certain action. So there is no implication that an action performed at time two must be performed for the same reason that it has been performed before or for a different reason than the alternatives have been performed before.

I am not saying that the choice is one of those conditions. I am saying that the reason for choosing is one of those conditions. Choice is the outcome of a deliberative process which will take as its input the various reasons for each element in the option set. Now that deliberative process will then try to decide which of the options to act on. There is either a reason for the the process to select action A rather than action B in a particular occasion or there is not.

If there is a reason then it forms part of the conditions. This may or may not be the same reason the same action was selected on a previous occasion but it has to be a different reason for the one of selecting B rather than A on another occasion. As it is a different reason then the conditions are different. The only way for the conditions to be the same and for the choice to be different is if the choice is purely arbitrary.

You may want to point out that the deliberative process may work out the reason for choosing A rather than B by itself, but it will do so based on some rule which evaluates the options and their reasons. This rule must also form part of the conditions unless it is constructed arbitrarily by the deliberative process itself. In which case the choice is again ultimately an arbitrary one.

[ughaibu]

. . . but it has to be a different reason for the one of selecting B rather than A on another occasion. As it is a different reason then the conditions are different.

No, the conditions are not different, in any relevant sense, unless you beg the question in favour of determinism, and that means rejecting principle 1b. Inevitably the reasons for choosing B will be different from the reasons for choosing A, in some significant sense, if B is selected and A is rejected, but as that's what choosing consists of, it isn't an objection to a demonstration of choice.
What are you trying to get at here? After all, you have accepted that a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives has been demonstrated.

[MGL]

MGL: ...but it has to be a different reason for the one of selecting B rather than A on another occasion. As it is a different reason then the conditions are different.


ughaibu: No, the conditions are not different, in any relevant sense, unless you beg the question in favour of determinism, and that means rejecting principle 1b. Inevitably the reasons for choosing B will be different from the reasons for choosing A, in some significant sense, if B is selected and A is rejected, but as that's what choosing consists of, it isn't an objection to a demonstration of choice.

MGL: I am not begging the question in favour of determinism because I am saying the conditions are different because the reasons are different because the reasons form part of the conditions.

What I fail to understand is why the reasons for choosing A rather than B should not be considered as part of the conditions. Just because an act of choosing involves reasons, that does not imply that those reasons are not part of the conditions that lead to a paricular choice. Separating them from the conditions seems arbitrary unless you are simply distinguishing the conditions that precede or are external to a process of choosing and the conditions that are internal to and form part of the process of choosing. When you are trying to explain how a choice was made, why would you consider the former conditions when comparing choices and ignore the latter conditions? It seems the line is being drawn simply to demonstrate that different decisions can be made in exactly the same circumstances by ignoring any circumstances that would explain why the decisions were different.


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ughaibu : What are you trying to get at here? After all, you have accepted that a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives has been demonstrated.


MGL: I only accepted that conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives had been demonstrated on an understanding that realisable alternatives did not imply non-determinism. As you have since clarified that it does so I can no longer do accept it has been demonstrated as that implication is what I fail to understand.

[ughaibu]

What I fail to understand is why the reasons for choosing A rather than B should not be considered as part of the conditions.

Because it commits one to the rejection of principle 1b. That, of course, is up to you, the reader, you can reject an essential principle of science or you can accept that an experimenter can repeat a procedure.

I only accepted that conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives had been demonstrated on an understanding that realisable alternatives did not imply non-determinism. As you have since clarified that it does. . .

1) you either accept that I have demonstrated a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives or you dont.
2) the demonstration establishes what can be observed, in the sense necessary for science.
3) if you deny the demonstration for metaphysical reasons, then you are committed to rejecting principle 1c.
4) I have, several times, pointed out that the question of determinism is not an empirical one, it is metaphysical, so I have not "clarified" any implication of non-determinism.
5) I have, more than once, pointed out that determinists have various strategies for accommodating demonstrations of realisable alternatives.

[MGL]

MGL: What I fail to understand is why the reasons for choosing A rather than B should not be considered as part of the conditions.

ughaibu: Because it commits one to the rejection of principle 1b. That, of course, is up to you, the reader, you can reject an essential principle of science or you can accept that an experimenter can repeat a procedure.

MGL: how is principle 1b rejected by considering the reason for choosing A rather than B as being part of the conditions? All 1b says is that - all things being equal an experimenter can repeat an experimental procedure. You need to join the dots because I can't see the connection.


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ughaibu:

1) you either accept that I have demonstrated a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives or you dont.
2) the demonstration establishes what can be observed, in the sense necessary for science.
3) if you deny the demonstration for metaphysical reasons, then you are committed to rejecting principle 1c.
4) I have, several times, pointed out that the question of determinism is not an empirical one, it is metaphysical, so I have not "clarified" any implication of non-determinism.
5) I have, more than once, pointed out that determinists have various strategies for accommodating demonstrations of realisable alternatives.

MGL:

I thought I was getting somewhere understanding you, but these last few points have confused me further. You are simply repeating the points I have been trying to get you to clarify. I was under the impression you could demonstrate by scientific principles that we could observe we had free-will in a libertarian sense that would not be compatible with determinism. If you are not making this assertion, what assertion are you making?

[ughaibu]

. . . I can't see the connection.

Okay.

[TecumsehHS]

In a quantum world, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is inadequate.