An Amoral Manifesto (Part I)

[Aetixintro]

I think the emphasis lies here on "particularly", thus the disguising of guilt etc. so I withdraw on the issue... Though, I clearly stick with the Humanists and most Religious people in the common sense of being moral... Good!

[Arising_uk]

Personally I think tbieter has a point about the practical aspects with respect to Professor Marks epiphany. But I cannot help but admire the philosopher who is prepared to admit such a thing, given that he's made a career upon being an ethical Kantian, as it, to me, is one of the aspects of being a 'philosopher', i.e. the ability to admit a change of belief. And I will be paying more attention to his posts from now on as it'll be interesting to watch where his thoughts go now.
p.s.
Not that I didn't read them with interest before but just disagreed with much of them

[philofra]

Another good thought provoking article in issue 80 is Complementarity and Reality.

Complementarity is a tool used to understand and explain phenomena. Niels Bohr used it to explain the phenomenon of light. There are two aspects of light, particles and waves. Those two aspects Bohr explained are necessary to light; they complement each other.

In medicine complementarity is used to understand the workings of organs. To understand the true workings of an organ it should not be studied in a vacuum. It has to be done in a complementary relationship to other organs. Understanding the human condition is similar. One cannot really understand one sensation without knowing something about the other sensations.

Complementarity is a holistic approach to understand the workings of the world.

Now to the matter at hand, atheism and faith, two ends of the human belief spectrum. I don't think they are complementary. They are two separate phenomena. Or maybe they are complementary in some unstudied, quantum way.

[philofra]

The article Complementarity & Reality in issue 80 by Allister MacFarlane is most interesting. It coincided with my reading "Quantum" in which I first read about the Complementarity Principle fathered by Niels Bohr.

I was so taken by the concept that I had to find anything I could on it. That brough me to an article "The Roots of Complementarity" which included Niels Bohr and the philosophers he read that led him to the idea. One thing the article didn't identify as a root of complementarity is the human mind. The human mind is the chief source of it since it itself is constructed in a complementary manner with two complementary hemispheres. If we didn't have that complementarity in our head we couldn't function properly. This says that complementarity is essential to life and the universe. The complementarity in our brain reflects the natural complementarity of the universe, which Niels Bohr used to describe the nature of light.

MacFarlane's article goes to the heart of things because the world is made up of little else but complementaries.

[Empedocles]

Now to the matter at hand, atheism and faith, two ends of the human belief spectrum. I don't think they are complementary. They are two separate phenomena. Or maybe they are complementary in some unstudied, quantum way.

Depends on what you mean by "faith." Some atheists seem to have a faith in atheism. That is, they adhere to it as stubbornly as some theists adhere to the belief that God exists.

[Empedocles]

Professor Marks seems to be saying that ethical imperatives are what Kant calls "hypothetical imperatives." Take this passage:

But an amoralist still has a compass, a ‘guide to life’, an ethics, or so I would argue; and it can be a match for anybody’s morality. Thus, consider that in purely practical terms, honesty may still be the best policy. A reputation for truth-telling will likely make one a more attractive person to do (literal or figurative) business with, which will enable one to thrive relative to one’s less scrupulous competitors. Thus, ‘survival of the fittest’ could naturally promote honesty as a prevalent trait even in the absence of any moral concern.

He's actually just making a factual statement about what promotes honesty, but it is easy to make a hypothetical imperative out of it, thusly:

If you want to be an attractive person, then you should tell the truth.

The hypothetical imperative is much like the logical modus ponens (I am elaborating the argument just a bit):

* Premise: A reputation for truth-telling will likely make one an attractive person.
* Premise: One gets a reputation for truth-telling most effectively by actually telling the truth.
* Premise: Someone (a particular person) wants to be an attractive person.
* Conclusion: Therefore that person should tell the truth.

So I don't think he is as untrustworthy as tbieter makes him out to be. Actually I find this approach to ethics refreshing.

[tbieter]

Professor Marks seems to be saying that ethical imperatives are what Kant calls "hypothetical imperatives." Take this passage:

But an amoralist still has a compass, a ‘guide to life’, an ethics, or so I would argue; and it can be a match for anybody’s morality. Thus, consider that in purely practical terms, honesty may still be the best policy. A reputation for truth-telling will likely make one a more attractive person to do (literal or figurative) business with, which will enable one to thrive relative to one’s less scrupulous competitors. Thus, ‘survival of the fittest’ could naturally promote honesty as a prevalent trait even in the absence of any moral concern.

He's actually just making a factual statement about what promotes honesty, but it is easy to make a hypothetical imperative out of it, thusly:

If you want to be an attractive person, then you should tell the truth.

The hypothetical imperative is much like the logical modus ponens (I am elaborating the argument just a bit):

* Premise: A reputation for truth-telling will likely make one an attractive person.
* Premise: One gets a reputation for truth-telling most effectively by actually telling the truth.
* Premise: Someone (a particular person) wants to be an attractive person.
* Conclusion: Therefore that person should tell the truth.

So I don't think he is as untrustworthy as tbieter makes him out to be. Actually I find this approach to ethics refreshing.

___________________________________

But truth-telling remains optional. That is where the untrustworthiness comes in. If all human actions are optional (meaning that none are morally obligatory), the hearer is in a state of uncertainty. I would argue that for the professional politician truth-telling is optional as a matter of principle.

[tbieter]

Lecture on fundamentals of morality by professor at Vanderbilt U
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNv0DnRppm8

[i blame blame]

Personally I think tbieter has a point about the practical aspects with respect to Professor Marks epiphany. But I cannot help but admire the philosopher who is prepared to admit such a thing, given that he's made a career upon being an ethical Kantian, as it, to me, is one of the aspects of being a 'philosopher', i.e. the ability to admit a change of belief. And I will be paying more attention to his posts from now on as it'll be interesting to watch where his thoughts go now.
p.s.
Not that I didn't read them with interest before but just disagreed with much of them

Did Marks only just discover that there is no objective morality?

[tbieter]

Personally I think tbieter has a point about the practical aspects with respect to Professor Marks epiphany. But I cannot help but admire the philosopher who is prepared to admit such a thing, given that he's made a career upon being an ethical Kantian, as it, to me, is one of the aspects of being a 'philosopher', i.e. the ability to admit a change of belief. And I will be paying more attention to his posts from now on as it'll be interesting to watch where his thoughts go now.
p.s.
Not that I didn't read them with interest before but just disagreed with much of them

Did Marks only just discover that there is no objective morality?

Yes; as I understand his new position, it amounts to the assertion that no human act is inherently right or wrong.
http://philosophynow.org/issue80/80marks.htm

[i blame blame]

Yes; as I understand his new position, it amounts to the assertion that no human act is inherently right or wrong.
http://philosophynow.org/issue80/80marks.htm

It's not so much an assertion as a realization of a fact, which, until now, I thought most atheists knew already. I find it startling that an atheist philosophy professor would take such a long time. Better late, than never, I guess.

[tbieter]

Yes; as I understand his new position, it amounts to the assertion that no human act is inherently right or wrong.
http://philosophynow.org/issue80/80marks.htm

It's not so much an assertion as a realization of a fact, which, until now, I thought most atheists knew already. I find it startling that an atheist philosophy professor would take such a long time. Better late, than never, I guess.

____________________________________

Hi Blame.

Consider the following event:

Professor Marks is taking a walk on a beautiful fall day. As he passes by an elementary school, he is approached by a five-year-old girl. As they pass each other on the sidewalk, Marks pulls out his knife. He cuts the girl's throat, severing her major arteries. She falls to the ground, bleeds out, and dies. Marks continues on his walk.

In light of the statement "no human act is inherently right or wrong," what can reasonably be said about and done to Marks relative to the event?

[i blame blame]

Consider the following event:

Professor Marks is taking a walk on a beautiful fall day. As he passes by an elementary school, he is approached by a five-year-old girl. As they pass each other on the sidewalk, Marks pulls out his knife. He cuts the girl's throat, severing her major arteries. She falls to the ground, bleeds out, and dies. Marks continues on his walk.
In light of the statement "no human act is inherently right or wrong," what can reasonably be said about and done to Marks relative to the event?

Measures can reasonably be taken to separate him from objects that can be used as weapons and people who are physically weaker than him, because most people don't like to have their or their loved one's throats cut. Furthermore, it can be attempted to find out what caused him to cut the gir's throat. If those causes are identified, it might be possible to suppress them while allowing him to be near potential weapons and weaker people. Those causes could range from enjoyment of murder coupled with psychopathy to someone blackmailing him to kill the girl with the threat of killing his entire family if he doesn't comply.

How likely do you consider such an event to be? Many atheists know there's no objective morality, and yet there's no evidence that they engage in more violence than theists.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkHSh0Dojz8

[tbieter]

Consider the following event:

Professor Marks is taking a walk on a beautiful fall day. As he passes by an elementary school, he is approached by a five-year-old girl. As they pass each other on the sidewalk, Marks pulls out his knife. He cuts the girl's throat, severing her major arteries. She falls to the ground, bleeds out, and dies. Marks continues on his walk.
In light of the statement "no human act is inherently right or wrong," what can reasonably be said about and done to Marks relative to the event?

Measures can reasonably be taken to separate him from objects that can be used as weapons and people who are physically weaker than him, because most people don't like to have their or their loved one's throats cut. Furthermore, it can be attempted to find out what caused him to cut the gir's throat. If those causes are identified, it might be possible to suppress them while allowing him to be near potential weapons and weaker people. Those causes could range from enjoyment of murder coupled with psychopathy to someone blackmailing him to kill the girl with the threat of killing his entire family if he doesn't comply.

How likely do you consider such an event to be? Many atheists know there's no objective morality, and yet there's no evidence that they engage in more violence than theists.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkHSh0Dojz8

________________________________

My fact situation involves an actual person - Professor Marks - who actually believes "that no human act is inherently right or wrong." You can reasonably assume that he is rational. I did not state a motive or reason for his act, so I suggest that you cannot reasonably assign any other motive (blackmail?) or reason for his act other than the existence of the quoted belief. Cutting the child's throat or not cutting the child's throat are equivalent acts in all considered senses.

I put it to you: what are the philosophical implications of this complete fact situation? (assume that it actually happened)

P.S. Upon what grounds can Professor Marks be distinguished from Camus's character Meursault in his novel The Stranger? I suggest that there are none. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Stranger_(novel)

[John]

The outcomes are different whether we allow people to commit murder or not. Whether murder is inherently wrong or not doesn't alter the fact that allowing murder may be bad for the general well-being of most humans as most humans would rather avoid being the victims of murder. Murder is therefore to be prohibited because doing so has an outcome considered beneficial and not for some inherent moral value place upon the act of murder itself.

If human beings were wired differently and we got more pleasure from wanton killing than suffering from the fear of being killed we may think entirely differently. Of course, in such circumstances we'd probably kill each other and it wouldn't be a problem.

I'd therefore suggest that it's perfectly possible to decide that murder is wrong even if not inherently so.

Not that I'm necessarily agreeing that murder isn't inherently wrong...just making an argument.