Why I Am An Atheist

[Immanuel Can]

Well, back to the article that is the subject of this particular strand: anyone got anything to say in defence of it?

Given his concluding remarks;"So, whatever my actual reasons for being an atheist, intellectually the case does not rest on the lack of evidence for God, or the bad behaviour of believers and religious institutions, but on the idea of God itself, which insofar as it is not entirely empty, is self-contradictory, and makes less sense than that which it purports to explain."

I'm curious as to why he dismisses the former items, yet considers the latter a better excuse.

Good question. I'd like to know too.

[Immanuel Can]

"Predestined" is a Theological Fallacy. It's as ridiculous to use in this context as "fatalism"
Aside from that...

I should have specified: I didn't mean theologically predestined...just predestined by material forces. I would have preferred just to use the word "determined," but that was the contested term, so it would have been too easy to misunderstand my intent if I had. However, perhaps this clears that bit up.

Let me just ask you this.
What happens for you to make a decision. Talk me through it in your own words. I'm puzzled to understand how and when your "Free" will kicks in.

That's a complex question.

Let's start with what everybody knows. We all know that human volition is at least largely a product of a group of factors which include seemingly-determinist things like culture, background, experiences, mood, what a person had for lunch that day...and so on. Now, both the Free will view and Determinism hold the same on those issues: except Determinism adds that all these things are prior material or natural stimuli which produce the inevitable response of a choice (which is not really a choice at all, but looks to the "chooser" as if it is). In other words, authentic choice doesn't happen...only the appearance of choice, and that that "choice" is actually nothing but the collocation of prior causes or stimuli. Nothing is "free" there.

In contrast, though the advocate of free will has no problem with the idea that prior causes and stimuli are present and often importantly involved in human decision-making, he or she regards the Determinist account as incomplete. He or she would add that with all that stuff there exists the ability of the individual to choose among them, and to respond or not respond to one or more of those factors. That would be to say that "freedom" consists in not being the slave of prior causes and stimuli exclusively, but with them also having the ability to decide not to respond to some or all of them.

Determinism says that can't happen.

So a "free will" advocate would point to many cases that exist in which a person refuses urgent stimuli and even basic needs, in order to do something he or she has decided to do...like the weight-lifter who ignores the pain in his arms because he believes he will be strong if he works out, or the athlete who refuses to drink liquids even though she is running hard, because she wants to win and doesn't want to cramp, or the soldier who knows he is going to die but stays to fight for some cause in which he believes, and so on. In those cases, pain, thirst and self-preservation are all urgent and basic motives; but something stronger enables us to relativize their claim upon us, and choose to do other than those stimuli incline us to do.

I wouldn't even bother with such complex cases. I think it's much more straightforward than that. I have never met a person who actually lives like his or her life is determined by forces. Everybody gets up in the morning and *assumes* they make their own decision to brush their teeth, tie their shoes, go to work or phone in sick...and so on. The natural living state of all people (including Determinists) is to act as if free will exists. The natural assumption is always on the side of free will. So I think it's really a burden of proof issue: the Determinist needs to make his case that that strong intuition that all of us mysteriously seem to share, the belief that our choices matter, is not authentic. And that's a really hard case to make. Absent such a case, we all just go on living as if free will exists.

Take our present conversation: you are arguing, and I am arguing. Both of us are assuming the other one is capable of choosing to change his mind. Neither one of us thinks that what we believe at the end will be a matter of determinism (not pre-set, already decided, guaranteed to happen only one way, and so on). We are both acting as though free will is possible, for that is entailed in any attempt to argue. On the other hand, if I believed you were already pre-set to be only and ever an Atheist, why would I reason with you? And you, if you believed you could not possibly influence my Theism, why would you argue? There would be nothing more futile than a communicative exchange that cannot change anything. So long are we're arguing, then, we're not Determinists...except one of us perhaps in theory...but not in action.

And actually, I can't even imagine how a Determinist could live Deterministically. He would have to literally believe no decision of his was authentic. So if he were perfectly rational, then he would make none. And such a one would surely not fare well under any circumstances.

For that reason, I regard Determinism as essentially self-defeating. Even its most ardent advocates cannot live as if it is true. If they do, they don't live long, I suspect. And if they are consistent Determinists, they certainly do not bother to argue.

[marjoram_blues]

Well, back to the article that is the subject of this particular strand: anyone got anything to say in defence of it?

Given his concluding remarks;"So, whatever my actual reasons for being an atheist, intellectually the case does not rest on the lack of evidence for God, or the bad behaviour of believers and religious institutions, but on the idea of God itself, which insofar as it is not entirely empty, is self-contradictory, and makes less sense than that which it purports to explain."

I'm curious as to why he dismisses the former items, yet considers the latter a better excuse.

You can always email him. Cut to the chase rather than speculate.

[Hobbes' Choice]

"Predestined" is a Theological Fallacy. It's as ridiculous to use in this context as "fatalism"
Aside from that...

I should have specified: I didn't mean theologically predestined...just predestined by material forces. I would have preferred just to use the word "determined," but that was the contested term, so it would have been too easy to misunderstand my intent if I had. However, perhaps this clears that bit up.

Let me just ask you this.
What happens for you to make a decision. Talk me through it in your own words. I'm puzzled to understand how and when your "Free" will kicks in.

That's a complex question.

Let's start with what everybody knows. We all know that human volition is at least largely a product of a group of factors which include seemingly-determinist things like culture, background, experiences, mood, what a person had for lunch that day...and so on. Now, both the Free will view and Determinism hold the same on those issues: except Determinism adds that all these things are prior material or natural stimuli which produce the inevitable response of a choice (which is not really a choice at all, but looks to the "chooser" as if it is). In other words, authentic choice doesn't happen...only the appearance of choice, and that that "choice" is actually nothing but the collocation of prior causes or stimuli. Nothing is "free" there.

In contrast, though the advocate of free will has no problem with the idea that prior causes and stimuli are present and often importantly involved in human decision-making, he or she regards the Determinist account as incomplete. He or she would add that with all that stuff there exists the ability of the individual to choose among them, and to respond or not respond to one or more of those factors. That would be to say that "freedom" consists in not being the slave of prior causes and stimuli exclusively, but with them also having the ability to decide not to respond to some or all of them.

Determinism says that can't happen.

So a "free will" advocate would point to many cases that exist in which a person refuses urgent stimuli and even basic needs, in order to do something he or she has decided to do...like the weight-lifter who ignores the pain in his arms because he believes he will be strong if he works out, or the athlete who refuses to drink liquids even though she is running hard, because she wants to win and doesn't want to cramp, or the soldier who knows he is going to die but stays to fight for some cause in which he believes, and so on. In those cases, pain, thirst and self-preservation are all urgent and basic motives; but something stronger enables us to relativize their claim upon us, and choose to do other than those stimuli incline us to do.

I wouldn't even bother with such complex cases. I think it's much more straightforward than that. I have never met a person who actually lives like his or her life is determined by forces. Everybody gets up in the morning and *assumes* they make their own decision to brush their teeth, tie their shoes, go to work or phone in sick...and so on. The natural living state of all people (including Determinists) is to act as if free will exists. The natural assumption is always on the side of free will. So I think it's really a burden of proof issue: the Determinist needs to make his case that that strong intuition that all of us mysteriously seem to share, the belief that our choices matter, is not authentic. And that's a really hard case to make. Absent such a case, we all just go on living as if free will exists.

Take our present conversation: you are arguing, and I am arguing. Both of us are assuming the other one is capable of choosing to change his mind. Neither one of us thinks that what we believe at the end will be a matter of determinism (not pre-set, already decided, guaranteed to happen only one way, and so on). We are both acting as though free will is possible, for that is entailed in any attempt to argue. On the other hand, if I believed you were already pre-set to be only and ever an Atheist, why would I reason with you? And you, if you believed you could not possibly influence my Theism, why would you argue? There would be nothing more futile than a communicative exchange that cannot change anything. So long are we're arguing, then, we're not Determinists...except one of us perhaps in theory...but not in action.

And actually, I can't even imagine how a Determinist could live Deterministically. He would have to literally believe no decision of his was authentic. So if he were perfectly rational, then he would make none. And such a one would surely not fare well under any circumstances.

For that reason, I regard Determinism as essentially self-defeating. Even its most ardent advocates cannot live as if it is true. If they do, they don't live long, I suspect. And if they are consistent Determinists, they certainly do not bother to argue.

The question is actually simple , and you have answered it with mystical psycho-babble.

You are attempting to place yourself out of nature, but have no warrant for that. I can see why you might be worried by determinism, but determinism does not change the fact that we make choices everyday. And at each nexus of causality that choice is always unique, but if it is not based on antecedent conditions the choice would be meaningless.
Imagine that on the moment that you are about to make a decision time stopped and the universe was duplicated so that you had two versions of the earth.

I submit that for the decision on earth A, to be different from the decision on earth B - your will would have to be free to chose to do otherwise.
However for the decision to be truly yours, of value, and based on your motivation, learning and experience, the decision on earth A and earth B would have to be the same in both cases. It would never make any sense for you to be able to do otherwise, as that would simple render 'freewill' as random and capricious.

The fact is that we act from our will as we can, and within the limits of the situation and the demands of who and what we are to say otherwise we would be useless.

The godly need to hold on to their myth of free will as their creed demands that salvation has to be a free and equal choice. However, god has made me in such a way as to not be able to believe. I have to will to chose the path of my life, but an omniscient being has to have known since the beginning of time that I would die a sinner; and he created me with that knowledge. I cannot simple suspend my disbelief - on what grounds? I would have to deny my reason and my learning. My will is not "FREE" but determined by the path of my like, the learning and the choices I have made, and it is of no importance or consequence that my choices ar determined and knowable by an omnipresent entity.
Those choice are still my choices as a determined agent; perfectly authentic.

The problem of authenticity is only a problem for a person who thinks himself created by a god. He has to adopt the myth of free will, because the 'freedom' is for choosing or not choosing god. For a determinist the possibility that the choices he makes and the influences he has acquired all go towards forging an unknowable future.
In determinism, people are the authors of their destiny - that can be never the case for the Theist, who despite his belief in the myth of his own freedom is created, guided and interfered with by his god.

[Immanuel Can]

For brevity of messaging, I'm going to cut off my own earlier reply, clip the bits of your message to which I'd like to respond, and trust anyone following our conversation to scroll up to get the full gist of your earlier response and mine.

You are attempting to place yourself out of nature, but have no warrant for that.

Not "out of nature," but "unique in nature." As a Theist, of course I believe that human beings are not mere animals, not mere subjects of nature, but also beings with special metaphysical properties like mind, spirit and personal identity -- features which Materialists deny, but which everyone is actually forced to take for granted in order to argue or assert anything. After all, what are you and I except two "minds" talking right now? We're not bodily present with each other: but someone is talking to someone else. Mind.

I would simply reply that you have no warrant for concluding human beings are NOT unique in nature, and that, in fact you believe it yourself without realizing it. For you do not expect foxes, emus and ocelots, far less amoebae and fish, to participate in this discussion...but you expect that we humans are different from them, in that we do this marvellous thing called philosophy, and can exercise rationality in ways they simply cannot.

I can see why you might be worried by determinism, but determinism does not change the fact that we make choices everyday.

But it explains them away. They're not "real," they're just psychological illusions. And those illusions are, like everything else, merely contingent, and express no volition on our part. So we think we make genuine choices, but we do not.

The fact is that we act from our will as we can, and within the limits of the situation and the demands of who and what we are to say otherwise we would be useless.

I agree. So you're not really a Determinist. You're just a person who takes some account of preceding factors in the forming of decisions -- as do we all --not someone who believes in "the Iron Cage" of Determinism.

The godly need to hold on to their myth of free will as their creed demands that salvation has to be a free and equal choice. However, god has made me in such a way as to not be able to believe.

Maybe this is where you're struggling with Determinism. It certainly preserves a person from the feeling of responsibility to respond to God. Such a person can simply say, "I can't: He made me (or Nature made me) unable to do so."

The key question there would be whether or not God would accept that interpretation of events, and whether or not He would regard it as true, if He exists.

The problem of authenticity is only a problem for a person who thinks himself created by a god.

The vast majority of persons who self-identify as Theists would not agree with your interpretation of God, and would point out the non-sequitur of the assumption that Divine Foreknowledge must necessarily be Deterministic. Certainly what you're representing there isn't reflective of most theologies. You'll find that Theists, for the most part, are not Determinists, and so think authentic free will exists...just as I am, in fact, asserting right now.

In determinism, people are the authors of their destiny...

Again, I think you are misunderstanding Determinism. But when I provided you with Britannica on that, you rejected it; and I agreed to disagree with you on that already, so I won't pursue it. But your characterization of Determinism is definitely non-standard, as is your understanding of Theism. And this makes it difficult to make progress in our discussion, I think.

[Hobbes' Choice]

For brevity of messaging, I'm going to cut off my own earlier reply, clip the bits of your message to which I'd like to respond, and trust anyone following our conversation to scroll up to get the full gist of your earlier response and mine.

You are attempting to place yourself out of nature, but have no warrant for that.

Not "out of nature," but "unique in nature." As a Theist, of course I believe that human beings are not mere animals, not mere subjects of nature, but also beings with special metaphysical properties like mind, spirit and personal identity -- features which Materialists deny, but which everyone is actually forced to take for granted in order to argue or assert anything. After all, what are you and I except two "minds" talking right now? We're not bodily present with each other: but someone is talking to someone else. Mind.

I would simply reply that you have no warrant for concluding human beings are NOT unique in nature, and that, in fact you believe it yourself without realizing it. For you do not expect foxes, emus and ocelots, far less amoebae and fish, to participate in this discussion...but you expect that we humans are different from them, in that we do this marvellous thing called philosophy, and can exercise rationality in ways they simply cannot.

I can see why you might be worried by determinism, but determinism does not change the fact that we make choices everyday.

But it explains them away. They're not "real," they're just psychological illusions. And those illusions are, like everything else, merely contingent, and express no volition on our part. So we think we make genuine choices, but we do not.

The fact is that we act from our will as we can, and within the limits of the situation and the demands of who and what we are to say otherwise we would be useless.

I agree. So you're not really a Determinist. You're just a person who takes some account of preceding factors in the forming of decisions -- as do we all --not someone who believes in "the Iron Cage" of Determinism.

The godly need to hold on to their myth of free will as their creed demands that salvation has to be a free and equal choice. However, god has made me in such a way as to not be able to believe.

Maybe this is where you're struggling with Determinism. It certainly preserves a person from the feeling of responsibility to respond to God. Such a person can simply say, "I can't: He made me (or Nature made me) unable to do so."

The key question there would be whether or not God would accept that interpretation of events, and whether or not He would regard it as true, if He exists.

The problem of authenticity is only a problem for a person who thinks himself created by a god.

The vast majority of persons who self-identify as Theists would not agree with your interpretation of God, and would point out the non-sequitur of the assumption that Divine Foreknowledge must necessarily be Deterministic. Certainly what you're representing there isn't reflective of most theologies. You'll find that Theists, for the most part, are not Determinists, and so think authentic free will exists...just as I am, in fact, asserting right now.

In determinism, people are the authors of their destiny...

Again, I think you are misunderstanding Determinism. But when I provided you with Britannica on that, you rejected it; and I agreed to disagree with you on that already, so I won't pursue it. But your characterization of Determinism is definitely non-standard, as is your understanding of Theism. And this makes it difficult to make progress in our discussion, I think.

I think you have already switched off.

[Immanuel Can]

I think you have already switched off.

I'm not sure what response is anticipated here. I guess we're done talking about it?

[Hobbes' Choice]

I think you have already switched off.

I'm not sure what response is anticipated here. I guess we're done talking about it?

As you will be aware this is one of Kant's Antinomies and we are not going to resolve the issue here.

[Immanuel Can]

As you will be aware this is one of Kant's Antinomies and we are not going to resolve the issue here.

Okay.