The Gettier Problem No Longer a Problem

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Philosophy Now
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The Gettier Problem No Longer a Problem

Post by Philosophy Now »

Lukasz Lozanski claims to know why Edmund Gettier was unjustified.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/63/The ... _a_Problem
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HexHammer
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Re: The Gettier Problem No Longer a Problem

Post by HexHammer »

Another article that stoops down philosophy to irrelevance, essentially it's mere wishful thinking and we all know it's sooo true, specially in medieval times they were good at it!

..tragic moronism on a high lvl!!!
Jpalm007
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Re: The Gettier Problem No Longer a Problem

Post by Jpalm007 »

From what I take the argument in this paper is that Gettier is using a bad kind of justification and and that because of this his conclusion is obviously flawed/impossible.

For the Jones/Smith case the entailed proposition, B, is either false if the man refers to smith, or the justification is wrong if it applies to Jones.

For the Ford case, it could be used to prove anything, so it is obviously not logical to make such statements, so the justification must be wrong.

I think Gettier would agree with all of the above, as that is essentially his argument. Yes the justification is made on false assumptions, however, our definition of justification seems to apply in these situations. If you hear from a reliable source that someone will get the job, it would make sense to think you are justified in believing that. To argue that you are not justified in believing this would create a very narrow definition of justification, so much so that our definition of being justified in believing something would require very strict conditions so much so that our usage of the word wouldn't be useful.

I guess the ultimate question is can we be justified in believing something that isn't true? But if we can't be justified in believing something that isn't true, then surely our definition of justification becomes essentially the same as our definition of knowledge. My intuition is that the word justified, and the way we use the word justified, isn't as rigorous as what the author is suggesting. This doesn't mean that knowledge is a meaningless concept, it just means that the JTB account of knowledge needs another condition, or a new definition of knowledge is needed.
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