tmoody wrote:It's true that the only intelligent designers we know about are beings with biological brains, so that indeed forms our inductive base. It doesn't follow, however, that we can only make an inductive inference to biological brains unless we add the premise that designing intelligence only belongs to them.
It's not a case of adding a clause, it is a fact that every instance of intelligent design we have unambiguously identified is associated with a biological brain, current or no longer with us. Given that your entire sample is biological brains, by what inductive process are you inferring there might be any other source?
tmoody wrote:The argument might look like this:
1. Structure X has properties, such as irreducible complexity, that we only find in intelligently designed things.
For the purposes of this argument, you are taking irreducible complexity for granted. You might be able to show that it is formally valid, but it isn't therefore necessarily sound. By assuming IC and attributing it to structure X, this clause becomes an argument in itself: X has IC. IC is only found in ID. The only thing missing is the conclusion.
tmoody wrote:2. We have no plausible account of how unguided natural forces could produce X.
The fact that we don't have one doesn't mean there isn't one. Besides, what one person finds plausible doesn't have to agree with someone else's view; there is no objective measure of plausibility. I was told off by Ginkgo for making what could be construed as ad hominem arguments, but the credulity of the individuals making an assessment of plausibility is an issue. It is not scientific to say 'I think such and such.' without offering the means by which people who disagree with you are compelled to take you seriously; generally an observation that rival theories fail to predict. In other words, science is about the stuff that makes a difference to what we see actually happening. On that account ID is not science, because it doesn't make any phenomenal claim that natural selection fails to account for, it is simply an assessment of plausibility.
tmoody wrote:3. Therefore X is intelligently designed.
Ah, there it is.
tmoody wrote:4. All known designing intelligences are beings with biological brains.
5. Therefore....what? I think you're saying that at most we are warranted in inferring that X was designed by a being with a biological brain.
Not having conceded IC, I wouldn't even go that far.
tmoody wrote:But,
6. No being with a biological brain could have designed X.
Where does that come from? I cannot conceive of any possible grounds for making such a claim. Again you are assuming that IC has been conceded.
tmoody wrote:7. Therefore X wasn't designed. Or maybe,
7. If X was designed, this fact is necessarily invisible to science.
No comment.
tmoody wrote:But my position is that the fact that science can't make an inference to a disembodied designer isn't an obstacle to making an inference to design, even if it appears that no embodied designer is available to fill the job.
Isn't your argument that ID is scientific? If you accept "that science can't make an inference to a disembodied designer", don't you have to concede that doing so isn't science? It is simply your judgement that it is designed; looking at bacterial flagella over and over and reaching the same conclusion on each occasion, doesn't make it science.
tmoody wrote:It's not denying the antecedent. If you accept that fairy rings are evidence of fairies, then yes, there is physical evidence for fairies. However, if you argue that fairies are invisible and, in fact, can avoid detection by any physical means, there is no direct physical evidence for fairies, even in principle.
If fairy rings are evidence of fairies then it's false that fairies can avoid detection by any physical means. The rings themselves are a way of detecting them.
You are confusing evidence with proof. Fairy rings might be used as evidence by people hoping to establish the existence of fairies. Fairies remain undetected.
tmoody wrote:Of course, if the rings are the only physical way of detecting them, then we might well wonder what fairies are, other than that putative cause of the rings. If that's all we know about them, and all we can know about them, it's not much. And one could make the same point about the inferred intelligent designer of structure X.
Yes, one could.
tmoody wrote:But as I see it, that's okay. I'm perfectly happy to say that the evidence points to design but it doesn't give us any handle on the identity or nature of the designer
The evidence does not point to design; you happen to think you see it.
tmoody wrote:Physical causes are themselves ultimately inexplicable. We have no explanation for why physical things have the basic causal powers they have. We can only explain how these basic causal powers produce the non-basic causal powers of things.
Yes, Hume made the point very well. Crucially though, when making a supposition of a causal interaction, science is looking at two, or more, events, for example; a billiards ball apparently striking another which then rolls off in a direction the player, if they are any good, has seen happen many times before and therefore has reason to believe the same will happen on this occasion. What you are asking is akin to demanding an explanation for billiards balls that move for no apparent reason. When they do, I'll give it a go.
tmoody wrote:If there are non-physical substances, then they, like physical substances, have their own basic causal powers.
Postulating non-physical substances is ontology, demonstrating the causal powers is science.
tmoody wrote:It comes down to the numbers. Opponents of ID complain that "it was designed" isn't a true explanation. But "the staggeringly improbable happened" isn't an explanation either, and it is even more impervious to confirmation and disconfirmation than the design hypothesis. At least the design hypothesis can be undermined by the discovery of a probable causal pathway.
That "the staggeringly improbable happened" isn't offered as a scientific explanation. The scientific explanation is the 'probable causal pathway' scientists are still looking for.
tmoody wrote:But you're saying that given the large numbers of interactions, the spontaneous convergence of factors to produce irreducibly complex systems isn't so improbable.
You are assuming I accept IC again.
tmoody wrote:This is itself an empirical claim, and I'm not convinced of its truth yet.
It's statistics, I think rather than empiricism. If a single person enters the UK national lottery, the chance of them winning is vanishingly small. If there are 20 or so million entries, there's a good chance that somebody will win.
tmoody wrote:Behe has quite a bit to say about this in his second book, The Edge of Evolution, which doesn't get nearly as much discussion as DBB. He has a very interesting discussion of malaria, which have existed in vast numbers for a very long time, and which have a fairly short generation rate. He considers the kinds of mutations that might enable Plasmodium to survive in temperate climates, instead of being limited to tropical climates. He suggests a pathway that might make this possible, but points out that despite the staggeringly huge breeding population, it still hasn't happened.
He may be right or he may be wrong, but I think his approach is sound.
I don't see that postulating something that could happen, but hasn't, adds anything to our understanding of chance. I'm intrigued by the thesis of this book; is it that there is a designer who puts spinning tails on bacteria and created a disease that kills lots and lots of people, but only in the tropics?
tmoody wrote:Let me ask this, in the spirit of bridging the gap in this discussion. Suppose the empirical trail ends at a fork. Either there was design or the staggeringly improbable happened. In my view, it's good science to state the dilemma clearly and say "That's as far as science takes us." Do you agree, or do you think science requires us to say the staggeringly improbable happened?
No. I don' think such a fork exists. Pragmatism might suggest you give it up, but as I've said on several occasions, science requires that you keep looking for demonstrable explanations.