Kant & Rand on Rationality & Reality

[Philosophy Now]

Dana Andreicut tells us about their philosophical differences and similiarities.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/101/Kan ... nd_Reality

[Stephen Boydstun]

Dana Andreicut,

Thank you for the summary comparison of core elements in Kant and Rand. Where you referred to space and time as fundamental categories in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, I believe you meant not categories, but forms of intuition. Perhaps you meant categories in usual parlance and did not intend allusion to Kant's categories of the understanding.

An additional element for comparison I’d add is this. Kant escapes from what he took to be the iron determinism of the phenomenal realm, to make room for free will and moral responsibility, through practical reason. Therein we are said to have a solid if delimited grip on the noumenal realm, and thereby a responsible freedom in the phenomenal realm without violating its determinism. Rand proposed locating originative human freedom—in what she likewise took to be a physically deterministic world—in the self-conscious controls of our higher levels of consciousness and entirely within the one realm that is.

As you indicated, there is some affinity yet ultimately square difference between on the one hand Rand’s thought that a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms and on the other hand Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism” in the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason. (I’ve noticed there are close relatives of this point by Rand in Plato’s Theatetus [160b] and in Abelard’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Herbart makes the point in 1824. Among Rand’s contemporaries, her point is made also by Sartre and Ortega y Gasset.) Particular rubs between Kant and Rand over his Refutation are these: Kant’s primacy of outer over inner intuition in the Refutation occasions no retreat from his characterization of space as form supplied from the side of the subject, form ideal and without which no outer experience is possible, form that does not exist without the perceiving subject. Kant’s primacy of outer intuition is not Rand’s primacy of existence over consciousness. Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental object also mutes his primacy of outer intuition. That is his proposal of an utterly opaque object underlying registration of objects as we experience them. Not such transcendental object, of course, but the formal aspects of the human mind are what, in Kant's view, objectify all the objects presented in our experience and indeed make human experience possible.

Big differences there, as you signaled. Another point on which there is some significant affinity in the theoretical philosophies of Kant and Rand is in her idea that her philosophical axioms are integrative touchstones for objectivity. There is a general resemblance in that with Kant’s view of the role of his categories and principles of the understanding. Only a general resemblance.

Another large difference in the theoretical philosophies of Kant and Rand is that the latter takes unity of mind to derive from unities in the world. This is housed in Rand’s Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification, which distinctive Rand you rightly did not neglect. Thanks again.

Stephen Boydstun

[Ginkgo]

Rand's objectivism tells us that reality is separate from consciousness. This means that regardless of what we think an object is, or want to believe about an object, naive realism is proper explanation for the world. Every event can be explains as having a cause.The fundamental problem is this approach ignores the very thing we cannot ignore. Hume's claim that there is no logical necessity when it comes to cause and effect. This prong of Hume's fork is still won't go away and today is still alive and well.

The idea that most things can be known with a large degree of certain is also called into question when viewed into the light of quantum mechanics. Some might be tempted to claim that Kant is really provided us with a quantum interpretation of events. However, I see Kant's solution to the problem of induction as an acknowledgement that there is no logical necessity when it comes to matters of fact, but this doesn't rule out the possibility there is a psychological necessity.

[Ansiktsburk]

Stephen, I know that you addressed your post directly to the article author, and you use the language of professional philosophers. Myself and others reading this forum are layman, and as for myself, I have only read the Prolegomena and some general works on Kant. Could you give a summary of your post in the same languagage as the article author use in hers? It looks interesting! But I know not what "outer intuition", "integrative touchstones for objectivity" is.

[Ansiktsburk]

Not having read Rand until just recently, I was quite surprised that Rand shows this animosity towards Kant. The objectivism - the detective work of the objectivist she describes, to try to understand the world as good as possible and use that knowledge, it resembles a lot the ding-fur-mich, when I read about Kant.

Of course, a saddlemaker's son in Königsberg living in the 18 century couldn't attack God and King in the same manner as a bourgeouise survivor of the russian revolution who came to Chicago and saw heaven. And Kant seems to be a little more careful than Rand is about the possibility for people to foresee the future. But from what little I have read about his ethics, it is not the rules of God or the communist party you shall obey but your own conception of what is justice.

To me she is like the gas pedal and he is the break when it come to taking decisions, being utilitarian or deontological.

Generally about Rand - objectivism is quite attractive in many ways in the sense of being a personal philosophy. But when she goes on to have ideas of how the world should be run and fashioned, she sounds too much like someone who escaped the communists.

[Stephen Boydstun]

Hi A,

The phrase “integrative touchstones for objectivity” is my own. An example of its application to Rand’s view of her axiomatic concepts and principles would be in Atlas where she writes: “Whatever the degree of your knowledge, these two—existence and consciousness—are axioms you cannot escape, these two are the irreducible primaries implied in any action you undertake, in any part of your knowledge and in its sum, from the first ray of light you perceive at the start of your life to the widest erudition you might acquire at its end. Whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the axioms remain the same: that it exists and that you know it.” Rand addressed the character of her philosophic axioms, their character as integrative touchstones for objectivity, in her nonfiction monograph Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (Chapter 6), which appeared a decade after Atlas.

An example of Kant’s categories of the understanding operating as integrative touchstones for objectivity would be his category of cause-and-effect relations. Objective happenings have determinate temporal orders and causal relations independently of our fancies, and we should try to find the causal relationships in those given temporal orders, for they necessarily will be there to be found.

The phrases “categories of the understanding” and “outer intuition” are technical vocabulary of Kant’s. We do have to dig into what Kant says he means by his technical terms to understand what he is saying. That done, I’m afraid we need to use his own terminology in representing his views. Reversions to ordinary meanings of understanding or intuition or reason in short representations of his views end up distorting his view. As you know from Prolegomena, Kant is at first impenetrable; one needs to get his definitions of his terms set in mind to get to his thought.

Rand’s technical vocabulary such as reason or entity is closer to common meanings. But here too, one has to study what she writes about them, for they are ordinary terms to which she has given specific definitions for sake of a larger theoretical structure into which they fit. Having gotten Kant’s vocabulary as well as Rand’s in hand, one can see, for example, that what Rand calls reason spans all of what Kant calls the distinct faculties of understanding, reason, and judgment. (One case in which Rand departs a great deal from ordinary meaning of a term in her technical definition for it is the term sacrifice.)

Rand had not always been hostile to Kant. She shows some friendliness toward him in her 1936 novel We the Living (in its original edition, not the edited one issued in 1959). Apparently, she later learned a little more about his views and realized how much she was opposed to them concerning the nature of the world and mind and the nature of human life and moral value. Rand’s own animosity towards Kant, based on her understanding of him and on her view of the history of philosophy and its effects in society, should be left to the side, however, when it comes to our own appraisal of the logical relations between the two philosophies and the merits and errors in each.

Rand definitely opposed, as have many others, Kant’s notion of things as they are in themselves as unknowable to us in principle. She rejected the view instigated by Descartes and picked up by the British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) and continued in Kant that we know directly only our ideas. Rand understood what was going on in that controversy approximately right, although she did not get exactly and fully how Kant was historically and logically to be fitted into the story. I don’t mean to be thumping my chest for knowing more about Kant than did Rand, for I have had the advantage of more time to devote to him and the aid of the enormous amount of Kant scholarship and Kant translation into English that has occurred since her day.

You are certainly along the right track when you conclude of Kant that in his view moral rule is from within us and in a natural way, not a supernatural way, and in an absolute way, durable against orders of the state.

Stephen

[uwot]

Well I was hoping for some enlightenment about Rands politics, (see the other Rand thread) but if they are anything like her metaphysics, I can well imagine that Kayla's assessment is on the money. From what I have read so far, Rand's refutation of idealism has all the subtlety of Dr Johnson's. It looks to me as though Ginkgo is absolutely right and Rand is just some gallumping naïve realist. I think the quote you chose, Stephen, as it stands, supports this view: "Whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the axioms remain the same: that it exists and that you know it.” It may be out of context and indeed you reference Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, but it doesn't seem very sophisticated. What does she argue in the op cit. to make her case?

[uwot]

I presume you are the same Stephen Boylston that has 2459 Atlas points on that Rebirth of reason thing. I've looked at some of your stuff, heavy on neologisms, light on analysis. This is a good example:

Rand definitely opposed, as have many others, Kant’s notion of things as they are in themselves as unknowable to us in principle. She rejected the view instigated by Descartes and picked up by the British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) and continued in Kant that we know directly only our ideas.

I dare say. What was her argument? Ginkgo has mentioned Hume's fork, what is Rand's treatment of that?

Rand understood what was going on in that controversy approximately right, although she did not get exactly and fully how Kant was historically and logically to be fitted into the story.

How does that impact on her understanding of his arguments?

I don’t mean to be thumping my chest for knowing more about Kant than did Rand, for I have had the advantage of more time to devote to him and the aid of the enormous amount of Kant scholarship and Kant translation into English that has occurred since her day.

Lucky old you. Can you explain what you know about Kant that Rand didn't?

You are certainly along the right track when you conclude of Kant that in his view moral rule is from within us and in a natural way, not a supernatural way, and in an absolute way, durable against orders of the state.

Stephen

This is banal. Frankly, if this quality of reasoning is typical of people who are impressed by Rand, I clearly haven't missed much.

[Stephen Boydstun]

Hi u,

Regarding the post before last:

Rand’s arguments for the truth and axiomatic standing of her axiomatic concepts and principles are given in Atlas Shrugged in the long radio speech of the protagonist. The discussion in her Epistemology is a further characterization of the relationship of those axiomatic concepts (existence, consciousness, and identity) to all other concepts. One of the axiomatic principles Rand proposes and defends in Atlas is “Existence is identity.” This principle was also upheld by Avicenna and by Spinoza, though not with the centrality and emphasis Rand placed on it. You will find there in her Atlas exposition the more particular forms of that principle she had in mind, but you will find she does not always carry out the argument needed to establish the axiomatic necessity of the principle in all its stripes. Some of my own extensions and arguments are here.

Where Rand does make a defense of an axiomatic principle, you will find some kinship with phenomenological arguments such as in Sartre and some kinship with Descartes’ (or Augustine’s) cogito type of consideration. But the main kinship you will notice is to Aristotle’s defense of the principle of non-contradiction. This last will figure large in the contribution of James Lennox (of Pitt) in the third volume of essays collected in the Ayn Rand Society Philosophical Studies series. (ARS is an APA affiliate.) This volume is expected to issue this year with the title Ayn Rand and Aristotle: Philosophical and Historical Studies.

The definitive professional elaboration of the type of direct realism Rand sketched concerning the nature of perception is David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses, a book that has become available online here.

Stephen

[uwot]

Rand’s arguments for the truth and axiomatic standing of her axiomatic concepts and principles are given in Atlas Shrugged in the long radio speech of the protagonist.

So what are they?

The discussion in her Epistemology is a further characterization of the relationship of those axiomatic concepts (existence, consciousness, and identity) to all other concepts.

You've mentioned Descartes, for whom consciousness is both existence and identity. How does Rand differentiate?

One of the axiomatic principles Rand proposes and defends in Atlas is “Existence is identity.”

You think it worthy of mention; what does it mean to you and how would you defend it?

This principle was also upheld by Avicenna and by Spinoza, though not with the centrality and emphasis Rand placed on it. You will find there in her Atlas exposition the more particular forms of that principle she had in mind, but you will find she does not always carry out the argument needed to establish the axiomatic necessity of the principle in all its stripes. Some of my own extensions and arguments are here.

Where Rand does make a defense of an axiomatic principle, you will find some kinship with phenomenological arguments such as in Sartre and some kinship with Descartes’ (or Augustine’s) cogito type of consideration.

I'm sure if I looked long and hard enough, I could find some kinship with any argument or type of consideration you care to mention. You have made a claim, it is for you to support it.

But the main kinship you will notice is to Aristotle’s defense of the principle of non-contradiction.

Will I? What makes you think so?

This last will figure large in the contribution of James Lennox (of Pitt) in the third volume of essays collected in the Ayn Rand Society Philosophical Studies series. (ARS is an APA affiliate.) This volume is expected to issue this year with the title Ayn Rand and Aristotle: Philosophical and Historical Studies.

From the little I know about Ayn Rand, I get the feeling she might point out that it is here, it is now, deal with it. You Stephen Boydstun, don't rely on other people to fight your battles.

The definitive professional elaboration of the type of direct realism Rand sketched concerning the nature of perception is David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses, a book that has become available online here.

–S

Thank you for the links. It would be much more helpful if you were to identify the passages pertinent to the point you mean to make. There is nothing in what you have written so far that inspires any confidence that you have much command of what you are talking about.

[Stephen Boydstun]

“Lucky old you.” – sarcastic, making small, disrespectful you.

Lucky me.

[uwot]

“Lucky old you.” – sarcastic, making small, disrespectful you.

No one's perfect, Stephen.

Lucky me.

Your personal details don't interest me; I'll judge you on the strength of your argument.
Ayn Rand is evidently popular with hard of thinking right wing nutters. From what you say about her metaphysics, they are vacuous; it is entirely possible, therefore, that so are her politics. You clearly think otherwise, but are ill prepared or unprepared to defend her views.
If you care for my respect, earn it.

[Stephen Boydstun]

You are also disrespectful in your Professor-Superior issuing of orders and handing out grades on compliance to a public not your student.

You are also disrespectful of mind and person in your presumptuousness of presuming I am in agreement with Rand's philosophy. For three decades I have given my standing-on-one-foot criticism: Metaphysics - Rand's is overly deterministic. Epistemology - Rand's is overly subjectivist. Ethics - Rand's is overly egoistic. Politics - Rand's rests in part on an incorrect theory of property rights in land and an incorrect theory of government in relation to that economic factor of production.

I am lately writing a book setting out my own philosophy. It includes systematic criticism of Rand's philosophy. It argues my opposing alternative. I do my best to present her philosophy accurately, and I do not presume she was an idiot as a philosopher, however far I think her mistaken in every area. This book treats metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of moral value. It does not cover any esthetics or politics. I'll return to that work now.

(PS to the site - Pleased to see those "details" are not trivialized by others here, and by the reads, have interest.)

[uwot]

You are also disrespectful in your Professor-Superior issuing of orders and handing out grades on compliance to a public not your student.

I get the gist. So what?

You are also disrespectful of mind and person in your presumptuousness of presuming I am in agreement with Rand's philosophy.

I can only judge what I can see.

For three decades I have given my standing-on-one-foot criticism:

Then you shouldn't have any trouble doing so now.

Metaphysics - Rand's is overly deterministic.

Why's that then?

Epistemology - Rand's is overly subjectivist.

You're confusing me, I was under the impression that she was an objectivist. Was she not objectivist enough?

Ethics - Rand's is overly egoistic.

I think it's fair to say that opinion is divided; what's your case?

Politics - Rand's rests in part on an incorrect theory of property rights in land and an incorrect theory of government in relation to that economic factor of production.

So, in your view, what are the correct theories?

I am lately writing a book setting out my own philosophy. It includes systematic criticism of Rand's philosophy.

I admire anyone with the tenacity to write a book, so good luck with that, but you have yet to demonstrate any capacity for criticism on anything but a superficial level.

It argues my opposing alternative. I do my best to present her philosophy accurately, and I do not presume she was an idiot as a philosopher, however far I think her mistaken in every area. This book treats metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of moral value. It does not cover any esthetics or politics. I'll return to that work now.

As I said, good luck with the book, but if you hope to have your philosophy taken seriously, you need to be willing and able to confront the issues.

[Stephen Boydstun]

Ansiktsburk, I should also have linked to my writings on Kant and Rand in the scope of the subject article. I try to define Kant’s technical terms as they arise in these.

Kant and Rand on Metaphysics

Normativity of Logic – Kant v. Rand

Perception and Truth – Kant and Rand

Kant’s Wrestle with Happiness and Life