Philosophy Now Forum

Some time ago, I've launched an Attack on Indexicality of the type promoted by John Perry in "The Problem of the Essential Indexical". It's from this link: http://t-lea.net/issues_from_the_internet.html#AAI.
It may be an expert topic and thus not very interesting to most, but if you bother to read it, you may get some information to consider. It follows:
I consider here the three indexicals, I, here, and now. Only these!

We want to have a timeline. So here I'll try to remove now by:
A human by the name Jesus, social security number so-and-so, white robe, long hair is dead, therefore we are in year 0 (zero).

We want to mention a certain place. So here I'll try to remove here by:
A place is at the coordinates so-and-so in the system of planet Earth.

We want to mention a certain person. So here I'll try to remove I by:
A person by the name so-and-so, with the social security number so-and-so, perhaps a description and a history so-and-so.

So, are indexicals necessary? I suggest that they are wholly ripe for elimination, theoretically. They are around because they are practical. Let's say we have an actual, obvious space and in it is an object. By giving the right description, we can remove the need for pointing and thus the definite need for indexicals disappears.

Let's try with an example from John Perry's article.
John Perry writes something like this: "I'm looking for the person who is making a mess in the supermarket. After a while I find that the person who is making the mess is myself. I'm making a mess. I'm taking action to limit the mess."

If I'm to explain this without indexical, I:
(John Perry is making a mess at time, t1, in the supermarket, but he does not know this.) John Perry is looking for the person who is making a mess in the supermarket at time, t2. After a while at time, t3, John Perry finds that the person who is making the mess is himself. John Perry has been making a mess. John Perry takes action at time, t4, to limit the mess.

F**k the indexicals!

What do you think? Can we do without the indexicals? If something is unclear, please point it out!

P.S.: Hans Reichenbach is developing something similar in "Elements of Symbolic Logic, 1947", §50: Token-reflexive Words. We are in the same direction, I believe, with me being a bit more radical.

Isn't language necessary for the expression of thoughts and communication? I can't see that it's around for sole practical reasons. Where is the alternative? I think it's unfair if you undermine this thread with bullsh*t! Why don't you just let it sink to the bottom of the ocean? Be serious!

That's good. I've been searching the net for other contemporary articles and I've been unsuccessful so I haven't searched this time around. Well, people, if you want the article known, just consume it! I don't exactly know the importance of indexicals, but I've already hinted at the practical importance. You don't have any arguments for the sake of theory? I'm just curious, how deep into Phil. of Lang. are you?

First, John Perry is arguing for the strict necessity of especially the essential indexical. Second, you have my attack on that kind of notion. There is no implication that the indexicals are going to be dropped from the language or that there is a wish for that kind of thing. This is foremost about the necessity of the indexicals and maybe also about certain contexts, the way I understand it.

I haven't analysed whether some parts of language are necessary or not. Has there been an issue on whether natural language is sufficient for the description of science? I believe a lecturer I've had has made a confirming comment on that.
Some people say that time isn't objective, but I think you can make every point in time objective as long as you stick to it and work out it's relativity to the other parts of the universe.
I think a language looks better if there's no necessity for indexicals. Somehow, it then appears scientifically deeper.

There is a strange way of argumentation in the paper of John Perry. It's like there's only been sloppy attempts of making fitting, exhaustive descriptions replacing the indexicals and when one gives this up, one latches onto the necessity of the indexicals. Why can't we assume: "at this moment" = "now", for example?

Reinvigoration. I'm sorry for having taken so long.
"The person that has the frame of mind of the person of context that is given" is "I".
"The person already given"="the given person"=indexical "myself"
"The description of location and person that gives the person"=indexical "I"
I think "I" includes "here". I have therefore added location to the formula.
"The moment has arrived"=indexical "now"

I'll counter any argument from memory loss and say that one can lose the conception of the word "I" as well in the case of memory loss. I therefore think that the indexical and the exterior description is still on equal footing. Memory loss is also a matter of empiri of investigation, just to have mentioned it.

What do you put into Perry's argument except linguistic focus and reflexivity?

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "1) The pain that "NameY" is experiencing is of no importance compared to the pain NameX is experiencing because I am NameX.
2) The pain that "NameY" is experiencing is of no importance compared to the pain NameX is experiencing because NameX is NameX."

I think 2) can be rephrased as
2') The pain that "NameY" is experiencing is of no importance compared to the pain NameX is experiencing because NameX is making the comparison.

I think some people speak of "now" as a time frame within which a scene is being played out.

I'm sorry I have included "himself" in the writing. It's a mistake and you are correct in pointing it out. I'll try to improve.

'I am NameX' usually means, in the indexical free world, that 'NameX is introducing NameX to others'.

Cuthbert wrote:
Quote: "Similarly, any time after now is in the future. Also, it's now 8:04am on 6 May 2009. But it's not the case that any time after 8:04am on 6 May 2009 is in the future. In the time it took to write the conclusion, 8:04am on 6 May 2009 is in the past."

Indexical free: Similarly, any time after the sense of moment given is in the future. Also, it's in another moment given 8:04am on 6 May 2009. But it's not the case that any time after 8:04am on 6 May 2009 is in the future. In the time it took to write the conclusion, 8:04am on 6 May 2009 is in the past.

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "There are ten people at a party. Someone says "bert1 knows where the host has hidden the Ferrero Rocher." I say, "bert1 is bert1". Everyone else says "So what? We all know that already." Then I say "Sorry, I meant that I am bert1". "Oh!" says everyone, "Then tell us where the Ferrero Rocher are!""

Indexical free: There are ten people at a party. Someone says "NameX knows where the host has hidden the Ferrero Rocher." NameX says, "NameX is NameX". Everyone else says "So what? Everyone in the party know that already." Then NameX says "Sorry, NameX is intending to say that NameX is introducing NameX to the others of the party and the person of the given location is in the moment doing so". "Oh!" says everyone, "Then tell the rest where the Ferrero Rocher are!"

I think my solution also solves:
There are ten people at a party. Someone says "NameX knows where the host has hidden the Ferrero Rocher." Two people (one of them NameX) simultaneously say, "NameX is NameX". Everyone else says "So what? We all know that already." Then NameX say "Sorry, NameX meant that NameX is introducing NameX to the rest of the party". "Oh!" says everyone, "Then tell us where the Ferrero Rocher are!"

Also, I don't think one should be forced to use the geocoordinates to designate a location. A good relative description can work just as well. The relative geocoordinates are supposed to solve the extreme cases.

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "Are we allowed to use 'is'? Is there an implicit 'now' in 'is'?"

I certainly find that we are allowed to use a given tense as appropriate and the rest should now be obvious.

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "Lets say we have a complete objective psycho-physical description of both NameX and NameY. Nowhere in these descriptions does it say which one of these people I am. When I say 'I am NameX, and not NameY' that is an extra fact not contained in the descriptions."

The indexical-free descriptions are dynamic and update as fast as new information is added to the situation. I think this is solved by what is already written.

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "But something is definitely removed from the language if we remove 'I', and not just convenience."

I disagree and you and the rest have not pointed to what this may be.

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "Is it a metaphysical issue?"

I think there is little to find in metaphysics regarding the descriptive use of indexicals, but that's just my opinion.

A funny fact.
In G. E. M. Anscombe's book of Mind and Language - Wolfson College Lectures 1974 1975 p. 65 it says in a footnote: "In Latin we have "ambulo" = "I walk". There is no subject-term. There is no need of one."

bert1 wrote:
Quote: "What makes 'the given location' the location where NameX is?"

"Given" is a short for a more comprehensive description of information that is not included in the situation that is being analysed. It is always possible to give that kind of information. This is part of the argument against the necessity of indexicals.

As a quick response: twin people, twin planets and everything else that is a twin to something is usually given a separating name otherwise it runs counter to the custom of giving names. Twin objects with the same name are counter to intelligence.

It has already been pointed out that "himself" is an indexical in the thread. "I am John Perry" is the equal to "John Perry knows that John Perry's name is John Perry". The main issue has been to show that the indexical "I" is not essential.

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "They are not the same belief. If I believe that "John Perry knows that John Perry's name is John Perry" that does not mean that I believe that "I am John Perry." As a matter of actual fact, I do hold the former belief, but not the latter."

They represent the exactly same meaning in that specific context in that situation. Obviously, when you put yourself into the equation, the situation, we are speaking of something entirely different and you fail to acknowledge this. I think you have skipped the information in this thread that says "The indexical-free descriptions are dynamic and update as fast as new information is added to the situation."

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "You cannot eliminate "himself" for the same reason that you cannot eliminate "I" in the explanation of Perry's behavior. To say that John Perry finds out that the person who is making the mess is himself is to say that John Perry finds out that "I am making the mess" (that is the belief that is required to explain Perry's behavior, because if John Perry believes that John Perry knows that John Perry's name is John Perry then he will still not behave the way he does in the store unless he also believes that he is John Perry, i.e., unless he also has the belief that "I am John Perry")."

I can very much eliminate indexicals with descriptions, but I and everyone else who do it must be very sensitive to what is contained in the actual situation. I don't think you try to eliminate indexicals even. You just seem to postulate the necessity of the indexicals. If you are up for the challenge, why don't you give an example of a situation where the indexicals are necessary? I'm more than willing to make the eliminations as I have done several times already in this thread.

I believe I'm not missing Perry's point, but I have no sympathy with it. I also think that attribution of belief and belief states can very well be done by proper descriptions.

I think Perry is identifying more with his indexical "I" than he is with the unique identifier of a proper name. To a certain degree, I understand this, but not when it comes to the "full power" of description.

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "So what attributions of belief do you make to Perry that explain his behavior but do not employ the first-person pronoun?"

I think the solution is to use the proper name and make a sufficient description to what it is supposed to explain including beliefs and belief states, respectively.

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "Belief contexts are referentially opaque. This means that the substitution of co-referential expressions/proper names in sentences involving belief ascriptions can change the truth value of the sentences."

I don't think this is the case if it's done thoroughly.

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "Consider the true sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.” Now substitute “Clark Kent” for “Superman” and we get “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly,” which is false."

I agree that a simple switch of disguise-identities doesn't work. In this description we should compensate Lois Lane's belief by writing this: “Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.” is equal to, in Lois Lane's eyes, “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent in disguise can fly". This is true! We can indeed write "Superman" is identical with "Clark Kent in disguise" and vice versa to accommodate Lois Lane's view.
Just a note. For Lois Lane, the two names are not interchangeable, but for us on the outside of the situation, they are.

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "Likewise, if Perry believes that “John Perry is making the mess,” but does not believe that “I am John Perry,” then he will not act as he does in the store unless he also believes that "I am John Perry", and this despite the fact that "John Perry" and "I" (when uttered by John Perry) are co-referential."

Let's turn the situation around: we can imagine, rather unlikely, that John Perry has no association to "I", but has a strong identification with his name. So when he believes "I'm making a mess", it's simply rubbish to him, but when he's in the belief that "John Perry is making a mess", there's an immediate reaction. We can hypothetically imagine that some people have brought up their child without making it learn what "I" is. This is, of course, very strange, but so and so. I believe that John Perry is simply making a postulation of our intimation of the indexical "I" and plays a psychological game around our recognition of our own name (and the power of descriptions), that is mostly an unique identifier.
My use of "intimation" is to mean "what we make dear to our heart" or something like that. I'm sorry. I'm not trying to redefine the English language.

(John Perry is making a mess at time, t1, in the supermarket, but John Perry does not know the given fact.) John Perry is looking for the person who is making a mess in the supermarket at time, t2. After a while at time, t3, John Perry finds that the person who is making the mess is John Perry. John Perry has been making a mess. John Perry takes action at time, t4, to limit the mess.

This is a context-specific description, explanation, of John Perry's behaviour.

Philo1965 wrote:
Quote: "It is not an explanation of Perry's behavior because, of course, it leaves out the fact that he must know that he himself is John Perry before he will come to act as he does. Calling it "context-specific" does not change that fact. He may just as well have come to believe that "Roger Daltry is making a mess" as that "John Perry is making a mess" if he does not believe that he himself is John Perry."

I find that normal people definitely know their name. It's so fundamental to us that people learn their own name before they learn the meaning of "I". Obviously, I can turn this on it's head to counter you and say that "He may just as well have come to believe that "Roger Daltry is making a mess" as that "John Perry is making a mess" if he does not believe that he himself is his own "I" when he calls himself "I"". If you take this stand, it's impossible to convince you no matter what description I put on the table. So in reality, you don't ask anything of me because no matter what I answer it falls short in your view. Instead of having me to try to eliminate the indexicals, why don't you come up with a situation where you think it's impossible to eliminate the indexical? While you're at it, you're welcome to add to the paper of John Perry. Is it really impossible to explain your behaviour without using indexicals? This problem should be rife in psychology then, but I find that psychologists are able to explain behaviour all the time, even the beliefs and belief-states as long as they are communicated honestly. I really think you may be some kind of an indexical-fundamentalist as you seem to make contradictory demands that ensures the continuation of your view of the indexicals. If there is nothing new to this discussion from you, I think we have finished.

jtoma wrote:
Quote: "Other than being 'wholly ripe for elimination', theoretically speaking, why do you want to get rid of indexicals? Perhaps I am being crude. Do you want to create an indexical free language?"

I want to show that indexicals are neither essential nor necessary. I want to create a potentially indexical free language.

jtoma wrote:
Quote: "I mean that there would be a different description being filled in depending on what you know about the person. Does that make any sense?"

I think it certainly makes sense in this regard. From earlier: "The indexical-free descriptions are dynamic and update as fast as new information is added to the situation." Maybe there is also something to learn from it in the process.

Is this good? Cheers!

I bet that you are very sensitive to her name, your lover, as well like if you hear it over the calling system at the mall. When you say "you, my lover" I think it comes close enough to your affection for the name like "Shania, my lover". In this situation I think there's equal affection for the unique identifier as when you use "you" for your lover. You obviously put a lot into it than a third person. This angle can be accommodated for in the descriptive situation, I hold. The extremity comes down to this: as long as there are thoughts or whatever that can be expressed in communication, they are. Rather, to save time, one economises slightly, but not when it's important. There may be mental imagery swirling around in a situation, but if one uses some time on it, it's really no obstacle. In the end there's some kind of "magic" put forward by the proponents of the indexicals. I think that is unfair in the communicative situation. Is it what is "heavenly"? Is it what is unique? Is it about "extra-sensory" qualities? I don't know. I rely on the descriptive power.

jtoma wrote:
Quote: "What would be the virtue that an indexical free language would have that an indexical containing language does not have?"

Good question! I can't say there is any difference at all. It may appear more "scientific" if it's indexical free, but it's really in the air. It's not a part of the purpose of this thread to answer this question. I have yet to discover the essential, the necessary about it. Cheers!

In relation to indexicals, it's worth noting that in suggesting there's a particular mystery with "I", one can equally highlight the mystery of substance. The depth of mystery of calling on a person by that person's name is equally mysterious as investigating the nature of substance. Therefore, the mystery of "I" and this person's name is exactly the same. "I" doesn't add or deduct anything to this mystery. If possible, calling on the "soul" of a person after this person's death by this person's name is equally meaningful as if this person is to use "I" in this "soul"-state. The two terms still nominate exactly the same information!

If I can recommend you a book, you can consider: The Philosophy of Language by A. P. Martinich, 5 ed.

In you case you're interested, just fire away!

[Edit, 29.04.2010:] I've found a paper by Evan C. Tiffany with the title "What is Essential about Indexicals?" (2000).
"# Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Jul., 2000), pp. 35-50
(article consists of 16 pages)
# Published by: Springer" This may be an additional good view to check out as much as I've found the paper by Michael E. Levin and Margarita Levin named "The Modal Confusion in Rawls' Original Position" to be a forceful attack on John Rawls, effectuating the breakdown of the notion that these "classics" stand without (good) counter-arguments! Just a tip! As I haven't read it myself, if you bother to, tell me how it goes! [End of edit.]

It says in the paper by Perry, following from above, that:
"In these three cases [you can investigate the paper for yourselves] the subjects in explaining their actions, would use indexicals to characterize certain beliefs they came to have. These indexicals are essential, in that replacement of them by other terms destroys the force of the explanation, or at least requires certain assumptions to be made to preserve it."
By essential in the meaning of necessary, this doesn't walk, I say. I'm against this notion of essential, but in exactly this quote, I'm uncertain to what definite opposition I bother to have other than I can make equally good objective (without the use of indexicals, especially "I") descriptions. It's also uncertain if using indexicals takes away any objectivity at all as the utterers are always in the given context. Much of this has its responsibility upon the one who is making the description where I adhere to the possibility of making as accurate a description as information and context allow, not necessarily without indexicals, but always possibly (as good). This should therefore be an incredibly minor issue and it may be one that has been exaggerated by the publishers and editor of The Philosophy of Language by A. P. Martinich, 5 ed., not really playing any important classic role at all.

On the other side, I've gained quite some consciousness of description by pursuing (more difficult) indexical-free descriptions and it may represent fine training and insight in going through this yourself (possibly mostly in one's scientific pursuit).

Cheers!

PS. I'll provide a better account of the three examples by Perry than I've made before (see post above). This will take some time.

Indexical have a practical purpose.

"Shall we have a cup of tea now or later ? "

Instead one would have to say:

"Shall we have a cup of tea on Saturday, the first of May 2010, at 6:28 pm, or later ? "

When 6:28 is gone, one would have to correct immediately: 6:29, 6:30, 6:31, 6:32 etc.

You want to call this an improvement ?

You can write: "Shall we have a cup of tea on Saturday, the first of May 2010, approximately at 6:28 pm, or later ?"

You may want to read my posts again, but writing "now" in a scientific report has a very limited use? Otherwise, I do agree with you performative implications. It says: not necessarily, but always possibly!

Cheers!

PS: Are you into Philosophy of Language?

I am into Philosophy of Language, yes.
I attend a lecture course on Frege and Wittgenstein in this semester.

The tense also indicates now:
What are you doing ? ( = now, in the moment when I am asking)
Instead of: What were you doing and are going to do on Sunday, 2 of May 2010, between 9:12 and 9:15 European time, or an hour earlier GMT ?

Indexicals are so extremely useful, they look like an invention of a genius to me.
What are your reasons for getting rid of them ? In a nutshelll please.

For the 3rd time: ...not necessarily, but always possibly!

There's no dogma in it for all I care. I use the indexicals all the time yet it strikes me that scientific papers demand more rigour. There's no program to get rid of the indexicals! There's no holocaust of the indexicals (perhaps this is rather distasteful...).

Getting rid of them, dogmatically or systematically would require major efforts in a wide number of people and it would probably go against people's logic (of what language is supposed to yield or provide).

In line with your writing of present tense as the indexical now, one that I agree with and have used in the first post, I can present these two sentences:
Should we have a cup of tea? Perhaps we can have a cup of tea later, if not? These should also provide a solution to your first post (in this thread). It can also be nice to think about this solution where the 2nd sentence takes out everything later than "now", implied by the 1st, a kind of "locking nut" to the first nut on the bolt.

Long live the indexicals and also the possibility of doing without them. Cheers!

This is the start of these examples I'm going to present indexical-free, equivalent to the indexical versions:

The Careless Shopper
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with a torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch.
I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess And I was right. But I didn't believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail around around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in behaviour.
I am making a mess.

Indexical free (IF):
John Perry once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing John Perry's cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with a torn sack to tell the shopper with a torn sack that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But John Perry seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on John Perry. John Perry was the shopper John Perry was trying to catch.
John Perry believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And John Perry was right. But John Perry didn't believe that John Perry was making a mess. That seems to be something John Perry came to believe. And when John Perry came to believe that, John Perry stopped following the trail around around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in John Perry's cart. John Perry's change in beliefs seems to explain John Perry's change in behaviour.
John Perry is making a mess.

(It's presumed that John Perry's name stand to John Perry's own perceptions in this example. The shopper with a torn sack is equally unique in John Perry's belief, that is, it is the same person John Perry is following.)

The Tardy Professor
In the first a professor, who desires to attend the department meeting on time, and believes correctly that it begins at noon, sits motionless in his office at that time. Suddenly he begins to move. What explains his action? A change in belief. He believed all along that the department meeting starts at noon; he came to believe, as he would have put it, that it starts now.

IF:
In the first a professor, who desires to attend the department meeting on time, and believes correctly that the department meeting begins at noon, sits motionless in the professor's office at the moment of time. Suddenly the professor begins to move. What explains the professor's action? A change in belief. The professor believed all along that the department meeting starts at noon; the professor came to believe, as the professor would have put the words, that the meeting starts at the moment the professor realises the time, noon.

The Lost Hiker
The author of the book, Hiker's Guide to the Desolation Wilderness, stands in the wilderness beside Gilmore Lake, looking at the Mt. Tallac trail as it leaves the lake and climbs the mountain. He desires to leave the wilderness. He believes that the best way out from Gilmore Lake is to follow the Mt. Tallac trail up the mountain to Cathedral Peaks trail, on to the Floating Island trail, emerging at Spring Creek Tract Road. But he does not move. He is lost. He isn't sure whether he is standing beside Gilmore Lake, looking at Mt. Tallac, or beside Clyde Lake looking at Jack's peak, or beside Eagle Lake looking at one of the Maggie peaks. Then he begins to move along the Mt. Tallac trail. If asked, he would have explained the crucial change in his beliefs this way: "I came to believe that this is the Mt. Tallac trail and that is Gilmore Lake."

IF:
The author of the book, Hiker's Guide to the Desolation Wilderness, stands in the wilderness beside Gilmore Lake, looking at the Mt. Tallac trail as the Mt. Tallac trail leaves the lake and climbs the mountain. The author desires to leave the wilderness. The author believes that the best way out from Gilmore Lake is to follow the Mt. Tallac trail up the mountain to Cathedral Peaks trail, on to the Floating Island trail, emerging at Spring Creek Tract Road. But the author does not move. The author is lost. The author isn't sure whether the author is standing beside Gilmore Lake, looking at Mt. Tallac, or beside Clyde Lake looking at Jack's peak, or beside Eagle Lake looking at one of the Maggie peaks. Then the author begins to move along the Mt. Tallac trail. If asked, the author would have explained the crucial change in the author's beliefs in the following way: "The author came to believe that the trail the author is perceiving is the Mt. Tallac trail and the lake the author is perceiving is Gilmore Lake."

(The author of the book, Hiker's Guide to the Desolation Wilderness is the author throughout the text above.)

Except for the three headers that I've taken from a paper, these texts are all the perfect reproduction of the paper of John Perry.

My argument/attack against indexicality is from a propositional, de dicto position. This written, it's in support of the possibility (concerning even those entities that are not) of a good/exhaustive description that's context-specific. Description is thus a matter of precision and applies where it should.

[Edit:] I've now added the indexical-free versions. They are finished. [End of edit.]

This is probably the last post on this topic from me.
So, some "funny" thoughts:
I am John Perry -> John Perry is presenting John Perry to others.

I am John Perry -> John Perry is John Perry in John Perry's belief (reinforcing self-belief or just thinking about one's identity and name)

In my opinion, it may be possible to equalise the de re position with the de dicto position and thus making it quite indifferent of what kind of propositional belief you have. This means also that it all boils down to description again! A fundamental/necessary belief in Indexicals is futile in my opinion. They can be bypassed. Proper description may be richer too, as shown above.

[Edit, 11.05.2010:]
From Wikipedia, 11.05.2010, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_re:
There are two possible interpretations of the sentence “Peter believes someone is out to get him”. On one interpretation, ‘someone’ is unspecific and Peter suffers a general paranoia; he believes that it is true that a person is out to get him, but does not necessarily have any beliefs about who this person may be. What Peter believes is that the predicate ‘is out to get Peter’ is satisfied. This is the de dicto interpretation.

On the de re interpretation, ‘someone’ is specific, picking out some particular individual. There is some person Peter has in mind, and Peter believes that person is out to get him.

De re: As it focuses on the person, the "thing", one can plausibly write this:
Peter believes someone is out to get him because he's suffering from paranoia and thus his belief may/is not (be) true.
Peter believes someone is out to get him because he knows about this person who is out to get him.
I think these two explanations are better to clarify the situation. To simply assert that a shortcoming of information explains one position better than the other, is simply to be untruthful and dishonest.

De dicto: As it focuses on the words, the sentences, one can plausibly write this:
Peter believes someone is out to get him because he's suffering from paranoia and thus his belief may/is not (be) true.
Peter believes someone is out to get him because he knows about this person who is out to get him.
The sentences become the same because the care for information adheres to both positions regardless if you focus on the "thing" in question or the words/sentences.

I can't believe this proves my point on de re and de dicto, but it's at least a precursor of what I believe is to come on the distinction between de re and de dicto. I've also come across de se (of oneself) that may fall into the same batch as one should always take into account that the world is not in your head or anyone else's, thus one should accomodate one's views to fit objectivity or everything thereof or as close to it as one can get. [End of edit.]

Aetixintro

As far as I can make out your argument against indexicality seems to miss the point.

Words such as I, here and now are only indexical when they are spoken.

Isn’t the whole point of indexicals that their function is contained within their use? So when one says I one is by that very act being I? Similarly saying here or now denotes what is, whereas writing all these terms down are mere representations of the real events so not indexicals at all.

John Perry's paper goes exactly against this, IMO! How come that this necessity of the Indexical can't have the persistence to be written down? Aren't the examples of John Perry meant to stand unrejected, plausibly? If we are to make sense of John Perry's writing then we have to put credit to exactly what he writes.

So my question is:
have you read John Perry's paper...?

No, but The Problem of the Essential Indexical is described on his web site as a book containing a collection of John Perry’s papers, both individually authored and collaboratively.

There is a list of his individual papers and from what you have written it is possible you are referring to his paper Using Indexicals. In this he does talk about indexicals being utterances and then proceeds to discuss them in written form without seeming to recognise that he has changed what he is describing.

He does seem to say that a study of indexicals will lead to a change in one’s view of theory of language but this will only be the case if one shares his current view.

My view on theory of language is that language is based upon use so there is no underlying logic that will explain all instances of any particular set of words.

To write that "My view on theory of language is that language is based upon use so there is no underlying logic that will explain all instances of any particular set of words." doesn't mean "...indexicals being utterances..."

If indeed the indexical is supposed to be essential it must possible to write it! I think this is most certain. Even if John Perry emphasises the aspect of utterances, it doesn't take away "The Essential Indexical" unless he writes so!

So I've nothing more to add! The analysis is as it is. Cheers!

I've written "Indexical Free" on the examples above and this is not correct (although essentially, it is). I'm now going to put a lid on this indexical coffin for good!

Here it follows:
(the list from SEP, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/, is ‘I’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘this’, and ‘that’; ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘actually’, ‘presently’, ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, and ‘tomorrow’; ‘my’, ‘his’, ‘her’,‘actual’, and ‘present’ (some may include 'given' too))
Indexical free, from before (IF*):
John Perry once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing John Perry's cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with a torn sack to tell the shopper with a torn sack that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But John Perry seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on John Perry. John Perry was the shopper John Perry was trying to catch.
John Perry believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And John Perry was right. But John Perry didn't believe that John Perry was making a mess. That seems to be something John Perry came to believe. And when John Perry came to believe that, John Perry stopped following the trail around around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in John Perry's cart. John Perry's change in beliefs seems to explain John Perry's change in behaviour.
John Perry is making a mess.

Indexical free, now (IF):
John Perry once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing John Perry's cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with a torn sack to tell the shopper with a torn sack that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But John Perry seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on John Perry. John Perry was the shopper John Perry was trying to catch.
John Perry believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And John Perry was right. But John Perry didn't believe that John Perry was making a mess. The belief of John Perry that John Perry was making a mess seems to be something John Perry came to believe. And when John Perry came to believe that John Perry was making a mess, John Perry stopped following the trail around around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in John Perry's cart. John Perry's change in beliefs seems to explain John Perry's change in behaviour.
John Perry is making a mess. (Changes have been underlined.)

IF*:
In the first a professor, who desires to attend the department meeting on time, and believes correctly that the department meeting begins at noon, sits motionless in the professor's office at the moment of time. Suddenly the professor begins to move. What explains the professor's action? A change in belief. The professor believed all along that the department meeting starts at noon; the professor came to believe, as the professor would have put the words, that the meeting starts at the moment the professor realises the time, noon.

IF:
In the first a professor, who desires to attend the department meeting on time, and believes correctly that the department meeting begins at noon, sits motionless in the professor's office at the moment of time. Suddenly the professor begins to move. What explains the professor's action? A change in belief. The professor believed all along that the department meeting starts at noon; the professor came to believe, as the professor would have put the words, that the meeting starts at the moment the professor realises the time, noon. (There is actually no need for changes to this. Object if you disagree, please.)

IF*:
The author of the book, Hiker's Guide to the Desolation Wilderness, stands in the wilderness beside Gilmore Lake, looking at the Mt. Tallac trail as the Mt. Tallac trail leaves the lake and climbs the mountain. The author desires to leave the wilderness. The author believes that the best way out from Gilmore Lake is to follow the Mt. Tallac trail up the mountain to Cathedral Peaks trail, on to the Floating Island trail, emerging at Spring Creek Tract Road. But the author does not move. The author is lost. The author isn't sure whether the author is standing beside Gilmore Lake, looking at Mt. Tallac, or beside Clyde Lake looking at Jack's peak, or beside Eagle Lake looking at one of the Maggie peaks. Then the author begins to move along the Mt. Tallac trail. If asked, the author would have explained the crucial change in the author's beliefs in the following way: "The author came to believe that the trail the author is perceiving is the Mt. Tallac trail and the lake the author is perceiving is Gilmore Lake."

IF:
The author of the book, Hiker's Guide to the Desolation Wilderness, stands in the wilderness beside Gilmore Lake, looking at the Mt. Tallac trail as the Mt. Tallac trail leaves the lake and climbs the mountain. The author desires to leave the wilderness. The author believes that the best way out from Gilmore Lake is to follow the Mt. Tallac trail up the mountain to Cathedral Peaks trail, on to the Floating Island trail, emerging at Spring Creek Tract Road. But the author does not move. The author is lost. The author isn't sure whether the author is standing beside Gilmore Lake, looking at Mt. Tallac, or beside Clyde Lake looking at Jack's peak, or beside Eagle Lake looking at one of the Maggie peaks. Then the author begins to move along the Mt. Tallac trail. If asked, the author would have explained the crucial change in the author's beliefs in the following way: "The author came to believe that the trail the author is perceiving is the Mt. Tallac trail and the lake the author is perceiving is Gilmore Lake." (There is actually no need for changes to this either. Object if you disagree, please.)

To the uninitiated: there are several meanings of "that" in English. In the indexical sense, one wishes to take out "pronoun" and "adjective", leaving "adverb" and "conjunction" out because they are not relevant, simply. Thus only one example has been modified!

Perhaps, for those who may have finished "that" before me, I say "I made this" and you reply "I fixed "that""!
I've taken it out myself now! It has been utterly dealt with! Thank you for following my work on this! Cheers!

Just to add to this: there are clearly programmable opportunities for indexical-free language and you should be able to see this from the examples above. [input_name] for "I", [input_that_sentence-pointed-to] for "that", and so on... Even though the Hiker example comes out different, it's no problem to use the approach to the "that"-word in it, just for one example. Clearly then, there may be some kind of underlying logical syntax/code that may be applied (for better understanding to various problems in the future).

For instance, what about the possibility to provide a logic/mathematics for all things, including language and such... Although I feel saturated with the indexicals right now, it should be exciting to see where the spin-offs are going in the question of, fx., the alleged separation between belief and belief state that John Perry mentions in the end of his paper... There are probably many more to go at, for example in psychology.

Over and out! Cheers!

Some words on De Se, De Re and De Dicto:
All these positions come down to explanatory power which is a plausible claim where one "camp" claims superiority over the others.
*De Se claims to be closer to one's self thus closer to the best explanatory power. This is a plausible claim and you have to be in sympathy to it.
*De Re claims to be closer to the thing itself as focus, objectivity, thus closer to the best explanatory power. This is a plausible claim and you have to be in sympathy to it.
*De Dicto claims to be closer to the language itself and its use as focus, thus closer to the best explanatory power. This is a plausible claim and you have to be in sympathy to it.

The conclusion is that all of these positions have to be equivalent if the above considerations are to be taken seriously and I think they are!

Cheers!

[Edit:] Educational note: You may want to object over "3 best explanations, how can that be?" But I suggest that, when considerations altogether respected, they eclipse one another thus the emphasis falls back to the description itself and how it is made! [End of edit.]

[Edit2:] Additional note that may be to your interest: There is a direct conflict between Indexicality (indexicals are necessary) vs. Noun-ity/noun_placeholders (nouns have the possibility to replace indexicals totally [..., but this view is not dogmatic, i.e., you are not forced to stick to only nouns. You are of course allowed the full range of language]) So you can't hold Indexicality/indexicals are indispensable as a view if you are sympathic/adhere to my argument put forward here because I think it's quite clear now that indexicals are dispensable (perhaps not a pretty language, but still...). [End of edit.]