## Subjective Deduction Part 2

Known unknowns and unknown unknowns!

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Hobbes' Choice
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### Re: Subjective Deduction Part 2

Like I said before you are not paying attention to my points.

wirius
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Joined: Sat Jun 11, 2016 9:33 pm

### Re: Subjective Deduction Part 2

So, if readers have read through both parts one and two and understand the points I am making, I can address the great example Hobbes gave about the Swan and demonstrate how to view this through self-subjective cognitive and applicable knowledge. At this point, I have not addressed the multi-subjective, so it cannot enter into consideration. So the goal right now is to understand what I am saying, so that way when I DO go onto the multi-subjective in part 3, it will be a simple A -> B -> C.

I'll repost the example:

All swans are white.
Ginny is a swan
Therefore Ginny is white.

Is this knowledge? That's the wrong question to ask. Recall a huge point, that there are two types of knowledge, cognitive and applicable. It is impossible to have applicable knowledge without first understanding the cognitive knowledge involved. Taking the first premise, what is the cognitive knowledge of "All swans are white?" Recall that an identity can be whatever we desire within the self-subjective. So, how do I define a swan? What are its essential properties, those properties which the identity must have to be the identity? Non-essential properties as you recall are properties which are irrelevant.

As a mathamatical example, imagine that X=1. X =1 is the cognitive knowledge I created. It is a discrete experience. The essential property of one is its a discrete unit. Its is nonessential as to what that discrete unit is. It could be one orange, or one elephant. Those properties do not matter, only the essential property of something having singular discreteness.

Now the non-essential properties of the swan might be color, but they might not. It could be that an essential property of the swan is that it is white. In which case, that is how I, within the self-subjective, cognitively know that identity. Of course, I could just as easily find a swans colors to be irrelevant, and if I found a different colored swan, such a creature could match my current definition of a swan. If you have issues with this or are scratching your head, then please re-read and address the issue where I define cognitive knowledge from the self-subjective. Remember, this is cognitive knowledge at self-formation.

So then depending on my cognitive knowledge, lets us say I visit Austrailia and discover a bird that is black. In the second case in which the color of a swan is non-essential to me, I note that all of the properties of the swan match to my essential properties of my cognitive knowledge, and no other cognitive knowledge. Therefore I applicably know the black bird as a swan.

In the case of the first instance in which the color white is an essential property of a swan, when I find the black bird in Austrailia that has all the essential properties of a swan, BUT the fact that it is black, I cannot applicably know that bird to be a swan within my cognitive knowledge of the swan currently.

So I have three choices:

A. Applicably know the black bird to not be a swan.
B. Amend or change my cognitive knowledge to either negate color as an essential property of the cognitive knowledge of a swan, or to amend it to two colors now, white and black. In this case, what I once cognitively and applicably knew as a swan can now no longer be cognitevely and applicably known as a swan.
C. Create a new cognitive knowledge for the "black swan". For example, calling it a Sweg. The essential properties are idenitical to a swan except for the fact that Sweg's are black while Swans are white.

The situation is very similar to the Dretske "GadWall Duck" puzzle. My proposed theory of knowledge can fix the same issue within Dretske's problem without the need for "relevant alternatives" I'll link it here.

Page 54, section 4

wirius
Posts: 47
Joined: Sat Jun 11, 2016 9:33 pm

### Re: Subjective Deduction Part 2

Hobbes' Choice wrote:Like I said before you are not paying attention to my points.
Have you been paying attention to mine Hobbes? In any good philosophy argument, both sides must strive to understand what the other is saying. I have directly addressed your point on induction in knowledge, and pointed out that you are not attacking my actual points of the paper, but things you perceive my paper to be saying. An unintentional straw man, but a straw man nevertheless. You are thinking in terms of YOUR definition of knowledge, when the whole point of the paper is to tackle a new definition of knowledge!

To keep it simple, all I point out is that there is no rational agreement on philosophical knowledge theories, and I point out this means we've failed at knowledge. I claim its because of inductive justification. You disagree as to WHY its failed. The problem is, if you insist knowledge theories can be founded on inductive justification, then what makes any one knowledge theory more viable than the other? What makes it different from just a belief, which is at its core inductive?

If you still insist on disagreement on the why of failure, that's fine. Considering I do not use inductive justification to make my point for my theory, you can assume I am doing something different from your established belief of knowledge. As such, since we can both agree there are rational problems with current approaches and theories to knowledge, instead of arguing about my belief of why general theory of knowledge have failed, try to address the proposal to knowledge I am constructing and point out where that succeeds or fails.

Necromancer
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### Re: Subjective Deduction Part 2

wirius,

how do you relate to the Closure Principle, yours seem to contain it?

Even a subjective experience needs to contain truth in order to be plausible, don't you think? You seem to argue subtly that truth is part despite not writing it. Or, another way, can a theory of knowledge be a theory of knowledge without being true? I mean, subjective experiences can surely be true while being subjective, that is, before the experience is shared with other people to be ascertained to be true.

With Plato we have:
Belief
Fact
Justified True Belief

as parts for a theory of knowledge. How can yours go outside this?

Curious... Either way, you seem to add good description. Well done, wirius!

Necro-

Hobbes' Choice
Posts: 8385
Joined: Fri Oct 25, 2013 11:45 am

### Re: Subjective Deduction Part 2

wirius wrote:
Hobbes' Choice wrote:Like I said before you are not paying attention to my points.
Have you been paying attention to mine Hobbes? In any good philosophy argument, both sides must strive to understand what the other is saying.
At least you got this bit right.
Try and practice what you preach.

wirius
Posts: 47
Joined: Sat Jun 11, 2016 9:33 pm

### Re: Subjective Deduction Part 2

Necromancer wrote:wirius,

how do you relate to the Closure Principle, yours seem to contain it?

Even a subjective experience needs to contain truth in order to be plausible, don't you think? You seem to argue subtly that truth is part despite not writing it. Or, another way, can a theory of knowledge be a theory of knowledge without being true? I mean, subjective experiences can surely be true while being subjective, that is, before the experience is shared with other people to be ascertained to be true.

With Plato we have:
Belief
Fact
Justified True Belief

as parts for a theory of knowledge. How can yours go outside this?

Curious... Either way, you seem to add good description. Well done, wirius!

Necro-
Thank you for the feedback and question Necromancer! The idea developed initially from the JTB theory of knowledge, so I am familiar with it and of course, Gettier. The idea proposed here does not start with truth as a prerequisite, simply because it is impossible to do so. I find one must have a theory of knowledge before they can define and attempt to apply that definition to reality.

In clearer terms, my theory could be called "Deductively justified belief". From the creation of definitions, to their application, the knowledge theory I am putting forward relies, initially, on deduction. An understanding of how I define and apply induction in part four let me more clearly demonstrate what I am about to write, but I will try to lead in that direction with what I have written in part 2.

At a basic level, how do I cognitively know, or define truth? Defining such a thing is tricky because applying that definition must come next. If I define truth as some "thing", then to apply my definition of truth and applicably know truth, I must find that "thing". Yet in many ways truth is intuitively understood as something which can be apart from what we "think" we know. We have an idea that even though we walk around believing reality is one way, we may wake up day and discover it is not. Most of us have had this experience. Such a "truth" defined as something always beyond what we rationally believe cannot be "found", and is outside of applicable knowledge.

At this point in the paper, the closest I get to a definition of truth is "reality". Reality is something which can contradict one's will, but does not necessarily have to. As such, if reality is in accordance with what one wills, this is fine and truly needs no greater analysis. What we as humans rightly fear is having reality contradict our thoughts, our will, and our conclusions. Thus knowledge as I propose isn't a search for truth, it is a search for a rational examination of our beliefs so that we may make decisions rationally and not irrationally. A rational decision does not mean one's belief is "real", but it is rational because it relies on logical steps which can only conclude one viewpoint from the information one has.

Even though deductive justification does not necessarily mean one's applied knowledge is real, the decision to trust in that belief is made from the rational viewpoint that it is the decision which MUST be concluded if one is to think logically. This is far better than inductive justification, as an inductively justified belief may not be real, AND one's justification does not necessarily follow logically! Is it not better to deduce that the person before you is human than induce that the person before you is actually an alien in disguise? I believe so. I'll be posting part 3 tomorrow.

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