Is Compatabilism the only thing that makes sense?
Posted: Tue Jun 14, 2016 3:24 pm
ecision I make it within the causal reality of the moment. In that moment I consult my learning and experience; the understanding of the situation; and my imagination as to the possible outcomes of my actions. This is the best case scenario for the exercise of the will.
More often we react with minimal amount of thought in some of the potentially most dangerous circumstances, such as driving a car whilst thinking about something entirely different, yet rely on semi-autonomic processes which nonetheless guide my hands to the wheel, my feet to the pedals and my left hand to the stick. In fact for most of these action, thought and conscious decision making is far too slow. Were we to think about each key on the piano we had to press for each note, we'd never be able to play anything more complex than chopsticks. these are all willful, yet thoughtless or thought minimal actions.
It's my view that a conscious decision is much the same, yet we take time and weigh possibilities one against the other. In both cases we are relying on cerebral structure to do our work that lie deeper than the immediate conscious brain. And as we weigh up the possible actions we might take and their consequences, the instances we can draw on , the understanding, the learning, and our emotional motivations which drive us - all of these things come from a place deeper than the conscious mind.
So there is no doubt as to the fact that we are able to act to our will. But is it possible that we can command our own will, and from what position can we stand if not determined by the antecedent? When we act, in what way is this "Free"? What is it free of? What is it free from?
Consider. At the moment of our choice that the world were split into two exact copies. World A, and B.
In what way would it make sense to suggest that with two identical worlds that in A we could make a different choice than in B?
It seems we would not be free of the antecedent factors with which we made that choice? Is it not the case that we could act in no other way, but that the decision we made was the same in A and B. And if it were different, would that not mean that the decision we made was capricious, and of no real value, being random or fickle?
So should we not conclude that for any given moment we cannot act in any other way except the way we do. We cannot be free or ourselves and doing so would make or decisions hopeless and irrelevant.
What value is learning and experience if it does not give us the determination to act on those things?
"Free" can only mean from of outside compulsion. Though rare this is the only adjectival meaning that can be appended to the noun "WILL", and because of this the idea of determinism is compatible with 'free' will. What we are determines what the will requires.
More often we react with minimal amount of thought in some of the potentially most dangerous circumstances, such as driving a car whilst thinking about something entirely different, yet rely on semi-autonomic processes which nonetheless guide my hands to the wheel, my feet to the pedals and my left hand to the stick. In fact for most of these action, thought and conscious decision making is far too slow. Were we to think about each key on the piano we had to press for each note, we'd never be able to play anything more complex than chopsticks. these are all willful, yet thoughtless or thought minimal actions.
It's my view that a conscious decision is much the same, yet we take time and weigh possibilities one against the other. In both cases we are relying on cerebral structure to do our work that lie deeper than the immediate conscious brain. And as we weigh up the possible actions we might take and their consequences, the instances we can draw on , the understanding, the learning, and our emotional motivations which drive us - all of these things come from a place deeper than the conscious mind.
So there is no doubt as to the fact that we are able to act to our will. But is it possible that we can command our own will, and from what position can we stand if not determined by the antecedent? When we act, in what way is this "Free"? What is it free of? What is it free from?
Consider. At the moment of our choice that the world were split into two exact copies. World A, and B.
In what way would it make sense to suggest that with two identical worlds that in A we could make a different choice than in B?
It seems we would not be free of the antecedent factors with which we made that choice? Is it not the case that we could act in no other way, but that the decision we made was the same in A and B. And if it were different, would that not mean that the decision we made was capricious, and of no real value, being random or fickle?
So should we not conclude that for any given moment we cannot act in any other way except the way we do. We cannot be free or ourselves and doing so would make or decisions hopeless and irrelevant.
What value is learning and experience if it does not give us the determination to act on those things?
"Free" can only mean from of outside compulsion. Though rare this is the only adjectival meaning that can be appended to the noun "WILL", and because of this the idea of determinism is compatible with 'free' will. What we are determines what the will requires.