What are concepts according to materialism?

[raw_thought]

If it is private and subjective it is an example of a quale.
Yes, 1+1=2 is an objective fact. However, my experience of that fact is subjective. If one looked into my brain one would not see 1+1=2.

[Ginkgo]

If it is private and subjective it is an example of a quale.

That's what I thought. Even the strongest proponents of qualia won't accept that all mental states are qualia states.

Have you had a look at Chalmers' easy and hard problems of consciousness?

[raw_thought]

I would agree that all experiences are examples of qualia. All experiences are subjective.
Yes, Chalmers is great!

[Ginkgo]

I would agree that all experiences are examples of qualia. All experiences are subjective.
Yes, Chalmers is great!

I think it will become clear if we appreciate that scientists use the term "experience" in one way and supporters of qualia use it in a different way.

Works for me.

[raw_thought]

I use the dictionary definition. Materialists do not. For me experiences are what something feels like (See Dennett's definition of qualia). Materialist 's say that the definition (is and only is) of pain is C fibers firing. I say that the definition of pain is an experience that hurts. It is disingenuous (as materialists have done) to redefine words. Why do they have to disguise the fact that they think feelings dont exist?

[Ginkgo]

I use the dictionary definition. Materialists do not. For me experiences are what something feels like (See Dennett's definition of qualia). Materialist 's say that the definition (is and only is) of pain is C fibers firing. I say that the definition of pain is an experience that hurts. It is disingenuous (as materialists have done) to redefine words. Why do they have to disguise the fact that they think feelings dont exist?

Dictionary definitions are not always useful when it comes to philosophy. If we need to blame someone then we can blame Leibniz and his "Identity of Indiscernibles for the materialist position.

[raw_thought]

I disagree. Definitions are important for any field of enquiry. If words have no agreed upon definitions then communication becomes almost impossible.
I can say that loveis defined as gerbil....
Yes definitions are conventions. However, like driving on the right side is arbitrary, once adopted it should be the rule.Otherwise accidents will happen.

[Ginkgo]

I disagree. Definitions are important for any field of enquiry. If words have no agreed upon definitions then communication becomes almost impossible.
I can say that loveis defined as gerbil....
Yes definitions are conventions. However, like driving on the right side is arbitrary, once adopted it should be the rule.Otherwise accidents will happen.

If you use a dictionary as your guide to philosophy then you will find dictionary definition, more often that not will provide a qualitative,or numerical explanation. I would suggests these are not the types of definitions you are looking for. The numerical claim by materialists is that all mental states are physical states. Your numerical claim is that all physical states are qualia states.There was a method in my madness regarding my earlier reference to 'Leibniz's Law'. I agree with Arising, by claiming that all mental states are qualia states you are in the idealist camp. George Berkeley's empiricism might be of interest in this respect.

[Hobbes' Choice]

When I look at a scientific reading m

Existentialism is a mode of living which preferences the lived experience, beyond the suggestions of a mere objective reality. It is based on an awareness of self and a rejection of imposed norms and moral strictures that demand we follow the pressures of society.
Compatibilists are determinists which recognise that a deterministic universe is compatible with a sense that we are each of us deterministic agents able to express our will, live our own lives as best we can. It does not, and cannot deny that the will is determined by all antecedent factors, and the expression of that will is best achieved for the individual who follows a path determined by his own existence and not lived vicariously for others about him.
Our continual dissatisfaction indicates that we are driven through our lives Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, deterministic but not determined. That is determined by the conditions of the world, how we represent it and by the self, as a fully functioning agent.
We act as we will, but we may not will as we will to borrow from Schopenhauer.

[raw_thought]

I disagree. Definitions are important for any field of enquiry. If words have no agreed upon definitions then communication becomes almost impossible.
I can say that loveis defined as gerbil....
Yes definitions are conventions. However, like driving on the right side is arbitrary, once adopted it should be the rule.Otherwise accidents will happen.

If you use a dictionary as your guide to philosophy then you will find dictionary definition, more often that not will provide a qualitative,or numerical explanation. I would suggests these are not the types of definitions you are looking for. The numerical claim by materialists is that all mental states are physical states. Your numerical claim is that all physical states are qualia states.There was a method in my madness regarding my earlier reference to 'Leibniz's Law'. I agree with Arising, by claiming that all mental states are qualia states you are in the idealist camp. George Berkeley's empiricism might be of interest in this respect.

I never said that all physical states are mental states. My baseball is not a mental state. Yes, my perception of it is a mental state,but not the baseball itself.

[Ginkgo]

I disagree. Definitions are important for any field of enquiry. If words have no agreed upon definitions then communication becomes almost impossible.
I can say that loveis defined as gerbil....
Yes definitions are conventions. However, like driving on the right side is arbitrary, once adopted it should be the rule.Otherwise accidents will happen.

If you use a dictionary as your guide to philosophy then you will find dictionary definition, more often that not will provide a qualitative,or numerical explanation. I would suggests these are not the types of definitions you are looking for. The numerical claim by materialists is that all mental states are physical states. Your numerical claim is that all physical states are qualia states.There was a method in my madness regarding my earlier reference to 'Leibniz's Law'. I agree with Arising, by claiming that all mental states are qualia states you are in the idealist camp. George Berkeley's empiricism might be of interest in this respect.

I never said that all physical states are mental states. My baseball is not a mental state. Yes, my perception of it is a mental state,but not the baseball itself.

Yes, I know you never said that all physical states are mental states. This is the materialist position, and I know you are not a materialist. What you are suggesting is that all mental states are qualia states. I have asked on several occasions to differentiate between those states that contain qualia and those that don't. Your indirect responses gives me the impression there is no distinction. Is this correct? can you give me a direct response to this question?

[raw_thought]

See my post May 21 1:16 in the "Qualia" thread.
I wish these posts were numbered!)
Yes, I believe that all mental states are examples of qualia. Mental state is not defined as brain state. Perhaps mental states do not exist (I strongly disagree) but lets keep the conventional definitions.

[raw_thought]

Actually, if I said that all physical states are mental states, I would be an idealist like Berkely,not a materialist. No problem,I type fast also and sometimes write the opposite of what I meant. You have been kind and so will I.
PS, I am not an idealist (in the philosophical sense. I actually do have a positive attitude if one uses the term as is used by normal people and not philosophers)

[Ginkgo]

See my post May 21 1:16 in the "Qualia" thread.
I wish these posts were numbered!)
Yes, I believe that all mental states are examples of qualia. Mental state is not defined as brain state. Perhaps mental states do not exist (I strongly disagree) but lets keep the conventional definitions.

Ok, at least we have got that out of the way. How about we get this bit out of the way? On this basis, you understand your position is in conflict with proponents of qualia such as Chalmers and Searle? I am not saying this is an insurmountable problem , but it would require a very interesting thesis.

[raw_thought]

Can you give an example from Chalmers and/or Searle of a mental state that is not a quale?