Knowing how versus Knowing that

[SpheresOfBalance]

Most people would answer the driving question: 'that' they turn the wheel to the right until the car is in the right lane, then straighten the wheel. However, you actually have to - after you get into the right lane - turn the wheel to the left (past the straight, 12 o'clock point) before you then straighten it out.

My point was, although you know how to move your car from the left lane to the right, you don't know that you are turning the wheel back to the left before straightening it out. It is done automatically and subconsciously. Do you think that unconscious abilities are also 'knowing thats?'

Sure! You feel it, you know 'that' if you continue turning in 'that' direction, you shall not be in control of your life, 'that' you may loose it. Knowing 'how' to preserve your life comes after knowing all those 'thats,' 'that' I mentioned above. Knowing 'how' to do anything always starts with the facts ('thats'), making 'how' just a plethora of 'thats.'

I'm not trying to be a pain in the arse, I really see it this way.

That baby I mentioned in my earlier message. It didn't know "how" it's eyesight focused, only 'that' it did. It found out 'how' many years later, while talking to an optometrist or maybe a pediatrician, after they went to school to learn millions of 'thats,' then finally the 'whys' and 'hows'. Think about it, Newton had to know "that" an apple fell on his head before he could formulate the 'why' and 'how' of it.

To say that 'how' comes before 'that' is like putting the cart before the horse.

[SpheresOfBalance]

You would have us all know completely nothing, before knowing a language complete, yet "that's" not true.

Just the opposite - I am saying prelinguists and animals do know - they know how. Since you don't believe that knowing how is knowwledge, you characterize it as 'nothing.'
No I don't, I'm saying that "knowing that" are facts and 'knowing how' is the reasoning of the many facts.
I characterize it as prior to knowing that.
Well I see that you're incorrect, because one has to know 'that' something exists before knowing 'how' it exists.

You're walking down the street towards a corner. Do you know what's around the corner, not just those things you've seen before, as you've rounded the corner, but those new things that were never there before?

If today there shall be something new around the corner, before rounding the corner can you know either 'that' it is or 'how' it is? Of course not. But as you round it, as soon as you see it, do you immediately know 'that' it's there or 'how' it's there? 'That' it's there of course. 'How' it's there can only be ascertained once you analyze it's that-ness. When you see 'that' it's hovering, by no means you know of, a 'how' jumps into your mind, from all the 'thats' (facts) you've come to know, so you yell 'that' a magician/illusionist is the 'why' and 'how' of it, yet it disappears into thin air, as you then know 'that' it did, yet still not the 'why' or 'how,' so you place you hand where is was, as it disappears, and in 'that' instance you only know 'that' it did, still not the 'why' or 'how'. So you put you head there, where it was, and instantly you know 'that' everything you once knew around that corner is gone, 'that' you are seeing a completely different world, as if you entered a portal. You know 'that' it's the case, yet you still don't know the 'why' or 'how' of it all. But if you analyze it with all the human knowledge possible, the billions of 'thats,' thus the millions of 'hows' and 'whys,' then you may finally know the 'why' and 'how' of 'that' phenomena. Then again maybe not. Instead you might only know 'that' everyone calls you crazy, 'that' they say they know the 'hows' and 'whys' of the world and 'that' what you speak of is not possible. Yet you know 'that' you saw it, and 'that's' all you'll ever know.

[Wyman]

OK, I see why we're so far apart. I am not thinking of 'knowing how' as anything like 'knowing how something exists'. I am using it like 'knowing how to ride a bike' - an ability, nothing to do with stating a proposition or explaining anything or describing anything. The limiting case would be Pavlov's dog or similar instinctual/unconscious behaviors. Up the spectrum would be habitual and learned behaviors, most of which (maybe all) involve problem solving.

I used to think it was mysterious how doing a mathematical proof often involved little in the way of words or statements until after the problem was solved 'in your head.' Then, you could go back and put it in words in the proper logical order and syntax. Knowing how to prove Pythagoras' Theorem is much different then stating it as a fact or theorem. The method could consist entirely of moving visual images around in your head or among cutouts of paper or computer graphics, for instance. If you think of words in language as a type of imagery that has been mastered (like shapes or images), then you can see how 'knowing that' can be seen as a special case of 'knowing how.'

[SpheresOfBalance]

OK, I see why we're so far apart.
But we're not really. I understand 'that' you are including those 'thats' of knowledge, 'that' 'seem' to be unexplainable, like the balance involved while riding a bike, steering a car, or better yet, steering a motorcycle, and many other things, seemingly automatic, as if some fundamental "knowing How" is at work, even to the point of being innate. And I disagree, they are still knowing 'that's.' Just like when an infant knows "that" if it crys, their mother will come to check on them, it's knowing 'that' something will happen, which doesn't have to necessarily be put into words, no language is required. In all those cases mentioned above, the baby, steering, balance, the human in question, learns these things, "INITIALLY," by trial and error. But instead of reading a book or being told with language, they "feel" them out, thus knowing 'that' if they do 'that' then 'that' shall happen, it's a basic association on a subconscious level, to do with ideomotor movement or now renamed ideomotor phenomenon.

I've actually put ideomotor movement to the test. It is real, it worked great, originally I was astonished. If you want me to try and convey 'that' test of ideomotor movement 'that' I was guided through, by a psychologist, over the radio no less, back in 1980, I'll do my best. The only tools needed are some thread, a heavy object, like a finger ring, (I used my wedding band), and someone you can trust, I've even done it myself, to calmly and even toned, go through the post hypnotic suggestion, of relaxation, settling, calmness, until such time 'that' you are completely relaxed. Oh I forgot to mention 'that' during this process, you must have the ring dangling from the thread about 8 to 12 inches free play (when finished setting up, so as to be dangling free), wrapped around your finger, with your two elbows resting on a table, both hands together with the thread pinched between you thumbs, so the ring is just above the table, then resting your forehead against your hands forming a tripod, where you can look between your arms seeing the ring dangling between them. then you go through the hypnotic relaxation technique, after which you decide in which direction equates to a yes answer and which equates to a no, usually people choose to and fro for yes and left to right for no. Then comes the really freaky part, as up until 'that' point you see the ring dangling freely all over the place, I mean it's not doing anything but moving randomly in all directions, 'that' is until, while completely relaxed, you tell it to stop. When I originally did this with the psychologist guiding me through the setup and relaxation techniques, it came to an immediate and decisive stop, with no nervious movement what so ever, as if the ring was suddenly suspended by a rigid wire, perfectly perpendicular to the surface of the earth, perfectly parallel to it's gravitational pull, and just sat there. Then I was told to ask it a question 'that' I overtly knew the answer to as being yes as a control question. I did, and instantly it swung to and fro, as if via machine precision, then I was told to stop it, and again with machine precision, it stopped instantly, no bobbling whatsoever, then the same control question for the no direction, and the exact same thing happened but left and right this time, then again asked to stop it, likewise precise. Then came the fun part, to ask questions 'that' you consciously 'believed' you didn't know the answer, to watch your subconscious answer in complete truth, things you feared admitting. It all worked flawlessly, I was floored, because at no time was there any consciously discernible purposeful movement, on my part. I would, in disbelief, liken it to "my skin must have been crawling," in some extremely precise way. They were indeed invisible micro-movements initiated by my subconscious. A valuable lesson in human subconscious capabilities, 'that' at 'that' time, were unbelievable.

With the bike for instance, you know 'that' you want to drive it straight like other kids, you know 'that' if you don't you can fall, and 'that' you may be hurt. You try it, and as it happens you know 'that' you drift left then falter, at the same time you feel 'that' it's happening, again, the same thing to the right, again, again and again you know 'that' you falter, 'that' you fail to do 'that' which you want to do, the entire time you feel 'that' which is happening, as you think of 'that' which you want to do, muscle memory is being slowly shaped, along with ideomotor movement, the subconscious understanding of 'that' which you want to accomplish and are feeling, finally, all those 'knowing thats' are placed back to back which yields 'know how,' as you finally succeed, you're riding a bike, just like 'that' which you see others do.

'Knowing that' comes first, 'knowing how' comes with the combination, the reasoning, of a plethora of 'knowing thats,' back to back, wrapped up into one 'knowing how,' and/or 'knowing why.' One has to know 'that' something is true or exists, before knowing the 'how' and 'why' of it. Any complex ability, like riding a bike, is formed from a plethora of 'knowing thats' yielding 'knowing hows' and 'knowing whys.' Which is why it takes a little time to learn 'how' to ride a bike, many of the 'thats,' the subconscious has to feel, so as to put all 'that' is required, back to back, yielding the 'know how'. No one, for the first time, can just jump on a bike and operate it flawlessly. The ever varying learning curves, of various people, are due to an ever varying combination of 'knowing thats,' due to an ever varying environment, yielding an ever varying degree of speed at learning 'how' to do so.

I am not thinking of 'knowing how' as anything like 'knowing how something exists'. I am using it like 'knowing how to ride a bike' - an ability, nothing to do with stating a proposition or explaining anything or describing anything. The limiting case would be Pavlov's dog or similar instinctual/unconscious behaviors. Up the spectrum would be habitual and learned behaviors, most of which (maybe all) involve problem solving.

I used to think it was mysterious how doing a mathematical proof often involved little in the way of words or statements until after the problem was solved 'in your head.' Then, you could go back and put it in words in the proper logical order and syntax. Knowing how to prove Pythagoras' Theorem is much different then stating it as a fact or theorem. The method could consist entirely of moving visual images around in your head or among cutouts of paper or computer graphics, for instance. If you think of words in language as a type of imagery 'that' has been mastered (like shapes or images), then you can see how 'knowing that' can be seen as a special case of 'knowing how.'

[Wyman]

I don't think we're going to find common ground here, which is necessary for a discussion to progress, as we disagree over facts (what happens when we learn something or know how to do something). Factual disputes are never solved by conversation.

I understand you as saying that a 'knowing how' is an implication - an 'if...then...' statement. And it is learned through a process of 'reasonings' - putting together a bunch of 'that' statements. I think this fits many scenarios, but will often lead to confusions implicit in jamming a square peg in a round hole. For instance, everyone learns to ride a bike differently, so the series of implications (thats) characterizing knowledge of bike riding will be different for everyone. So everyone has their own, unique 'bundle' of 'thats' when they have learned a skill. I think if you look closely into this, it will become clear that each 'bundle' is both indeterminate and infinite. You hide this in your vague notion of the 'reasonings' which put all the facts together and in not clearly defining how you determine what 'thats' are - how are they determined, defined, enumerated. Obviously, the baby could not enumerate them - so is there some objective method of enumerating which 'thats' have been utilized?

And how do we come to know 'that so and so is true'? Presumably, like any other instance of knowledge, we come to know 'that x is the case' by a series or bundle of other 'that' statements. It can't be a 'knowing how' - such as 'knowing how to recognize a true set of facts' as that would place 'knowing how' firmly on a foundational level. So, it would have to consist of a series of 'that' statements upon which 'that x is the case' rests. How do you get out of this circle - where does the series terminate?

[SpheresOfBalance]

I don't think we're going to find common ground here, which is necessary for a discussion to progress, as we disagree over facts (what happens when we learn something or know how to do something). Factual disputes are never solved by conversation.

I understand you as saying that a 'knowing how' is an implication - an 'if...then...' statement. And it is learned through a process of 'reasonings' - putting together a bunch of 'that' statements. I think this fits many scenarios, but will often lead to confusions implicit in jamming a square peg in a round hole. For instance, everyone learns to ride a bike differently,
The that's for riding a bike are all the same on planet earth, that if you fall you will probably get hurt, that you need to balance, that you have to steer when required or get hit by a car, or that you may go over a cliff, that you could die. There are thousands more, and they all lead to know how. Largely because of ideomotor-movement and muscle memory, both beyond the conscious mind. 'That" there is such things, definitely leads to the how of it.

so the series of implications (thats) characterizing knowledge of bike riding will be different for everyone. So everyone has their own, unique 'bundle' of 'thats' when they have learned a skill. I think if you look closely into this, it will become clear that each 'bundle' is both indeterminate and infinite. You hide this in your vague notion of the 'reasonings' which put all the facts together and in not clearly defining how you determine what 'thats' are - how are they determined, defined, enumerated. Obviously, the baby could not enumerate them - so is there some objective method of enumerating which 'thats' have been utilized?

And how do we come to know 'that so and so is true'? Presumably, like any other instance of knowledge, we come to know 'that x is the case' by a series or bundle of other 'that' statements. It can't be a 'knowing how' - such as 'knowing how to recognize a true set of facts' as that would place 'knowing how' firmly on a foundational level. So, it would have to consist of a series of 'that' statements upon which 'that x is the case' rests. How do you get out of this circle - where does the series terminate?

I believe you're trying to make this more complicated than it actually is. The child does not need to know anything other than 'that' it was hungry, whatever 'that' might be, a pain in the pit of it's stomach, weakness, who knows and who cares. Make no mistake it knows (feels) 'that' something is amiss, and it is, 'that' the organism requires nourishment. It doesn't matter if it can quantify it in seven different languages or not. It matters not, that it can enumerate. 'That' it feels 'that' way, (knows), it responds to 'that' pain 'that' it feels and crys. It then learns 'that' when 'that' figure enters into the room, carrying 'that' thing, placing it in it's mouth, 'that' instinct takes over, and 'that' the pain disappears, 'that' it cannot compose a 20 page dissertation, as to "how" to request 'that' which sooth's it's needs, matters not, as the 'how' of it is finally built from those 'that's,' 'that' were in place first. Then it finally knows 'how" to ask for more. If not for those that's, it could never learn 'how'. Later it learns 'that' to cry is not tolerated as a 'how.' As all the 'that's' that the parents complain about, yield a more socially acceptable 'how,' "Please pass me the salt." The 'that's' clearly come before the how's.

You seem to want us to believe 'that' one knows 'how' to ride a bike, fly a plane, build and explode an atomic bomb, before they ever existed. To me it's common sense 'that' one had to know 'that' there was a need for such things, before they knew 'how' to satisfy them.

Are you really trying to say 'that' 'how' they were created, preexisted 'that' they were wanted, and all those things 'that' were in place, prior to them, 'that' gave way to 'how' to achieve them? Obviously all the 'that's,' 'that' were already in place, gave rise to 'how' to achieve them.

There was a show on TV, I forgot it's name, but it showed how invention A, finally, many years later, gave way to invention Z. "That" invention A existed, gave way to 'how' to create invention Z, but only after knowing 'that' Z was wanted.

All the engineers out there are cringing as they read your arguments.

[Wyman]

The child does not need to know anything other than 'that' it was hungry, whatever 'that' might be

Make no mistake it knows (feels) 'that' something is amiss

It matters not, that it can enumerate. 'That' it feels 'that' way, (knows), it responds to 'that' pain 'that' it feels and crys.

So a feeling is an instance of knowledge. Baby feels hunger = baby knows that (something); baby feels pain = baby knows that ________ ;
Baby feels tired = etc..

When a worm feels a pinprick and cringes, does it know 'that' something is the case? Is the feeling itself an instance of knowledge, or is there a cognition of something which arises as a consequence of the feeling episode? Is there any distinction you draw between automatic stimulus/response versus cognized/self aware responses?

[Lev Muishkin]

You guys have been verbally masturbating on this topic since November and achieving fuck all.
Some time ago I suggested it might be a good idea to nail down what was the nature of this standardly understood philosophical problem.
Instead you've been fucking each other in the ears, pretending that arguing over the terms is doing philosophy. Well it ain't.
Since this is a well known Philosophical discussion, it does not matter a rat's kidney what you personal ideas of the terms mean. You are just jerking.

There is nothing mysterious about the meaning of the problem. It is possibly the most mundane and simple of problems at face value, and if only pedantic and arrogant egos were not involved you might have got off the masturbation and actually talked about the subject itself.

http://aphilosopherstake.com/2013/02/20 ... know-that/

**I know that moving the pedals forward moves a bike. I know that holding on to the handlebars and turning them when appropriate will steer the bike. I know that squeezing the right lever on the handle bars will engage the rear brake and slow down the bike’s momentum. Do I know how to ride a bike?
knowledge
Intellectually, I can explain to someone how to ride a bike, but this sense of ‘how’ does not imply that I can or have the ability to do so. Having the ability to ride a bike involves some sort of practical knowledge, but the practical knowledge seems distinct from having intellectual knowledge. Practical knowledge often times requires dispositional abilities—I might not be able to intellectualize how to ride a bike, but I can do it. Know-how of the dispositional sort seems to conflict with our standard intuition of the concept ‘knowledge’.
One question that we should ask is how distinct are ‘knowledge-that’ and ‘knowledge-how’?

[Wyman]

Know-how of the dispositional sort seems to conflict with our standard intuition of the concept ‘knowledge’.
One question that we should ask is how distinct are ‘knowledge-that’ and ‘knowledge-how’?

That's the question I'm asking and I am challenging the 'standard intuition of the concept 'knowledge.'' What is the mundane and simple answer to the question what is the relationship between what this author calls 'intellectual' and 'practical' knowledge?

[Ginkgo]

Know-how of the dispositional sort seems to conflict with our standard intuition of the concept ‘knowledge’.
One question that we should ask is how distinct are ‘knowledge-that’ and ‘knowledge-how’?

That's the question I'm asking and I am challenging the 'standard intuition of the concept 'knowledge.'' What is the mundane and simple answer to the question what is the relationship between what this author calls 'intellectual' and 'practical' knowledge?

In my opinion pretty distinct.

A person riding a bike, a dog fetching a stick or a fish avoiding a predator are in essence all the same type of practical knowing. Knowing these types skills does not always require higher cognitive functions.

Hans Moravec,
"Encoded in the , highly evolved sensory and motor portions of the human brain is billions of years of experience about the nature of the world and how to survive in it. The deliberate process we call reasoning, I believe is only the thinnest veneer of human thought, effective because it is supported by a much older and more powerful unconscious motor knowledge...."
Embodied Cognition:Wikipedia

I don't see any reason why this statement by Moravec should only apply to humans. A bear or a parrot can learn to ride a bike by using sensory and unconscious motor parts of the brain.

[Wyman]

Know-how of the dispositional sort seems to conflict with our standard intuition of the concept ‘knowledge’.
One question that we should ask is how distinct are ‘knowledge-that’ and ‘knowledge-how’?

That's the question I'm asking and I am challenging the 'standard intuition of the concept 'knowledge.'' What is the mundane and simple answer to the question what is the relationship between what this author calls 'intellectual' and 'practical' knowledge?

In my opinion pretty distinct.

A person riding a bike, a dog fetching a stick or a fish avoiding a predator are in essence all the same type of practical knowing. Knowing these types skills does not always require higher cognitive functions.

Hans Moravec,
"Encoded in the , highly evolved sensory and motor portions of the human brain is billions of years of experience about the nature of the world and how to survive in it. The deliberate process we call reasoning, I believe is only the thinnest veneer of human thought, effective because it is supported by a much older and more powerful unconscious motor knowledge...."
Embodied Cognition:Wikipedia

I don't see any reason why this statement by Moravec should only apply to humans. A bear or a parrot can learn to ride a bike by using sensory and unconscious motor parts of the brain.

I see I'm not winning any converts here. Which is fine because a benefit of sharing our opinions on these sites is to test our theories and see where the problems are and what parts are controversial. But I think the above quote by Moravec is actually close to my position.

I see language as just another activity - a la Wittgenstein's 'language game' theory. So learning a language is just a more advance form of a bear learning to ride a bike. However, learning language creates the illusion that something of a wholly different kind is going on - rather than just a much more complex activity than bears and parrots are capable of. That 'thin veneer of human thought' is language, period. It not only is 'supported by ... unconscious motor knowledge' but is just a relatively new and complex form of it.

[SpheresOfBalance]

The child does not need to know anything other than 'that' it was hungry, whatever 'that' might be

Make no mistake it knows (feels) 'that' something is amiss

It matters not, that it can enumerate. 'That' it feels 'that' way, (knows), it responds to 'that' pain 'that' it feels and crys.

So a feeling is an instance of knowledge. Baby feels hunger = baby knows that (something); baby feels pain = baby knows that ________ ;
Baby feels tired = etc..

When a worm feels a pinprick and cringes, does it know 'that' something is the case? Is the feeling itself an instance of knowledge, or is there a cognition of something which arises as a consequence of the feeling episode? Is there any distinction you draw between automatic stimulus/response versus cognized/self aware responses?

What you haven't been understanding, and I thought I made it clear. It doesn't matter if someone can say they know that something is the case. That these things above about the baby are in fact those things that shall be, knowing that something is the case, after it learns a language and finally associates those words that apply. That just because they don't know it's knowing that something is the case, doesn't mean that it's not the case that they know. That those things that they sense shall become knowing that, once they know a language, which doesn't mean they aren't before knowing a language. People seem to be suggesting that we are brain dead until we know a language, then how do we learn a language? Because we know that to speak shall supply word associations to all those things that we already know.

And I could care less what anyone says, knowing how is simply placing possibly billions, depending on the level of know how in question, of knowing that's back to back. Whether one want to acknowledge it or bat around some hoity toity BS is irrelevant. It is the case!

[SpheresOfBalance]

You guys have been verbally masturbating on this topic since November and achieving fuck all.
Some time ago I suggested it might be a good idea to nail down what was the nature of this standardly understood philosophical problem.
Instead you've been fucking each other in the ears, pretending that arguing over the terms is doing philosophy. Well it ain't.
Since this is a well known Philosophical discussion, it does not matter a rat's kidney what you personal ideas of the terms mean. You are just jerking.

There is nothing mysterious about the meaning of the problem. It is possibly the most mundane and simple of problems at face value, and if only pedantic and arrogant egos were not involved you might have got off the masturbation and actually talked about the subject itself.

http://aphilosopherstake.com/2013/02/20 ... know-that/

**I know that moving the pedals forward moves a bike. I know that holding on to the handlebars and turning them when appropriate will steer the bike. I know that squeezing the right lever on the handle bars will engage the rear brake and slow down the bike’s momentum. Do I know how to ride a bike?
knowledge
Intellectually, I can explain to someone how to ride a bike, but this sense of ‘how’ does not imply that I can or have the ability to do so. Having the ability to ride a bike involves some sort of practical knowledge, but the practical knowledge seems distinct from having intellectual knowledge. Practical knowledge often times requires dispositional abilities—I might not be able to intellectualize how to ride a bike, but I can do it. Know-how of the dispositional sort seems to conflict with our standard intuition of the concept ‘knowledge’.
One question that we should ask is how distinct are ‘knowledge-that’ and ‘knowledge-how’?

That article it total BS.

This part had me laughing out loud, "Intellectually, I can explain to someone how to ride a bike, but this sense of ‘how’ does not imply that I can or have the ability to do so." Such contradiction!! As that sense of how he speaks of is a lie. It's him asserting that something is true when in fact it's not!

Some of these "so called" philosophical conundrums are really a joke. A word game, which says more, or is that less, of mans language than anything else. Or should I say, an individuals usage of it.

You guys should be ashamed to be taking that crap so seriously.

Knowing how is simply a plethora of knowing that's, placing them back to back. Yes reason, developed from extrapolation. And some of those that's are feel.

You guys, I'm sure would have us believe you are Talosians with big pulsating brains for heads. I know it's hard to swallow fellows, but you feel, yes you feel, and that's knowing that too, whether you have words for it or not. And it started on day one, that you finally come to terms with, many days later.

Oh and your demeanor, LM, makes you a schmuck, as you stroke your shaft!

[Ginkgo]

That 'thin veneer of human thought' is language, period. It not only is 'supported by ... unconscious motor knowledge' but is just a relatively new and complex form of it.

Agree with the first part, not so sure about the the latter. I know how to avoid a snake. If I unwittingly stumble upon a snake on a bush track, I know how to avoid the snake in exactly the same way a mouse knows how to avoid a snake in a similar situation. Unconscious motor responses don't seem to require any higher level cognitive abilities. A paramecium can implement avoidance strategies and it is just a single cell organism.

In light of Moravec's statement I would say when it comes to humans, primitive cognitive motor functions are difficult to separate from higher level cognitive functions. But just because it is difficult doesn't mean that as humans we can't initiate such a separation.

[Wyman]

Unconscious motor responses don't seem to require any higher level cognitive abilities.

That doesn't seem to jibe with the bear learning to ride a bike using only such responses.