What are concepts according to materialism?

[raw_thought]

I think the poster who said that materialists are nominalists is correct. A concept is a name given to a group of particulars.

How can a materialist believe in universals. Are universals physical. I think not. The concept "red" does not refer to a particular physical object or even type of object. One can have a red ball, a red house etc.

[raw_thought]

Do materialists believe that concepts are physical and tangible?
If I understood everything about Einstein's brain,would I understand Relativity?
Does a light switch in the "on" position know that the light is on?
The concept "book" does not refer to an object that has a specific size,shape,weight,language,title or any quantified property. * If only physical objects exist,then the concept "book" is meaningless because it does not refer to a physical object.
If knowledge is only a physical pattern, does that mean that a book that no one ever reads knows something?
* In other words a book can be any size,weight...etc.

Bit of a silly question. It's a bit like asking if one could understand everything about a computer motherboard, could one perform advanced computer calculations.

Of course I think that if one understands Einstein's brain one would not understand Relativity. For a strict materialist there is no difference between the programming in Einstein's brain and what he understands. Therefore, a materialist must believe that if one understands Einstein's brain one understands Relativity. That is obviously absurd and so therefore materialism is absurd.

[Wyman]

I think the poster who said that materialists are nominalists is correct. A concept is a name given to a group of particulars.

How can a materialist believe in universals. Are universals physical. I think not. The concept "red" does not refer to a particular physical object or even type of object. One can have a red ball, a red house etc.

That's the whole point - they don't believe in universals. So, they don't believe that universals are physical, as they are nothing. If pressed, maybe some would say that universals are physical 'somethings' in so far as they are words spoken or printed. But such mangling of expressions is just a product of playing your 'game.' Materialists don't talk about such things in those ways.

Why can't 'red' refer to a type of object? Just because you say it is so does not make it so. A red ball and a red house are two types of objects with some physical attributes in common - one such attribute is the arrangement of atoms in such a way that they reflect light in wavelengths (or whatever) that cause our eyeballs to react in a certain way. This reaction is similar in the case of the ball to the reaction in the case of the house; so we call then both red, due to our (culturally endorsed) learned use of the word 'red.'

[raw_thought]

“No, a name does not signify nothing, it signifies what it name”
Wyman
The signifier http://changingminds.org/explanations/c ... nified.htm “book” does not refer to a particular book.
Matter cannot signify anything. An arrow does not point at anything it is our interpretation that makes it point.
"materialism" is not a name. It is a concept. Since materialists do not believe that concepts exist, they cannot believe in materialism!

You and that website just state things. You do not present any arguments. 'Book' names a group of objects. Put an object in front of me and I'll tell you whether or not it is in that group. 'Materialism' names a group of spoken and written words that belong to the group 'materialism.' Think of it like a drop down list on your computer - when you click on 'file' you are not clicking on a concept, but a symbol that takes you to a group of other symbols.

You were confused as to definitions. Scroll back to see my argument. Do you disagree that one must define one's terms before revealing one's argument???

[raw_thought]

I think the poster who said that materialists are nominalists is correct. A concept is a name given to a group of particulars.

How can a materialist believe in universals. Are universals physical. I think not. The concept "red" does not refer to a particular physical object or even type of object. One can have a red ball, a red house etc.

That's the whole point - they don't believe in universals. So, they don't believe that universals are physical, as they are nothing. If pressed, maybe some would say that universals are physical 'somethings' in so far as they are words spoken or printed. But such mangling of expressions is just a product of playing your 'game.' Materialists don't talk about such things in those ways.

Why can't 'red' refer to a type of object? Just because you say it is so does not make it so. A red ball and a red house are two types of objects with some physical attributes in common - one such attribute is the arrangement of atoms in such a way that they reflect light in wavelengths (or whatever) that cause our eyeballs to react in a certain way. This reaction is similar in the case of the ball to the reaction in the case of the house; so we call then both red, due to our (culturally endorsed) learned use of the word 'red.'

Therefore materialism contradicts itself. For a materialist there is nothing that refers. Also, there cannot be a type of object (for a materialist) because that is a universal.

[Wyman]

How can a materialist believe in universals. Are universals physical. I think not. The concept "red" does not refer to a particular physical object or even type of object. One can have a red ball, a red house etc.

That's the whole point - they don't believe in universals. So, they don't believe that universals are physical, as they are nothing. If pressed, maybe some would say that universals are physical 'somethings' in so far as they are words spoken or printed. But such mangling of expressions is just a product of playing your 'game.' Materialists don't talk about such things in those ways.

Why can't 'red' refer to a type of object? Just because you say it is so does not make it so. A red ball and a red house are two types of objects with some physical attributes in common - one such attribute is the arrangement of atoms in such a way that they reflect light in wavelengths (or whatever) that cause our eyeballs to react in a certain way. This reaction is similar in the case of the ball to the reaction in the case of the house; so we call then both red, due to our (culturally endorsed) learned use of the word 'red.'

Therefore materialism contradicts itself. For a materialist there is nothing that refers. Also, there cannot be a type of object (for a materialist) because that is a universal.

Words (for one) refer. You're just repeating yourself.

Again:

Just because you say it is so does not make it so.

[Hobbes' Choice]

If you have an incoherent definition of a word, it is easy enough to convince yourself that, that which the word defines is incoherent.
If you define a word with innate contradictions, it is easy enough to congratulate yourself that you have discovered a contradiction.

But in the real world, you have found nothing.

[Ginkgo]

Therefore materialism contradicts itself. For a materialist there is nothing that refers. Also, there cannot be a type of object (for a materialist) because that is a universal.

The problem is that materialists will invariably reject any pre-suppoed ontological status of universals.

[David Handeye]

Therefore materialism contradicts itself. For a materialist there is nothing that refers. Also, there cannot be a type of object (for a materialist) because that is a universal.

The problem is that materialists will invariably reject any pre-suppoed ontological status of universals.

Yes, of course. You are right, I can't understand why so many matters in accepting this truth about materialists.
Personally, I find materialists quite boring.

[Ginkgo]

Therefore materialism contradicts itself. For a materialist there is nothing that refers. Also, there cannot be a type of object (for a materialist) because that is a universal.

The problem is that materialists will invariably reject any pre-suppoed ontological status of universals.

Yes, of course. You are right, I can't understand why so many matters in accepting this truth about materialists.
Personally, I find materialists quite boring.

I concur.

[Wyman]

The problem is that materialists will invariably reject any pre-suppoed ontological status of universals.

Yes, of course. You are right, I can't understand why so many matters in accepting this truth about materialists.
Personally, I find materialists quite boring.

I concur.

I once knew a circus performer who was a materialist - she was quite interesting!

I think you mean that 'materialism' is boring.

[David Handeye]

I once knew a circus performer who was a materialist - she was quite interesting!

I think you mean that 'materialism' is boring.

Actually it depends on the materialist,

Yes, of course you're right.

[raw_thought]

Words for a materialist do not refer. For example, an "on" light switch does not refer to an on light. It is just some ink pattern (on) .
Materialists contradict themselves because they do not believe in concepts ( there are only neurons firing etc) . However, "materialism" is a concept.* It cannot be quantified. Therefore, a materialist cannot believe in materialism!
* a concept does not refer to a tangible object. For example the concept "book" does not refer to something that has a particular weight, size, title, shape etc. A book can be large , small, heavy, lite....

[Hobbes' Choice]

Words for a materialist do not refer. For example, an "on" light switch does not refer to an on light. It is just some ink pattern (on) .
Materialists contradict themselves because they do not believe in concepts ( there are only neurons firing etc) . However, "materialism" is a concept.* It cannot be quantified. Therefore, a materialist cannot believe in materialism!
* a concept does not refer to a tangible object. For example the concept "book" does not refer to something that has a particular weight, size, title, shape etc. A book can be large , small, heavy, lite....

If you have an incoherent definition of a word, it is easy enough to convince yourself that, that which the word defines is incoherent.
If you define a word with innate contradictions, it is easy enough to congratulate yourself that you have discovered a contradiction.

But in the real world, you have found nothing.


When you know what materialism is, then come back and think again.

[raw_thought]

Hmmm,
So materialism is not a concept? It is a physical thing?????
How much does materialism weigh?
I always thought that materialism is the belief that only the physical exists.
But you obviously disagree. So what do you think materialism is?
Note, the context. Obviously "materialism "is also the belief that one should strive after material goods. I am not refering to that definition. Similarly, "mouse" can be a furry rodent or something you use with a computer.
Since you believe that materialism is not a concept and that it is a physical object, what do you define it as?
1. Materialism believes that only the physical exists.
2. Therefore if one says that one is a materialist, materialism must be a physical object.
If it is not physical object (since materialism believes that only the physical exists) then to say "materialist " is meaningless.