I am game for anything that is novel to me.
Here's what I gather from google."
MCKINSEY ONE MORE TIME
Crispin Wrighthttp://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1187/mckinsey ... e_time.pdf
§1 It is not always true that recognizably valid reasoning from known, or otherwise
epistemically warranted premises, can be enlisted to produce knowledge, or other epistemic
warrant, for a conclusion. The counterexamples are cases that exhibit what I have elsewhere
called warrant transmission-failure. It is nowadays widely accepted that there are indeed such
counterexamples, though individual cases remain controversial. One such controversial case is
the so-called McKinsey paradox. The paradox presents as a simple collision between three
claims that many would find attractive:
1. That many ordinary types of intentional self knowledge, including in a wide class of
cases knowledge of what one thinks or believes, are immediately available to a
normal subject, without empirical investigation, (in the armchair, or “a priori” in one
loose and popular sense of the phrase).
2. That psychological content is conditioned by various forms of externalist constraints,
with the effect that many ordinary concepts are available to a thinker only when she,
or her speech community, has had certain kinds of historical interaction with items
lying in the extension of the concepts concerned; and moreover, that the fact that such
external constraints operate on certain specific contents is something that can be
appreciated a priori, by doing pure philosophy.
3. That it is not possible to know a priori, by armchair reflection alone, anything about
the historical interaction of oneself, or others in one’s speech community, with
particular objects and kinds.
Suppose water is a concept of which it may be recognized a priori that point 2 applies. And
suppose that ordinary intentional self-knowledge encompasses attitudes to simple contents
involving water. That sets up the following reasoning:
(A) I believe that water is wet
(A+) If I believe that water is wet, then I or others in my speech community have had
a history of interaction with water.
(B) I or others in my speech community have had a history of interaction with water
Each of the two premises may, on our assumptions, be known without elevation from the
armchair, yet the conclusion (B), accessible from them merely by a modus ponens step, may not
be so known if claim 3 is accepted.
It is a nice tight paradox.1 How to respond?
— Should we allow the possibility of some limited degree of armchair knowledge of human