Panpsychism

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

MGL: all that is being demonstrated is CORRELATION between phenomenal experience and neuron firing. What is missing is the EXPLANATIOn of how one causes\produces the other.

Chaz:

I had not taken you to be a Nihilist.
If it is ONLY correlation, as it might be, then you can apply that skepticism to ALL categories of Causality; then you have nothing to say at all.
This is a perennial objection to induction which is very childish of you to assert. If you really want to do that then you are going to shoot yourself in the foot in many forthcoming discussions because you can use the same argument with the Dawn and setting of the Sun and the movement of the Earth.

MGL:

Induction, which I do not object to by the way, only establishes correlation between phenomena. What explains these correlations are scientific theories of laws of nature that science reduces to primitive properties of matter and energy. What is missing from your non-account of consciousness is the explanation of the correlation established by induction.

The inducted pattern of the sun rising at regular intervals without fail is explained by the rotation of the earth, because given the rate at which the earth spins one can DEDUCE how often the sun will rise in a particular spot. The induction that neuron firings are accompanied by consciousness demonstrates a correlation between the two phenonena but the neuron firings cannot explain consciousnes because you cannot deduce the latter from the former.

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

MGL: all that is being demonstrated is CORRELATION between phenomenal experience and neuron firing. What is missing is the EXPLANATIOn of how one causes\produces the other.

Chaz:

I had not taken you to be a Nihilist.
If it is ONLY correlation, as it might be, then you can apply that skepticism to ALL categories of Causality; then you have nothing to say at all.
This is a perennial objection to induction which is very childish of you to assert. If you really want to do that then you are going to shoot yourself in the foot in many forthcoming discussions because you can use the same argument with the Dawn and setting of the Sun and the movement of the Earth.

MGL:

Induction, which I do not object to by the way, only establishes correlation between phenomena. What explains these correlations are scientific theories of laws of nature that science reduces to primitive properties of matter and energy. What is missing from your non-account of consciousness is the explanation of the correlation established by induction.
[color=#0040FF]
Yes, that is what we are all missing - so why are you bothering to fill the gap with mumbo-jumbo?

The inducted pattern of the sun rising at regular intervals without fail is explained by the rotation of the earth,

Ooops - NO that is ONLY correlation.

because given the rate at which the earth spins one can DEDUCE how often the sun will rise in a particular spot.

But the deduction is based on the premise of the Induction being causal - so once again you are shooting yourself in the foot.

The induction that neuron firings are accompanied by consciousness demonstrates a correlation between the two phenonena but the neuron firings cannot explain consciousnes because you cannot deduce the latter from the former.

Sorry - it is every bit as valid as the sun rising.

[/color]

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

MGL: The inducted pattern of the sun rising at regular intervals without fail is explained by the rotation of the earth,

Chaz: Ooops - NO that is ONLY correlation.

MGL:

Ooops. No - the correlation between the rotation of the earth and the regular pattern of sun rises is not an explanation of the regular sun rise. It only explains the regular sun rises BECAUSE they can be deduced from the earth's rotation.

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

MGL: because given the rate at which the earth spins one can DEDUCE how often the sun will rise in a particular spot.

Chaz: But the deduction is based on the premise of the Induction being causal - so once again you are shooting yourself in the foot...Sorry - it is every bit as valid as the sun rising.

MGL:

All the induction does is establish a correlation - in Hume's terms the constant conjunction of two distinct phenomona AND an assumption that the correlation has some explanation in which the two phenomena may be directly causally related OR - again in Hume's terms - have some necessary connection. Any scientist will tell you that a correlation does not imply one phenomena causes another. In the case of the earth's rotation, the premise that it explains the regularity of the sunrise is justifed BECAUSE the latter can be DEDUCTED from it. The premise that neuron firings cause consciousness to explain the correlation between the two cannot be justified BECAUSE the latter can NOT be DEDUCTED from it.

Therefore the apology that it is every bit as valid as the sun rising is an excuse you still need to justify.

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

MGL: because given the rate at which the earth spins one can DEDUCE how often the sun will rise in a particular spot.

Chaz: But the deduction is based on the premise of the Induction being causal - so once again you are shooting yourself in the foot...Sorry - it is every bit as valid as the sun rising.

MGL:

All the induction does is establish a correlation - in Hume's terms the constant conjunction of two distinct phenomona AND an assumption that the correlation has some explanation in which the two phenomena may be directly causally related OR - again in Hume's terms - have some necessary connection. Any scientist will tell you that a correlation does not imply one phenomena causes another.
[color=#0040FF]
`No any scientist assumes it until proven false in reality - you are naive too.

In the case of the earth's rotation, the premise that it explains the regularity of the sunrise is justifed BECAUSE the latter can be DEDUCTED from it.

You can deduce mental acts from changes in brain activity. There is no difference here.

The premise that neuron firings cause consciousness to explain the correlation between the two cannot be justified BECAUSE the latter can NOT be DEDUCTED from it.

Rubbish. This is not the case just because YOU say it! You are just continuing to make yourself look silly.
Neurologist are already starting to PREDICT mental activity FROM brain activity. You have no case here at all.

tify.[/color]

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

MGL: because given the rate at which the earth spins one can DEDUCE how often the sun will rise in a particular spot.

Chaz: But the deduction is based on the premise of the Induction being causal - so once again you are shooting yourself in the foot...Sorry - it is every bit as valid as the sun rising.

MGL:

All the induction does is establish a correlation - in Hume's terms the constant conjunction of two distinct phenomona AND an assumption that the correlation has some explanation in which the two phenomena may be directly causally related OR - again in Hume's terms - have some necessary connection. Any scientist will tell you that a correlation does not imply one phenomena causes another.
[color=#0040FF]
`No any scientist assumes it until proven false in reality - you are naive too.

In the case of the earth's rotation, the premise that it explains the regularity of the sunrise is justifed BECAUSE the latter can be DEDUCTED from it.

You can deduce mental acts from changes in brain activity. There is no difference here.

The premise that neuron firings cause consciousness to explain the correlation between the two cannot be justified BECAUSE the latter can NOT be DEDUCTED from it.

Rubbish. This is not the case just because YOU say it! You are just continuing to make yourself look silly.
Neurologist are already starting to PREDICT mental activity FROM brain activity. You have no case here at all.

Since you mention Hume You might consider that the problem he proposes makes the entire concept of causality suspect. That would go worse for you whose claim is more far removed from probability than what we can actually demonstrate.
You really are arguing against us both - but the consequence would be to make your proposal less likely than mine.
I puzzled why you don't see this.
Whilst you want to claim that the entire universe is mindful you are trying to deny any causal link with mental activity and brain matter, as if brain matter did not qualify as part of the universe. Aren't you feeling ridiculous yet?

.[/color]

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

MGL: In the case of the earth's rotation, the premise that it explains the regularity of the sunrise is justifed BECAUSE the latter can be DEDUCTED from it.

Chaz: You can deduce mental acts from changes in brain activity. There is no difference here.

MGL: The premise that neuron firings cause consciousness to explain the correlation between the two cannot be justified BECAUSE the latter can NOT be DEDUCTED from it.

Chaz: Rubbish. This is not the case just because YOU say it! You are just continuing to make yourself look silly.
Neurologist are already starting to PREDICT mental activity FROM brain activity. You have no case here at all.
....

Whilst you want to claim that the entire universe is mindful you are trying to deny any causal link with mental activity and brain matter, as if brain matter did not qualify as part of the universe. Aren't you feeling ridiculous yet?

MGL

Yes. You probably can deduce mental ACTS from changes in brain activity.
Yes. Neurologist probably are already starting to PREDICT mental ACTIVITY FROM brain activity.
No. I am not trying to deny any causal link with mental ACTIVITY and brain matter.

Far from denying that brain events cause or are identical with mental events, panpsychism actually takes this for granted in its premises.

The hard problem of consciousness, which is what panpsychism addresses, is not the problem of explaining mental activity, it is the problem of explaining how mental activity has a phenomenally conscious nature, eg of how the conscious sensation of redness accompanies this mental activity. It is that property of mental activity which cannot be deduced from brain activity, unless that brain activity already has experiential ingredients in the ultimate processes it reduces to.

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

Chaz:

Since you mention Hume You might consider that the problem he proposes makes the entire concept of causality suspect. That would go worse for you whose claim is more far removed from probability than what we can actually demonstrate.
You really are arguing against us both - but the consequence would be to make your proposal less likely than mine.
I puzzled why you don't see this.

MGL:

My understanding of what Hume established is that causation is not somthing we observe, but something we infer in phenomena because of an a priori or innate and unjustifiable assumption of a necessary connection between phenomena.

There is certainly an interpretation of Hume that suggested he thought causation is not a real property of reality and I am certaintly in no position to claim what he actually believed.

As we are both taking it for granted that causation is real, at least in the context of this discussion, I am not sure what Hume's believed is actually relevant. My point was that correlation between two phenonena does not necessarily imply a direct causal link, not that there is no causation involved at all. My reference to Hume was made in the hope this might help you understand the relationship between induction, correlation, deduction, causation and explanation.

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

Chaz:

Since you mention Hume You might consider that the problem he proposes makes the entire concept of causality suspect. That would go worse for you whose claim is more far removed from probability than what we can actually demonstrate.
You really are arguing against us both - but the consequence would be to make your proposal less likely than mine.
I puzzled why you don't see this.

MGL:

My understanding of what Hume established is that causation is not somthing we observe, but something we infer in phenomena because of an a priori or innate and unjustifiable assumption of a necessary connection between phenomena.

There is certainly an interpretation of Hume that suggested he thought causation is not a real property of reality and I am certaintly in no position to claim what he actually believed.

As we are both taking it for granted that causation is real, at least in the context of this discussion, I am not sure what Hume's believed is actually relevant. My point was that correlation between two phenonena does not necessarily imply a direct causal link, not that there is no causation involved at all. My reference to Hume was made in the hope this might help you understand the relationship between induction, correlation, deduction, causation and explanation.

I think its helpful to relate to Hume's "mitigated skepticism". He considered billiard balls. For two balls colliding we have no a priori knowledge about what event will unfold. The moving ball might reverse, both balls might go off in unpredictable direction; or they might transform into a punch of flowers. There is nothing innate or predictable until we actually experience the event. For these common successions of action we tend to infer general rules. Causation (in this context) is a metaphysical proposition, a rationalisation that humans seem bound by their nature to seek out.
For pragmatic reasons we tend to use probabilistic judgements about possible outcomes based on the principle of causality. The wisest of us will learn to reject common contradictions of those predictions and change our thoughts on underlying causalities.
All this takes hard work and study.

I just don't think Panpsychism has anything to offer this process. Complete answers answer nothing. You might as well say- god makes it so.

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

Chaz:

Since you mention Hume You might consider that the problem he proposes makes the entire concept of causality suspect. That would go worse for you whose claim is more far removed from probability than what we can actually demonstrate.
You really are arguing against us both - but the consequence would be to make your proposal less likely than mine.
I puzzled why you don't see this.

MGL:

My understanding of what Hume established is that causation is not somthing we observe, but something we infer in phenomena because of an a priori or innate and unjustifiable assumption of a necessary connection between phenomena.

There is certainly an interpretation of Hume that suggested he thought causation is not a real property of reality and I am certaintly in no position to claim what he actually believed.

As we are both taking it for granted that causation is real, at least in the context of this discussion, I am not sure what Hume's believed is actually relevant. My point was that correlation between two phenonena does not necessarily imply a direct causal link, not that there is no causation involved at all. My reference to Hume was made in the hope this might help you understand the relationship between induction, correlation, deduction, causation and explanation.

I think its helpful to relate to Hume's "mitigated skepticism". He considered billiard balls. For two balls colliding we have no a priori knowledge about what event will unfold. The moving ball might reverse, both balls might go off in unpredictable direction; or they might transform into a punch of flowers. There is nothing innate or predictable until we actually experience the event. For these common successions of action we tend to infer general rules. Causation (in this context) is a metaphysical proposition, a rationalisation that humans seem bound by their nature to seek out.
For pragmatic reasons we tend to use probabilistic judgements about possible outcomes based on the principle of causality. The wisest of us will learn to reject common contradictions of those predictions and change our thoughts on underlying causalities.
All this takes hard work and study.

I just don't think Panpsychism has anything to offer this process. Complete answers answer nothing. You might as well say- god makes it so.

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

Chaz:

Since you mention Hume You might consider that the problem he proposes makes the entire concept of causality suspect. That would go worse for you whose claim is more far removed from probability than what we can actually demonstrate.
You really are arguing against us both - but the consequence would be to make your proposal less likely than mine.
I puzzled why you don't see this.

MGL:

My understanding of what Hume established is that causation is not somthing we observe, but something we infer in phenomena because of an a priori or innate and unjustifiable assumption of a necessary connection between phenomena.

There is certainly an interpretation of Hume that suggested he thought causation is not a real property of reality and I am certaintly in no position to claim what he actually believed.

As we are both taking it for granted that causation is real, at least in the context of this discussion, I am not sure what Hume's believed is actually relevant. My point was that correlation between two phenonena does not necessarily imply a direct causal link, not that there is no causation involved at all. My reference to Hume was made in the hope this might help you understand the relationship between induction, correlation, deduction, causation and explanation.

I think its helpful to relate to Hume's "mitigated skepticism". He considered billiard balls. For two balls colliding we have no a priori knowledge about what event will unfold. The moving ball might reverse, both balls might go off in unpredictable direction; or they might transform into a punch of flowers. There is nothing innate or predictable until we actually experience the event. For these common successions of action we tend to infer general rules. Causation (in this context) is a metaphysical proposition, a rationalisation that humans seem bound by their nature to seek out.
For pragmatic reasons we tend to use probabilistic judgements about possible outcomes based on the principle of causality. The wisest of us will learn to reject common contradictions of those predictions and change our thoughts on underlying causalities.
All this takes hard work and study.

I just don't think Panpsychism has anything to offer this process. Complete answers answer nothing. You might as well say- god makes it so.

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

Chaz:

I think its helpful to relate to Hume's "mitigated skepticism". He considered billiard balls. For two balls colliding we have no a priori knowledge about what event will unfold. The moving ball might reverse, both balls might go off in unpredictable direction; or they might transform into a punch of flowers. There is nothing innate or predictable until we actually experience the event. For these common successions of action we tend to infer general rules. Causation (in this context) is a metaphysical proposition, a rationalisation that humans seem bound by their nature to seek out.
For pragmatic reasons we tend to use probabilistic judgements about possible outcomes based on the principle of causality. The wisest of us will learn to reject common contradictions of those predictions and change our thoughts on underlying causalities.
All this takes hard work and study.

I just don't think Panpsychism has anything to offer this process. Complete answers answer nothing. You might as well say- god makes it so.

MGL:

it is still not clear to me what relevance this point has to panpsychism. Panpsychism is not intended to add anything to the process of explaning reality it merely makes an inference from it. The key principle is that a scientific explanation of one phenomena in terms of another should use rules about the former from which the latter phenomena can be deducted. If not, then the explanation is no better than saying - as you say - god makes it so. Now, this principle works perfectely well when explaining mental BEHAVIOUR from brain behaviour, but it is not conceivable how the rules governing the activity of the brain could produce the phenomenal conscious nature this mental activity.All panpsychism is saying is that - as consciousnees cannot be produced by the brain - and for there to be an explantion of how conscious properties are present in the world - one is obliged to assume they are a fundamental feature of reality, something like mass.

chaz wyman · **Joined:** Fri Mar 12, 2010 7:31 pm **Posts:** 10592

MGL wrote:

MGL:

it is still not clear to me what relevance this point has to panpsychism. Panpsychism is not intended to add anything to the process of explaning reality it merely makes an inference from it.

"It" meaning reality!? As you have not presented evidence for this supposed phenomenon you can hardly claim to infer Panpsychism from it.

The key principle is that a scientific explanation of one phenomena in terms of another should use rules about the former from which the latter phenomena can be deducted.

You don;t have a scientific phenomenon without evidence.

If not, then the explanation is no better than saying - as you say - god makes it so. Now, this principle works perfectely well when explaining mental BEHAVIOUR from brain behaviour, but it is not conceivable how the rules governing the activity of the brain could produce the phenomenal conscious nature this mental activity.

It does not explain anything. You don't have anything to show. You would need to demonstrate something. If this psychic essence (or whatever it is) where present in everything then you would need to explain why a computer has not become self aware.

All panpsychism is saying is that - as consciousnees cannot be produced by the brain - and for there to be an explantion of how conscious properties are present in the world - one is obliged to assume they are a fundamental feature of reality, something like mass.

But you are simply deny the evidence that does indeed exist; the brain does produce consciousness, rocks do not.

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

MGL:
it is still not clear to me what relevance this point has to panpsychism. Panpsychism is not intended to add anything to the process of explaning reality it merely makes an inference from it.

Chaz: "It" meaning reality!? As you have not presented evidence for this supposed phenomenon you can hardly claim to infer Panpsychism from it.

MGL:

No, the "It" meaning the process of explaning reality

MGL · **Joined:** Thu Sep 01, 2011 12:58 pm **Posts:** 230

MGL: All panpsychism is saying is that - as consciousnees cannot be produced by the brain - and for there to be an explantion of how conscious properties are present in the world - one is obliged to assume they are a fundamental feature of reality, something like mass.

Chaz: But you are simply deny the evidence that does indeed exist; the brain does produce consciousness, rocks do not.

MGL:

The evidence only demonstrates there is a correlation between brain and consciousness. This correlation remains to be explained by a theory.

If a theory is causal it needs to do the following:

1) establish all the antecedent conditions & stipulate the relevant laws of nature & properties of components. In the case of the billiard ball analogy the antecedent conditions would be the location of billiard balls and the relevant laws of nature would be, say Newtonian physics and the properties of components would be things like mass and momentum of billiard balls.
2) From the above factors the consequent event of one billiard ball being knocked and caused to move in a particluar trajectory by the other is DEDUCTIBLE. Note that no new type of property is being generated.

In the case of the brain producing consciousness a new type of property is being produced that is not reducable to any of the properties of the brain. The only option is therefore to stipulate an entirely new kind of law of nature, one that says - if a specific macroscopic combination of matter is formed ( eg into a brain ) then a new kind of property magically emerges ( phenomenal consciousness ).

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