The problem of self under materialism

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Justintruth
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Justintruth »

Londoner wrote:....

Again, this seems to be a problem with the notion of 'change'. I might equally be asked how an atom becomes a molecule, or an acorn becomes an oak. If this is really about 'consciousness', then there has to be a line we can draw and say this effect is quite different to all the other effects we observe, such that none of the normal explanations are satisfactory. ...
An atom becomes a molecule by moving together with another atom and forming newly shaped orbitals with some of the electrons of the constituent atoms. An acorn becomes an Oak by the motion of Carbon from carbon dioxide into the structures that are the tree.

In these examples and all of the others the key is that things have moved differently and that does not cause the change that is the change. A tree is just a different arrangement of the same stuff that was there - by definition. A CO2 molecule is just an arrangement of a carbon and two oxygen atoms that were there before.

But to experience is not an arrangement, or a type of motion. You can conceive of that motion being there without the experiencing going on.

Any form of "experiencing" is superfluous to the motion. The motion can be and experiencing be or the same motion can be and no experiencing occur. This experiencing that is not just a motion but some other property. Seeing, hearing, thinking, all of them - are not motions and that is what is different.

Try to find an example that is not motion within physics. With the exception of certain transitions in state described in the standard model there are none. But experiencing is not motion.

This effect - experiencing of any kind - is exactly as you say: "...quite different to all the other effects we observe, such that none of the normal explanations are satisfactory". It does not matter what kind of experiencing it is. No experiencing is described by the standard model of physics no matter how complex the device.
Londoner
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Londoner »

Immanuel Can wrote: It's the only assumption worth considering....I'm not a solipsist. You'll search in vain for someone to defend that view here. But the view you're suggesting as an alternative amounts to solipsism.
Then by all means make the assumption..

But you have wandered far from the point. We are discussing whether the concept 'consciousness' is meaningful, whether it describes anything in particular. You assume that I have a 'consciousness'. I am saying that this assumption is unnecessary.

I am not a solipsist, I also assume that there is an external world, but I don't assume it is all conscious. To assume some external objects, like humans (and perhaps other things) are conscious is a separate step. To think that 'consciousness' isn't meaningful doesn't make you a solipsist.
Only in the broadest sense. Physical entities are "things," but so are abstractions like "courage" or "love." All are nouns: some are concrete, and some are not.
If 'consciousness' qualifies as a 'thing' simply because it is a noun, then I have no problem with that. As are 'soul', 'God', 'unicorn', 'phlogiston', 'ghost'....
Me: I cannot disagree that we have the concept 'morality' (or 'consciousness'), but there is no mystery where concepts come from; we create them.
Prove it. Plato thought we got them from the realm of higher forms. Objectivists say they are real-world entities we are interpreting. Theists say they are grounded in God. Metaphysicians say they're metaphysical. Dualists say they are one of two kinds of entity in the universe, and Idealists say that they ARE reality....
I'm not sure about the accuracy of that brief guide to philosophy. However, if you consider concepts are one of those things, then by all means make the argument. However, I got the impression that you thought of 'consciousness' as more than a concept, that it was something in itself, rather than being an abstraction.

However, if your notion of 'consciousness' is simply 'a concept' then I am fine with that.
Me: I know you don't think this, but that it what we are discussing here, whether there is this mysterious medium 'consciousness' that allows you to escape from the sort of determinism that governs everything else.
Well, we don't actually know that Determinism governs ANYTHING, to be honest. But if we did, perhaps this would indeed be the next question. But I think "How much of the world is Deterministic" would probably be the better one, then. So maybe yours would be third.
By all means ask those questions. It is just that I had got the impression you had jumped them and were asserting the existence of this thing called 'consciousness'.
Couldn't disagree more. What is very clear is that Determinism grounded in Materialism can do absolutely nothing by way of explaining consciousness. That's a good prima facie reason for rejecting it...especially if, as you and I believe, consciousness is real. If you don't believe it, of course, then we're not talking to each other at all.
I am baffled how in the quotes above you point out all the reasons we must lack certainty, and then in this paragraph write that you believe consciousness is 'real'. You cannot undermine my position with considerations of metaphysical doubt, then refuse to apply it to your own. In one place 'consciousness is merely a noun, or a concept, then it becomes something for which there is empirical evidence i.e. conversations.

It is a very slippery fellow!

But we have had this point about conversation. I react to all sorts of things and they react to me. I do not need to posit something called 'consciousness' in order to explain that.
Me: It is a pity you will not describe where the difference is between humans and other animals.
The line you're drawing is in the wrong place; that's why. The real line is between conscious entities and non-conscious ones, not between entities of differing levels of consciousness. They HAVE important differences, to be sure: but that's not the essential question of consciousness, because it's already conceded to exist in some form even in lower animals.
I'm not drawing any line. I don't think there is a line. I'm trying to discover what you mean by consciousness.

For example, now you say that even lower animals have consciousness. But lower animals do not have conversations of the type we are having. I'm doubtful if they form concepts like 'morality' and the others you listed in an earlier post (Wednesday) as being 'inextricably tied' to consciousness. So, if you think lower animals have 'consciousness' then your reason must be other than what you say is evidence of consciousness in humans.

Indeed, if there is no clear definition, but instead what you call 'differing levels of consciousness' then you agree that there is no line to be drawn. In which case, since no living thing is positively excluded, then 'consciousness' just means 'alive'.

But it is absurd at this stage in this exchange about 'consciousness' that I am still trying to find the meaning of 'consciousness'. It really isn't for me to guess, it is for those who assert it has meaning to say what that meaning is.
Let's take an entity that we both agree doesn't exist: say, ghosts. If ghosts existed, they would interact with the natural world, but not be governed by its laws. Natural science would remain unable to describe them, since it by definition limits itself to the purely empirical. But that would be caused by science's self-imposed parameters, not by the non-existence of the supernatural phenomena in question.
If the ghost does interact with this world, then it would be governed by its laws, because science would have to adjust its laws to take account of this new force. (If the ghost didn't interact with this world, then questions about its 'existence' would be meaningless because both its existence or non-existence would have no consequences and thus amount to the same thing).
Me: So 'consciousness' takes its place alongside God; being spiritual it cannot be investigated through science.
Add the word "exhaustively," and you're probably right. Put it between "investigated" and "through." There's no reason we might think it has to be impossible to get some knowledge of the supernatural world, if such exists, through the natural world. It just wouldn't ever be a complete view.

Likewise, we can learn some things about consciousness through observation of ourselves and others; but we can't be quite sure, or present a complete theory, because that's indicative evidence, but not exhaustive.
But why would we need the notion of 'consciousness'? If we are learning through empirical observation of ourselves and others, then why aren't we just learning about ourselves and others? Why the need for this extra entity? Why won't all the existing words we have, like 'biology' or 'psychology' cover all our findings?
Londoner
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Londoner »

Justintruth wrote:
Me: Again, this seems to be a problem with the notion of 'change'. I might equally be asked how an atom becomes a molecule, or an acorn becomes an oak. If this is really about 'consciousness', then there has to be a line we can draw and say this effect is quite different to all the other effects we observe, such that none of the normal explanations are satisfactory. ...

An atom becomes a molecule by moving together with another atom and forming newly shaped orbitals with some of the electrons of the constituent atoms. An acorn becomes an Oak by the motion of Carbon from carbon dioxide into the structures that are the tree.

In these examples and all of the others the key is that things have moved differently and that does not cause the change that is the change. A tree is just a different arrangement of the same stuff that was there - by definition. A CO2 molecule is just an arrangement of a carbon and two oxygen atoms that were there before.
Absolutely. And we understand that. If somebody says the acorn has 'changed' into an oak they are pointing out it no longer resembles the acorn. They understand that seen in another way it is still the acorn. I would say the same applies to 'movement'. We can say both that the moon moves around the earth, but also that its relationship to the earth is fixed. It all depends on the context of the conversation.
But to experience is not an arrangement, or a type of motion. You can conceive of that motion being there without the experiencing going on.

Any form of "experiencing" is superfluous to the motion. The motion can be and experiencing be or the same motion can be and no experiencing occur. This experiencing that is not just a motion but some other property. Seeing, hearing, thinking, all of them - are not motions and that is what is different.
If I say an event was an 'experience', then I am (normally) saying I was part of that event. As you say, I can also talk of events that did not directly involve me. You write: This experiencing that is not just a motion but some other property. I think the property of 'experience' is simply 'I was directly involved', it is the difference between 'there was a sound' and 'I heard a sound'.

Humans are objects in the world, just like everything else. We act on things, things act on us. We describe such events, using different language depending on whether we were directly involved.
Try to find an example that is not motion within physics. With the exception of certain transitions in state described in the standard model there are none. But experiencing is not motion.
If we wanted to characterise physical change in terms of 'motion', then to call something an 'experience' would be to claim we have participated in some motion. 'I heard a sound' is to report that some mechanical wave caused my tympanic membrane to vibrate.
This effect - experiencing of any kind - is exactly as you say: "...quite different to all the other effects we observe, such that none of the normal explanations are satisfactory". It does not matter what kind of experiencing it is. No experiencing is described by the standard model of physics no matter how complex the device.
I think it is entirely explained. As I say, the only difference between experiences and any other event is that they involve us, as the subject. So to say this puts them beyond all normal description is to claim that events which involve humans are beyond all normal description. But whether we are different in that way is the very point at issue.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Londoner wrote:To think that 'consciousness' isn't meaningful doesn't make you a solipsist.
Well, if I can say so without implying an insult to myself or you, I think it has to. After all, one cannot doubt one's OWN consciousness. So if one disbelieves everyone else is conscious, then there is only one consciousness left in the universe....

Hence, "solipsism." No insult implied. Just a label for the belief.
If 'consciousness' qualifies as a 'thing' simply because it is a noun, then I have no problem with that.
Grammatically, it does. And you're right to point out that no differentiation on that point is made between actual and fictive abstractions. All are nouns. Now to the sorting process...
...I got the impression that you thought of 'consciousness' as more than a concept, that it was something in itself, rather than being an abstraction.
I think that's the best theory.
By all means ask those questions. It is just that I had got the impression you had jumped them and were asserting the existence of this thing called 'consciousness'.
Heavens, no. :shock: I was just clearing the debris off the deck first.

Materialism is the main impediment between us and any inquiry into consciousness, because rather stultifyingly, it pretends the very thing cannot exist, so cannot be discussed. That needs to be cleared up first, but then the rest of the questions follow.
I am baffled how in the quotes above you point out all the reasons we must lack certainty, and then in this paragraph write that you believe consciousness is 'real'.

Absolute certainty is not an epistemological precondition of "knowledge." In fact, it's impossible, in most cases. We get absolute certainty only in closed systems like maths and symbolic logic, never in empirical reality. But high probability knowledge, yes, that's what science can give us. And I'm all for that.
You cannot undermine my position with considerations of metaphysical doubt, then refuse to apply it to your own.
As you can see, I'm not doing that.
But we have had this point about conversation. I react to all sorts of things and they react to me. I do not need to posit something called 'consciousness' in order to explain that.
The problem has been that we must differentiate between "react" as a chemical process and "react" as a conscious decision. It's a false analogy to go from limestone to Londoner, as I've been saying. So job one is to get the amphiboly fallacy out of the word "react."
Me: It is a pity you will not describe where the difference is between humans and other animals.
The line you're drawing is in the wrong place; that's why. The real line is between conscious entities and non-conscious ones, not between entities of differing levels of consciousness. They HAVE important differences, to be sure: but that's not the essential question of consciousness, because it's already conceded to exist in some form even in lower animals.
I'm not drawing any line.
Yes you are: your question draws it. You ask me to distinguish between human / animal. See the line? :wink: I'm saying that it's the wrong line. The right one is human & animal (conscious things) / rocks and compounds (non-conscious things).
Let's take an entity that we both agree doesn't exist: say, ghosts. If ghosts existed, they would interact with the natural world, but not be governed by its laws. Natural science would remain unable to describe them, since it by definition limits itself to the purely empirical. But that would be caused by science's self-imposed parameters, not by the non-existence of the supernatural phenomena in question.
If the ghost does interact with this world, then it would be governed by its laws, because science would have to adjust its laws to take account of this new force.

You are correct. But Materialism cannot do that. It incorporates only the "material," i.e. that which is manipulable, measurable and calculable by its conventional material "laws." But you're absolutely right: it would have to adjust its ontology to include things other than those.
But why would we need the notion of 'consciousness'? If we are learning through empirical observation of ourselves and others, then why aren't we just learning about ourselves and others? Why the need for this extra entity? Why won't all the existing words we have, like 'biology' or 'psychology' cover all our findings?
We haven't even agreed there is an "us" to study, or a "selves" in ourselves. :wink: You have questioned the conscious existence of "others" as well. So surely we cannot study what we don't believe even exists, can we?

Biology will tell us about bodies, which are physical. Psychology is different, though: you'll note that even it's status as a 'science' is highly contentious among scientists. And this is precisely because it attempts to describe the regularities not of the physical world, but of human beings making conscious interactions and choices with the world. That's a messy business. It's the stuff of "soul," if such there be. It's nowhere near as reliable as the physical sciences. Scientists in general are often not convinced it's not just pseudo-scientific.

So far from solving the scientific problem of consciousness, Psychology will aggravate it by foregrounding the phenomena Materialism is at pains to deny any reality.
Dalek Prime
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Dalek Prime »

Londoner wrote:
Dalek Prime wrote: Well, without the consciousness, we are without thought. As to what it is, I simply accept that we have it; may, we are it. Otherwise, we would be no different from a rock ie. things without thought. Keep your premises simple, and you'll do fine. Remember, from solid premise, led by firmly connected reasoning. That's how a good philosophy is built. Follow that, and you'll do fine. You strike me as a good thinker, Londoner.
To say consciousness is the same as 'thought' isn't what I am looking for.

A very simple organism will react to stimuli i.e. it has something that functions as a nervous system. Does that count as 'thought/consciousness'?

If it does, then 'thought/consciousness' reduces to a very simple electro-chemical reaction. In that case, why is it any more mysterious than any other reaction?

If not, if 'thought/consciousness' is something else, something more complicated, then what is it? Because the problem will arise that (as with evolution) what now appears to be complicated is explicable in terms of the simple, i.e. that our brains are only more elaborate version of those of simple creatures, that there is no big jump that needs explaining.

As you say, a solid premise is always helpful. But with discussions of 'consciousness' we never seem to get it.
Immanuel Can wrote:
Londoner wrote:If we don't know what consciousness is, then we can't know we have it.
If you don't have it, then I guess I'm not talking to anybody. :wink:

Get the point? It's that simple. If "consciousness" is not a real thing, then there's nobody around to notice it. "Noticing" is an activity of consciousness.
This is a different idea of what 'consciousness' is to Dalek Prime's.

First, surely your first sentence contradicts the second. If 'noticing' is an activity of your consciousness, then it says nothing about my existence. That I exist requires you to have a theory about the nature of experience, i.e. to believe that there is more than your own consciousness.

But if there is something outside your consciousness, something that is affecting your consciousness, that it just another example of cause-and-effect. In that case, consciousness can be entirely explained in terms of toes encountering stones, sending electrical impulses along nerves etc. That is no different in kind to plants turning to face the sun. As I wrote to Dalek Prime, in that case the simplest life forms are conscious.

To put it another way, the word 'noticing' is reserved for when humans react to things. But if we replace it with the word 'react', then everything reacts. We could say that limestone 'notices' acid, meaning it has an effect on it. So what is special about reactions that they need a special explanation, just because they involve us?

So, I disagree it is 'that simple'. I think that every time we try to express it simply the concept unravels.
Perhaps it's best if we stick to talking about human consciousness, which is very unique and highly... nay, overly evolved. It contains that bit which allows introspection, and the ability to plan beyond our own lives. We can speculate on other animals, but we can never know for a certainty.

I recommend this essay on human consciousness, if only to better understand where I'm coming from.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/45/The_Last_Messiah
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Terrapin Station
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Terrapin Station »

Londoner wrote:A very simple organism will react to stimuli i.e. it has something that functions as a nervous system. Does that count as 'thought/consciousness'? . . . If not, if 'thought/consciousness' is something else, something more complicated, then what is it?
It seems to be a factor of a far more complicated nervous system. It appears to be a set of properties that only arise once particular structures of neurons, synapses, etc., and the processes of interaction between them reach a sufficient level of complexity.
seeds
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by seeds »

seeds wrote: The other “Will or Spirit” to which Berkeley is referring is, of course, God.
Immanuel Can wrote: Possibly, but not certainly. It could be Descartes Demiurgic Spirit, or some other kind of "will." Idealism per se isn't definite about that.
Oh come on now, I thought you didn’t like to nitpick.

“Bishop” Berkeley was a Christian.

Referencing Wiki once again, Berkeley was...
wiki wrote: A convinced adherent of Christianity, Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediate cause of all our experiences.
So clearly he was alluding to the Christian God and not some “other kind of will.”

And just to set the record straight for why we are even discussing Berkeley, it was you who introduced Berkeley into the conversation by insisting that his form of idealism was in no way related to my argument, to which I countered in the following statement...
seeds wrote: The fundamental implication of Berkeleyan Idealism can be interpreted to mean that the phenomenal features of reality are, in essence, “ideas” in the mind of God (with the “mind” of God being the universe itself).

To which you then erroneously conflated with Deism in the following...
Immanuel Can wrote: Deism. Does anybody believe it anymore? It has SO many problems inherent in it...
It was never my intent to promote Deism.

I was merely attempting to offer a plausible (non-materialistic) explanation for how consciousness (and by extension, the conscious “self”) could emerge from, as you put it, “...unthinking matter...”.

In fact, if you would make the slightest effort in trying to understand what I am saying, then you would realize that I am not only on your side in your argument regarding materialism's inability to explain consciousness, but I am also affirming the very reason why you being a “Theist” makes absolute sense.
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Immanuel Can
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

seeds wrote:“Bishop” Berkeley was a Christian.
An Anglican Bishop. What the Anglican Church "believes" ranges from nearly-Catholic to broad evangelical. So it's pretty hard to say what concept of God Berkeley himself had. But it doesn't much matter, since it's for his philosophy that he is primarily remembered, and his philosophy, even on the subject of God, is pretty broad.

Philosophically, he was an Idealist. That much we can safely say.
Immanuel Can wrote: Deism. Does anybody believe it anymore? It has SO many problems inherent in it...
It was never my intent to promote Deism.
Okay. It sounded rather Deistic, but I'm listening.
...I am not only on your side in your argument regarding materialism's inability to explain consciousness, but I am also affirming the very reason why you being a “Theist” makes absolute sense.
Yes, I think I noted my observation of our points of agreement, did I not?
Justintruth
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Justintruth »

Londoner wrote:
Justintruth wrote:
Me: Again, this seems to be a problem with the notion of 'change'. I might equally be asked how an atom becomes a molecule, or an acorn becomes an oak. If this is really about 'consciousness', then there has to be a line we can draw and say this effect is quite different to all the other effects we observe, such that none of the normal explanations are satisfactory. ...

An atom becomes a molecule by moving together with another atom and forming newly shaped orbitals with some of the electrons of the constituent atoms. An acorn becomes an Oak by the motion of carbon from carbon dioxide into the structures that are the tree.

In these examples and all of the others the key is that things have moved differently and that does not cause the change that is the change. A tree is just a different arrangement of the same stuff that was there - by definition. A CO2 molecule is just an arrangement of a carbon and two oxygen atoms that were there before.
Absolutely. And we understand that. If somebody says the acorn has 'changed' into an oak they are pointing out it no longer resembles the acorn.


My understanding is that the Acorn does not "become" an Oak. Rather it is the Carbon from CO2 in the atmosphere as demonstrated by Hooke.
Londoner wrote: They understand that seen in another way it is still the acorn.
Actually no it has nothing to do with how or even whether it is seen. It is still not the acorn but the carbon. Even if no one is there to see or describe it. Again it is an assembly. An oak is an assembly of atoms and the carbon in it came from the air not from the acorn.
Londoner wrote: I would say the same applies to 'movement'. We can say both that the moon moves around the earth, but also that its relationship to the earth is fixed. It all depends on the context of the conversation.
No again. It is true that for two particles one can adopt a frame of reference in which the particles have zero velocity. Einstein pointed out that for three particles you can't do that. The tree is an assembly of way more than three. That means the relative motion of its molecules cannot be transformed away.

And saying that the tree is and assembly is not the same as saying that the tree can be spoken of as an assembly. I am saying it is an assembly not that it can be spoken of as one. The way it is spoken of is not important. It is not the context of a conversation or anything to do with speech. It is about the nature of the tree. It is not about ways of speaking. The claim is that the tree really is an assembly of atoms and if you take a piece of it into the lab you can show how that is so... independent of the context of the conversation.

Now motion of only two particles is a very sophisticated conversation. It involves General Relativity. I will admit that I am out of my depth on this. While I understand General Relativity somewhat this particular problem has to do with Mach's principle in a universe in which there are no stars. What would be needed would be a solution of Einstein's equation in General Relativity - that's just normal General Relativity. But what boundary conditions? My understanding is that there are boundary conditions at infinity required for the solutions like the Schwarzschild solution and that at infinity one assumes the flat Lorenz metric. Once one does that then motion can be established relative to that flat Lorentz frame at infinity. But we are again back to pre-relativity as what makes that frame "special" and deserving of that flat metric? - according to Mach nothing. So do we find a solution to the equation without boundary conditions? If anyone reading this knows how that is handled I'd love to hear it.

A colleague once said the answer is simple. Accelerated motion is not relative. Now I hate to say that is true but....
Londoner wrote:
But to experience is not an arrangement, or a type of motion. You can conceive of that motion being there without the experiencing going on.

Any form of "experiencing" is superfluous to the motion. The motion can be and experiencing be or the same motion can be and no experiencing occur. This experiencing that is not just a motion but some other property. Seeing, hearing, thinking, all of them - are not motions and that is what is different.
If I say an event was an 'experience', then I am (normally) saying I was part of that event.
This is just wrong. Experiencing occurs all the time when I am not present. But for that experience of mine where I am present: saying that I am experiencing - let's say a color red for example - does not normally mean that I was part of that event. My presence may be a pre-requisite for my seeing but it is only a necessary not sufficient condition. You cannot conflate "I was there" with "I experienced". Not (normally) . Not anyway. It's just incorrect. I was there present, yes, but I also heard. Those are two different reports of two different facts. One represents the physical location of my body. The other an experiencing that occurred of a specific type - hearing.
Londoner wrote: As you say, I can also talk of events that did not directly involve me. You write: This experiencing that is not just a motion but some other property. I think the property of 'experience' is simply 'I was directly involved', it is the difference between 'there was a sound' and 'I heard a sound'.
Again you cannot conflate presence with hearing. A deaf person can be as present as I and not hear. But even if you find some way to keep deaf people away - saying that I was involved is not the same thing as saying that I heard. In fact the phrase "there was a sound" is ambiguous. There were compressions and rarefication of the air traveling (motion) in the air and if by sound you mean that then there was a sound. But the term sound can also refer to experiencing in a particular set of ways. Those ways of experiencing are connected to those compressions and rarefications by the biological sensory aparati that includes the ear etc. That connection can be altered and sound in the experiencial sense can be generated by say light in the sense of visible frequency electromagnetic radiation. The connection or sound in the experiential sense to the compressions and rareifications is therefore accidental. I need not be present to sound waves to hear and sound waves need not be heard to be.

You cannot say that to hear means to be present. It does not. Two separate realities are picked up by those phrases. Equivocation is a logical fallacy.
Londoner wrote: Humans are objects in the world, just like everything else. We act on things, things act on us. We describe such events, using different language depending on whether we were directly involved.
Nor can you conflate this with a way of speaking. Even if no speaking were done about it and independent of how it is spoken about the event in the world of hearing is not the same as the event of being present to some stimuli. Nor is is the motion of all of the atoms in the brain, the sensory pathways and beyond into the world. Those molecules and structures all move and interact - that is true. But it is also true that they hear. And that hearing is not just motion. More is happening than motion no matter how we choose to capture the facts in language. There is a factual addition - the actual hearing - to the factual motion of the molecules.
Londoner wrote:
Try to find an example that is not motion within physics. With the exception of certain transitions in state described in the standard model there are none. But experiencing is not motion.
If we wanted to characterise physical change in terms of 'motion',
With little exception you must - motion here is taken figuratively to represent the way the path integrals work in QED for example - but the laws of physics specify what changes occur. You can adopt other physics but then you are beyond science.
Londoner wrote:....
then to call something an 'experience' would be to claim we have participated in some motion.
Again, to claim we have participated in motion is not the same as claiming we heard or saw. And further that statement must be interpreted as meaning not just something about the way you can claim. The claiming is incidental to the facts. The facts are that brains do not just move. They see. They actually see. Independent of our claims about them. And that fact that they see is not the same fact that they move in some way.

Even if whenever seeing occurs molecules are set up in such and such a way and whenever molecules are set up in such and such a way there is always seeing - even if the sets are one to one onto - that does not mean that the seeing is the molecules being set up in such and such a way. There is a factual difference between the two situations. Talking about an arrangement of molecules - take a thermostat for example - as if it sees is not the same situation as the thermostat actually seeing. Brains actually see. It is doubtful that thermostats do. But I can say "The thermostat saw the temperature change and started the air conditioner". But saying that something happened does not make it happen and in fact a better description would be that the energy around the metal of the thermistor moved into it as its molecules moved with more energy due to collisions with the atmosphere around it. That means that the metal expanded which etc etc motion following motion including the air conditioner pumping heat out of the room. No seeing actually occurred there. [/quote]
Londoner wrote: 'I heard a sound' is to report that some mechanical wave caused my tympanic membrane to vibrate.
False. Just false. You can cut the link between the membrane and the brain. You can anesthetize the brain. You can... there are so many counterexamples.

Londoner wrote:
This effect - experiencing of any kind - is exactly as you say: "...quite different to all the other effects we observe, such that none of the normal explanations are satisfactory". It does not matter what kind of experiencing it is. No experiencing is described by the standard model of physics no matter how complex the device.
I think it is entirely explained. As I say, the only difference between experiences and any other event is that they involve us, as the subject.
They involve someone or something that hears - you might be able to carry that although there are sophisticated attacks even on that much. But to imply that the statement that hearing occurs refers to the fact of general involvement that is simple equivocation. It's just an incorrect report of the facts.

Londoner wrote: So to say this puts them beyond all normal description is to claim that events which involve humans are beyond all normal description.
Beyond all normal description????? Who said that? They are not beyond normal description. We do it all the time. Red, loud, stinky. This is a pure straw man.

Londoner wrote: But whether we are different in that way is the very point at issue.
We are not different in that way. My claim is there are very simple ways of describing the facts and not leaving out or equivocating them and that we should adopt them so we can move out of the shallows and attack the real problems that arise as a consequence.

We need to examine our experiencing carefully and decide its meaning.
Dalek Prime
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Dalek Prime »

seeds wrote:
seeds wrote: The other “Will or Spirit” to which Berkeley is referring is, of course, God.
Immanuel Can wrote: Possibly, but not certainly. It could be Descartes Demiurgic Spirit, or some other kind of "will." Idealism per se isn't definite about that.
Oh come on now, I thought you didn’t like to nitpick.

“Bishop” Berkeley was a Christian.

Referencing Wiki once again, Berkeley was...
wiki wrote: A convinced adherent of Christianity, Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediate cause of all our experiences.
So clearly he was alluding to the Christian God and not some “other kind of will.”

And just to set the record straight for why we are even discussing Berkeley, it was you who introduced Berkeley into the conversation by insisting that his form of idealism was in no way related to my argument, to which I countered in the following statement...
seeds wrote: The fundamental implication of Berkeleyan Idealism can be interpreted to mean that the phenomenal features of reality are, in essence, “ideas” in the mind of God (with the “mind” of God being the universe itself).

To which you then erroneously conflated with Deism in the following...
Immanuel Can wrote: Deism. Does anybody believe it anymore? It has SO many problems inherent in it...
It was never my intent to promote Deism.

I was merely attempting to offer a plausible (non-materialistic) explanation for how consciousness (and by extension, the conscious “self”) could emerge from, as you put it, “...unthinking matter...”.

In fact, if you would make the slightest effort in trying to understand what I am saying, then you would realize that I am not only on your side in your argument regarding materialism's inability to explain consciousness, but I am also affirming the very reason why you being a “Theist” makes absolute sense.
_______
What's wrong with deism? Mind, it's tougher to back up than, say, misotheism, because it makes unprovable assumptions about the nature of deity. Misotheism, on the other hand, makes few if any assumptions, being a feeling towards God and creation, belonging solely to the bearer of those feelings, and not unlike a theist's stance to choose to appreciate God and creation. Actually, come to think of it, they are theists as well, as are deists (at least the true ones, who don't use it as a cover for atheism), as they do not deny God's existence.
Last edited by Dalek Prime on Sat Oct 22, 2016 3:03 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Justintruth
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Justintruth »

Dalek Prime wrote: I recommend this essay on human consciousness, if only to better understand where I'm coming from.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/45/The_Last_Messiah
Interesting article. Reminiscent of Nietzsche.

I think the problem with it is a conflation of the universe with being. The universe is what is. But being is that what is is and there is a difference.

There are experiences to be had that defeat that sense of fear and despair. Death and doom and that sense of randomness that is not just randomness but is tinged with meaninglessness - all of it is at root misinterpretation of being.

To speak loosely: What happened is evolution needed three things - an organism that had the ability to manipulate its environment sufficiently to skew survival probabilities in its favor, an urge in that organism to reproduce, and a desire in that organism to live.

It's solution, ontology and the way it plays out in our nature, is imperfect, perhaps, when judged by the individual and indeed there are many teenagers who opt out and kill themselves before they reproduce just because of a form of this alienation. But at root, that desire to be at the foundation of the survival instinct is related to ontological awareness. An experience of being that is derived from naïve materialism defeats the direct experiencing of being and short circuits the evolution provided reward substituting fear, dread, boredom, nausea, etc. The polar opposite experience of mystical ecstasy - is an immersion of the self in being itself - a heightened sense of being and consequent fulfillment of the survival instinct with its release of whatever is needed to experience that ecstasy.

The fact is that even though we die we still are. In a sense death is just the end of life. Being is eternal and death cannot affect it for that reason.

Now to see that way all the time? Just doesn't happen in our current states. An analysis of power and money and danger needs to be done with its relation to this question. For being, doing, and having somehow play out and we get the "varieties of ontological experience". The billionaire, the tyrant, the rock climber - all trying to dispel the gloom!
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Dalek Prime »

Justintruth wrote:
Dalek Prime wrote: I recommend this essay on human consciousness, if only to better understand where I'm coming from.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/45/The_Last_Messiah
Interesting article. Reminiscent of Nietzsche.

I think the problem with it is a conflation of the universe with being. The universe is what is. But being is that what is is and there is a difference.

There are experiences to be had that defeat that sense of fear and despair. Death and doom and that sense of randomness that is not just randomness but is tinged with meaninglessness - all of it is at root misinterpretation of being.

To speak loosely: What happened is evolution needed three things - an organism that had the ability to manipulate its environment sufficiently to skew survival probabilities in its favor, an urge in that organism to reproduce, and a desire in that organism to live.

It's solution, ontology and the way it plays out in our nature, is imperfect, perhaps, when judged by the individual and indeed there are many teenagers who opt out and kill themselves before they reproduce just because of a form of this alienation. But at root, that desire to be at the foundation of the survival instinct is related to ontological awareness. An experience of being that is derived from naïve materialism defeats the direct experiencing of being and short circuits the evolution provided reward substituting fear, dread, boredom, nausea, etc. The polar opposite experience of mystical ecstasy - is an immersion of the self in being itself - a heightened sense of being and consequent fulfillment of the survival instinct with its release of whatever is needed to experience that ecstasy.

The fact is that even though we die we still are. In a sense death is just the end of life. Being is eternal and death cannot affect it for that reason.

Now to see that way all the time? Just doesn't happen in our current states. An analysis of power and money and danger needs to be done with its relation to this question. For being, doing, and having somehow play out and we get the "varieties of ontological experience". The billionaire, the tyrant, the rock climber - all trying to dispel the gloom!
Nothing akin to Nietzsche. And I beg to differ with your interpretation of antinatalism, and what it is. Oh well. I'm used to it. Carry on.

By the way, you are not eternal. You are sandwiched between two nothings; the nothing you were before your consciousness, and the nothing after. Oh yeah, sure, matter was there before, and the matter will be there afterwards. But not your matter. It's not yours to keep, as it wasn't yours before. All that mattered was the matrix that allowed the consciousness to be. And unless you can show me a disembodied consciousness outside of that temporary matrix, I'm not satisfied with your prognostication of eternity.
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by uwot »

Immanuel Can wrote:Absolute certainty is not an epistemological precondition of "knowledge." In fact, it's impossible, in most cases. We get absolute certainty only in closed systems like maths and symbolic logic, never in empirical reality. But high probability knowledge, yes, that's what science can give us. And I'm all for that.
C+. This shows some development in your understanding of science, Mr Can. Well done for recognising the distinction between analytic and empirical. I feel, however, that there is still work to be done on how you interpret the role of probability. To use the example of gravity; it is not a scientific hypothesis that things which are dropped will fall to the ground. We all experience that, and by induction, assume we probably always will. The scientific part of gravity is twofold.
Firstly, there is the measurement, which has been done methodically since Galileo rolled his balls down his slope. The acceleration has been found to be approximately 9.8mss. That is not probably true, it is demonstrably the case.
Then there is the explanatory hypothesis; the warping of spacetime by matter, for example. Beyond the fact that the model works reasonably well, there are no agreed criteria by which such hypotheses can be judged to be probable, it is simply a matter of individual taste. If it pleases you to believe that angels fart on your teacup when you drop it, there is nothing to contradict that. What makes an hypothesis 'scientific', is that it is pretty much anything other than 'God did it.' In other words, there will be some prediction that can be tested. It may take time, but when the experiments are done, they either confirm that the model works reasonably well, or they don't.
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Dalek Prime wrote: What's wrong with deism?
I would say it was a solution that pleases no one, and that answers far too few questions and explains too few phenomena. In other words, what we would call, not a "powerful" explanatory model.

Religiously, what's the relevance of the famed permanent "Absentee Landlord"? It amounts to a "God is NOW dead" kind of thing, since He's no longer an effective Agent in the universe. Scientifically, there's perhaps some utility to it in accounting for origins -- and it would help somewhat answer the "self" problem, for sure -- and it would ground science's primary supposition of the existence of natural laws; still, it is surely of limited importance, since it deals only with the past, and does not really help us with an account of what goes on presently or in the future. From an Atheistic point of view, if true, Deism defeats its central and only postulate, and that would surely not be considered desirable by them. And from an Agnostic point of view, if true, it would make the doubt element errant and the belief element unimportant: there would be an answer to whether or not there once was a God, but
since He would be unknowable and irrelevant to the future, what's the value gained by the end of the doubt? Believe or disbelieve, it makes no difference.

So who's winning here? What's the attraction of Deism?
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Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by uwot »

Immanuel Can wrote:...it (deism) would ground science's primary supposition of the existence of natural laws...
Who is this 'science' that supposes anything? Scientists can work perfectly well with a variety of different models, without supposing that they are natural laws. They just happen to account for and predict behaviour in useful ways.
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