The problem of self under materialism

So what's really going on?

Moderators: AMod, iMod

Londoner
Posts: 783
Joined: Sun Sep 11, 2016 8:47 am

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Londoner »

Dalek Prime wrote: Well, without the consciousness, we are without thought. As to what it is, I simply accept that we have it; may, we are it. Otherwise, we would be no different from a rock ie. things without thought. Keep your premises simple, and you'll do fine. Remember, from solid premise, led by firmly connected reasoning. That's how a good philosophy is built. Follow that, and you'll do fine. You strike me as a good thinker, Londoner.
To say consciousness is the same as 'thought' isn't what I am looking for.

A very simple organism will react to stimuli i.e. it has something that functions as a nervous system. Does that count as 'thought/consciousness'?

If it does, then 'thought/consciousness' reduces to a very simple electro-chemical reaction. In that case, why is it any more mysterious than any other reaction?

If not, if 'thought/consciousness' is something else, something more complicated, then what is it? Because the problem will arise that (as with evolution) what now appears to be complicated is explicable in terms of the simple, i.e. that our brains are only more elaborate version of those of simple creatures, that there is no big jump that needs explaining.

As you say, a solid premise is always helpful. But with discussions of 'consciousness' we never seem to get it.
Immanuel Can wrote:
Londoner wrote:If we don't know what consciousness is, then we can't know we have it.
If you don't have it, then I guess I'm not talking to anybody. :wink:

Get the point? It's that simple. If "consciousness" is not a real thing, then there's nobody around to notice it. "Noticing" is an activity of consciousness.
This is a different idea of what 'consciousness' is to Dalek Prime's.

First, surely your first sentence contradicts the second. If 'noticing' is an activity of your consciousness, then it says nothing about my existence. That I exist requires you to have a theory about the nature of experience, i.e. to believe that there is more than your own consciousness.

But if there is something outside your consciousness, something that is affecting your consciousness, that it just another example of cause-and-effect. In that case, consciousness can be entirely explained in terms of toes encountering stones, sending electrical impulses along nerves etc. That is no different in kind to plants turning to face the sun. As I wrote to Dalek Prime, in that case the simplest life forms are conscious.

To put it another way, the word 'noticing' is reserved for when humans react to things. But if we replace it with the word 'react', then everything reacts. We could say that limestone 'notices' acid, meaning it has an effect on it. So what is special about reactions that they need a special explanation, just because they involve us?

So, I disagree it is 'that simple'. I think that every time we try to express it simply the concept unravels.
User avatar
Greta
Posts: 4389
Joined: Sat Aug 08, 2015 8:10 am

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Greta »

Here's some simplicity. Imagine that you have no emotions, they are completely gone. What kind of consciousness would you have? (aside from an emotionless one lol). Without emotions there just seems to be information processing.
Ginkgo
Posts: 2657
Joined: Mon Apr 30, 2012 2:47 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Ginkgo »

Greta wrote:Here's some simplicity. Imagine that you have no emotions, they are completely gone. What kind of consciousness would you have? (aside from an emotionless one lol). Without emotions there just seems to be information processing.
You would probably be a philosophical zombie.
Londoner
Posts: 783
Joined: Sun Sep 11, 2016 8:47 am

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Londoner »

Greta wrote:Here's some simplicity. Imagine that you have no emotions, they are completely gone. What kind of consciousness would you have? (aside from an emotionless one lol). Without emotions there just seems to be information processing.
I would have thought that the problem centering 'consciousness' on emotions is that emotions are something that seem to be imposed upon us, not under our control. Thus they seem more analogous to feelings like 'pain' - and very simple organisms seem to have that sort of experience, in that they respond to stimuli.

I think that the fundamental problem with 'consciousness' is that we have a mental framework we use to understand the world, but are simply uncomfortable with using it to understand ourselves. Perhaps there is a vaguely religious notion; that as the creature that has 'named' the world, put an order on it, we should not ourselves be subject to that order. We humans have to retain some sort of mystery!
User avatar
Immanuel Can
Posts: 22257
Joined: Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:42 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Londoner wrote:
First, surely your first sentence contradicts the second. If 'noticing' is an activity of your consciousness, then it says nothing about my existence. That I exist requires you to have a theory about the nature of experience, i.e. to believe that there is more than your own consciousness.

But if there is something outside your consciousness, something that is affecting your consciousness, that it just another example of cause-and-effect.
Nope. You've begged the question there. It's a non-sequitur as well. If there is a plurality of persons, and each has its own consciousness, then consciousness-to-consciousness connection may well be an activity capable of producing outcomes: but not "cause-and-effect," but rather, "communication between persons, and exercise of their will."

To make the point you want to make, you'd have to prove it was not the latter.

But you've missed the point. Of course I am assuming the existence of more than one consciousness. I never said I was a solipsist. And you'd have to show me that solipsism was an appropriately wise starting point...I think it's not.
To put it another way, the word 'noticing' is reserved for when humans react to things. But if we replace it with the word 'react', then everything reacts.

Again, you're missing the point: why does ANYTHING "react"? Why does ANYTHING "notice"? Given that the regnant theory of Materialism is that everything came from non-conscious sources, like basic chemicals or elements, we need an account of how those elements became capable of "notice" or "consciousness" at all.
We could say that limestone 'notices' acid, meaning it has an effect on it.
Bad analogy: so far as we can detect, it involves no consciousness.
So what is special about reactions that they need a special explanation, just because they involve us?
Consciousness. Your limestone isn't capable of having the conversation we're having, or even a pale imitation of it. Why is that, if "consciousness" is so automatic and mechanical as you seem to suppose here?

How can a "you" be talking to a "me," when we are not even physically in each other's presence, and we can be "affecting" each other to respond? You'll observe that email is an action of consciousness, not of cause-and-effect. 8)
Londoner
Posts: 783
Joined: Sun Sep 11, 2016 8:47 am

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Londoner »

Immanuel Can wrote: Nope. You've begged the question there. It's a non-sequitur as well. If there is a plurality of persons, and each has its own consciousness, then consciousness-to-consciousness connection may well be an activity capable of producing outcomes: but not "cause-and-effect," but rather, "communication between persons, and exercise of their will."

To make the point you want to make, you'd have to prove it was not the latter.
I do not understand how I have begged the question as I don't know what question we are discussing yet! We have to explain what we mean by 'consciousness' before speculating about 'consciousness-to-consciousness connections'.
But you've missed the point. Of course I am assuming the existence of more than one consciousness. I never said I was a solipsist. And you'd have to show me that solipsism was an appropriately wise starting point...I think it's not.
I think you have missed my point. I gathered you are not a solipsist. The question is not whether there is an external world, it is whether the way that external world interacts with our mind is different to the way it acts on anything else, such that we need a special explanation of 'consciousness'.
Again, you're missing the point: why does ANYTHING "react"? Why does ANYTHING "notice"? Given that the regnant theory of Materialism is that everything came from non-conscious sources, like basic chemicals or elements, we need an account of how those elements became capable of "notice" or "consciousness" at all.
We say that something has reacted with something else if we observe a cause-effect relationship. We say limestone reacts to acid because it changes the limestone. What I am asking is why that sort of explanation isn't good enough when it comes to humans. Why, if a human animal reacts to stimuli we have to posit some mysterious ethereal medium called 'consciousness' that fits in somehow between the cause and effect.
Me: We could say that limestone 'notices' acid, meaning it has an effect on it.
Bad analogy: so far as we can detect, it involves no consciousness.
But that is the point at issue, we are discussing whether 'consciousness' really is distinct from any other reaction.
Me: So what is special about reactions that they need a special explanation, just because they involve us?
Consciousness. Your limestone isn't capable of having the conversation we're having, or even a pale imitation of it. Why is that, if "consciousness" is so automatic and mechanical as you seem to suppose here?...
You still keep mentioning 'consciousness', without us ever being clear what feature is being described. So is it 'communication'? If so, I notice that many animals besides humans can communicate; ants for example. As I have said before, if we were tracing the evolution (in the Darwinist sense) of an ability to communicate, we do not see any sharp division between humans and other creatures, so why is 'communication' considered distinct from any other human attribute?

(Or are we saying 'consciousness' isn't some special human attribute, perhaps it just means 'responds to stimuli' (i.e. is a living thing), or 'has a central nervous system'? We have gone on few yet more pages, and I still don't know what is meant!)

Suppose we transferred this thread to the religious section. Because if 'consciousness' is this special thing, a feature of humanity that cannot be explained by anything physical, that could not have arisen through the normal evolutionary mechanism, then it must be (literally) supernatural! Is that what is being suggested?
User avatar
Immanuel Can
Posts: 22257
Joined: Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:42 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Londoner wrote:I do not understand how I have begged the question as I don't know what question we are discussing yet! We have to explain what we mean by 'consciousness' before speculating about 'consciousness-to-consciousness connections'.
You assumed that if there is "something outside your consciousness, something that is affecting your consciousness," then "that it just another example of cause-and-effect." (Your words)

That does not follow. If I sense something outside me, that does not determine what I do about it. I may have free choice of what I do. Moreover, if the "something outside of me" is not a physical thing, but is rather, say, the voice of a discussion partner or his ideas expressed in print, then the "something outside of me" is not "causing" me to react in a particular way. Again, I'm choosing what I do with that.

So we can't jump to the wild conclusion that it is just a case of "cause-and-effect"...unless you can conclusively prove it is, which I know you can't do.
The question is not whether there is an external world, it is whether the way that external world interacts with our mind is different to the way it acts on anything else, such that we need a special explanation of 'consciousness'.
What makes us think "the external world" is the root cause of the existence of consciousness? We don't even know that. But as it is, consciousness is observably quite different from everything in "the external world." It's material, and consciousness is not. We can weigh, measure, manipulate and dissect "the external world" but can do none of these things with consciousness, which is (as Locke pointed out) indivisible, and inextricably tied to things like "identity," "morality" and a whole bunch of other universal but non-material things.

We say that something has reacted with something else if we observe a cause-effect relationship. We say limestone reacts to acid because it changes the limestone. What I am asking is why that sort of explanation isn't good enough when it comes to humans.
Oh, that's easy. The limestone doesn't make any choice. Moreover, the "reaction" is utterly predictable, physical and repeatable. It's not unique, and it involves no consciousness at all, but is merely a material process.

No lump of limestone has an opinion about that. And none sends emails.
Why, if a human animal reacts to stimuli we have to posit some mysterious ethereal medium called 'consciousness' that fits in somehow between the cause and effect.
Because they don't just do that. They do operations like "perceiving," "deciding," "evaluating," "rationalizing," "explaining," "resenting," "accepting," and a whole bunch of other cognitive activities your lump of limestone never does. It's not straightforward cause-and-effect, because of the presence of these intermediate activities that can completely change the expected "reaction."
we do not see any sharp division between humans and other creatures,
Really? I do. But let us leave that aside.

Do you see a difference between limestone and sentient beings of any kind? THAT's the real question.
Suppose we transferred this thread to the religious section. Because if 'consciousness' is this special thing, a feature of humanity that cannot be explained by anything physical, that could not have arisen through the normal evolutionary mechanism, then it must be (literally) supernatural! Is that what is being suggested?
No, I'm not suggesting it. I'm asserting it.

But if it's true, then there's nothing uniquely "religious" about it at all; it's just the truth. And unless you think "all truth is religious," then the thread doesn't need to go anywhere other than here. It's fine where it is.

Besides, "Materialism", the topic, is not (uncontentiously) a religious view in its proponents' opinions, although I think it surely is.
Justintruth
Posts: 187
Joined: Sun Aug 21, 2016 4:10 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Justintruth »

Immanuel Can wrote:
Dalek Prime wrote:we can't recreate this consciousness, artificially. And that's because we don't know what consciousness is, beyond the fact we have it. And that's what Immanuel Can was asking you.
This is well put. Thank you.
I have a friend who yesterday received a depressed skull fracture when she was ripped off her motorcycle by a purse snatcher. I tried to do some research on the subject. I found that skull fracture and concussion (both physical terms) frequently result in temporary loss of consciousness - a non-physical term. My friend suffered a loss of consciousness and was in a coma for several hours.

Ironic isn't it to find oneself arguing that the term is meaningful and useful and that we know SOMETHING but not EVERYTHING about it and then to have its practical use thrust into ones face. To have a doctor actually describing what happens using the term.
User avatar
Immanuel Can
Posts: 22257
Joined: Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:42 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Justintruth wrote:Ironic isn't it to find oneself arguing that the term is meaningful and useful and that we know SOMETHING but not EVERYTHING about it and then to have its practical use thrust into ones face. To have a doctor actually describing what happens using the term.
Wow. What a story. That's timing, for sure. Thank you for that: I hope your friend recovers...that's nasty.
...temporary loss of consciousness - a non-physical term.
Quite so.

What's particularly interesting in this case is that all the physical parts of your friend were, and remain present, but that something we're struggling to identify -- consciousness -- was clearly absent. And as you point out, that really, really matters to us, doesn't it? It would not at all be the same thing if your friend were to remain bodily whole, but in a coma. We would say we had lost "her," even though her body would be present at the time.

So again we're faced with the question: what is this thing we're "missing"? Equally importantly, how does this thing "emerge" from the purely physical components that make up a human body? How did it first emerge? Why did it emerge, if it did; and if it's real, why can't science get any traction at all on this thing? A purely physical property, if that is what consciousness were, would surely be analyzable by ordinary scientific methods and procedures: why would we have to do anything extraordinary there?

So it's all a very big puzzle; and I would suggest that while it may not be conclusive proof, it is certainly existentially compelling evidence of something metaphysical and yet very, very real.
Londoner
Posts: 783
Joined: Sun Sep 11, 2016 8:47 am

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Londoner »

Immanuel Can wrote: You assumed that if there is "something outside your consciousness, something that is affecting your consciousness," then "that it just another example of cause-and-effect." (Your words)

That does not follow. If I sense something outside me, that does not determine what I do about it. I may have free choice of what I do. Moreover, if the "something outside of me" is not a physical thing, but is rather, say, the voice of a discussion partner or his ideas expressed in print, then the "something outside of me" is not "causing" me to react in a particular way. Again, I'm choosing what I do with that.

So we can't jump to the wild conclusion that it is just a case of "cause-and-effect"...unless you can conclusively prove it is, which I know you can't do.
I don't really understand what point you are making. You wrote: If you don't have it (consciousness), then I guess I'm not talking to anybody. I was pointing out that you cannot know whether I have consciousness or not (because I might be a machine, a figment of your imagination, etc.)

So your guess that there is a conscious person behind my posts is just that; you are the one who thinks there is a cause (me) and an effect (my posts).

I don't know how your reactions come into this. We are discussing consciousness; I am saying you can't deduce the existence of something called 'consciousness' by observing other people.
Me: The question is not whether there is an external world, it is whether the way that external world interacts with our mind is different to the way it acts on anything else, such that we need a special explanation of 'consciousness'.

What makes us think "the external world" is the root cause of the existence of consciousness? We don't even know that. But as it is, consciousness is observably quite different from everything in "the external world." It's material, and consciousness is not. We can weigh, measure, manipulate and dissect "the external world" but can do none of these things with consciousness, which is (as Locke pointed out) indivisible, and inextricably tied to things like "identity," "morality" and a whole bunch of other universal but non-material things.
I only mentioned the external world because you suggested I was saying you were a solipsist.

As to consciousness, you rightly point out that it not supposed to be material. But we can't define it entirely by negatives. You say it is ' inextricably tied to things like "identity," "morality" and a whole bunch of other universal but non-material things'. So is this to say that 'morality' and 'identity' (and others) are 'things'?

I do not understand what 'thing' means in this context. We don't mean 'as a material object' so as what? As a word? As a concept? Because I cannot disagree that we have the concept 'morality' (or 'consciousness'), but there is no mystery where concepts come from; we create them. But I got the impression that the argument was the other way round, that concepts emerged from our consciousness.
Me: We say that something has reacted with something else if we observe a cause-effect relationship. We say limestone reacts to acid because it changes the limestone. What I am asking is why that sort of explanation isn't good enough when it comes to humans.
Oh, that's easy. The limestone doesn't make any choice. Moreover, the "reaction" is utterly predictable, physical and repeatable. It's not unique, and it involves no consciousness at all, but is merely a material process.
But you keep begging the question. I might argue you don't make any choice either, That you react in a deterministic way. I know you don't think this, but that it what we are discussing here, whether there is this mysterious medium 'consciousness' that allows you to escape from the sort of determinism that governs everything else.
Because they don't just do that. They do operations like "perceiving," "deciding," "evaluating," "rationalizing," "explaining," "resenting," "accepting," and a whole bunch of other cognitive activities your lump of limestone never does. It's not straightforward cause-and-effect, because of the presence of these intermediate activities that can completely change the expected "reaction."
Again, you are positing this mysterious non-material layer where all this activity takes place. It seems unnecessary. Certainly humans react to things, we also have brains that can think of words to generalise such reactions, but this doesn't seem so remarkable that we need to posit some 'thing' unlike anything else in the universe in order to explain it.
Me: we do not see any sharp division between humans and other creatures

Really? I do. But let us leave that aside.

Do you see a difference between limestone and sentient beings of any kind? THAT's the real question.
I see the basic similarity that both we and limestone can be analysed in terms of the materials and forces that compose us. Certainly different things are different! However you are suggesting that there is a fundamental difference that involves some extra 'spirit' that inhabits humans that is not related to the material.

It is a pity you will not describe where the difference is between humans and other animals. I am still trying to work out what you understand by 'consciousness', so it would be useful to know if you think it is unique to humans, and why.
Me: Suppose we transferred this thread to the religious section. Because if 'consciousness' is this special thing, a feature of humanity that cannot be explained by anything physical, that could not have arisen through the normal evolutionary mechanism, then it must be (literally) supernatural! Is that what is being suggested?

No, I'm not suggesting it. I'm asserting it.
OK. Well, if 'consciousness' is something supernatural, then it explains why we are unable to describe it, or define it. (But then we have the usual problem with supernatural entities, how do they react with the material world? You would still have to have some sort of interface between the immaterial and the material, at which point it would no longer be supernatural.)

So 'consciousness' takes its place alongside God; being spiritual it cannot be investigated through science. But it gains this safety at the cost of being irrelevant. We can describe everything, including thought, without needing to invoke it.
seeds
Posts: 2143
Joined: Tue Aug 02, 2016 9:31 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by seeds »

seeds wrote:
Questions such as the one you have posited above are relatively easy to answer if one is not afraid to entertain Idealism.
Immanuel Can wrote:
Well, what you're talking about certainly isn't the Idealism of Berkeley. That's for sure.
To reference a quote from Wiki:
Wiki/Berkeley wrote:
Here is Berkeley's proof of the existence of God:

Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. (Berkeley. Principles #29)
The other “Will or Spirit” to which Berkeley is referring is, of course, God.

The fundamental implication of Berkeleyan Idealism can be interpreted to mean that the phenomenal features of reality are, in essence, “ideas” in the mind of God (with the “mind” of God being the universe itself).

Therefore, the defense of my earlier assertion that literally everything is “alive” is based on the fact that if God is obviously alive, then the “ideas” (again, the phenomenal features of the universe) within God’s mind are also alive.

You merely have to think of them (material phenomena) as being imbued with God’s life essence in the same way that your own thoughts and dreams (“ideas” suspended within the “universe” of your own mind) are imbued with your life essence.
seeds wrote:
If Idealism is true, then what we refer to as being hydrogen, carbon, and electricity are constructed from the very substance of thought itself.
Immanuel Can wrote:
That seems a rather mystical idealism.
Keep in mind that it is you who posited the following when it comes to the inability of materialism to explain consciousness...
Immanuel Can wrote:
HOW does unthinking matter become conscious entities?
The point is, do not rule-out my (and Berkeley's) so-called “mystical idealism” from being a plausible answer to your question.
Immanuel Can wrote:
...what's pretty clear is that Materialism just can't "float the boat" when it comes to making an account of consciousness.

And I think that's the big takeaway here. On that much, I'm sure we agree.
Indeed, IC, we do agree on that point.
_______
User avatar
Immanuel Can
Posts: 22257
Joined: Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:42 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

Londoner wrote:I don't really understand what point you are making. You wrote: If you don't have it (consciousness), then I guess I'm not talking to anybody. I was pointing out that you cannot know whether I have consciousness or not (because I might be a machine, a figment of your imagination, etc.)

So your guess that there is a conscious person behind my posts is just that; you are the one who thinks there is a cause (me) and an effect (my posts).
It's the only assumption worth considering. If one of the other assumptions is true, there's absolutely no point to the conversation. So you might be a machine or a figment -- but if you are, who cares? Then the whole exchange is just stupid, because I'm talking with an entity that cannot invent anything, cannot be taught anything, or cannot change its mind. I may as well talk to a wall.

Are you a wall? :wink:
I don't know how your reactions come into this. We are discussing consciousness; I am saying you can't deduce the existence of something called 'consciousness' by observing other people.
I didn't, and I don't have to. I know myself. Once I do, it takes only a very modest level of faith to suppose someone other than me might exist: indeed, it looks like basic epistemological humility, and a very good bet: for again, I'm not a solipsist. You'll search in vain for someone to defend that view here. But the view you're suggesting as an alternative amounts to solipsism.
As to consciousness, you rightly point out that it not supposed to be material. But we can't define it entirely by negatives. You say it is ' inextricably tied to things like "identity," "morality" and a whole bunch of other universal but non-material things'. So is this to say that 'morality' and 'identity' (and others) are 'things'?
Only in the broadest sense. Physical entities are "things," but so are abstractions like "courage" or "love." All are nouns: some are concrete, and some are not.
I cannot disagree that we have the concept 'morality' (or 'consciousness'), but there is no mystery where concepts come from; we create them.
Prove it. Plato thought we got them from the realm of higher forms. Objectivists say they are real-world entities we are interpreting. Theists say they are grounded in God. Metaphysicians say they're metaphysical. Dualists say they are one of two kinds of entity in the universe, and Idealists say that they ARE reality....

Refute all those other views, and MAYBE your view becomes the default, provide no new views emerge while you're doing it. Otherwise, there's simply no reason to give it that status: it hasn't earned it.
But I got the impression that the argument was the other way round, that concepts emerged from our consciousness.
I did not say that. That would be a form of Idealism.
But you keep begging the question. I might argue you don't make any choice either, That you react in a deterministic way.
That's not a question: where's the question mark? It looks like a statement.
I know you don't think this, but that it what we are discussing here, whether there is this mysterious medium 'consciousness' that allows you to escape from the sort of determinism that governs everything else.
Well, we don't actually know that Determinism governs ANYTHING, to be honest. But if we did, perhaps this would indeed be the next question. But I think "How much of the world is Deterministic" would probably be the better one, then. So maybe yours would be third.
Again, you are positing this mysterious non-material layer where all this activity takes place. It seems unnecessary.
Couldn't disagree more. What is very clear is that Determinism grounded in Materialism can do absolutely nothing by way of explaining consciousness. That's a good prima facie reason for rejecting it...especially if, as you and I believe, consciousness is real. If you don't believe it, of course, then we're not talking to each other at all.
...this doesn't seem so remarkable that we need to posit some 'thing' unlike anything else in the universe in order to explain it.
That seems to me obviously untrue. I think it's very remarkable. But take a look at somebody perhaps more sympathetic, such as Thomas Nagel. I won't bother to explain it here, because he does a nice job. And despite being a confirmed Atheist, he sees that consciousness is a most remarkable and atypical phenomenon.
It is a pity you will not describe where the difference is between humans and other animals.
The line you're drawing is in the wrong place; that's why. The real line is between conscious entities and non-conscious ones, not between entities of differing levels of consciousness. They HAVE important differences, to be sure: but that's not the essential question of consciousness, because it's already conceded to exist in some form even in lower animals.
OK. Well, if 'consciousness' is something supernatural, then it explains why we are unable to describe it, or define it. (But then we have the usual problem with supernatural entities, how do they react with the material world? You would still have to have some sort of interface between the immaterial and the material, at which point it would no longer be supernatural.)
Not so. To be "natural" is, among other things, "to be governed by natural laws."

Let's take an entity that we both agree doesn't exist: say, ghosts. If ghosts existed, they would interact with the natural world, but not be governed by its laws. Natural science would remain unable to describe them, since it by definition limits itself to the purely empirical. But that would be caused by science's self-imposed parameters, not by the non-existence of the supernatural phenomena in question.
So 'consciousness' takes its place alongside God; being spiritual it cannot be investigated through science.
Add the word "exhaustively," and you're probably right. Put it between "investigated" and "through." There's no reason we might think it has to be impossible to get some knowledge of the supernatural world, if such exists, through the natural world. It just wouldn't ever be a complete view.

Likewise, we can learn some things about consciousness through observation of ourselves and others; but we can't be quite sure, or present a complete theory, because that's indicative evidence, but not exhaustive.
User avatar
Immanuel Can
Posts: 22257
Joined: Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:42 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Immanuel Can »

seeds wrote:The other “Will or Spirit” to which Berkeley is referring is, of course, God.
Possibly, but not certainly. It could be Descartes Demiurgic Spirit, or some other kind of "will." Idealism per se isn't definite about that.
The fundamental implication of Berkeleyan Idealism can be interpreted to mean that the phenomenal features of reality are, in essence, “ideas” in the mind of God (with the “mind” of God being the universe itself).
Deism. Does anybody believe it anymore? It has SO many problems inherent in it...
Immanuel Can wrote:
That seems a rather mystical idealism.
Keep in mind that it is you who posited the following when it comes to the inability of materialism to explain consciousness...
Immanuel Can wrote:HOW does unthinking matter become conscious entities?
That's not a "posit." It's a question.
The point is, do not rule-out my (and Berkeley's) so-called “mystical idealism” from being a plausible answer to your question.
Well, I'm not interested in it here, because the question at the top of the page is about the problem of the self "under materialism." If Idealism is true, then yes, Materialism is false. But it can also be false other ways. And I'm not plugging for Idealism.

If you like it, I suppose you may want to go ahead and make your case. Me, I'm a Theist, not a Deist, so I can't speak for you on that: it's not my game to play.

Either way, Materialism is in trouble.
User avatar
Arising_uk
Posts: 12314
Joined: Wed Oct 17, 2007 2:31 am

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Arising_uk »

Immanuel Can wrote:...
Deism. Does anybody believe it anymore? It has SO many problems inherent in it...
And theism doesn't?
Either way, Materialism is in trouble.
Compared to what? A big sky-father watching over us, waiting to judge and punish us for being us, I don't think so.
Justintruth
Posts: 187
Joined: Sun Aug 21, 2016 4:10 pm

Re: The problem of self under materialism

Post by Justintruth »

Londoner wrote:....then everything reacts. We could say that limestone 'notices' acid, meaning it has an effect on it. So what is special about reactions that they need a special explanation, just because they involve us?

So, I disagree it is 'that simple'. I think that every time we try to express it simply the concept unravels.
There is a simple way to see it. The medeval philosophers had a different notion of the word "motion" than we do. Motion meant change in the nature of something. The form of the matter could change - let's say from red to blue. "Loco motion" meant what we think of today as "motion".

The claim that we know nothing is just a mistake in the form of an assumption that we can possibly see how locomotion produces experiencing in the same way that we see how ut dissolves limestone. Dissolution of limestone is just an example of locomotion. Seeing red is not.

Today in the scientific result there is very limited change that is not loco-motion. For example there is pair creation in which a photon turns into an electron and a positron but the notion of a particle has evolve and you can no longer think of it as a particle. Without going further into it lets call the Feyman's path integrals as "loco motion".

Now here is how you simplify it:

Spit your "everything reacts" onto two classes. The physical one and experiencing. All of those reactions you mention - limestone noticing acid" for example are svientifically loco motion in the quantum mechanical sense. Specifically, acidity is the transfer of certain ions between molecules. Ph is the measure of the quantity of these ion produce. To be an ion itself has to do with the locomotion of an electron in this case from a hydrogen atom. The forces between the limestone molecules and these ions cause parts of the limestone to move away from the solid structure and into solution. This locomotion we call disolving.

So all physical processes locomote. In addition there are certain changes - very few in number - that can occur in the quantum sense. These entities and the allowed motions are described in the standard model of physics.

Now there is locomotion that occurs in a brain also and from the eye a causal chain of locomotion occurs and it enters the brain and further locomotion in the quantum sense occurs. We know some of the details but not all but it is locomotion under plausible hypoyhesis. It is possible that there is some strange new physical particle or something in there but we have no reason to believe so at this time and the requirement for claiming it exists is to show evidence.

But we do know that experiencing occurs as a result of this locomotion and we know what that experiencing is like - at least for the class of locomotions that is our brain. We dont know for the arbitrary configuration of matter how many primary color experiencings can be made. Minimum three. Maximum?

So the fact is when you say everything reacts you can classify it as locomotion and non locomotive change as described in physics and then experiencing as described by phenomenology. This forms an excellent basis for science and philosophy to proceed away from these preliminaries to the deeper questions of truth, being, etc
Post Reply