Problem of emergent phenomena

[bahman]

We know that matter can be divided into its parts. We know that the act of division cannot go into infinitum. Lets define indivisible parts as irreducible particles. We know that each irreducible particle has some very well defined attributes. This means that we can explain the properties of matter in term of its constitutes. We know that matter behaves well in certain regime (external parameters) but suddenly an emergent phenomena pops up from nowhere when we change the regime.

We know that there are world view that suggest that the whole is more than sum of the parts, holism for example, but they don't provide any systematic framework that help us to understand the whole. These world views simply leave us in state of ignorance and to my opinion they are useless and absurd.

The only solution which comes to my mind is that particles could behave differently depending on situation. In simple word we cannot define a particle by a simple set of attributes.

Your thoughts?

[Philosophy Explorer]

The Standard Model is based on a definite set of subatomic particles. However it may be altered or ditched depending on recent experiments. As it stands now, SM is weak as it's unable to account for dark energy and dark matter, etc.

Stay tuned.

PhilX

[Noax]

You need to actually read some of those posts by Conde Lucanor which are quite appicable to this issue. Since you seem to be baffled by every aspect of physics, perhaps you might actually try to learn from somebody rather than just reject every post that is made in reply to your threads.

So one irreducible particle cannot behave like a liquid, but a bunch of them can. Is this so baffling? Do we now need to posit an immaterial realm of liquidness to restore sanity?

One particle doesn't have a temperature property either, but a bunch of them does.

[bahman]

You need to actually read some of those posts by Conde Lucanor which are quite appicable to this issue. Since you seem to be baffled by every aspect of physics, perhaps you might actually try to learn from somebody rather than just reject every post that is made in reply to your threads.

So one irreducible particle cannot behave like a liquid, but a bunch of them can. Is this so baffling? Do we now need to posit an immaterial realm of liquidness to restore sanity?

One particle doesn't have a temperature property either, but a bunch of them does.

I am not baffled with every aspect of physics. I am a physicist.

[creativesoul]

We know that matter can be divided into its parts. We know that the act of division cannot go into infinitum. Lets define indivisible parts as irreducible particles. We know that each irreducible particle has some very well defined attributes. This means that we can explain the properties of matter in term of its constitutes. We know that matter behaves well in certain regime (external parameters) but suddenly an emergent phenomena pops up from nowhere when we change the regime.

We know that there are world view that suggest that the whole is more than sum of the parts, holism for example, but they don't provide any systematic framework that help us to understand the whole. These world views simply leave us in state of ignorance and to my opinion they are useless and absurd.

The only solution which comes to my mind is that particles could behave differently depending on situation. In simple word we cannot define a particle by a simple set of attributes.

Your thoughts?

You're conflating that which is emerging with the set of necessary preconditions(elemental constituents) which facilitate that. I suspect that that is an unavoidable consequence of working from a physicalist/monist conceptual framework. No meaningful distinction is being drawn between 'mind' and matter. At least, that's the impression I'm left with. I could be wrong.

I took exception - in particular - to the following...

...there are world view that suggest that the whole is more than sum of the parts, holism for example, but they don't provide any systematic framework that help us to understand the whole. These world views simply leave us in state of ignorance and to my opinion they are useless and absurd.

There are world-views that do provide a systematic framework to understand the whole. As a result of my knowing that much, I also know that the last bit of the first statement quoted directly above is false as a direct result of being in direct contradiction to everyday states of affairs.

[Hobbes' Choice]

We know that matter can be divided into its parts. We know that the act of division cannot go into infinitum. Lets define indivisible parts as irreducible particles. We know that each irreducible particle has some very well defined attributes. This means that we can explain the properties of matter in term of its constitutes. We know that matter behaves well in certain regime (external parameters) but suddenly an emergent phenomena pops up from nowhere when we change the regime.

We know that there are world view that suggest that the whole is more than sum of the parts, holism for example, but they don't provide any systematic framework that help us to understand the whole. These world views simply leave us in state of ignorance and to my opinion they are useless and absurd.

The only solution which comes to my mind is that particles could behave differently depending on situation. In simple word we cannot define a particle by a simple set of attributes.

Your thoughts?

Science just describes what is observable. I think the problem comes when people expect there to be explanations.
We can only expect reductionism to lead to a reduction in explanation. Why would it be otherwise?

[bahman]

We know that matter can be divided into its parts. We know that the act of division cannot go into infinitum. Lets define indivisible parts as irreducible particles. We know that each irreducible particle has some very well defined attributes. This means that we can explain the properties of matter in term of its constitutes. We know that matter behaves well in certain regime (external parameters) but suddenly an emergent phenomena pops up from nowhere when we change the regime.

We know that there are world view that suggest that the whole is more than sum of the parts, holism for example, but they don't provide any systematic framework that help us to understand the whole. These world views simply leave us in state of ignorance and to my opinion they are useless and absurd.

The only solution which comes to my mind is that particles could behave differently depending on situation. In simple word we cannot define a particle by a simple set of attributes.

Your thoughts?

You're conflating that which is emerging with the set of necessary preconditions(elemental constituents) which facilitate that. I suspect that that is an unavoidable consequence of working from a physicalist/monist conceptual framework. No meaningful distinction is being drawn between 'mind' and matter. At least, that's the impression I'm left with. I could be wrong.

Yes, consider the example mind and matter. Physicalists have failed to explain mind since mind is something extra to what matter can offer (they at least don't understand how mind can emerge from matter).

I took exception - in particular - to the following...

...there are world view that suggest that the whole is more than sum of the parts, holism for example, but they don't provide any systematic framework that help us to understand the whole. These world views simply leave us in state of ignorance and to my opinion they are useless and absurd.

There are world-views that do provide a systematic framework to understand the whole. As a result of my knowing that much, I also know that the last bit of the first statement quoted directly above is false as a direct result of being in direct contradiction to everyday states of affairs.

Can you offer a systematic framework which can explain that the whole is more than sum of parts for a specific instance?

[bahman]

Science just describes what is observable. I think the problem comes when people expect there to be explanations.
We can only expect reductionism to lead to a reduction in explanation. Why would it be otherwise?

The problem arises when reductionism does not lead to a reduction explanation so either the whole is more than sum of parts or parts behaves differently in a given situation, when an phenomena emerges.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Science just describes what is observable. I think the problem comes when people expect there to be explanations.
We can only expect reductionism to lead to a reduction in explanation. Why would it be otherwise?

The problem arises when reductionism does not lead to a reduction explanation so either the whole is more than sum of parts or parts behaves differently in a given situation, when an phenomena emerges.

What? You mean that you could never predict the properties of water by the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen - or do you have something more complex in mind?

Do you not think this is a failing of intelligence, information and knowledge rather than the methodology?

[Terrapin Station]

Properties are functions of (a) matter, (b) the relations of matter with respect to other matter--what you call "situatedness," and (c) the processes of matter (which is another way of naming changing relations, and really, they're always changing).

Those two or three things (depending on whether you count relations and changing relations as the same thing or as two things) are the parts of wholes, and as such, wholes are never "more than the sum of their parts."

We could say that some properties are "emergent," but where emergence simply refers to different properties obtaining depending on just how the parts are put together and just how they're dynamically interacting. What we need to guard against is suggesting anything like epiphenomenalism.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, consider the example mind and matter. Physicalists have failed to explain mind

As I've noted before with this and similar comments, the issue here is what counts as an explanation and why.

It's worth noting that whatever counts as an explanation to an individual, if physicalism hasn't explained mind, then certainly no other ontological stance has either (unless one says something like, "What counts as an explanation to me is something that posits nonphysical existents").

[HexHammer]

I am not baffled with every aspect of physics. I am a physicist.

That's a blatant lie! OP clearly shows you have no idea what you are talking about.

You say some particles are irreduceable, which give away your hapless ignorance!

[Terrapin Station]

I am not baffled with every aspect of physics. I am a physicist.

That's a blatant lie! OP clearly shows you have no idea what you are talking about.

You say some particles are irreduceable, which give away your hapless ignorance!

You'd say there aren't elementary particles in the (current) standard model?

[HexHammer]

I am not baffled with every aspect of physics. I am a physicist.

That's a blatant lie! OP clearly shows you have no idea what you are talking about.

You say some particles are irreduceable, which give away your hapless ignorance!

You'd say there aren't elementary particles in the (current) standard model?

Not saying that.

[Terrapin Station]

That's a blatant lie! OP clearly shows you have no idea what you are talking about.

You say some particles are irreduceable, which give away your hapless ignorance!

You'd say there aren't elementary particles in the (current) standard model?

Not saying that.

So then what would be the problem with positing irreducible particles?