Problem of emergent phenomena

[HexHammer]

I'm just going to address one thing at a time (I started doing that a post or two ago actually, but hopefully we'll get back to other stuff:)Where are you getting that from? Where did I say anything even remotely resembling that?

Just admit that I'm right, instead of trying to dodge my point.

Could you answer the question I asked? I'm not interested in playing a game.

Ofc, but you just need to say I'm right first, then I'll answer your silly diversion.

[HexHammer]

I am not baffled with every aspect of physics. I am a physicist.

That's a blatant lie! OP clearly shows you have no idea what you are talking about.

You say some particles are irreduceable, which give away your hapless ignorance!

You of course don't have an idea about what I am talking about.

I do, and it's pure nonsense and babble like all your other threads.

[bahman]

Do you believe in free will?

Yes.

How that could be true if every state of matter is a function of previous state of matter.

I've already told you a number of times that I'm not a realist on physical laws.

Aside from that, though, the received view of the sciences hasn't been strong determinism for physical phenomena in general for well over 100 years. That is not just due to quantum phenomena. It's due to stochastic phenomena in general. "Laplace's Demon" has been considered folly for a long time. Why that knowledge can't filter down and spread among the CompSci and engineering types who dominate Internet interaction areas like this I don't know.

Yes, you are right. But in here you said that "Properties are functions of (a) matter, (b) the relations of matter with respect to other matte and (c) the processes of matter". So you are having a little problem with embedding free will in your framework.

[Hobbes' Choice]

The problem arises when reductionism does not lead to a reduction explanation so either the whole is more than sum of parts or parts behaves differently in a given situation, when an phenomena emerges.

What? You mean that you could never predict the properties of water by the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen - or do you have something more complex in mind?

Do you not think this is a failing of intelligence, information and knowledge rather than the methodology?

I am interested in the problem of mind which allows us to experience and to act freely.

But it does not. Nothing at all makes any sense unless there is causality.
Clearly gravity, for example does not give a rat's arse what we might will, you are still going to kill yourself if you jump off a tall building.
ANd you are avoiding answering my question.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, you are right. But in here you said that "Properties are functions of (a) matter, (b) the relations of matter with respect to other matte and (c) the processes of matter". So you are having a little problem with embedding free will in your framework.

Those two aren't inconsistent at all.

Imagine that that every state of matter occurs acausally.

So let's take something simple:

We have @, and to the right of it from perspective x is %, with @ and % forming a chemical bond via sharing an electron.

Completely randomly, the next state of that system is % on top of @ from perspective x, and they're now sharing two (different) electrons.

And so on.

Well, the properties of that system are factors of the matter involved, the structure of the matter re @'s relationship to %, and the processes of that matter, re how @'s relationships are changing with respect to %. Yet the system is completely acausal--one event follows another completely randomly.

So the two aren't incompatible at all. You're only thinking that because you continue to have cognitive dissonance with respect to the idea of materialists who are not realists (and strong determinists) on physical laws.

[creativesoul]

Yes, consider the example mind and matter. Physicalists have failed to explain mind since mind is something extra to what matter can offer (they at least don't understand how mind can emerge from matter).

Part of the problem may be the way that mind is conceived. I work from thought/belief, which - at their core - consist of precisely the same things; mental correlations, associations, and/or connections drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own emotional and/or instinctual 'state of mind'. The scare-quotes indicate my reluctance to use that phrase due to the historical baggage attached to notions of "mind".

Can you offer a systematic framework which can explain that the whole is more than sum of parts for a specific instance?

The presupposition of truth(as correspondence to fact/reality), symbolism(meaning), and the recognition/attribution of causality all emerge solely by virtue of a capable agent drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or their own state of mind.

Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content... necessarily so. <----That is exactly how the presupposition of truth(as correspondence) begins playing a central role in everything ever thought, believed, and/or stated. Drawing correlations is necessary and sufficient for symbolism, and the recognition/attribution of causality. Symbolism and causality are necessary and sufficient for the attribution of all meaning as we know it.

The necessary elemental physical constituents for drawing correlations do not include the correlation and/or the association itself. Think of a simple example...

My cat has associated the sounds of certain kinds of plastic bags crinkling with me feeding her. I know that that is the case, because I can intentionally call her by making the sound. It is also the case that she mistakes some other plastic bag sounds for her treat bag's. I know that because she immediately comes and looks back and forth between me and her food dish until I put treats there. Since I've turned it into a language by virtue of intentionally using the sound to summon her presence, knowing that she expects to get fed afterwards, I've entered into a voluntary obligation to meet the expectations that I taught her. The sound of the bag is akin to making a promise...

I digress...

A purely physicalist ontology cannot take proper account of that which gives rise to it... thought/belief about the world and/or ourselves.

[bahman]

What? You mean that you could never predict the properties of water by the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen - or do you have something more complex in mind?

Do you not think this is a failing of intelligence, information and knowledge rather than the methodology?

I am interested in the problem of mind which allows us to experience and to act freely.

But it does not. Nothing at all makes any sense unless there is causality.
Clearly gravity, for example does not give a rat's arse what we might will, you are still going to kill yourself if you jump off a tall building.
ANd you are avoiding answering my question.

Yes, the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen make one molecule of water. The problem I have in my mind is that how a process in a set of neurons can give rise to mind in which you could act freely if causality rules.

[bahman]

Yes, you are right. But in here you said that "Properties are functions of (a) matter, (b) the relations of matter with respect to other matte and (c) the processes of matter". So you are having a little problem with embedding free will in your framework.

Those two aren't inconsistent at all.

Imagine that that every state of matter occurs acausally.

So let's take something simple:

We have @, and to the right of it from perspective x is %, with @ and % forming a chemical bond via sharing an electron.

Completely randomly, the next state of that system is % on top of @ from perspective x, and they're now sharing two (different) electrons.

And so on.

Well, the properties of that system are factors of the matter involved, the structure of the matter re @'s relationship to %, and the processes of that matter, re how @'s relationships are changing with respect to %. Yet the system is completely acausal--one event follows another completely randomly.

I don't understand your notation and what you are trying to say here.

So the two aren't incompatible at all. You're only thinking that because you continue to have cognitive dissonance with respect to the idea of materialists who are not realists (and strong determinists) on physical laws.

No, I am asking a question related to what you post: if properties are functions of (a) matter, (b) the relations of matter with respect to other matte and (c) the processes of matter" then we could have free will.

[Greta]

This talk gives a insight into the dynamics of emergence: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ElMqwgkXguw

[Hobbes' Choice]

I am interested in the problem of mind which allows us to experience and to act freely.

But it does not. Nothing at all makes any sense unless there is causality.
Clearly gravity, for example does not give a rat's arse what we might will, you are still going to kill yourself if you jump off a tall building.
ANd you are avoiding answering my question.

Yes, the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen make one molecule of water. The problem I have in my mind is that how a process in a set of neurons can give rise to mind in which you could act freely if causality rules.

You do not act freely, You act determinedly. In the same way H and O act like water so to do the neurones act beyond their innate and isolated capacity.
You would have a much bigger problem by asserting "freedom" as you would have to ask how, and where that comes from.

[bahman]

But it does not. Nothing at all makes any sense unless there is causality.
Clearly gravity, for example does not give a rat's arse what we might will, you are still going to kill yourself if you jump off a tall building.
ANd you are avoiding answering my question.

Yes, the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen make one molecule of water. The problem I have in my mind is that how a process in a set of neurons can give rise to mind in which you could act freely if causality rules.

You do not act freely, You act determinedly. In the same way H and O act like water so to do the neurones act beyond their innate and isolated capacity.
You would have a much bigger problem by asserting "freedom" as you would have to ask how, and where that comes from.

Well, we have the problem with consciousness even if we agree that we don't have free will. Can you explain how consciousness arises from simple bio-chemical process?

[Terrapin Station]

I don't understand your notation and what you are trying to say here.

I'm just using arbitrary symbols to avoid semantic associations with anything.

No, I am asking a question related to what you post: if properties are functions of (a) matter, (b) the relations of matter with respect to other matte and (c) the processes of matter" then we could have free will.

I agree with that, but I don't know if you didn't mean to type "then we couldn't have free will" instead.

Nothing in my ontology implies universal strong causal determinism.

[OuterLimits]

The problem arises when reductionism does not lead to a reduction explanation so either the whole is more than sum of parts or parts behaves differently in a given situation, when an phenomena emerges.

One planet cannot orbit itself. Orbits only "emerge" when multiple planets are under consideration.

Is this the kind of emergence you mean?

As for the mind, the most consistent empirical approach is simply not to posit that it exists out there. This salvages material science from any confusion about mind/brain, mind/matter, etc. Even eliminative materialists are not willing to go this far. They will move more and more of what people report as subjective into the domain of neurology, but don't seem willing to say that the subject is in fact not having an experience. The problem of other minds.

[bahman]

The problem arises when reductionism does not lead to a reduction explanation so either the whole is more than sum of parts or parts behaves differently in a given situation, when an phenomena emerges.

One planet cannot orbit itself. Orbits only "emerge" when multiple planets are under consideration.

Is this the kind of emergence you mean?

No, this is what happen when we have a system with many objects. Orbits are simply the result of what laws of nature dictate. The problem is that in some specific system we have another phenomena on top of this, so called emergent phenomena.

As for the mind, the most consistent empirical approach is simply not to posit that it exists out there.

well I thought that it is mind is well accepted in empirical approach.

This salvages material science from any confusion about mind/brain, mind/matter, etc.

True.

Even eliminative materialists are not willing to go this far. They will move more and more of what people report as subjective into the domain of neurology, but don't seem willing to say that the subject is in fact not having an experience. The problem of other minds.

Ok.

[OuterLimits]

The problem arises when reductionism does not lead to a reduction explanation so either the whole is more than sum of parts or parts behaves differently in a given situation, when an phenomena emerges.

One planet cannot orbit itself. Orbits only "emerge" when multiple planets are under consideration.

Is this the kind of emergence you mean?

No, this is what happen when we have a system with many objects. Orbits are simply the result of what laws of nature dictate. The problem is that in some specific system we have another phenomena on top of this, so called emergent phenomena.

As for the mind, the most consistent empirical approach is simply not to posit that it exists out there.

well I thought that it is mind is well accepted in empirical approach.

This salvages material science from any confusion about mind/brain, mind/matter, etc.

True.

Even eliminative materialists are not willing to go this far. They will move more and more of what people report as subjective into the domain of neurology, but don't seem willing to say that the subject is in fact not having an experience. The problem of other minds.

Ok.

I would have thought that the orbit was an "emergent phenomenon" but can you give another example - preferably at a small scale?

I think that sloppily, yes, it is habitual to consider the the mind as an emergent phenomenon. Pet peeve of mine.