Is Personal Identity Arbitrary?

[UhOH]

"Identity" is a set of ideas that a human hold of itself. A "table" has no identity of itself. It can only have an identity in the minds of humans.
Anything beyond this seems idiotic to me.
From the source given. It would seem that numerical identity is the quality of uniqueness. Why append the world 'numerical" is odd.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/

No matter. So what makes you think it arbitrary?

Either it is logically true that a table constitutes a thing or it is not, if it is then a table is an entity which must, by necessity be the same as itself and thus has objective identity. If the table does not constitute a thing then there must be some other object of perception which can logically described as a thing, for there is obviously something rather than nothing, then this entity must be the same as itself.

To summarise, it seems arbitrary because our intuitions do not seem to constitute a reliable method of discovering the persistence criteria of objects.

[Hobbes' Choice]

"Identity" is a set of ideas that a human hold of itself. A "table" has no identity of itself. It can only have an identity in the minds of humans.
Anything beyond this seems idiotic to me.
From the source given. It would seem that numerical identity is the quality of uniqueness. Why append the world 'numerical" is odd.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/

No matter. So what makes you think it arbitrary?

Either it is logically true that a table constitutes a thing or it is not, if it is then a table is an entity which must, by necessity be the same as itself and thus has objective identity.

It does not have an identity except that which we as humans bestow upon it. Is that the same as objective? Or is it your interested and partial analysis from your own subject? It's thingness is not with the table but with the observer.

If the table does not constitute a thing then there must be some other object of perception which can logically described as a thing, for there is obviously something rather than nothing, then this entity must be the same as itself.

You have this backwards. You need to employ the Kantian turn, otherwise you are making the table a intentional being.
The table has to be mute in all this. It is YOU that is giving the table thingness.

To summarise, it seems arbitrary because our intuitions do not seem to constitute a reliable method of discovering the persistence criteria of objects.

It's only as arbitrary as the criteria which we apply to our perceptions.
But you asked about "PERSONAL" identity? That's why I mentioned categories such as; American; human' male etc....What has a table got to do with all this?

[Obvious Leo]

It's only as arbitrary as the criteria which we apply to our perceptions.
But you asked about "PERSONAL" identity? That's why I mentioned categories such as; American; human' male etc....What has a table got to do with all this?

Surely your basic Kantian perspective, with which I completely agree, must also apply to your perception of the "self". When he refers to "persistence criteria" I suspect that UhOH is referring to an innate Cartesian anxiety that such criteria are illusory, as indeed that are. The self has no objective identity and its subjective identity is an ever-moving target.

[Hobbes' Choice]

It's only as arbitrary as the criteria which we apply to our perceptions.
But you asked about "PERSONAL" identity? That's why I mentioned categories such as; American; human' male etc....What has a table got to do with all this?

Surely your basic Kantian perspective, with which I completely agree, must also apply to your perception of the "self". When he refers to "persistence criteria" I suspect that UhOH is referring to an innate Cartesian anxiety that such criteria are illusory, as indeed that are.

I think not. How do you work that bit of flim-flam out?

The self has no objective identity and its subjective identity is an ever-moving target.

This is only a problem for your own ideas about objectivity and subjectivity, which I pointed out in my first response to this thread: it's not a problem for personal identity, which is a process, and not a static object, or static subject.

[Obvious Leo]

it's not a problem for personal identity, which is a process, and not a static object, or static subject.

The very point I'm making. Any process can only be defined in terms of its dynamic changes, which makes the notion of "persistence criteria" problematic, to say the least.

[UhOH]

It does not have an identity except that which we as humans bestow upon it. Is that the same as objective? Or is it your interested and partial analysis from your own subject? It's thingness is not with the table but with the observer.

My point could be interperated in a Kantian light as well. We cannot perceive the true intrinsic divisions of reality and instead observe the world through a number of concepts. This does not remove the necessity of the 'noumenal' world containing true divisions of objects. For, presumably, if we were somehow able to perceive things the way they are then we would clearly see the nature of the divisions of reality as they are.

But since we cannot know the true nature of the world, the identity of noumena is unknowable and would thus might as well be arbitrary for our purposes.

As to why I consider the case of the table relevant, I see persons as objects which produce experience and serve as the substrate on which it occurs.

On this conception the persistence criteria of objects is wholly relevant.

[Obvious Leo]

We cannot perceive the true intrinsic divisions of reality and instead observe the world through a number of concepts. This does not remove the necessity of the 'noumenal' world containing true divisions of objects.

Why doesn't it? If the noumenal world can only be understood in terms of subjective concepts then why would it "of necessity" contain intrinsic divisions of physical reality into objects? Aside from anything else the mass/energy equivalence principle of Special Relativity clearly suggests otherwise. Even subatomic particles are nothing more than energy quanta which are configured in a particular way and the way we codify this configuration is indeed entirely arbitrary, in the sense that there is no "right" or "wrong" way of doing it.

But since we cannot know the true nature of the world, the identity of noumena is unknowable and would thus might as well be arbitrary for our purposes.

I agree, and since it might as well be arbitrary we should embrace Occam economy and accept that it is. The phenomenal world of our experience can model the noumenon but it can't possible define it, even in principle, so an assumption that such a definition exists is faith-based rather than grounded in logic. In other words it's Platonist bullshit, for those who prefer the more robust language.

[Hobbes' Choice]

It does not have an identity except that which we as humans bestow upon it. Is that the same as objective? Or is it your interested and partial analysis from your own subject? It's thingness is not with the table but with the observer.

My point could be interperated in a Kantian light as well. We cannot perceive the true intrinsic divisions of reality and instead observe the world through a number of concepts. This does not remove the necessity of the 'noumenal' world containing true divisions of objects. For, presumably, if we were somehow able to perceive things the way they are then we would clearly see the nature of the divisions of reality as they are.

But since we cannot know the true nature of the world, the identity of noumena is unknowable and would thus might as well be arbitrary for our purposes.

As to why I consider the case of the table relevant, I see persons as objects which produce experience and serve as the substrate on which it occurs.

On this conception the persistence criteria of objects is wholly relevant.

According to Kant, the noumenal is not accessible to us, and in this sense you cannot say anything about it, nor assume as you say " 'noumenal' world containing true divisions of objects". - that there are any divisions at all.
Phenomenally, it is true to say that all categories are interested, related to their utility and their understanding by the human metric. Where there is no interest things get lumped into larger categories such as "the environment" or "Germany" where there is no detailed knowledge about the component parts. So the act of division is an interpretive, partial and concerned process. On an other level we use "Bob" or "Bill" to group a collection of phenomena, as we are interested in the "identity" of Bob and not his components, such as his lungs, his cell, his molecules, his atoms.
Where exactly do you suggest that Bob's "true" categories lies on this spectrum?

Thus we have no warrant to even assume that the idea that the noumenal might have true categories, or even that it is possible to talk about the noumenal having ANY categories at all.

In fact I would go so far as to suggest that your statement luanches you into the Platonic world of Forms--- whooooopppsss!

[UhOH]

According to Kant, the noumenal is not accessible to us, and in this sense you cannot say anything about it, nor assume as you say " 'noumenal' world containing true divisions of objects". - that there are any divisions at all.
Phenomenally, it is true to say that all categories are interested, related to their utility and their understanding by the human metric. Where there is no interest things get lumped into larger categories such as "the environment" or "Germany" where there is no detailed knowledge about the component parts. So the act of division is an interpretive, partial and concerned process. On an other level we use "Bob" or "Bill" to group a collection of phenomena, as we are interested in the "identity" of Bob and not his components, such as his lungs, his cell, his molecules, his atoms.
Where exactly do you suggest that Bob's "true" categories lies on this spectrum?

Thus we have no warrant to even assume that the idea that the noumenal might have true categories, or even that it is possible to talk about the noumenal having ANY categories at all.

In fact I would go so far as to suggest that your statement luanches you into the Platonic world of Forms--- whooooopppsss!

There must be, however, a portion of the noumena which is the substrate for a particular conscious perspective. Could we define this theoretical entity as an object for which we do not know the persistence conditions of and constitutes something important to that individual's identity?

[Obvious Leo]

There must be, however, a portion of the noumena which is the substrate for a particular conscious perspective. Could we define this theoretical entity as an object for which we do not know the persistence conditions of and constitutes something important to that individual's identity?

It seems perfectly logical to assume that there is such a thing as an objective physical reality which exists independently of our conceptual construction of it. However it does not follow that such an objective reality must take on a physical form which has some sort of absolute ontological status. I presume that such a transcendental Platonist Form is what you are referring to when you speak of "persistence conditions" and to prove such an assumption as un-philosophical is a relatively easy argument because it necessitates an appeal to the invisible hand of the supernatural. Such an appeal may be attractive to many but it ought to be anathema to a philosopher.

[Hobbes' Choice]

There must be, however, a portion of the noumena which is the substrate for a particular conscious perspective.

Eh? Why?

Could we define this theoretical entity as an object for which we do not know the persistence conditions of and constitutes something important to that individual's identity?

No, not in any way.

[Hobbes' Choice]

There must be, however, a portion of the noumena which is the substrate for a particular conscious perspective. Could we define this theoretical entity as an object for which we do not know the persistence conditions of and constitutes something important to that individual's identity?

It seems perfectly logical to assume that there is such a thing as an objective physical reality which exists independently of our conceptual construction of it. However it does not follow that such an objective reality must take on a physical form which has some sort of absolute ontological status. I presume that such a transcendental Platonist Form is what you are referring to when you speak of "persistence conditions" and to prove such an assumption as un-philosophical is a relatively easy argument because it necessitates an appeal to the invisible hand of the supernatural. Such an appeal may be attractive to many but it ought to be anathema to a philosopher.

I agree that there is an independent reality. I disagree that you can call it objective - when we know that what is 'objective' is that which is agreed upon by us and constructed from human perceptions.

Whilst the subjective is personal and constructed from our perceptual apparatus; what is objective is just those elements of our world upon which we can agree, and whilst this suggests that there is an independent world that persists regardless of humanity, we can never escape the fact the the objective is as humanly constructed as the subjective world and is only seen through each of our subjective filters.

That which is independent is more than mere objective reality

[Obvious Leo]

UhOH.

Perhaps your own example can illustrate the flaw in your reasoning. Essentially what you're suggesting is that there is an intrinsic noumenal quality about your desk which gives it the property of "desk-ness". However the very same atoms which constitute your desk could be configured in trillions of different ways which would not confer such a property of desk-ness upon them. What would be the ontological status of such objects were your desk to be re-configured into one of them?

Incidentally this reasoning applies equally to the "objects" of subatomic physics. These objects are modelled as particles and yet Einstein showed us that particles are in fact nothing more than a representation of the collective emergent properties of energy quanta which have been configured in a particular way, which immediately defines them as an observer construct. The "quark-ness" of the quark is thus no more a feature of the noumenon than is the desk-ness of the desk. This accounts for the wave/particle duality of quantum physics which so many theorists find so mysterious but which a philosopher can explain with a single sentence. "It all depends which way you look at it".

[RG1]

...we can never escape the fact the objective is as humanly constructed as the subjective world and is only seen through each of our subjective filters.

Hi Hobbes, well said! And in general I agree with this statement. BUT, if we wish to be ‘technically’ correct, then there are actually 3 (three) exceptions to this claim. There are 3 things that exist in the ‘objective world’ (i.e. with ‘certainty’) that do not require “subjective filters” (i.e. a subjective view) to confirm/see its existence. We can know these 3 items exist with certainty, beyond that of our ability to subjectively perceive them. These certainties are:

1. The ‘subjectiveness’ itself! We can claim with absolute and objective certainty that ‘Experiencing’ exists. It is an absolute, self-evident, and an undeniable truth (…the more we deny it, the more we affirm it!). This is an ‘objective’ truth that does not require viewing through the “subjective filters” to confirm/see its existence.

2. Secondly, and contingent upon the existence of ‘experiencing’, an ‘Experiencer’ exists. For without an ‘experiencer’, ‘experiencing’ could not logically happen/exist. One requires the other. (Note: be careful not to jump to conclusions over who/what this mystery 'experiencer' is!)

So now we know 2 things exist with certainty (within the ‘objective world’); one is ‘absolute’, and the other is ‘logically derived’, and neither require viewing through the subjective world/filters/eyeglasses to confirm its existence. So what else exists (with certainty) in this ‘objective’ world’?

3. Thirdly, and again contingent upon the existence of ‘experiencing’, ‘Memory’ exists. For without Memory, experiences could not logically be ‘known’, and in effect, could not be ‘felt’, (…i.e. you wouldn’t know it if happened!). Memory is therefore an objective, logically derived, truth/certainty.

Now, where do we go from here, what else is certain and exists in the ‘objective’ world. It is here at this point where I agree with Hobbes with my certainty #4--

4. Fourthly, Everything Else can ONLY be known to exist through imagination and perceptions; via the ‘subjective’ world, and through the lens of our subjective eyeglasses. "...we can never escape the fact the objective is as humanly constructed as the subjective world and is only seen through each of our subjective filters." --- Hobbes' Choice

Notes:
A. Don’t confuse the ‘experiencer’ (in item #2 above) with the ‘experience of "I"/self-awareness/identity’. These are not the same. One is an objective, logically derived, 'thing', and the other is a 'subjective' experience. The ‘experiencer’ (in item #2) exists in the OBJECTIVE world (via logically derived), and the “I”/self-identity experience exists only in the SUBJECTIVE world (via the subjective experience of self-awareness/identity).

B. Also, it seems to be logically possible that Experiencer and Memory could actually be one-in-the-same.

[Impenitent]

Nietzsche was right... "We have not god rid of God because we still have faith in grammar"

and our faith in grammar gives us "objective" certainty as well...

-Imp