Who- why- where are we ?

[Arising_uk]

Then it can't be "All" can it.

[Conde Lucanor]

Dimensions' are the names of the measurements we make; they are not places such that things are located within them. For example, we might describe a point within the universe in terms of co-ordinates, but there is no metaphysical edge to the universe where there is an 'x' axis etc.

Measurements are comparisons; I can compare this object to that ruler in a particular way and say 'it is 10cm long';77

You are confusing two meanings of the term "dimension". One has to do with measurement, the quantitative aspect of things, but the subject here is the qualitative aspect in the existence of those things, of their mere presence, their ontology. We could call it the domains of time and space. Back to the original statement, what I'm conveying is that you seem to recognize only the space domain, a static universe where there are no events, no change, no movement.

What about before I was conceived, or born? Or when I am dead and decayed? Am I still the one changing Londoner? I would say that whether we wanted to count these states of being as still 'Londoner' is flexible, that "in one sense" we still might call the dispersed atoms of my body "Londoner" but for most purposes we would say they are so different from the present "Londoner" the name no longer fits. There is no right answer, it just depends on what we are trying to communicate. A scientist might argue that "Londoner" never did exist, since there is no reason to differentiate that particular assembly of atoms from the rest of the universe - it is all the same stuff, obeying the same laws.

When unborn or dead, you just don't exist. But when an entity exists, then being is a concrete reality and not just a representation of that reality. In our representation it exists as a unity of elements which identifies the object as such, but even though the elements and their relation to each other differ in time, the essential relationships that conform its unity as an object, remain as to consider it being the same. The being of Londoner changes, but not enough as not to be recognized as Londoner.

I do not think it is at all easy to fix on that criteria. For example, as far as something exists objectively, independently of our consciousness, then how could we know it? We can only know via our consciousness, so how can we disentangle the thing in itself from the nature of the consciousness that perceives it?

Everything goes through our perceptual senses and is formed as a representation in our subjective consciousness, that's common knowledge. But it is also common knowledge that our very own subjectivity is able to assess the objective existence of things and events. They can be inferred from the perception of the conjunction of events in different instances, contrasted with the perceptions of other subjectivities. If I go alone into a room and collect data from an object I perceive there, I have no means to validate that I'm not just having an illusion. But if another subject goes into the room and collects data, I can compare and make inferences about the real existence of the object that I couldn't do before. Add some events of cause and effect and you get a trustable method of validating through your subjectivity the objective reality of what you had perceived.

I'd say that an idea of God that puts him outside the scope of science, maths, logic etc. does just that. That is the correct position to take.

What is outside the scope of knowledge, is unknowable, unintelligible. You couldn't take a position on it, because that would make it knowable. If the universe had, for example, just two spatial dimensions, you would not have the inhabitants of that world saying: "well, there must be a third dimension that is outside the scope of our knowledge". Their world is two dimensional and that's it, just the same as our world not having a knowable god is that: a world without a god. And if we were allowed to speculate that there is another dimension and a god, we could as well entertain the notion that there are millions of dimensions and millions of gods, because there would be no way to know.

Absolutely. As I say, I am distinguishing arguments about God based on the infinite (which I think are mistaken - irrespective of which side is using them) from those claims of knowledge of God based on claims of personal subjective experiences. I was simply observing that in practice religious belief tends to be more based around the second, rather than the theorising about abstract notions of God that we are discussing.

But in the end you're just admitting that in practice people fool themselves by believing they know things that they really cannot know, like the existence of gods. So they are not gaining knowledge of god from scripture of personal revelation, they're just getting beliefs, grounded on limited, common human experience.

If the objects on the strip were discrete, then they would be distinguishable one from the other. It is necessary that they must be distinguishable in order for us to count them. That being the case, then to call them a 'series' and to say the series does not end would require us to both distinguish each object individually but simultaneously to think of it only as only being part of a series, which would be self-contradictory.

Suppose we imagine the strip, then try to imagine those 'discrete objects'. Whatever we imagine (numerals, pictures, dots) are not infinite. It is true that they might be made so similar in that our eyes could not remember each shape, such that we could not remember where we had started counting, but that would just be a failure of human perception, easily remedied by marking the start.

You've taken the analogy too far. It just illustrates that a system without fixed ends (eliminating the need for another system beyond that limit) can exist in form of a loop. If your relative starting mark moves and flows with the rest of the continuous loop, it disappears as a fixed reference marker again.

[Londoner]

You are confusing two meanings of the term "dimension". One has to do with measurement, the quantitative aspect of things, but the subject here is the qualitative aspect in the existence of those things, of their mere presence, their ontology. We could call it the domains of time and space. Back to the original statement, what I'm conveying is that you seem to recognize only the space domain, a static universe where there are no events, no change, no movement.

My position is that of Kant. Our notions of space (extension) and time (past, present and future) are the way that we order our perceptions; what we need to do in order to make sense of them. But they arise in us; they are part of our mental architecture, a tool - they are not in themselves objects of perception. If they are a 'domain' then it would only be a domain within our human understanding.

(Regarding my recognising only the space domain, I do not see space and time as being two distinct things; they are two sides of the same coin, we understand one in relation to the other.)

When unborn or dead, you just don't exist. But when an entity exists, then being is a concrete reality and not just a representation of that reality. In our representation it exists as a unity of elements which identifies the object as such, but even though the elements and their relation to each other differ in time, the essential relationships that conform its unity as an object, remain as to consider it being the same. The being of Londoner changes, but not enough as not to be recognized as Londoner.

But the existence of that identity is in the eye of the beholder; you say the being is identified by 'essential relationships' but who is to say which ones are 'essential'? When I am dead I will still exist; if the undertaker is asked 'Who is that?' they will be able to answer; 'Londoner'. But if pressed; 'Is that really Londoner?' they would have to ask 'How do you mean? As throughout my life, there will be some degree of continuity with the Londoner of the day before, and some discontinuity; which is taken as more significant depends on the object of the enquirer, not the ontology of the corpse.

Me: I do not think it is at all easy to fix on that criteria. For example, as far as something exists objectively, independently of our consciousness, then how could we know it? We can only know via our consciousness, so how can we disentangle the thing in itself from the nature of the consciousness that perceives it?

Everything goes through our perceptual senses and is formed as a representation in our subjective consciousness, that's common knowledge. But it is also common knowledge that our very own subjectivity is able to assess the objective existence of things and events. They can be inferred from the perception of the conjunction of events in different instances, contrasted with the perceptions of other subjectivities. If I go alone into a room and collect data from an object I perceive there, I have no means to validate that I'm not just having an illusion. But if another subject goes into the room and collects data, I can compare and make inferences about the real existence of the object that I couldn't do before. Add some events of cause and effect and you get a trustable method of validating through your subjectivity the objective reality of what you had perceived.

It would only show that the object had a degree of persistence, such that you could label it using language. You could not tell that you and the other observer had the same mental representation. If I see green when you see red, and vice-versa, we can never know that. I have learnt that the word for the colour of grass is 'green' and so have you; we can both carry on agreeing that 'grass is green' forever.

So, I would argue that to say what is in our heads is a 'representation' of objective reality begs the question. To say that something is a representation suggests that we have access to the object in itself, other than via our senses, such that we can say; that part of the mental image is a true representation of this aspect. But we can only access it via our senses, so we can only check sensation against sensation, never against the (assumed) cause of those sensations.

I think that what we think of as 'real' arises from how it fits into a web of beliefs, the sets of rules that we have created in order to make sense of the world. Some are very core and so we are reluctant to change them, others are only peripheral. But there is ultimately no anchor; all the elements of our belief system lean on each other.

Me: Absolutely. As I say, I am distinguishing arguments about God based on the infinite (which I think are mistaken - irrespective of which side is using them) from those claims of knowledge of God based on claims of personal subjective experiences. I was simply observing that in practice religious belief tends to be more based around the second, rather than the theorising about abstract notions of God that we are discussing.
But in the end you're just admitting that in practice people fool themselves by believing they know things that they really cannot know, like the existence of gods. So they are not gaining knowledge of god from scripture of personal revelation, they're just getting beliefs, grounded on limited, common human experience.

I don't disagree, however I would not be so harsh since I think everybody fools themselves into believing they know things they cannot know - or to put it another way, we are all obliged to act on certain assumptions that ultimately we cannot justify.

I don't mean 'anything goes', since there still has to be a connection between the beliefs and the assumptions. For example, if I have assumed that you can tell the difference between reality and illusion by whether other people also report the same experience, I could not then claim an entirely subjective vision of God is 'real', at least not retaining the original meaning of 'real'.

You've taken the analogy too far. It just illustrates that a system without fixed ends (eliminating the need for another system beyond that limit) can exist in form of a loop. If your relative starting mark moves and flows with the rest of the continuous loop, it disappears as a fixed reference marker again.

I think all analogies about 'infinity' must be 'too far'; they will always create contradictions, as with this starting mark that is both a starting mark yet not at any particular place. As I say, I do not think 'infinite' can be used as a predicate - once we start to talk about an infinite something then it will be found to contradict itself.

[Dontaskme]

Excellent poem! Was this actually written by Richard Hay or was it a translation? His book is mostly famous for his haikus which are easier to write than intelligent rhyme.

I don't think Richard Hay actually wrote the poem himself, he was instead transcribing some of Haikus material and consequently made a book dedicated to that esoteric stuff. And yes, a good poem, kind of hits the right spot really.

[Dontaskme]

P.S.
All is conscious – but there those who are not aware of it.

No thing is conscious. Consciousness IS ALL things.
To be conscious of consciousness is the activity of consciousness itself. Mind being an aspect of latent consciousness is activity consisting of thought and feeling, perception, and belief, etc...all arising in it,known by it, experienced by it, and are temporal appearances of it...but not IT in the absolute sense.

What you essentially are is (Consciousness) which is not a thing and doesn't come and go, it's always here now ever unchanging and is that which is constantly aware (knowing) of every changing thing/thought/belief/perception/feeling COMING AND GOING

There has to be a permanent knowing presence of consciousness/awareness for anything to be possibly known/experienced...that presence is known as consciousness. That's what everything is, that's you, the you has to be here always as this immediate unbroken,continuously seamless without beginning nor end...known as NOW...otherwise life would ONLY be made up of fragmented bits and pieces of you coming in and out of existence, and that's not how life operates. Life is a continuous stream of Now's...where past and futures are only thoughts appearing NOW IN CONSCIOUSNESS...the only place and knowing there is...that never changes or moves.

You as consciousness doesn't change or move...what appears in you as consciousness is that which changes and moves, ie: mind activity, or to put another way, the appearances and disappearances of thoughts, perception, feelings, beliefs..etc etc..

''God sleeps in the rock
dreams in the plant,
stirs in the animal
and awakens in man''

In other words...God or Self becomes aware it is dreaming as and through the fictional character, namely, man.

Am I dreaming my life or am I dreamt...same difference. The one aware of every night-time dream (unaware in sleep) is the same one aware of the waking state (awakened) dream.

When you awaken from night-time sleep, you know you have been dreaming. Even though you were not aware of your being since you were asleep.

That's because what you really are doesn't sleep or wake up, it's always this self shinning presence awareness now. The you that you think goes to sleep at night is just a cessation of mind activity that's all...that same mind activity is what our dreams are...not known by the mind, which is either on or off, but known by awareness always present here now that is always on.

[Hobbes' Choice]

P.S.
All is conscious – but there those who are not aware of it.

What an arrogant piece of shit.
You have no evidence that ANYTHING is conscious, let alone "all".
You just about have the right to assert that you are conscious.

[waechter418]

Yes Dontaskme, Consciousness IS ALL things!


and you so called "Hobbeschoice", are obviously neither aware, nor civilised

[Hobbes' Choice]

Yes Dontaskme, Consciousness IS ALL things!


and you so called "Hobbeschoice", are obviously neither aware, nor civilised

You'll need more that "awareness" to prove your delusion.

[Conde Lucanor]

My position is that of Kant. Our notions of space (extension) and time (past, present and future) are the way that we order our perceptions; what we need to do in order to make sense of them. But they arise in us; they are part of our mental architecture, a tool - they are not in themselves objects of perception. If they are a 'domain' then it would only be a domain within our human understanding.

Kant's view is problematic, as it resembles in many instances that of Bishop Berkeley's, of which he tried to distance himself. Is still a matter of debate, but in other instances Kant seems to reject solipsism and implies that objects represented in our minds do exist out there. In any case, I don't subscribe to any form of idealism. Ordinary things age, evolve, change, for real, not as an illusion of our senses. They do it independently of our percpetion of them. And they occupy space, they have a real space-dimensional quality, not just in our minds.

(Regarding my recognising only the space domain, I do not see space and time as being two distinct things; they are two sides of the same coin, we understand one in relation to the other.)

I wonder: the two sides of what? Of being? Or of our supposedly illusory perception of being?

But the existence of that identity is in the eye of the beholder; you say the being is identified by 'essential relationships' but who is to say which ones are 'essential'? When I am dead I will still exist; if the undertaker is asked 'Who is that?' they will be able to answer; 'Londoner'. But if pressed; 'Is that really Londoner?' they would have to ask 'How do you mean? As throughout my life, there will be some degree of continuity with the Londoner of the day before, and some discontinuity; which is taken as more significant depends on the object of the enquirer, not the ontology of the corpse.

People who have met Londoner, will have formed a conception of Londoner in their minds, which is not the same as saying that Londoner exists only subjectively in their minds. It exists there with the assurance that Londoner is a concrete, real being, which as all beings, changes in time. Surely, when Londoner is not around anymore, they still will have access to the impression of Londoner in their minds and relate that impression to their past, present and future experiences.

It would only show that the object had a degree of persistence, such that you could label it using language. You could not tell that you and the other observer had the same mental representation. If I see green when you see red, and vice-versa, we can never know that.

If I place outside the room several objects, one of them identical to the one in the room, and I ask the other observer to identify which one he/she saw inside the room, then I will know that both me and the other observer had the same mental representation of the object in the room. It all can be achieved without resorting to labels of language. I can also replace the independent observer with an instrument that measures properties of the object and validate those in other objects I have perceived. One can devise many ways to validate that our mental representations of objects are not mere illusions.

I don't disagree, however I would not be so harsh since I think everybody fools themselves into believing they know things they cannot know - or to put it another way, we are all obliged to act on certain assumptions that ultimately we cannot justify.

I don't mean 'anything goes', since there still has to be a connection between the beliefs and the assumptions. For example, if I have assumed that you can tell the difference between reality and illusion by whether other people also report the same experience, I could not then claim an entirely subjective vision of God is 'real', at least not retaining the original meaning of 'real'.

I see you move between different forms of solipsism, subjectivism and idealism: nothing can be known to be concrete or real, but abstract and relative to perception. Under such view, no statement can hold any truth. Despite declaring otherwise, in that view "anything goes", everything is possible, even contradictory statements about the world, since their truth is not fixed, but fluid and only momentarily valid. In that world, saying god does not exist is equally valid to saying god exists. It's the hypostatization of the absurd. I can't subscribe to such view.

[Belinda]

Conde Lucanor wrote:

I see you move between different forms of solipsism, subjectivism and idealism: nothing can be known to be concrete or real, but abstract and relative to perception. Under such view, no statement can hold any truth. Despite declaring otherwise, in that view "anything goes", everything is possible, even contradictory statements about the world, since their truth is not fixed, but fluid and only momentarily valid. In that world, saying god does not exist is equally valid to saying god exists. It's the hypostatization of the absurd. I can't subscribe to such view.

But don't you agree that some perceptions correspond to absolute reality more than other perceptions?

[Conde Lucanor]

Conde Lucanor wrote:

I see you move between different forms of solipsism, subjectivism and idealism: nothing can be known to be concrete or real, but abstract and relative to perception. Under such view, no statement can hold any truth. Despite declaring otherwise, in that view "anything goes", everything is possible, even contradictory statements about the world, since their truth is not fixed, but fluid and only momentarily valid. In that world, saying god does not exist is equally valid to saying god exists. It's the hypostatization of the absurd. I can't subscribe to such view.

But don't you agree that some perceptions correspond to absolute reality more than other perceptions?

Sure, we have not achieved absolute certainty in many fields. It is not denied that there are limits to our knowledge.

[Londoner]

Kant's view is problematic, as it resembles in many instances that of Bishop Berkeley's, of which he tried to distance himself. Is still a matter of debate, but in other instances Kant seems to reject solipsism and implies that objects represented in our minds do exist out there. In any case, I don't subscribe to any form of idealism. Ordinary things age, evolve, change, for real, not as an illusion of our senses. They do it independently of our percpetion of them. And they occupy space, they have a real space-dimensional quality, not just in our minds.

I do not understand how we can claim to know about things 'independently of our perception of them'. Where would our knowledge be obtained except through our perception?

Me:(Regarding my recognising only the space domain, I do not see space and time as being two distinct things; they are two sides of the same coin, we understand one in relation to the other.)
I wonder: the two sides of what? Of being? Or of our supposedly illusory perception of being?

You cannot explain them separately; one can only be understood relative to the other.

People who have met Londoner, will have formed a conception of Londoner in their minds, which is not the same as saying that Londoner exists only subjectively in their minds. It exists there with the assurance that Londoner is a concrete, real being, which as all beings, changes in time. Surely, when Londoner is not around anymore, they still will have access to the impression of Londoner in their minds and relate that impression to their past, present and future experiences.

So Londoner may have no physical existence, in that every single molecule that was in his body has dissolved and become part of other objects, and yet Londoner will still be a concrete and real being, that persists in time, in the form of memories (not identical memories) in people's heads?

If Mrs Londoner is the only person who has a particular memory, and there is no physical counterpart to that memory why doesn't that qualify as Londoner existing only subjectively in her mind? If it doesn't, then surely 'subjective' would have no meaning. Mrs Londoner might also have an idea of a unicorn; would the unicorn also be a concrete and real being, that persists in time...as long as people think of unicorns?

I do not think this reflects how we actually refer to things. When we talk about 'an impression of' or 'a memory of' or 'the corpse of' or 'the youth of' Londoner, then although the same word 'Londoner' persists its reference changes, its meaning changes. When two people use that name, what matters is the meaning, which is usually made clear in context and the purpose of the conversation. If an official is compiling a list of voters, and Londoner is dead, then there is no such thing as Londoner.

If I place outside the room several objects, one of them identical to the one in the room, and I ask the other observer to identify which one he/she saw inside the room, then I will know that both me and the other observer had the same mental representation of the object in the room. It all can be achieved without resorting to labels of language. I can also replace the independent observer with an instrument that measures properties of the object and validate those in other objects I have perceived. One can devise many ways to validate that our mental representations of objects are not mere illusions.

You would know that they had had the mental representation 'X' within the room and the same (or very similar) mental representation 'X' regarding a particular object outside the room. And you might do the same, but your own mental representation in both cases might have been 'Y'.

What you cannot do is compare your 'Y' to their 'X'. Adding a third observer, human or mechanical would not help. The only way you could compare your 'X' and their 'Y' was if you could be them, while simultaneously remaining yourself.

Isn't it improbable that our own human organs of perception, and our brains, just happen to be configured in such a way that we can know objects as they are in themselves? It is not just theoretical that some see 'X' and others see 'Y'; all humans do see things slightly differently, as do animals, and some lack the sense of sight at all. Who sets the benchmark to say 'what things really look like'?

I see you move between different forms of solipsism, subjectivism and idealism: nothing can be known to be concrete or real, but abstract and relative to perception. Under such view, no statement can hold any truth. Despite declaring otherwise, in that view "anything goes", everything is possible, even contradictory statements about the world, since their truth is not fixed, but fluid and only momentarily valid. In that world, saying god does not exist is equally valid to saying god exists. It's the hypostatization of the absurd. I can't subscribe to such view.

I would say truth is understood relative to context. But - since every assertion must have a context (if it is meaningful) - then it would not follow that no statement has truth, or that truth is fluid.

For example, God certainly exists - as an idea. Since you regard a dead Londoner as existing in the form of an assortment of different mental images in people's heads, I cannot see why you wouldn't agree that God also exists in that sense. But that doesn't oblige you to agree God also exists as an object in science, or maths.

And if a statement about God was presented with no context at all,e.g. 'God is.' Then the sensible response is 'I do not understand what you are saying', and that is neither solipsism or subjectivism or idealism.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Yes Dontaskme, Consciousness IS ALL things!


and you so called "Hobbeschoice", are obviously neither aware, nor civilised

You can saying nothing about "ALL" unless you are omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent.

Are you?

[attofishpi]

Attofishpi wrote:

Yes. I have had 20yrs of direct interaction with this 'God' - i have knowledge of its existence through experience.

Why did you put startle marks around the name God?

I didn't.

How do you identify God so that you know that it is He with whom you are interacting?

How do you identify a long lost great Aunt that turns up at your doorstep?

[waechter418]

Lift her skirt - to make sure she isn`t the infamous wolf in disguise