Reflex wrote: ↑Thu Jul 06, 2017 1:36 am
Me:
I do not think 'existence exists'.
It doesn't, at least not in the sense we ascribe existence to things that have
existence.
I do not think anything 'has existence'. Existence is not a thing, such that we can have it. John can '
be a boy', but he cannot just '
be'. If 'John' was just pure existence, then he wouldn't be John (and he wouldn't be 'he').
We do not ascribe existence to 'things'. 'Things' is an abstraction; it does not name any particular thing thing, which means there is nothing to exist (or not-exist). If I write
'X exists', what would show whether what I have written is true or false? You could only answer if I say what 'X' stands for.
Me: But if I was to say 'God exists' I do not know what sort of a claim that would be.
Exactly, which is why Tillich argued that it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it is to deny it.
I do not see how that follows. If I do not understand what somebody means, (or think what they say is meaningless) then I cannot say anything about their statement. If they cannot explain what they mean by '
God exists' then affirmation or denial does not come into it, because they haven't asserted anything.
Things become a little more clear, I think, when we allow ourselves to discern the difference between existence and essence.
It might or might not! Since we are still not clear about what 'existence' in the abstract is supposed to mean, I don't think we are ready to start comparing it to other words.
‘Being’ cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; ...nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term “entity” applied to it. “Being” cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that ‘Being’ no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that ‘Being’ cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of ‘definition’ as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a justifiable way of characterizing “entities”. The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face. -- Heidegger
Indeed, but Heidegger questions 'being' in terms of '
how things are given to us', and questions whether we have just one understanding of 'being', or several (and he invents different words to describe them). So he starts from asking what the word 'exist' means. He is a long way from statements like: "
God does not exist but is existence itself".