Londoner wrote: ↑Thu Jun 29, 2017 11:00 amIf some people don't know something, it is a fact they don't know something!
If those people are asked '
What is the case?' the true answer is
'I don't know'.
Not
'Since nobody knows, I am free to pretend that I do'.
The phrase "nobody knows X" needs justification. We don't know what other people do or do not know, unless for some reason we have evidence that a) what they claim to know is actually wrong, or b) that, as in the case of the size of the cosmos, it is
inherently impossible to know X: but such cases are very rare.
Meanwhile, we all "know" things all the time. So there's nothing irregular about a claim that "I know X," if X is not already known to be wrong or inherently impossible to know.
Finally, "I'm free to pretend...", as you characterize it, is slanted language. It already assumes that the person in question
does not, in fact, know. But what if he
does?
You cannot know whether Divine Revelation is Divine Revelation, or whether you understand it.
It depends on what we mean by "know." We "know" stuff all the time. But you're onto one thing: if we were left to guess what was or was not Divine Revelation, then yes, we would not be certain. But in the scenario you describe, you've already granted (for argument's sake only, of course) that a Supreme Being would have to exist for that to happen; but IF a Supreme Being exists, why would we imagine it would even be a problem for Him to make known His will to particular persons? After all, He would be "supreme."
Moreover, you and I express our intentions to others every day -- and nobody has a difficulty accepting that "Londoner said X." So now, what reason would we have for thinking that the Supreme Being would have any trouble doing a thing that is so simple to do that you and I do it all the time?
Your objection in this case is feather-light, therefore. A Supreme Being can reveal Himself if He wishes...assuming He exists, of course.
Actually, the vast majority of Muslims worldwide think that is exactly what the Koran is saying.
But that wouldn't matter. You write 'the question of who believes or disbelieves' has no impact, so how the vast majority (or all) the Muslims of the world think would have no relevance to the
correct interpretation of the Koran. You cannot have it both ways.
I'm not. I was simply responding to YOUR claim that Muslims don't read the Koran in a homicidal way, showing that it was untrue, despite your having walked by a few who didn't slit your throat today. It was
you who made the claim about what Muslims believe.
It may still be 'Divine Revelation' even if nobody (except me) reads it correctly.
Theoretically, that
could be possible. The more important question, though, is "Is it?"
I know other people disagree. It doesn't mean they're right. In fact, whenever two people disagree, both may be wrong, or one may be wrong and the other right: but what Aristotle's Law teaches us definitively is that they both cannot be right. So it's not even imperious to call another person potentially wrong; it's just basic logic.
So might
you be potentially wrong?
All human knowing is probabilistic. All of it has a chance of being mistaken. But some of it is so probable that a reasonable person acts upon it anyway. It is not certain that you are speaking to me right now. But I'm willing to believe it. It's low-percentage, I'll admit; but it's enough. Other things are much more certain: we don't leap off high places flapping our arms, even though there is a very slim chance we'll be the first men to fly by this method. The chances against it are so astronomical that you and I don't doubt for a second that that would be a dumb idea. Still, we don't know unless we've tried...
So probability is always in play when we use the word "know." We humans don't have 100% certainty of anything. And yet we know stuff all the time.
That's why I gave you several indicators, not simply "moral intuitions." Moral intuitions can be wrong. On the other hand, sometimes they're telling you something.
But how do we know which moral intuitions are telling us something, and which are not? We would need a higher frame of reference. It cannot be scripture, since we validate scripture because it 'makes sense of our moral intuitions'. So, if moral intuitions validate the truth of scripture, but not all moral intuitions are right, where do we go to check those moral intuitions?
Against the revealed will and character of God. Remember that IF God exists, it's a small thing for Him to reveal something to us. And though our human knowing is only probabilistic, we have good reason to believe our knowing if the confirmations are multitudinous or profound enough.
It would have to be at that meta-level that your claim to correctly understand religion rests. And as I wrote before, I think that must be a belief in Divine
Revelation. This seems to be characterised as an experience that is subjective (personal) but has the feeling of being empirical, that is to say it forces itself upon the subject. I think you hint at this in your final paragraph:
Meanwhile, logic also counts. Evidence counts. History counts. Prediction counts. Textual integrity counts. And personal experience counts...though not usually for others, it can be terribly compelling to the one experiencing it. Bring a bunch of these indicators together, and one's case starts to get strong.
I would suggest that knowing is often a combination of these factors, not merely one OR the other. You don't know that your high school science teacher didn't lie to you about the scientific method. But you add stuff up: she was a very nice person, she used an edited textbook, the school board did not fire her, your university studies said some of the same things...and so on...and at some point, you decided your science teacher was reliable. But it wasn't just her white lab coat that convinced you, nor was it that she had the name "teacher." Those were, if anything, minor considerations in your judgment. But they all came together to create a solidity to your conviction. And you were probably right.
As I have written before, I do not have any objection to such accounts as such. But what I find odd is the combination of personal revelation with hostility to the idea that others might have had the same experience, just because it differs in character from one's own.
Two caveats: nobody ever said that ALL of another person's views had to be wrong in order to say that SOME of their views were wrong...so the idea that an Islamic person could know nothing is simply
ad hominem. But falsehoods are
always a mix of truth and fiction: were they 100% fictions, nobody would believe them at all. Still this means that a person could be right about X, but not about Y. And I would say this is true of Islam.
Secondly, if one person's view contradicts another's directly, then Aristotle told us what logically we needed to know. Both parties could be wrong. One party could be wrong, and the other right. But one thing, Aristotle showed, was impossible: it would be utterly, rationally impossible for mutually-contradicting views to
both be right.
So when I say "I think Islam's (partially) wrong," I'm not saying Islam is without any referents to truth. I'm saying that when it goes against what is true, then
on that matter it is wrong. For example, its view of the legitimacy of beating women is wrong. So is its predilection for killing infidels and subjugating nations. Terrorism is wrong. Slavery is wrong. Female circumcision is wrong. The Burqa is wrong. Recruiting child soldiers is wrong. Throwing people off buildings, burning them to death or slitting throats on the beach is wrong.
And about a lot of these things, I'll bet you and I agree.
... isn't there room for some humility?
I hope so. But I also hope there's room for listening to God when He does speak.
