Immanuel Can wrote:
In a "chance-governed" universe, you don't even have a die. No two molecules act in any predictable way toward each other. There are no laws, and matter has no integrity at all.
The word 'chance' remains inappropriate, but yes; the universe might have been like that. In that universe, matter having no integrity would then be the order of matter. Why do we privilege the state of affairs that does exits, such that only
this one represents 'order', therefore must have been 'designed'?
No, induction doesn't work like that, nor does abduction, and both are relevant to deciding the question. You can start with the observation, and then move the most plausible explanation.
You cannot observe 'everything' because you, as observer, are part of the thing you are observing. You cannot do inductive reasoning about the universe because there are never any negative examples; the universe never contradicts the rules of the universe.
I would suggest that the problem is that we are using the 'universe' to mean 'everything'. But we are also using it as if it was a location, meaning 'where we happen to live', such that their might be other universes. So when we talk about 'this universe' have been chosen from a range of possible universes we can only do so by contradicting the first meaning of 'universe' ('everything').
So, to say stuff about one universe ('everything') we have to imagine an observer who is outside the universe (who
doesn't happen to live there). And we have done; 'God'. We do this by suggesting a parallel spiritual realm, so that although our own universe is still 'every
thing', there is also a separate universe of spirit. And from the point of view of that universe of spirit, our own universe is a separate object, one that can be observed.
Unless we take that step, which assumes what we are trying to prove, we cannot get started.
Re: universal theories (everything is by God's will, life is all a dream etc.)
Me: There is no piece of evidence that can disprove them, because everything can be accounted for within the theory.
Non-sequitur. Just because an "explanation" is possible and comprehensive does not make it the exclusive explanation, the correct explanation or the necessary explanation. It just makes it a very elaborate mistake.
Absolutely it does not make it the exclusive explanation. My point was that there can be any number of universal theories; none of them can be proved or disproved, so that none of them can claim exclusivity. That doesn't make them mistakes, as I wrote it makes them 'inconsequential', since whichever is true (if any) it makes no difference.
There was a time when people believed that matter was solid. That is a comprehensive explanation, covering all things: there was no "further down" to drill, it was thought, and nobody yet had the means to show it wrong. So it was just like the brain-in-a-vat. And yet, it was wrong.
'Matter is solid' is not a theory; it is a description. In due course we came up with a more complex description of the nature of matter.
The distinction is between saying how things behave a particular way, and why they behave a particular way. The law of gravity describes what things do; we say it is a law because it always seems to happen, we theorise that it will always be the case. But we cannot say
why it is the case, if I say the law of gravity is '
the will of God' and somebody else says '
the controllers of the matrix have configured the illusion that way' we can look at falling apples all day and get no information to decide between them.
This is what Newton meant when he wrote 'Hypotheses non fingo'; he described gravity, but he could not give a
reason for it.
Re: Language and 'truth'.
Me: I'm sure you are aware of the many problems with this idea, for example how then can we talk about 'cats' unless we are having an identical sense experience?
Too easy. There's such a thing as comparable experience. Our minds have things called "categories," ironically, that let us recognize new cats. But yes, Plato puzzled about this.
That would be like finding the meaning of words by looking them up in an imaginary dictionary. How do you know the new cats are the same as the old cats? You need an imaginary librarian to make sure the mental categories have been maintained, then that librarian needs an imaginary supervisor... Isn't it more likely that you know the meaning of 'cat' through your interactions with other people? That we fix the meaning of 'cat' not through introspection, or some innate template from the spirit world, but because when we misuse it other people will correct us; '
That's not a cat, it's a dog!'
Once again, there is was mass of philosophy that attempted to fix words to 'things', or sense experiences in this way, both using natural language and artificial languages, the most famous names probably being Russell and Wittgenstein. I would say that philosophy today, at least in the UK and USA, is still digesting the realisation that language is not transparent in that way.
Me: But I don't think that. I do not think there is only one metaphysical 'Truth', so there is no paradox in my saying 'X is true in one sense of that word, but not in another'
.
Well, then there's no meaning communicated by your use of the word "true." For what does "true" mean, except as a value-term telling another hearer that such-and-such a statement will turn out to be the case for her as well as for you, as in "It's true that Exmouth is in England"? If she does not find things are, for her, as you have said, then in what sense would she regard your claim as "true"?
There is meaning, but it is not the same meaning in all cases. In the example you give, both parties understand the context, so the meaning of 'true' is established by that context. If there was a different context, for example if they were playing word games, then it might not be true; I might reply; '
No, for example there is an 'x' in 'Exmouth', but no 'x' in 'England'. Or if we were doing maths, and somebody said "
It's true that Exmouth is in England" I would reply '
I don't think you understand what maths is about'. Or, a West Country nationalist might dispute the 'true', they might say
'Exmouth is in the West Country; the English claim it is in England is a lie!'.
That's what I mean when I say that "true" is anchored in the real world. "True" is not a private concept, but rather a social one -- it informs others of what is the case for all of us, regardless of our preferences.
Which? If 'truth' was anchored in 'the real world' then the social concept would not matter. Exmouth would be in England regardless of our preferences. But if it is a social one, then the location of Exmouth would be whatever society thought was the truth.
And of course the answer is 'both'. We understand that '
Exmouth is in England' viewed one way can be seen as an impersonal fact, but viewed another way can be seen as a social construct.