free will-how can it exist?

[chaz wyman]

Responses to Chaz Wyman.

Chaz: True - nothing comes from nothing.
MGL: I am not sure how this response proves determinism or even how it relates to anything I said. Could you elaborate?

It's a axiom which is used to test the idea of determinism. So far it has proved robust.
Your problem seems to be that you have to accept causality, but to propose free will you have to fudge it.

Chaz: That is a contradiction. You still are stuck exactly where I say you are.
MGL: Where exactly is the contradiction in claiming that an event A that is reducable to and therefore identifiable with its sub-events is not caused by those sub-events? Causation requires the cause to come before the effect. If event A and its constituent sub-events occur at exactly the same time how can the latter cause the other?

How not?

Chaz: You are postulating a contradictory idea that there can be effects for which there was no cause; for which you have no evidence or reason to assert.
What sort of thing do you imagine is a 'non-deterministic' force.
A thing which is 1) either of unknown cause, 2) or is incoherent babble.
From what or where does such a force emanate, or does it just puff into existence?

That is, as they say, your problem, not mine!

MG: I am pustulating no such thing.
Or even postulating?
I am merely suggesting that some effects are not inevitable given their cause.
In what way?
The standard interpretation of quantum theory suggests the same.
Not at all. QM effects are as yet unknown that does not mean they come from no where. 2000 years ago the origin of the earth was also unknown, that does not mean you are free to decide on any version you like.
The event of an electron travelling through a slit towards a detector panel may be caused by it being fired out of some device, but this firing does not determine the precise path that it takes. The theory that calculates its path is non-deterministic. There is no conclusive evidence either way to know for sure if this is intrinsically so or just a consequence of our ignorance but many scientists believe it to be the former. If you have an argument that proves otherwise I would very much like to hear it.
None of this goes towards helping your case.

Chaz: The fact that there are laws of physics some of which are uncannily reliable you would have to account for why it is that these are somehow immune from these 'occult' forces of which you speak, whilst only humans seem to be able magically to summon such 'occult' forces that you describe as "non-deterministic".
Can you account for humans having this remarkable power?
And why is it that a rock or pebble cannot also have a free-will.

MGL: The ways scientists account for the reliability of the laws of physics is usually in terms of probability and scale. The randomness of sub-atomic particles is not utterly chaotic. They are constrained to behave within certain parameters. There will always be a higher probability for a particle to be in one place rather than another. The interaction between particles also constrains there behaviour so that on macroscopic scales the behaviour of the objects they constitute are much more reliable. However, there is no good reason to suppose that the spontaneity on the sub-atomic scale cannot be amplified in suitable complex circumstances to the macroscopic arena. This could explain why non-complex objects like rocks or pebbles are unable to do anything interesting while biological organisms and especially humans never cease to surprise.

Great, now answer the question above! RPT:"The fact that there are laws of physics some of which are uncannily reliable you would have to account for why it is that these are somehow immune from these 'occult' forces of which you speak, whilst only humans seem to be able magically to summon such 'occult' forces that you describe as "non-deterministic".
Can you account for humans having this remarkable power?
And why is it that a rock or pebble cannot also have a free-will."

[charon]

Dimebag

I wonder if the acceptance of free will as myth might be correlated with ones locus of control

If I understand you I think that's right. One has a certain freedom of choice but those choices are always limited.

[adge]

Thanks for the posts, I find the case against free will to be pretty convincing.
Must admit i was already leaning towards that direction.
But what are the implications of this, does this mean that i’m typing this post because of the
Big Bang?
Is everything i am and do somehow predictable (given some hypothetical omniscience about causality), surely
the implications are pretty severe-if our every waking action are straightjacketed by causality.

[MGL]

Response to Chaz:

None of your responses seem to address any of my points other than simply to contradict them.
Your position seems to be based on what you consider to be an unassailable assumption that the universe is wholly deterministic. That every event is strictly caused by antecedent events such that in principle if all antecedent events were known it would be possible to predict their consequences with 100% accuracy. This is all quite coherent and may be true, but I can't see an argument that makes it necessarily true, let alone an argument that makes a non-deterministic universe necessarily false. What is logically unsound about the possibility that a particle's trajectory is inherently unpredictable albeit constrained by probable paths?

The only argument that favours a deterministic universe is a practical one - ie scientsists should never give up on the possibility that there are deterministic causes of seemingly random events. It's quite possible that the Copenhagen interpreters of quantum physics gave up too early and that Einstein was right all along when he said "God does not play dice". Nevertheless, it seems rather short-sighted to presume as a purely rational principle that there are no events in the universe without an antecedent cause, which is what you seem to be doing. It also seems equally shorsighted to presume that causation by definition has to be deterministic in the sense that any event will have inevitable consequences. What is so logically wrong with an event having a range of possible consequences all things being equal?

Just to be clear, I am not trying to prove that the universe is non-deterministic or that free-will exists, I am merely claiming that these seem to be perfectly coherent possibilities and nothing you have said has demonstrated that they are not. All you seem to be doing is using assumptions such as nothing comes from nothing to prove determinism. This assumption might be sound when talking about objects, but when it comes to events I find it less convincing. Another clarification, by non-deterministic forces, I meant physical forces, such as elecro-magnetism and its related sub-atomic particle the photon. Nothing occult about them I trust.

As there are reliable laws of physics which are non-deterministic and if this non-determism is inherent and not a matter of ignorance then they can't possibly be immune from non-deterministic forces. The question comes back to why you are convinced that physical forces MUST be ultimately deterministic.

[Notvacka]

Is everything i am and do somehow predictable (given some hypothetical omniscience about causality), surely the implications are pretty severe-if our every waking action are straightjacketed by causality.

That is only a problem if you think that we somehow live in reality, where free will does not exist. But we don't. We inhabit a shared illusion, where free will is taken for granted, and try as you might, you can't free yourself from the illusion other than on a purely intellectual level.

Since we don't have access to "omniscience about casuality", what you are and do is not particularly predictable. It is, however, determined, which is another matter. The only difference between the future and the past is our perspective. In practice, there is no difference between predetermination and postdetermination.

[chaz wyman]

Response to Chaz:

None of your responses seem to address any of my points other than simply to contradict them.

Then I suggest you read them again, and try to think as well.

Your position seems to be based on what you consider to be an unassailable assumption that the universe is wholly deterministic.

No, it is based on a proposition that there is a cause for every effect. It has been tested and it holds.

That every event is strictly caused by antecedent events such that in principle if all antecedent events were known it would be possible to predict their consequences with 100% accuracy.

I do not make this claim, and my assertion of determinism does not rely on it.

This is all quite coherent and may be true, but I can't see an argument that makes it necessarily true, let alone an argument that makes a non-deterministic universe necessarily false. What is logically unsound about the possibility that a particle's trajectory is inherently unpredictable albeit constrained by probable paths?

The possibility of true randomness does not help your case for Free-wiil; it makes it worse.
Please keep to the point.



The only argument that favours a deterministic universe is a practical one - ie scientsists should never give up on the possibility that there are deterministic causes of seemingly random events. It's quite possible that the Copenhagen interpreters of quantum physics gave up too early and that Einstein was right all along when he said "God does not play dice". Nevertheless, it seems rather short-sighted to presume as a purely rational principle that there are no events in the universe without an antecedent cause, which is what you seem to be doing. It also seems equally shorsighted to presume that causation by definition has to be deterministic in the sense that any event will have inevitable consequences. What is so logically wrong with an event having a range of possible consequences all things being equal?

QM evaluations all assume determinism.

Just to be clear, I am not trying to prove that the universe is non-deterministic or that free-will exists, I am merely claiming that these seem to be perfectly coherent possibilities and nothing you have said has demonstrated that they are not.

Then you have failed in your mission.


All you seem to be doing is using assumptions such as nothing comes from nothing to prove determinism.

I am proposing it to see if the notion can be falsified. So far it has not.

This assumption might be sound when talking about objects, but when it comes to events I find it less convincing. Another clarification, by non-deterministic forces, I meant physical forces, such as elecro-magnetism and its related sub-atomic particle the photon. Nothing occult about them I trust.

I meant occult in the literal sense of hidden or unseen; as yet to be recognised.

As there are reliable laws of physics which are non-deterministic

Duh. Name one!


and if this non-determism is inherent and not a matter of ignorance then they can't possibly be immune from non-deterministic forces. The question comes back to why you are convinced that physical forces MUST be ultimately deterministic.

NO, the question is "free will how can it exist?"

[chaz wyman]

Thanks for the posts, I find the case against free will to be pretty convincing.
Must admit i was already leaning towards that direction.
But what are the implications of this, does this mean that i’m typing this post because of the
Big Bang?
Is everything i am and do somehow predictable (given some hypothetical omniscience about causality), surely
the implications are pretty severe-if our every waking action are straightjacketed by causality.

There is no need to think of it as a straight jacket.
You are able to change and that change is part of who you are and what you are.
But how dreadful would it be if there was actually a thing such as free-will. If you were able to act in spite of your education, motivation, upbringing, genetics etc.. then you would be acting as if you were not the person you are.
Nothing would matter any more; there would be no need for learning or experience if you could simply disregard all that and act as if they were not important.

[MGL]

Responses to Chaz:

MGL: If event A and its constituent sub-events occur at exactly the same time how can the latter cause the other?
Chaz: How not?
MGL: My understanding of causation is that the causing event temporally precedes its effect. If I am mistaken, can you provide an example?
---------
MGL: Your position seems to be based on what you consider to be an unassailable assumption that the universe is wholly deterministic.
Chaz: No, it is based on a proposition that there is a cause for every effect. It has been tested and it holds.
MGL: If you admit that there are events for which we don’t yet know the cause how does this confirm that your proposition holds? If you only count the events that have a known cause as test cases this seems to be prejudging the issue.
---------
MGL: All you seem to be doing is using assumptions such as nothing comes from nothing to prove determinism.
Chaz: I am proposing it to see if the notion can be falsified. So far it has not.
MGL: The reason why it has not been falsified is because it cannot be falsified. But then the same is true for the assumption that something can come from nothing. What kind of evidence could falsify either of these claims? If neither can be falsified, then there is no reason to believe one rather than the other. Perhaps for a particular event or specific type of event we can falsify the claim that it comes from nothing if we discover its cause, although strictly speaking we can only ever infer a cause, as David Hume pointed out. However this does not falsify the general claim that something comes from nothing.
-------
MGL: ...That every event is strictly caused by antecedent events such that in principle if all antecedent events were known it would be possible to predict their consequences with 100% accuracy.
Chaz: I do not make this claim, and my assertion of determinism does not rely on it.
MGL: Perhaps I should restate. If all antecedent events AND the relevant laws of physics were known it would be possible to predict their consequences with 100% accuracy. Is that what you understand - or at least is implied - by determinism?
-------
Chaz: QM evaluations all assume determinism.
MGL: As there are reliable laws of physics which are non-deterministic....
Chaz: Duh. Name one!
MGL: My understanding of the wave function in Schroedinger’s equation for quantum mechanics is that it only gives a probability of a particle being at a certain location. This is all I meant by non-deterministic in this expression as a I clarified in my next expression “... and if this non-determinism is inherent and not a matter of ignorance...” Of course this function may ultimately be a replaced by a deterministic one specifying the variables that we can only assume are hidden to us at the moment. But QM does not assume determinism. The actual equations (or laws if you like ) are neutral on that point and the issue is therefore open to interpretation, and contrary to what you suppose, there is a generally accepted interpretation that the indeterminism in QM is not a matter of ignorance but a matter of the intrinsic randomness of reality. Now, IF it turns out that that this indeterminism is intrinsic to reality, THEN it follows that the laws of nature cannot be immune to non-deterministic forces. Our disagreement here is either down to a mutual misunderstanding over what the other means by determinism or an argument over a matter of fact, but I cannot figure out which. Are you denying that the wave function of Schroedinger’s equation is a probabilistic? Or are you denying that probabilistic implies non-deterministic in the neutral sense of the word –ie uncommitted about the intrinsic randomness of reality.

[chaz wyman]

Responses to Chaz:

MGL: If event A and its constituent sub-events occur at exactly the same time how can the latter cause the other?
Chaz: How not?
MGL: My understanding of causation is that the causing event temporally precedes its effect. If I am mistaken, can you provide an example?

Are you denying any kind of causation?
How is this relevant to the question of free will?

---------
MGL: Your position seems to be based on what you consider to be an unassailable assumption that the universe is wholly deterministic.
Chaz: No, it is based on a proposition that there is a cause for every effect. It has been tested and it holds.
MGL: If you admit that there are events for which we don’t yet know the cause how does this confirm that your proposition holds? If you only count the events that have a known cause as test cases this seems to be prejudging the issue.

Because I know that our perception and evidence is limited. It seems, clear, however, that in cases where the causes are be perceived and are repeated such events are reliable. There seems to be no case for free will, as that implies an effect with no cause in any sense. Not only does this seem impossible it begs the question what use is free will if it seems possible to act with complete disregard for all that we hold important - such as education, experience, capability, skill, knowhow and a vast range of determining factors.

---------
MGL: All you seem to be doing is using assumptions such as nothing comes from nothing to prove determinism.
Chaz: I am proposing it to see if the notion can be falsified. So far it has not.
MGL: The reason why it has not been falsified is because it cannot be falsified. But then the same is true for the assumption that something can come from nothing.

But you would need at least one example to be able to make such a bizarre claim. For me there is any number of cases that demonstrate causality, and the assumption of uniformitarianism is a useful and reliable proposition. In the end, as with all inductive science, the balance of probabilities has to be assumed until proved deficient. For millions of cause and effect relationships everyday determined events are found to be replicable and reliable.
I cannot disprove the existence of Russell's teapot. Similarly I cannot dis/prove free will. If there are any effects without cause that support your view of Free will please let me know. Any account of free will would have to account why anyone with this power seems unable to change ordinary events. Please demonstrate.

What kind of evidence could falsify either of these claims? If neither can be falsified, then there is no reason to believe one rather than the other. Perhaps for a particular event or specific type of event we can falsify the claim that it comes from nothing if we discover its cause, although strictly speaking we can only ever infer a cause, as David Hume pointed out. However this does not falsify the general claim that something comes from nothing.

You can falsify it by showing ONE event that has no cause.

-------
MGL: ...That every event is strictly caused by antecedent events such that in principle if all antecedent events were known it would be possible to predict their consequences with 100% accuracy.
Chaz: I do not make this claim, and my assertion of determinism does not rely on it.
MGL: Perhaps I should restate. If all antecedent events AND the relevant laws of physics were known it would be possible to predict their consequences with 100% accuracy. Is that what you understand - or at least is implied - by determinism?

But this is the truth in many cases where the causal factors are known. What is your point?

-------
Chaz: QM evaluations all assume determinism.
MGL: As there are reliable laws of physics which are non-deterministic....
Chaz: Duh. Name one!
MGL: My understanding of the wave function in Schroedinger’s equation for quantum mechanics is that it only gives a probability of a particle being at a certain location.

This is an imaginative model. There is no cat. It is a thought experiment.

This is all I meant by non-deterministic in this expression as a I clarified in my next expression “... and if this non-determinism is inherent and not a matter of ignorance...” Of course this function may ultimately be a replaced by a deterministic one specifying the variables that we can only assume are hidden to us at the moment. But QM does not assume determinism. The actual equations (or laws if you like ) are neutral on that point and the issue is therefore open to interpretation, and contrary to what you suppose, there is a generally accepted interpretation that the indeterminism in QM is not a matter of ignorance but a matter of the intrinsic randomness of reality. Now, IF it turns out that that this indeterminism is intrinsic to reality, THEN it follows that the laws of nature cannot be immune to non-deterministic forces. Our disagreement here is either down to a mutual misunderstanding over what the other means by determinism or an argument over a matter of fact, but I cannot figure out which. Are you denying that the wave function of Schroedinger’s equation is a probabilistic? Or are you denying that probabilistic implies non-deterministic in the neutral sense of the word –ie uncommitted about the intrinsic randomness of reality.

There is a difference between non-deterministic, and undeterminable. In practice they both look the same. One implies that something can come from nothing; matter poofs into the universe with no cause breaking the laws of thermodynamics, and the second implies that an event has an (as yet) unknown cause.
You do not get to assert the former from a thought experiment that assumes it.
Now please show how any of this helps your case for free will!

[Arising_uk]

MGL: If event A and its constituent sub-events occur at exactly the same time how can the latter cause the other? ...

Not wanting to butt-in but can you give an example of such an event?

[MGL]

Responses to Chaz re determinism.

MGL: If you admit that there are events for which we don’t yet know the cause how does this confirm that your proposition holds? If you only count the events that have a known cause as test cases this seems to be prejudging the issue.

Chaz: Because I know that our perception and evidence is limited. It seems, clear, however, that in cases where the causes are be perceived and are repeated such events are reliable.

MGL: what about those cases where causes are not perceived? Just because there are many reliable causal theories for a wide range of events, why does that suggest that all events are caused rather than most?

-------------------

MGL: The reason why it has not been falsified is because it cannot be falsified. But then the same is true for the assumption that something can come from nothing.

Chaz: But you would need at least one example to be able to make such a bizarre claim. For me there is any number of cases that demonstrate causality, and the assumption of uniformitarianism is a useful and reliable proposition. In the end, as with all inductive science, the balance of probabilities has to be assumed until proved deficient. For millions of cause and effect relationships everyday determined events are found to be replicable and reliable.

MGL: exactly the same evidence support the claim that most events have a cause which implies that some events are uncaused. There is a practical motive for assuming all events have a cause, but it is also sensible to be cautious in our assumptions.

-------

Chaz: You can falsify it [ the claim that nothing comes from nothing ] by showing ONE event that has no cause.

MGL: My point is that you can never falsify it because if you do not know what the cause of something is then you cannot know whether it has a cause or not. There is nothing that could count as conclusive evidence that something is uncaused.

----------

MGL: My understanding of the wave function in Schroedinger’s equation for quantum mechanics is that it only gives a probability of a particle being at a certain location.

Chaz: This is an imaginative model. There is no cat. It is a thought experiment.

MGL: I am not talking about Schroedinger’s cat thought experiment I am talking about his equation that underpins quantum mechanics.

--------------

Chaz: There is a difference between non-deterministic, and undeterminable. In practice they both look the same. One implies that something can come from nothing; matter poofs into the universe with no cause breaking the laws of thermodynamics, and the second implies that an event has an (as yet) unknown cause.

MGL: Perhaps I need to clarify what I mean more explicitly
I am using the term non-deterministic in two contexts. When I say as a matter of fact that there are non-deterministic laws of physics I am referring to theories which rely on probability (ie QM). These theories are neutral to the issue of whether reality itself is ultimately non-deterministic, which is the second context of the term. The theory neither says there are no causes or that there are unknown causes which are undeterminable. There are however interpretations of QM theory that do say that the uncertainties in the theory reflect uncertainties in reality itself.

-------

Chaz: You do not get to assert the former [non-determinism] from a thought experiment that assumes it.

MGL: My point was not to assert non-determinism but to refute your argument against it. As there are non-deterministic THEORIES (ie QM) about reality then either a) reality is deterministic and the theory is incomplete or b) reality itself is non-deterministic. You claimed that the laws of physics are immune from non-deterministic forces. My point was that AS the current theories are non-deterministic AND IF this non-determinism reflects a non-determinism in reality itself THEN it is not logically possible for the laws of physics to be immune from non-deterministic forces – because the laws of physic would be non-deterministic.

[MGL]

Responses to Chaz re Free-Will

MGL: If event A and its constituent sub-events occur at exactly the same time how can the latter cause the other?

Chaz: How not?

MGL: My understanding of causation is that the causing event temporally precedes its effect. If I am mistaken, can you provide an example?

Chaz: Are you denying any kind of causation?

MGL: Why would you think I might be denying any kind of causation? I am only denying that two precisely concurrent events cannot be in a relation of cause and effect because for one to cause the other it surely has to occur before the other.

--------------
Chaz: How is this relevant to the question of free will?

MGL: You were suggesting that if the event of my deliberation is reducable to a collection of random sub-events then they are being caused by these sub-events, thereby inferring that my actions are still determined. My point was that if an event is reducable to sub-events they are identical with this collection of sub-events so the notion of them being caused by them is nonsensical.

The relevance of all this to free will comes back to my original claim that free will is only possible in a universe that is not wholly deterministic. As your objection to non-determinism – if correct - would undermine the possibility of free-will - as I understand it - then your objection deserves consideration.

--------

Chaz: There seems to be no case for free will, as that implies an effect with no cause in any sense. Not only does this seem impossible it begs the question what use is free will if it seems possible to act with complete disregard for all that we hold important - such as education, experience, capability, skill, knowhow and a vast range of determining factors

MGL: Why would you think that the possibility of random events has to imply that anything at all can happen? What is wrong with the notion that what can happen is restricted to a narrow range of possibilities with some being more likely than others? You seem to think that laws of cause and effect have to be of the form IF A then B happens. The alternative is not - IF A then anything at all happens - but - IF A then either B or C happens. This restricted view of randomness retains the importance of education, experience, capability, skill, knowhow and a vast range of determining factors in our behaviour.

[chaz wyman]

Responses to Chaz re Free-Will

MGL: If event A and its constituent sub-events occur at exactly the same time how can the latter cause the other?

Chaz: How not?

MGL: My understanding of causation is that the causing event temporally precedes its effect. If I am mistaken, can you provide an example?

Eh? It's your problem. I thin kyou need to provide an example.

Chaz: Are you denying any kind of causation?

MGL: Why would you think I might be denying any kind of causation? I am only denying that two precisely concurrent events cannot be in a relation of cause and effect because for one to cause the other it surely has to occur before the other.

But you have not given any example here. SO you are sort of blowing hot air.
What would be the problem of simultaneous causation , even if you did have an example?
None of this leads to free will.

--------------
Chaz: How is this relevant to the question of free will?

MGL: You were suggesting that if the event of my deliberation is reducable to a collection of random sub-events then they are being caused by these sub-events, thereby inferring that my actions are still determined. My point was that if an event is reducable to sub-events they are identical with this collection of sub-events so the notion of them being caused by them is nonsensical.

That does not follow at all. What has this got to do with free will?
Are you trying to suggest that simultaneous causation is the meaning of free will?


The relevance of all this to free will comes back to my original claim that free will is only possible in a universe that is not wholly deterministic.

Sorry but that is simply not an argument. Even if you could prove non-determinism (whatever that is) you would still have all your work to do.
You would have to say how it is that having a free will could be a causal power, without being itself caused. I can't image where you would begin.


As your objection to non-determinism – if correct - would undermine the possibility of free-will - as I understand it - then your objection deserves consideration.

Fine, but I'm not sure that even if I was right how that would help free will. If free will depends on your version of non determinism, that is not the same as saying that free will exists.


--------

Chaz: There seems to be no case for free will, as that implies an effect with no cause in any sense. Not only does this seem impossible it begs the question what use is free will if it seems possible to act with complete disregard for all that we hold important - such as education, experience, capability, skill, knowhow and a vast range of determining factors

MGL: Why would you think that the possibility of random events has to imply that anything at all can happen?
That is not what I am saying. I am saying that a random event makes the concept of free will bankrupt.
What is wrong with the notion that what can happen is restricted to a narrow range of possibilities with some being more likely than others?
Fine, but this has no bearing on free will.
The point I am making above (If free will depends on your version of non determinism, that is not the same as saying that free will exists.) is not even referencing randomness. Free will would not have anything to do with your will if it were random.
You seem to think that laws of cause and effect have to be of the form IF A then B happens.

Only to a point. If A then B in conditions x,y,z ad infinitem, would be closer to the truth. Linear causality is not the case except under theoretically perfect experimental conditions. In the real world there are many determining factors some unknown.
But the clue that we are living in a deterministic universe is the fact that when you reduce the conditions of causality you increase the accuracy of the outcome; and conversely the more complex the conditions the less predictable the outcome.


The alternative is not - IF A then anything at all happens - but - IF A then either B or C happens. This restricted view of randomness retains the importance of education, experience, capability, skill, knowhow and a vast range of determining factors in our behaviour.

Is that a joke? The efforts of out experience and education are random - and that is supposed to amount to free will?

[chaz wyman]

Responses to Chaz re determinism.

MGL: If you admit that there are events for which we don’t yet know the cause how does this confirm that your proposition holds? If you only count the events that have a known cause as test cases this seems to be prejudging the issue.

Chaz: Because I know that our perception and evidence is limited. It seems, clear, however, that in cases where the causes are be perceived and are repeated such events are reliable.

MGL: what about those cases where causes are not perceived? Just because there are many reliable causal theories for a wide range of events, why does that suggest that all events are caused rather than most?

Since there are so many examples of determined events and none of free will. It seems apt to mention Ockham. Can you find one example in nature were you have evidence of a freely willed event?

-------------------

MGL: The reason why it has not been falsified is because it cannot be falsified. But then the same is true for the assumption that something can come from nothing.

Chaz: But you would need at least one example to be able to make such a bizarre claim. For me there is any number of cases that demonstrate causality, and the assumption of uniformitarianism is a useful and reliable proposition. In the end, as with all inductive science, the balance of probabilities has to be assumed until proved deficient. For millions of cause and effect relationships everyday determined events are found to be replicable and reliable.

MGL: exactly the same evidence support the claim that most events have a cause which implies that some events are uncaused. There is a practical motive for assuming all events have a cause, but it is also sensible to be cautious in our assumptions.

In other words you do not have a single example of a freely willed cause. And I do not have a single example of the worked of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (may his noodley appendage never go dry) so that means we should always consider the possibility that events are his acts.

-------

Chaz: You can falsify it [ the claim that nothing comes from nothing ] by showing ONE event that has no cause.

MGL: My point is that you can never falsify it because if you do not know what the cause of something is then you cannot know whether it has a cause or not. There is nothing that could count as conclusive evidence that something is uncaused.

Might I mention Karl Popper now. Or shall I save him for later?


----------

MGL: My understanding of the wave function in Schroedinger’s equation for quantum mechanics is that it only gives a probability of a particle being at a certain location.

Chaz: This is an imaginative model. There is no cat. It is a thought experiment.

MGL: I am not talking about Schroedinger’s cat thought experiment I am talking about his equation that underpins quantum mechanics.

Yes, a thought experiment. maths is a model, it is not reality. Maths can be used to simulate any reality that does not mean they are true.


--------------

Chaz: There is a difference between non-deterministic, and undeterminable. In practice they both look the same. One implies that something can come from nothing; matter poofs into the universe with no cause breaking the laws of thermodynamics, and the second implies that an event has an (as yet) unknown cause.

MGL: Perhaps I need to clarify what I mean more explicitly
I am using the term non-deterministic in two contexts. When I say as a matter of fact that there are non-deterministic laws of physics I am referring to theories which rely on probability (ie QM). These theories are neutral to the issue of whether reality itself is ultimately non-deterministic, which is the second context of the term. The theory neither says there are no causes or that there are unknown causes which are undeterminable. There are however interpretations of QM theory that do say that the uncertainties in the theory reflect uncertainties in reality itself.

I have highlighted in green why I need not add any more here.


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Chaz: You do not get to assert the former [non-determinism] from a thought experiment that assumes it.

MGL: My point was not to assert non-determinism but to refute your argument against it. As there are non-deterministic THEORIES (ie QM) about reality then either a) reality is deterministic and the theory is incomplete or b) reality itself is non-deterministic. You claimed that the laws of physics are immune from non-deterministic forces. My point was that AS the current theories are non-deterministic AND IF this non-determinism reflects a non-determinism in reality itself THEN it is not logically possible for the laws of physics to be immune from non-deterministic forces – because the laws of physic would be non-deterministic.

See above.

[chaz wyman]

To MGL.

Maybe you would also like to answer Arising?